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2011 YLR 1702

Haji IMAM DIN vs CHAIRMAN, WAPDA and 7 others

Citation2011 YLR 1702
CourtPeshawar High Court
Case No.F.A.O. No,1 of 2010
Date2011-03-28
Judge(s)Attaullah Khan
ResultAppeal dismissed

ATTAULLAH KHAN, J.---Haji Imam Din, appellant herein, through this first appeal filed under Order XLIII, Rule 1, C.P.C. has impugned the judgment and decree dated 26-11-2007 passed by the learned Civil Judge-I, D.I. Khan, whereby his application for grant of temporary injunction was accepted subject to the deposit of the disputed amount within thirty days.

2. Briefly stated facts of the case leading to this appeal are that the appellant/plaintiff had sued the defendants/ respondents for declaration to the effect that he is not liable to pay the outstanding arrears of electricity dues amounting to rupees 15,46,950. Along with the snit, an application for temporary injunction to reconnect the disconnected energy supply to the Flour Mill of the petitioner was also filed.

3. The defendants filed reply to the suit and application by raising various factual and legal objections.

4. On hearing the parties and going through the record, the application of the plaintiff was allowed subject to the payment of the outstanding amount within thirty days s through the order which is now under challenge in this appeal.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the defendants/respondents did not give any notice under section 24-A of the Electricity Act 1910, therefore, the appellant is not bound to pay the disputed amount. He further argued that the appellant took over the charge of the Flour Mill after 14-6-2008 for business and an agreement deed of the same date was executed with respondent No, 8, who is the previous owner of the said Mill. He next submitted that on application of the appellant for reconnection, the defendants examined his request and issued sanction which did not contain any arrear, therefore, he is not liable to pay the outstanding dues.

6. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents contended that the appellant has paid some amount as down payment and has also promised to pay the remaining arrear. Therefore, he is now estopped to claim otherwise.

7. I have carefully gone through the record and considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties.

8. Under section 54-C of the Electricity Act 1910, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred and no Court shall make an order of prohibiting discontinuing of supply of electricity but according to the proviso if the disputed amount is deposited with the Court within a period of thirty days, then order prohibiting the disconnection may be made. The relevant part of section 54-C of the Act ibid is reproduced below:-- "54-C Bar of Jurisdiction"

(1) Where a licensee gives a notice referred to in subsection (1) of section 24 or discontinues supply of energy to a premises under the provisions of this Act, no Court shall make an order prohibiting the licensee from discontinuing supply of energy to the premises or requiring him to restore supply of energy to such premises, and any such order made before the commencement of the Electricity (Amendment) Ordinance, 1979, shall cease to have effect: Provided that nothing contained herein shall apply to a case in which the plaintiff, appellant or applicant within a period of thirty days of the aforesaid date or at the time of filing the suit, application or appeal, as the case may be, deposits with the Court the amount assessed against him by the licensee and all further charges of the licensee as and when they become due, and in the event of this failing to do so, any order prohibiting the licensee from discontinuing the supply of energy to the premises or requiring him to restore the supply of energy to the premises, if already made, shall cease to have effect".

9. Keeping in view the above provision, disconnection may be stayed after the disputed amount is made. The Court While issuing the impugned order has complied with the provisions of law. But the objection of the learned counsel for the appellant is that no notice has been given by the defendants/respondents under section 24 of the Act ibid which reads as under:-- Section 24. Discontinuance of supply to consumer neglecting to pay charge. ---(1) Where consumer neglects to pay any charge for energy or any sum other than a charge for energy, assessed against him by a licensee in respect of supply of energy to his premises, the licensee may after giving not less than seven clear day's notice in writing to such consumer and without prejudice to his right to recover such charge or other sum by suit or otherwise, cut off the supply and for that purpose cut or disconnect any electric supply line energy may be supplied to such premises or to any other premises, other than domestic premises, running distinctly in the name or other sum together with any expenses incurred by him in cutting off and reconnecting the supply and the minimum charges on account of continue reservation of supply during the period of such discontinuance, are paid, but no longer.

10.The above provision reveals that the licensee is bound to give notice of not less than seven days. The said provision further reveals that notice is required to be in matter pertaining to the disconnection of power, but in this case, no disconnection notice has been given, therefore, in my opinion, notice is not necessary.

11.In this case, the trial Court has granted interim relief to the appellant subject to the condition that he would deposit the disputed amount in the Court as required under section 54-C of the Act ibid. It would not cause an irreparable loss because it is a money matter and can be measured in terms of money. In this respect, reliance is placed on PLD 2000 Peshawar 4 wherein it has been held as under:-- "Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondents, who was in attendance on pre-admission notice, I have come to the irresistible conclusion that the impugned orders are unexceptionable. It is by now firmly settled that temporary injunction cannot be granted if any of the three essential ingredients, namely, prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss is missing and a loss which can be measured in terms of money cannot be termed as an irreparable loss. However, section 54-C of the Electricity Act has mollified the element of irreparable loss vis-a-vis the cases in regard to supply of energy by providing that interim relief can be granted if the amount assessed against a consumer by the licensee is deposited with the Court. This extraordinary concession has made the deposit the disputed amount in the Court a condition precedent for grant of interim relief and temporary injunction cannot be granted unless the requirement of section 54-C of the Electricity Act 1910 is fulfilled. The view not only gets support from the case law reported as Mst. Raisa Bibi v. The Sub-Divisional Officer (E) WAPDA Operati n Sub-Division Mansehra and 2 others (PLD 1990 Peshawar 105; WAPDA v.

Muhammad Fayyaz Butt (1999 MLD 2731) and WAPDA v. Messrs Kashmiri Steel Furnance alias T.I.

Steel Furnance, Bund Road Rawalpindi (1999 CLC Lahore 492).

12. As discussed above, the appellant is bound to comply with the provisions of section 54-C of the Electricity Act 1910 and the respondents are not required to give notice under section 24 of the aforesaid Act. The appellant has got no prima facie case, he would also not suffer irreparable loss and the balance of convenience is also not in his favour. Therefore, the impugned order is based on correct legal footings and needs no interference which is accordingly upheld.

13. Consequently, I find no substance in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

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