Maulvi Anwar-ul-Haq, J.--Respondent No, 3 is daughter of the petitioner. On 26.8.2002 she filed a suit against the petitioner. According to the contents of the plaint, the mother of the respondent, namely, Mst. Shamim was married to the petitioner in the year 1991. In the course of birth of the respondent in the year 1994, her mother died. The petitioner contracted another marriage and has children. The grievance being made out was that she is not being provided the maintenance by her father. She accordingly claimed maintenance at the rate of Rs, 1000/- per month w,e,f, six years prior to the institution of the suit. The suit was contested by the petitioner. Issues were framed.
Evidence of the parties was recorded. Vide judgment and decree dated 2.4.2003 the learned trial Court granted a decree to the respondent awarding her maintenance at the rate of Rs, 500/- per month w,e,f, the date of institution of the suit. Feeling aggrieved the respondent filed a first appeal which was heard by a learned ADJ, Muzaffargarh, who allowed the appeal inasmuch as he fixed the maintenance at the rate of Rs, 1000/- per month w,e,f, 26.8.1996.
2. This writ petition came up before our learned brother Jawwad S. Khawaja, J. when the writ petition was admitted to hearing after noting the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the decree having been awarded in the sum of less than Rs, 1000/- year month only, the appeal filed by the respondent was not competent and as such the decree passed by the Appellate Court is without jurisdiction. The matter was again taken up on 19.2.2004 when the reliance was placed by the respondent on the case of Mst. Neelam Nosheen and others v. Raja Muhammad Khaqaan and others (2002 MLD 784) to urge that the plaintiff in a maintenance suit can file an appeal even if the amount of decree is less than Rs, 1000/-. Our learned brother examined the judgment and observed that the rule laid down in the cases of Government of Pakistan and others v. Messrs Hashwani Hotel. Ltd. (PLD 1990 SC 68) and The Punjab Province v.
Malik Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana (PLD 1956 Federal Court 200) for interpretation of statute has not been taken into consideration while pronouncing the said judgment in the case of Mst. Neelam Nosheen and others. The matter was referred to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench to examine the said question involved in the case.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that upon a plain reading of Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, no appeal would lie in case a decree for maintenance is passed in the sum of Rs, 1000/- or less. According to him the said statutory provision is to be read as it is and effect is to be given to the same, notwithstanding the fact that the Court may find the same to be laconic or absurd. Learned counsel contends that the statute has to be read as it is and not as it ought to be.
He relies on the cases of Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. Khalid Farooq (1999 SCMR 599), Muhammad Talib v. Additional District Judge and others (2004 YLR 583), Khalid and others v. The State (2003 YLR 1948), Hassan Usmani, Sole Proprietor and another v. T.F. Pipes Limited through Managing Director (2003 YLR 1075), Dr. Neelam Hussain v. Dr. Razia Parveen Qureshi and 2 others (2003 PLC (C.S.) 1222), Raja Muhammad Sohaib, Deputy Director Planning v. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government Through Chief Secretary and 6 others (2002 PLC (C.S.) 1138) and Commissioner Income-Tax, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Muzaffarabad v. Messrs Haji Ali Khan & Co. Forest Lesses Havelian (PLD 1985 SC (AJ&K) 62). Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, relies upon the said case of Mst. Neelam Nosheen and others v. Raja Muhammad Khaqaan and others (2002 MLD 784), Saeeda Alia v. Syed Ghulam Mursalin Naqvi and another (2004 MLD 306) and judgment dated 7.11.2002 delivered by our learned brother Muhammad Khalid Alvi, J. in W.P. No, 12013/99 to urge that this Court has consistently held that a plaintiff can file an appeal for enhancement of the maintenance allowance even if the decree awarded by the trial Court is in a sum of Rs, 500/- or less. He then refers to the case of Riaz Hussain and others v. Muhammad Akbar and others (2003 SCMR 181) to urge that the statute providing a remedy ought to be interpretted so as to advance the remedy and not suppress it.
4. We have examined the copies of the records. So far as the merits of the case are concerned, the finding of fact recorded by the learned ADJ that the requirement of the respondent is Rs, 1000/- per month and that the petitioner can pay the same has not been seriously questioned and only the said legal and jurisdictional question has been pressed.
5. We may reproduce here the relevant Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, which is as follows: "14. Appeal.--(1) Notwithstanding anything provided in any other law for the time being in force, a decision given or a decree passed by a Family Court shall be appealable:-- "(a) to the High Court, where the Family Court is presided ever by a District Judge, an Additional District Judge, or a person notified by Government to be of the rank and status of a District Judge or an Additional District Judge, and
(b) to the District Court, in any other case.
(2) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by a Family Court--
(a) for dissolution of marriage, except in the case of dissolution for reasons specified in clause (d) of item (viii) of Section (2) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939;
(b) for dower not exceeding rupees fifteen thousand;
(c) for maintenance of rupees one thousand or less per month.
(3) The Appellate Court referred to in sub-section (1) shall dispose of the appeals filed under this section within a period of four months."
6. It will be seen upon a reading of the said provision of law that it makes a decision given or a decree passed by a Family Court appealable to the forums prescribed. Sub-section (2) provides the circumstances in which no appeal shall lie from a decree of a Family Court and one of the circumstances mentioned in sub-section (2)(c) of the said Section 14 is that where a decree for maintenance of Rs, 1000/- or less per month is passed. Now as per judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondent, the said Section 14 has been interpreted not to bar an appeal by a plaintiff who seeks enhancement of the maintenance allowance notwithstanding the fact that the decree is less than the said stipulated amount. The learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, has cited the said judgments containing the said rule of interpretation of statute with which no cavil possible can be taken. We have also examined the judgments noted by Mr. Justice Jawwad S. Khawaja- in his reference order dated 19.2.2004. In the said case of Messrs Hashwani Hotel Ltd. (PLD 1990 SC 68), guidelines for interpretation of a' taxing statute were laid down.
Following extracts of Statutory Construction (Crawford Edition page 270) were quoted with approval: "Where the statute's meaning is clear and explicit, words cannot be interpolated. In the first place, in such a case, they are not needed. If they should .be interpolated, the statute would more than likely fail to express the legislative intent, as the thought intended to be conveyed might be altered by the addition of new words. They should not be interpolated even though the remedy of the statute would thereby be advanced or a more desirable or just result would occur. Even where the meaning of the statute is clear and sensible, either with or without the omitted word, interpolation is improper, since the primary source of the legislative intent is in the language of the statute."
While in the said case of Malik Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana (PLD 1956 Federal Court 200), the following observations were made by their Lordships: "In such matters the Courts are not to question the motives or policy of the legislature or to refuse to give effect to legislation merely because it appears to be harsh or unreasonable or vindictive.
Their plain duty is to ascertain the intention of the legislature and to carry it out irrespective of the consequences that may ensue to a particular party."
7. Now we have examined the said Section 14 in the light of the several judgments cited by the parties and in the light of the rules of interpretation noted therein. Now it will be seen that when we read the entire Section 14, Section 14(1) is the enacting clause granting a right of appeal against a decision, given or a decree passed by a Family Court while sub-section (2) provides for the cases in which no appeal shall lie. Thus to our mind sub-section (2) is in the nature of a proviso to the generality of sub* section (1). Now the nature and effect of a "proviso" to a statute came up for consideration in the case of Ibrar Hussain and others v. Government of N. W.F.P. through Secretary, Board of Revenue and others (2001 SCMR 914), it was observed by their Lordships as follows at page 920 of the report: "5. It is well-settled principle of interpretation of statutes that it is to be read as a whole and not in bits and pieces. Generally three functions are ascribed to a proviso:--
(i) To exempt something from the enacting clause;
(ii) to qualify or restrain its generality;
(iii) and to exclude some possible misinterpretation of it as extending to cases not intended by the Legislature."
Thereafter the functions of a proviso were thus stated with reference to Statutory Construction by Crawford in the 1940 Edition: "While there is considerable similarity between an exception and a proviso--each restrains the enacting clause and operates to except something which would otherwise fall within the general terms of the Statute,--there is a technical distinction between them, although even that is frequently ignored and the two terms used synonymously. The exception, however, operates to affirm the operation of the Statute to all cases not excepted and excludes all other exception: that is, it exempts something which would otherwise fall within the general words of the Statute. A proviso, on the other hand, is a clause added to an enactment for the purpose of acting as a restraint upon, or as the qualification of the generality of the language which it follows. Sometimes, however, as a precautionary measure, it is used to explain the general words of the Act and to exclude some ground of mis-interpretation which would extend it to cases not intended to be brought within its operation or purview."
"In order to decide whether a provision is or is not in the nature of a proviso or an exception, what has to be seen is the scope of the enactment, the object it was intended to achieve, the scheme of the enactment and the language used in, and the reasons for enacting the exceptional or special provision."
With reference to the case of Sh. Liaqat Hussain and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and others (PLD 1999 SC 504), it was observed that a proviso or an exception to the main enacting part is to be construed strictly. It was further observed that while section of an Act dealt with particular field, proviso would except or take or carry out from the field specific portion, therefore, before the proviso could have any application, section itself must apply. After thus referring to the said text and the precedents their Lordships concluded as follows: "It is, therefore, the duty of the Court to reconcile the enacting clause and the proviso and to avoid repugnancy between the two, the proviso must be considered with relation to the principal clause to which it is attached. Ordinarily, a proviso is governed by the operative portion of the section."
8. Now applying the said rule to the said Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, one finds no ambiguity whatsoever in the words of the proviso to the said statute that the intention of the Legislature was to avoid the challenge by a person to a decree passed in the sum of Rs, 1000/- or less by way of maintenance to a child or a wife. Applying the very rule being relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner we find a bar to an appeal by a child or a wife to seek enhancement of the maintenance allowance where the trial Court grants it in a sum less than Rs, 1000/- is not to be read into the said proviso. We, therefore, express agreement with the interpretation placed upon by the said provision of law by this Court in the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent as the said enacting section granting the right of appeal and the said sub-section (2) in the nature of a proviso do stand reconciled thereby. We, therefore, do hold that the appeal filed by the respondent child was competent and the learned Court of appeal has acted within its domain while enhancing the amount of maintenance while hearing and deciding the said appeal. The writ petition accordingly is dismissed without any orders as to costs.