1. GHULAM MUJADDID, J.--This appeal by Government of Pakistan and two others is by leave of this Court. The judgment impugned is that of the Lahore High Court dated 3-5-1982 passed in the Constitution petition filed by Messrs Hashwani Hotel Limited (hereinafter to be referred as the hotel), the respondent in this appeal.
2. The respondent is a public limited company. It owns Holiday Inn, a four star hotel, in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan.
3. Three show-cause notices dated 6-1-1981, 27-1-1981 and 27-1-1981, respectively, were served on the respondent from the Office of Deputy Collector, Central Excises and Land Customs under the signatures of the Deputy Collector.
4. By means of notice dated 6-1-1981, the respondent was required to show cause why central exise duty short deposited amounting to Rs,175,680.60 should not be recovered from them under Rule 10 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and why penal action should not be taken against them under Rules 226 and 210 of the Central Excise Rules.
5. By means of the notice dated 27-1-1981, the respondent was called upon to show cause why the central excise duty evaded amounting to Rs,60,794.94 and additional duty amounting to Rs,30,397.97 should not be recovered from them under Rules 10 and 96 of Central Excise Rules, 1944 and why action should not be taken against them under Rules 210 and 226 of these Rules.
6. By means of the third notice dated 27-1-1981, the respondent was required to show cause why the central excise duty amounting to Rs,777,867.90 and additional duty of Rs,388,933.95 be not recovered from them under Rules 10 and 96W and they should not be penalised under Rules 218 and 226 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944.
7. The respondent was given option to be heard in person through representative or a counsel". The respondent availed of this facility; filed representation before the Chairman, Central Board of Revenue. On 29-1-81 the representation was rejected.
8. Messrs Hashwani Hotel Limited then invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of the Lahore High Court in which they impugned the show-cause notices and the order dated 29-1-1981 passed by the Central Board of Revenue whereby the representation was rejected on the ground that those were without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
9. ' The Constitution petition was accepted by means of the impugned judgment. Government of Pakistan felt aggrieved. A petition for leave to appeal was filed in this Court. Leave was granted to consider "whether the charging provision Section 4(3) Clause (a) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 applies to a concessional exception within the respective categories of customers prescribed in advance or to the category itself considered with the category of customers charged at the highest rate."
10. Before dealing with the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, it is important to mention the set up/arrangement of the hotel. According to the averments in the Constitution petition before the High Court, there are 150 single and double bed rooms in the hotel. They have the usual facilities of service and other amenities. The customers are categorised in different categories and the following rates have been prescribed:-- Single (Rs,) Twin (Rs,) Suite (Rs,) Presidential Suite (Rs,)
11. Airlines Personnel & Bona Fide Travel Agents225.00 300.00 500.00 900.00 Quarterly & monthly rates seminars & conventions for 15 rooms or more.3250.00 250.00300.00 300.00- - International Trouist grounp for 10 persons or more. - - Commercial accounts. - - - - Diplomatic/UN & officials 400.00 480.00 800.00 1,500.00 British Airways Crew 320.00 - - - F.I.T. standard Single 480.00 Twin 570.00 Deluxe 510.00 600.00 Deluxe Suite 1000.00 600.00 Presidential suite 1,800.00 The services and facilities provided to the guests are subject to duty under the Central Excises and Salt Act of 1944. The rate is 15% of charges for the services. The rate of duty is not disputed. It is with regard to the charges for the service facilities and other amenities. The hotel has been paying duty on the actual income from the different categories of customers as referred to above.
12. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the duty was not being demanded on the basis of any notional rent but was in accordance with the provisions of subsection (3) of section 4 of the Central Excises and Salt Act of 1944 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act) which provisions did not exempt from the levy of the central excise duty. It was further submitted that the violation of the aforesaid provisions exposed the respondent to penal liability.
13. The main emphasis of the learned counsel was on the word "concession" mentioned in subsection
(3) of section 4 of the Act. It was contended that the respondent was debarred by law to create categories of customers. According to the learned counsel, it was a mere pretext to come out of the ambit of the word "concession".
14. Learned counsel then pressed into service section 13 of the General Clauses Act in order to explain the scope of the expression, "in any case" used in clause (a) of subsection (3) of the Act.
15. It was argued that the expression not only applied to the cases of particular individuals but was applicable in any case that is to say to the cases of number of individuals and classes of individuals. What the learned counsel meant was that categorisation did not exempt the respondent from paying the maximum duty. Learned counsel could only cite one decided case which is that of Atlas Battery Ltd. v. Superintendent, Central Excise and Land Customs, Karachi (PLD 1984 SC 86)
16. The learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned judgment and submitted that the word, "concession" cannot be legally extended so as to cover the categorization done by the respondent. According to the learned counsel, the categorisation was nothing new in the hotel business and the management is fully authorised to do so without violating any legal provision. It is the privilege of the management to do so.
17. Learned counsel relied upon the case of Sky Rooms Limited v. Assistant Collector, Central Excise and Land Customs, Karachi (PLD 1982 Kar. 244). In this case the Court observed that:-- "Now, it is well known practice in the field of trade and commerce that various merchandise or commodities are sold to different classes of customers at different rates, for example a mill sells cloth produced by it in wholesale at a rate different from the one charged by it at its retail shop and in such a case the rate charges from a wholeseller cannot be termed as a concessional rate, for the term "concession" in our view imports reduction of prices already fixed for a class of customers or for a quantity, and if different rates are fixed for different classes of customers or for different quantities, then the difference in rate cannot be said to be a "concession".
18. Further, according to dictionary meaning the term, in the present context, means, rebate or reduction in fixed rate or price as a favour but when the rates or prices are already fixed and known and the services, facilities, and utilities could be obtained by any person or that class then the question of favour would not arise."
19. It was further observed by the High Court that:-- "It is, therefore, apparent that the rates charged from different Airlines or from P.I.A. On account of their crew members and transit passengers are not in the nature of concession and they could conveniently be termed as, or compared with the rates for bulk sale, quantityt-wise or numberwise.
20. In our view the convenient and safe criteria for judging whether a concession has been allowed or not would be that if two customers of the same class are: sold the same goods in the name or similar quantity at different rates, then in the absence of some other good reason, the one who purchases the same at lower rate can be said to have been granted a concession."
21. The other case relied upon by the learned counsel was Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Govt. Of Pakistan, Karachi v. Popular Tobacco Co., Karachi (PLD'1961 SC 66) where it was observed that:- "The intention of the law is that excise duty should be paid by the manufacturers on the amount which they actually receive and it is on such amount that excise duty was being originally levied. In agreement with the learned Judges of the High Court. We find that the demand for additional duty made by the Excise Department was unjustified and we dismiss the appeal with costs."
22. 'Before examining the wording of clause (a) of section 4 (3) of the Act to which reference shall be made later on, it is essential to advert to the accepted principles for the construction of statutes with special reference to the Taxing Statute.
23. The first and the foremost principle of interpretation is that words are to he taken in their literal meaning. The plain ordinary meaning of the word is to be adopted in construing a document.
24. There have to be special circumstances where this principle is to be deviated and certain words have to be interpreted differently than their plain meanings with reference to the context.
25. In the case of Pakistan Textile Mill Owners Association Karachi v. Administrator of Karachi PLD 1963 Supreme Court 137, it was observed that:- "In a taxing statute, as in any other statute, there is no reason to depart from the general rule that words used in a statute must first be given their ordinary and natural meaning. It is only when such an ordinary meaning does not make sense that resort can be made to discovering other appropriate meanings."
26. This Court in the case of Messrs Hirjina and Co. (Pakistan) Ltd., Karachi v. Commissioner of Sales Tax Central, Karachi 1971 SCMR 128 made it quite clear by making the following observation:- "We may here observe that interpreting the taxing statute the Courts must look to the words of the statute and interpret it in the light of what is clearly expressed. It cannot import provisions in the statute so as to support assumed deficiency."
27. While dealing with the question of interpreting a taxing Act in the case of Cape Brandy Syndicate v.
28. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1921) 1 K. B. 65 at page 71, Rowlatt, J observed as follows:- "It simply means that in taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied, one can only look fairly at the language used."
29. This is an excellent guideline and can be safely utilized for interpreting a taxing statute.
30. In this very sequence it is important to refer to the following parapraph from the Statutory Construction (Crawford Edition page 270):-- "Where the statute's meaning is clear and explicit, words cannot be interpolated. In the first place, in such a case, they are not needed. If he interpolated, the statute would mere than likely fail to Lucy express the legislative intent, as the thought intended to be conveyed might be altered by the addition of new words. They should not be interpolated even though the remedy of the statute would thereby be advanced, or a more desirable or just result would occur. Even where the meaning of the statute is clear and sensible, either with or without the omitted word, interpolation is improper, since the primary source of the legislative intent is in the language of the statute."
31. Section 4(3)(a) of the Act is to the following effect:-- "(a) any such services, facilities or utilities are, in any case, rendered or provided free of charge or at a concessional rate, the duty shall be levied and collected on the amount which would, have been charged for such services, facilities and utilities had they not been rendered or provided free of charge or at a concessional rate."
32. ' The word "concession" was thoroughly examined by the learned Judges of the Sind High Court in the case referred to above. We are fully in agreement with the reasoning of the learned Judges while determining as to what is meant by the word "concession" its scope and interpretation.
33. We have not found anything in the aforesaid provision which either expressly or even by implication prohibited the hotel management to create different categories of different customers.
34. There being no legal bar we are of the G view that categorisation was lawful and was not done with any ulterior motive or to avoid paying the duty.
35. We are further of the view that the learned Judge of the Lahore High Court, therefore, rightly observed:- "While subscribing to the conclusion reached by the Sind High Court I will like to add that according to subsection (3) of section 4 of the said Act, undoubtedly the charges for service facilities and utilities are to be fixed by the management of the hotel and not by the law of the excise authorities.
36. It is only the rate of the duty which is to be prescribed by law. Fixation of different charges for different categories of customers is not forbidden by law. Perhaps such fixation has got to be done by the management for operational considerations. The law also does not insist that a single uniform charge shall be fixed for all categories of customers."
37. This leaves us to examine as to whether section 13 of the General Clauses Act can be of some help to the learned counsel for the appellants so far as the expression "in any case is concerned.
38. The expression "in any case" is to be read conjunctively not disjunctively. Having held that categorisation does not amount to any concession, we don't think that section 13 is applicable in the instant case.
39. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal which is hereby dismissed.
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