' This judgment shall dispose of nine Writ Petitions, i.e. Writ Petitions Nos. 4424 of 1984, 4425 of 1984, 4426 of 1984, 4427 of 1984, 4428 of 1984, 4429 of 1984, 4430 of 1984, 4431 of 1984, apart from the one cited in the heading (i.e. 4423 of 1984). All these nine Writ Petitions arise out of judgment, dated 20- 2-1984 passed by Mr. Riaz Ahmed, the then Rent Controller, Gujranwala, directing the eviction of the nine petitioners herein. The judgment of the learned Controller was upheld by the learned appellate Authority viz. a learned Additional District Judge, Gujranwala, vide his judgment, dated 9- 6-1984, whereby he dismissed the appeals of the petitioners.
2. Respondent No. 3, namely, Sh. Zafarullah, hereinafter referred to as the respondent (in all the Writ Petitions) is admittedly the owner of one composite building which contains eight shops and a residential portion. The aforementioned shops and the residential portion were rented by the petitioners in the under consideration Constitutional Petitions on different occasions through different agreements of tenancy. The respondent, however, sought eviction of his tenants of the aforesaid building through one single application for ejectment on the ground that he wanted to reconstruct the building for which he has already got the plan approved from the local Municipal Committee and that in the reconstructed premises i.e. a shop and a godown, he intended to carry on his personal business as since April, 1980, he had retired from Government service.
3. The ejectment application was, of course, resisted by all the petitioners who maintained that as they occupied different premises under different agreements of tenancy, therefore, one single ejectment application against all of them was not legally competent. On merits also, they controverted the respondent's plea of need for reconstruction and bona fide need for personal use.
4. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Controller framed the following issues:--
(1) Whether the petition is bad for misjoinder of parties?
(2.) Whether the petitioner requires the disputed property in good faith for his personal need?
(3) Whether the petitioner requires the disputed property in good faith for reconstruction?
(4) Relief.
5. After recording the parties' evidence and after hearing them, the learned Controller vide his impugned judgment, dated 20-2-1984, concluded that the petition was not bad for misjoinder of parties and that the respondent required the tenanted premises for reconstruction and for his bona fide personal use. He consequently ordered the ejectment of the petitioners.
' Their appeal before the learned appellate authority, as said above, failed and was dismissed on 9-6-1984.
6. The aforementioned judgments passed by the learned Rent Controller and the learned Additional District Judge have been assailed through the under consideration nine Constitutional Petitions.
7. It has been urged on behalf of the petitioners that:--
(a) nine tenants (petitioners) who occupied different premises under the respondent as a result of different agreements of tenancy, could not be evicted as a result of single ejectment petition;
(b) due to misjoinder of parties, the learned Rent Controller and the learned Additional District Judge did not apply the conscious mind and failed to appreciate that different provisions of law were applicable to residential and commercial premises in the matter of ejectment;
(c) in case of Writ Petition No. 4430 of 1984, the shop was given on rent to the petitioner on 15-1- 1980 at a monthly rent of Rs.150 for a period of eleven months, but before the expiry of that period, ejectment petition giving rise to the impugned judgments was filed, although by virtue of proviso to the explanation under section 13 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, the petition for ejectment was not legally competent before the expiry of the fixed period of tenancy; and
(d) the ejectment of the petitioners have been ordered through the impugned judgments on the grounds of need for reconstruction and need for bona fide personal use, although both these grounds are mutually destructive of each other.
8. Regarding the petitioners' plea that single ejectment petition against nine tenants, who occupied different premises under the respondent, pursuant to different agreements of lease was not legally competent, it has been argued on behalf of the respondent that under Order I, rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, all persons may be joined as defendants against whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, or in the alternative, where, if separate suits were brought against such persons, any common question of law or fact would arise. Reference has also been invited to the provisions of Order II, rule 3 ibid which enables a plaintiff to unite in the same suit several causes of action against the same defendant or same defendants jointly. It has further been contended that no suit can be defeated by reason of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, as provided in Order I, rule 9, P.P.C.
9. When confronted with the proposition that provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are not directly applicable to the proceedings under the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, reliance on behalf of the respondent has been placed on Ayub Khan and another v. Fazal Haq and others PLD 1976 SC 422 wherein it has been held that the Rent Controller, in exercise of his discretion, is entitled to follow equitable principles of the Civil Procedure Code. Din Muhammad v. Abdul Aziz PLD 1967 Lah. 653 has also been cited. In this case, it was ruled that proceedings under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, are in pari materia with a suit. Order IX, rule 13, C.P.C. is, therefore, applicable to these proceedings as being an enabling provision and the time prescribed by Article 164 of the Limitation Act would be similarly attracted. In Abdul Qayyum and another v. Mst. Khurshid Jehan and others 1984 SCMR 710, ejectment of five tenants through one order was upheld in a case where the landlord proposed to reconstruct the premises by removing some of the walls and raising some new ones and thus to convert five shops into a big hall with a kitchen and pantry.
10. After analysing the above arguments advanced on behalf of the parties, it can be safely concluded that a landlord can competently bring a single ejectment application against different tenants, if the ejectment is based on the same ground and is result of the same cause of action.
11. As regards the second plea that the learned Controller and the learned appellate authority did not apply their conscious mind and failed to appreciate the difference between the law applicable to residential and commercial premises, it may be observed that in the circumstances of the under consideration case, the respondent sought eviction of the petitioners mainly on the ground that he wanted to reconstruct the premises and to convert them into one shop and a godown. He also substantiated before the learned lower tribunals that plan regarding his proposed reconstruction had already been approved by the local Municipal Committee. In the light of this contention when the premises were required for reconstruction, the applicability of different provisions of the Rent Restriction Ordinance applicable in cases of ejectment of residential premises and commercial premises, has hardly any relevancy. In Muhammad Akbar and another v. Dr. Muhammad Rafiq etc. 1980 SCMR 483, it has been observed:--"The requirement of the law is that there should be sanctioned plan of construction or reconstruction of the property and it is, therefore, immaterial whether the forwarding letter of the Municipal Committee concerned is produced or not, if the Court is satisfied that the plan produced is, indeed, a sanctioned plan as required by law." In Ghulam Muhammad and another v. Maqsood Hussain and 3 others 1984 SCMR 1142, it has been ruled that High Court had fallen in error in not noticing clear position of law that under the amended provisions of clause (vi) of section 13(2) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, landlord having obtained necessary sanction for erection of a new building was under no further obligation to prove that premises were reasonably and in good faith required by him for the said purpose.
After having obtained necessary sanction for reerection, he was entitled under law to the eviction of the tenant.
12. As regards the plea that the tenancy in case of Writ Petition No. 4430 of 1984 commenced on 15- 1-1980 for a fixed term of eleven months, but before the expiry of that term, the respondent filed ejectment petitions, it has been noticed that proviso to subsection (3) of section 13 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance is applicable where the eviction of a tenant is sought on the ground of need for personal use in good faith. But, in the present case, the eviction of the tenants was sought mainly on the ground that the building was required to be reconstructed for which the local Municipal Committee had already approved the plan. Subsection (2)(b)(vi) of section 13 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, deals with a case where eviction is sought on the ground of reconstruction. The proviso referred to above is not applicable to subsection (2). It is, therefore, immaterial that the ejectment application was filed before the expiry of the fixed term of the tenancy.
13. The last contention that the grounds of need for reconstruction and bona fide need for personal use are mutually destructive of each other is certainly without any substance. In Dawood v.
Muhammad Yasin PLD 1982 SC 287, after analysing the relevant provisions of Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, the Supreme Court of Pakistan found that grounds of personal requirement and reconstruction were not mutually destructive of each other and that eviction of a tenant on both such grounds through the same proceedings was not illegal. The contrary view adopted in Muhammad Yusuf v. Mst. Zohra Bibi PLD 1973 Pesh. 186 was overruled. In Muhammad Shafiq v. S.M.
Khurram and others 1983 SCMR 1227 also it has been ruled that plea of reconstruction and that of personal use were not mutually destructive of each other.
14. In the light of the foregoing conclusions, it is found that there is no merit in the under consideration Constitutional Petitions and thus interference with the impugned judgments, in exercise of writ jurisdic tion, is not called for. The Writ Petitions, in this view of the matter, fail and are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
15. The petitioners are, however, allowed three months' time, effective from today, for vacating the tenanted premises.