1. ' The brief facts out of which the present revision petition arises are that the petitioner secured electricity connection from the respondents for his tubewell. The respondents sent bill amounting to Rs.170,936. The petitioner had to deposit the same till 14-7-2004. The petitioner instead of depositing the said bill filed suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Tandlianwala along with an application for ad interim relief. The trial Court dismissed the application vide order dated 24-12-2004. The petitioner being aggrieved filed appeal in the Court of Addl. District Judge, Tandlianwala who dismissed the same vide impugned judgment dated 28-2-2005. Hence the present revision petition.
2. Learned counsel of the petitioner submits that bill in question is not in accordance with the reading of the meter but this fact was not considered by both the Courts below. The petitioner has prima facie good case and balance of convenience also lies in his favour but these principles were overlooked by both the Courts below. Therefore, judgment and order of the Courts below are not sustainable in the eyes of law. He further submits that petitioner be allowed, under protest, to discharge his liabilities till the final decision of his suit in easy instalments. Under the provisions of Electricity Act, 1910 this Court has no power to suspend the payment of the disputed bill which of course may be suspended subject to payment of bill by the petitioner in terms of proviso of section 54-C(i) of Electricity Act, 1910 wherein the petitioner, plaintiff or appellant has to deposit the amount within 30 days or at the time of filing the suit or appeal as the case may be, thereafter where as amount has been deposited under subsection (1), the Court shall direct it to be deposited in a scheduled Bank in view of section 54(2)(c) A of the said Act. Both the Courts below have given concurrent finding of fact and decided the case against the petitioner after judicial application of mind and proper appreciation of evidence on record. The order and judgment of the Courts below are in consonance with the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Sahibzada Muhammad Umar Baig's case (PLD 1970 SC 139). I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the impugned order and judgment of the Courts below. It is settled principle of law that it is the prerogative of the trial Court to exercise discretion. When the trial Court has exercised the discretion keeping in view the principle of equity after judicial application of mind, in such situation, even the Appellate Court has no jurisdiction to set aside the order passed by the trial Court in exercising the discretion which is in accordance with provision of law which is interpreted by the superior Courts and upheld the orders passed by the Courts. In arriving to this conclusion I am fortified by the law laid down in the following judgments:- - ' Col. (Retd.) Dr. Sharif Ullah Khan's case (PLD 2000 Peshawar 4); WAPDA Operation's case (PLD 1990 Peshawar 105); Muhammad Fayyaz Butt's case (1999 MLD 2731); WAPDA's case (1999 CLC 492) and Muhammad Akbar's case (1999 CLC 1198).
2. In case the contention of the petitioner be accepted then it tantamounts to legislation of section 54-C otherwise as legislated by the legislature in its wisdom which is not permissible under law as the Courts have only power to interpret the law. In the garb of interpretation, Courts cannot take the role of legislature as laid down in Zia-ur-Rehman's case (PLD 1973 SC 49). The power exercised by the trial Court in the discretionary side is upheld by the First Appellate Court, therefore, this Court has very limited jurisdiction to disturb the concurrent finding of fact while exercising jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. As the law laid down by the Privy Council in N.S. Venkatagiri Ayyangar and another v. The Hindu Religious Edowments Board Madras (PLD 1949 P.C. 26). The relevant observation is as follows:-- "This section empowers the High Court to satisfy itself upon three matters; (a) that the order of the subordinate Court is within its jurisdiction; (b) that the case is one in which the Court ought to exercise jurisdiction; and (c) that in exercising jurisdiction, the Court has not acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity, that is, by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. If the High Court is satisfied upon those three matters, it has no power to interfere because it differs, however profoundly, from the conclusion of the subordinate Court upon questions of fact or law."
3. Learned counsel of the petitioner has failed to bring the case within the parameters prescribed in the aforesaid judgment.
4. ' Therefore, as mentioned above, I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the impugned order and judgment of the Courts below.
5. ' In view of what has been discussed above, this petition has no merits and the same is dismissed.