1. ' ABDUL KADIR SHAIKH, J.-Facts giving rise to this appeal briefly stated are that appellants who are the owners of a building constituting 9 shops situated on G. T. Road, Dina, Tehsil and District Jhelum filed a civil suit in 1971 against the first respondent, their tenant, for possession' of 4 shops let out to him on the ground that they wish to demolish the structure and erect a new building of a shopping market. The relief for respondents' eviction was sought through a civil suit because at that time Dina village where the building is situated was not an urban area within the meaning of the Punjab Urban Restriction Ordinance, 1979. The suit was decreed in plaintiffs' favour by the trial Court, but at the stage of second appeal the parties compromised the dispute on 30-6-1976, whereby the respondent surrendered two shops to the landlords and he was allowed to retain the remaining two shops.
2. ' Afterwards on 20-9-1980, appellants filed an application for respondents' eviction under the provisions of Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, for, in the meantime Dina village was declared as a municipality under Notification dated 9-3-1977 issued by the Provincial Government and became an urban area to which the provisions of the Ordinance were applicable. The grounds pleaded in support of the eviction application were that the first respondent had unauthorized sublet the rented premises to the second respondent, apart from having damaged the property, and the premises were also required by the landlords for the erection of a new building, namely, the shopping market. The Rent Controller was, however, not impressed by the first two grounds urged but he felt satisfied with the third plea that the landlords required the demised premises for construction of the new market, and by the order dated 21-7-1981 directed respondents' ejectment.
3. ' Respondents' appeal against the order of the Rent Controller was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Jhelum, but their writ petition in Lahore High Court succeeded with the result that the order passed by the Rent Controller as upheld by the Additional District Judge on appeal, was set aside.
4. Leave to appeal was granted by this Court in order to appreciate the plea raised by the appellants that "the writ petition before the High Court was not competent as it did not lie within the ambit of the scope allowed by this Court in Muhammad Sharif and another v. Muhammad Afzal Sohail etc. (1).
5. ' Mr. Bashir Ahmed Ansari, learned counsel appearing in support of the appeal firstly pointed out that on the pleadings of the parties the Rent Controller framed the crucial issue, namely "Whether petitioners want to reconstruct the shops in dispute", which was in consonance with the newly- substituted provisions of section 13(2)(vi) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. In order to appreciate this argument it will be useful to reproduce the original as well as the substituted provisions of clause (vi) of subsection (2) of section 13 of the Ordinance. These read as under :- "Section 13(2).-A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied that- {{DATA MISS ARRANGED}} #TBS Substituted
(vi) the building or rented land is required by the landlord for the construction or erection of a building on the site and the landlord has obtained the necessary sanction for the said #TBE Original
(vi) the building or rented land is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for reconstruction or erection of a building on the site, and the landlord has obtained the necessary sanction for the said reconstruction or erection from the Town Improvement Trust, Municipal Cor-
(1) PLD 1981 SC 240 poration, Municipal Committee or Town Committee for the area where such building or rented land is situated, the Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building or rented land and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application. Reconstruction or erectior from the local authority competent to sanction reconstruction or erection for the area where such building or rented land is situated, the Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building or rented land and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting he application. {{DATA MISS ARRANGED}} ' Learned counsel submitted that the comparison of the language of clause (vi), before its substitution and in its present form, clearly shows that whereas formerly a landlord who wished to seek eviction of his tenant was required to manifest his intention to demolish the rented premises for construction of a new building on the same site and was to obtain the necessary sanction for the reconstruction or erection of the building from the local authority, he was under the further obligation to prove that the premises were reasonably and in good faith required by him for the said purpose, but under the amended provisions of law, the further obligation referred to above has been dispensed with. Mr. Bashir Ahmed Ansari referred to these provisions in support of the argument that the learned Rent Controller as well as the Additional District Judge had acted very rightly on the basis of the present provisions of law in the light of the evidence recorded in the case, and interference by the High Court in exercise of the constitutional jurisdiction was totally unjustified, and in disregard of the rule laid down in this Court in the case of Muhammad Sharif and another v. Muhammad Afzal Sohail etc."
6. ' We have gone through the record of the case in the light of the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the parties. Reference to the order passed by the Rent Controller would show that he was fully satisfied that appellants required the demised premises for erection of a new building on the site. He rejected the plea advanced by the first respondent that the earlier compromise by which the respondent handed over two shops to the landlords and was allowed to retain the remaining two shops did not tantamount to waiver of landlords' right to get the two remaining shops vacated in the proceedings under the Ordinance. Learned Rent Controller also rejected respondents' plea that landlords' application for their eviction was not bona fide. These findings of the learned Rent Controller were upheld by the Additional District Judge in these words : "I may mention here that in 1971-72, there was no Town Committee or Municipal Committee within the area of Dina. Rent Restriction Ordinance, admittedly, was not applicable to the property situated in that area (Dina). The eviction petition out of which the present appeal has arisen is the first application under Rent Restriction Ordinance seeking eviction of the appellants-respondents.
7. Section 14 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance is not applicable to the facts of the instant case. Even otherwise, if in 1971, an application under Transfer of Property Act was preferred against the tenant- appellant, which also succeeded before the trial Court as well as before the appellate Court, and if in the High Court, a compromise between the parties was effected, it would not in any way create a legal bar for the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant if his case is fully covered under section 13 of Rent Restriction Ordinance. The undertaking referred to by the learned counsel is Exh. R.
1. Its reading would show that the landlord did not commit himself that he will not file an eviction petition against the tenant. It simply pertains to the effect that out of for shops in possession of the tenant, two were taken away from him and two were left with him. Again, this undertaking Exh. R. 1 is not signed by the landlord. It was executed by Maqsood Hussain the tenant only.
9. The bona fide of the demolition and reconstruction have been sufficiently established on the record. It is in the evidence of Ghulam Muhammad landlord that the site plan has been approved from the concerned authority which is Exh. P.
1. He further deposed that the other five shops from one side and the two shops on the other side of the disputed shops have already been got vacated. He has expressed his intention in so many words, to construct a market on that place. Khadim Hussain appeared as A. W. 1 and deposed that he had a shop in his possession on rent from the landlord and that he had vacated the same, inasmuch as the landlord wants to reconstruct them. He further deposed that his shops were demolished. Muhammad Latif was also a tenant under Ghulam Muhammad. He appeared as A. W.
8. 2 and deposed that he had a shop on rent from Ghulam Muhammad which he had vacated. Abdur Rehman also deposed on the same line. He was a tenant and his shop was also got vacated. The landlords, therefore, produced the best kind of evidence in support of their plea that they want to reconstruct a market after demolition and also that they had got certain shops vacated for the purpose. It is fully proved that the site plan has also been sanctioned. The evidence of the tenant does not show that the requirement of the landlord for reconstruction of the building was in any way dishonest or that it is not bona fide. The learned trial Court has very rightly observed that the market is to be constructed and it could only be constructed if the entire property is demolished.
9. The plea that the landlord wants to enhance the rent is unfounded and does not find any support from the evidence on the record."
10. ' On the other hand, learned Judge in the High Court who dealt with the case on a petition brought by the respondents under Article 9 of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981 took a different view of the case. He held that : "The present eviction petition, in the face of the compromise effected on 30-6-1976 is mala fide. I do not think it is the intention of the law to permit a landlord, who has compromised his case with his tenant in a petition where he sought possession on the ground of reconstruction, to turn round at some later date and to say that he has now a fresh cause of action, unless the earlier compromise was subject to a condition precedent or subsequent, which has been violated by the tenant. If this principle is not observed, there would be no sanctity to any compromise, such as of the nature as entered into by the present tenants with their landlords. In the face of the compromise which the landlords entered with the petitioners (respondents herein) on 30-6-1976, the present eviction petition is mala fide. The consideration that the respondents (appellants herein) have already demolished the seven adjacent shops and that they have the site plan approved by the Town Committee, Dina in their favour does not displace their mala fide intention.
11. In these circumstances, the findings of the learned Additional District Judge and that of the Rent Controller, Jhelum, on Issue No, 3, are illegal and perverse and deserve to be set aside."
12. ' It is obvious that attention of the learned Judge in the High Court was not drawn to the fact that learned Additional District Judge had rightly held that the alleged compromise, which is Exh. R. 1 on the record, was in fact not a compromise or a settlement, but an undertaking given by the first respondent which was not even signed or executed by the landlords. The bare perusal of this document would show that it did not create any legal bar on the landlords from seeking respondent's eviction under the provisions of section 13 of the Ordinance, or under any other provisions of law. Learned Judge in the High Court was obviously misled into the belief that it was permissible to him, in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, to interfere with the findings of fact reached by the Rent Controller and the first appellate Court, if the opposite view of evidence in the case found favour with him. This Court in the case of Muhammad Sharif and another v. Muhammad Afzal and others has already clarified that the High Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction is not to convert itself and act as a Court of First Appeal on facts over the Tribunal created by law to exercise powers vested in them in respect of matter which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on them. Learned Judge further fell in error in not noticing the clear position under the law that under the amended provisions of clause (vi) of subsection (2) of section 13 of the Ordinance appellants, as landlords, having obtained the necessary sanction for the erection of a new building and demonstrated through evidence on record their intention to demolish the rented premises for construction of a new building on the same site, were under no further obligation, as was the position under the unamended provisions of clause (vi), to prove further the premises were reasonably and in good faith required by them for the said purpose, and were, therefore, entitled under the law to evict the tenant. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that interference made by the High Court in this case in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction was wholly unjustified under the law.
13. ' For these reasons, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed with the result that the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller against the respondents as upheld by the Additional District Judge is restored. By consent of the parties, the respondents are allowed two months' time to vacate the premises subject to the condition that they shall voluntarily surrender possession and shall pay rent for these two months in advance.
14. ' The parties are however left to bear their own costs.