' This is a Revision Petition against the order of the Additional Commissioner (Revenue), Multan Division, dated 3-1-1979. Whereby the appeal filed against the order of the A. C./Collector, Lodhran, dated 4-3-1978, was accepted.
2. Briefly the facts of the case are that one Muhammad Abdul sold the land in dispute in favour of Ali Muhammad respondent, vide mutation No, 282 dated 26-6-1972. Nawab Ali etc. Petitioners instituted a pre-emption suit as they were the tenants of the suit land. After the filing of written statement a preliminary issue was framed : "Whether the plaintiff had no right to pre-empt at the time of attestation of the mutation in dispute.
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' The counsel for the respondent contended before the A. C./Collector that the tenant was given right to pre-empt only from Kharif 1972 and the Kharif crops started from 1st of July and therefore, when the sale took place on 26-6-1972, the petitioners had no right to pre-empt. The counsel further contended that the petitioners in the pre-emption suit had CO prove their right of pre- emption at three stages i,e,, at the time of sale, at the time of institution of suit and at the time of decree of the suit.
3. The counsel for the petitioners argued before the A. C./Collector, that, according to PLD 1972 Lah.
567, the petitioners even if they had no right to pre-empt at the time of sale, could file the suit if at the time of its institution the right was available. The A. C./Collector decided the preliminary issue in favour of the petitioners vide order dated 4-3-1978. The respondents preferred an appeal against that order in the Court of the Additional Commissioner (Revenue) Multan Division, who, accepting it, set aside the order of the A.C./Collector, dated 4-3-1978. The Additional Commissioner (Revenue), decided the case on the basis of the case of Faqir Muhammad v. Younis Khan etc. (I) in which it was held that pre-emption suit in such cases could not be decided retrospectively. Since in this case the sale was made on 26-6-1972 when the law was not available, the pre-emption suit could not be filed.
4. The counsel for the petitioners contended that the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 was enforced on 11-3-1972 and thus the petitioners got the right of pre-emption on the very date of the enforcement of the said Ordinance. He argued that the A. C./Collector had rightly held that the suit of the petitioners was competent. He referred to NLR 1980 Rev. (Lah.) 97 at p. 100 in which the High Court held that Kharif 1972 had commenced from the month of June 1972. The counsel for the respondent referred to PLD 1979 Lah. 23 in which it was held that Kharif refers to the season which falls between the Summer and Winter seasons. In this ruling it was held that Kharif started from 1st of July.
(1) PLD 1974 Rev. 292
5. I have considered the arguments advanced by the two counsel. They have referred to two different rulings of the High Court regarding the commencement of the Kharif. In view of the two apparently contradictory rulings the matter requires to be gone into thoroughly. In NLR 1980 Rev.
(Lah.) 7, reference has been made to the Punjab Tenancy Act wherein the term 'Agriculture Year' has been defined as the year commencing from the 16th day of June. It has been stated in PLD 1979 Lah. 23, 'that Kharif starts after the Summer season is over which means a season which falls between summer and winter seasons'. In the two rulings, reliance in one case has been placed on the definition given in the Tenancy Act while in the other case on the meaning that is given by the people in general and as described in the dictionary. It appears that the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 also carries the definition of 'Agriculture Year' under section 4, and according to it, the 'Agriculture Year' commences from the 1st of July or on such other date as Board of Revenue may by notification appoint for any specified area. A comparative study of the Land Revenue Act and the Tenancy Act reveals that the Land Revenue Act is the Primary Law whose provisions are followed by the Tenancy Act. Going back to the origin of the two Acts, the point becomes clear.
Land Revenue Act was first enacted in 1887 as Act XVI of 1887, Tenancy Act followed it as Act XVII. In Land Revenue Act, 1887 the 'Agriculture Year' was described as 'commencing from 16th of June'. The Tenancy Act, 1887 which is still in force follows this definition. However, the Land Revenue Act was amended and re-enacted in 1967. According to this Act the 'Agriculture Year' commences from 1st of July. In -view of this position the later definition will prevail and has to be followed and it will be taken that the Agriculture Year and, therefore, Kharif commences, from 1st of July. The above position is supported by the factual position also as rains generally start in these parts from the 1st week of July. Sowing of various Kharif crops, though an important factor, cannot be taken to be the only basis for fixing the commencement of Kharif. Crops relating to Kharif are nowadays sown during a long period starting from April to July while after the harvest of Rabi in some areas there is a harvest called `Zaid Rabi' during the months of May and June. Sowing of the various Kharif crops, therefore, cannot be taken as sole criteria for determining the commencement of Kharif but some definite date has to be fixed for the purpose which has been done by the Land Revenue Act, 1967.
6. The above discussion, therefore, makes it clear that legally Kharif will be taken to commence from the 1st of July. In the present case, the transaction took place on 26th of June 1972, i,e, before the commencement of111 Kharif. M. L. R. 115 lays down that the rights for pre-emption will be available from Kharif 1972. It is, therefore, clear that in the present case the transaction took place before the commencement of Kharif and thus this right was not available to the petitioners. The arguments on behalf of the petitioners that it did not effect their rights because when they filed their suit this right was available, cannot be accepted. A claimant to the preemption right has to establish his right of pre-emption at the time of the transaction, at the time of the filing the suit and at the time the decree is passed. As the right was not available to the petitioners in the present case at the time this transaction took place, their case of pre-emption cannot be allowed. The Revision Petition is dismissed.
7. The argument was heard and the order was reserved on 17-6-1980. The parties be informed.