M. S. H. QURAISHI, J.-The petitioner is a tenant in a shop in Property No. S. 66. R. 32, McLagan Road, Lahore, whose writ petition against order of ejectment from the shop passed by the Rent Controller and armed in appeal was dismissed by the Lahore High Court. The ejectment had been sought by the respondent/landlord on the' ground of his requirement for (1) re-construction and (2) the use of his son. Both the grounds were found by the Rent Controller against the petitioner but the appellate Court noticing that the landlord had withdrawn the plea of re-construction in the ejectment applications filed against the tenants of other shops in the same building and that shop in question not existing independently could not be separately re-constructed, reversed the finding on the question of re-construction. That Court however, upheld the finding on the issue of bona fide requirement for use of the son. The contentions raised before the High Court that the pleas of re- construction arid personal need were mutually exclusive, that if one had failed the other also must fail and that the need of the son was mala fide were considered but rejected.
2. Learned counsel points out that in view of the statement made by the landlord himself before the Rent Controller it was clear that he would first get the building re-constructed before commencing business and that even if the shop was got vacated, the son would- have to wait until it was re- constructed. He, therefore, urges that the plea of re-construction having failed, the landlord's son would not use the shop.
3. This Court had in Dawood v. Muhammad Yasin (PLD 1982SC227) expressed the view that the plea of re-construction and of personal use are not mutually destructive. We have gone through the statement of the landlord where he did assert in his cross-examination that be would re-construct the shop before his son would start his business but be did not say that if re-construction was not permitted the son would not require -the shop at all. It is to be noted that no question had been put to the landlord directly on this point. In any case the question basically is one of fact and no proper basis had been furnished before the High Court to justify interference in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. There is, therefore, no case for gram of leave. The petition is dismissed.