1. ' By this judgment I propose to dispose three Revision Applications bearing Nos.108/1975, 118/1975 and 231/1975 which are interlinked, and relate to the same controversy. Brief facts giving rise to the controversy between the parties are these. The immovable property bearing Custodian No. G-2, which is comprised in the northern part of the Plot No. NP/15(257 sq. yards) in Jodia Bazar, Karachi, is a godown. It is said to belong to the Public Charitable Trust called Dedharbai Pragji Sanitoriam Trust Malir and have remained under control and management of Administrator Evacuee Trust Property Southern Zone, Karachi (herein after referred to as the Administrator, Evacuee Trust), since 1960. Moose Bhai who had been tenant in respect of the above godown and had been paying rent to the Administrator Evacuee Trust applied for its transfer in 1959 but without any success. It is alleged that subse quent to Moosa Bhai's death which occurred on 5-4-1967, the applicant Jamal Bhai, his son and other two applicants Haji Tayyab and Haji Ghaffar, his partners in business, conspired to secure the transfer of the godown in dispute by fraudulent means. Towards this end they were alleged to have forged various documents and made some mis representations.
2. Although Moosa Bhai was dead, the Chief Settlement Commissioner was moved in his name to declare the disputed godown as non-trust property. By his order dated 12-12-1968, the Settlement Commissioner made the requisite declaration. This order was assailed in appeal before the High Court, but on coming to know that Moosa Bhai had expired much 'before the application purported to have been made by him to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, the Administrator, Evacuee Trust withdrew the appeal, which was accordingly dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 28-4-1969.
3. Meanwhile the godown in dispute had been transferred to Moosa Bhai under order dated 26-8- 1968 of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Karachi. Some how the permanent Transfer Deed No. 14101, dated 5-6-1970 in respect of the said godown was issued in the name of applicants Jamal Bhai and others.
4. ' Since the applicants in Revision Application No.108/1975 had entered into agreement with respondents Nos. 4 to 7 in the said Revision Application for sale of the disputed premises and published a public notice in the Daily Jang, the Administrator Evacuee Trust opposed the proposed sale of property sending his objections against the contemplated transaction off sale. The Administrator, Evacuee Trust also filed a suit No.1951 of 1974 on 12-12-1974 praying therein that the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, dated 26-8-1968 by which the disputed godown was transferred to the dead man namely Moosa Bhai and so also the order of the Settlement Commissioner, dated 12-12-1968 whereby he had declared the said godown as non-trust prop y, be declared as null and void, having been obtained through fra and misrepresen tation.
5. ' Instead of filing their reply to the suit the defendants moved an application under Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C, seeking rejection of the plaint. The application was allowed, vide order of the Vth Senior Civil Judge, Karachi dated 13-1-1975. The Administrator Evacuee, Trust preferred appeal No.19 of 1975 from the said order which was allowed by the Vth Additional District Judge, Karachi by his judgment dated 24-4-1975. It is the last mentioned judgment which has been called in question in the Revision Applications Nos.108 of 1975 and 118 of 1973. So far Revision Application No.231 of 1975 is concerned, it is filed by the Administrator Evacuee Trust, and is directed against the order of the Additional District Judge, Karachi, dated 15-7-1975 whereby he vacated his earlier order dated 7-6- 1975 granting stay in favour of the Administrator, Evacuee Trust, as the High Court on entertaining the other Revision Application had suspended the operation of the impugned judgment of the Additional District Judge dated 24-4-1975 referred to above.
6. ' I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at great length and with their assistance have also gone through various documents including the judgments sought to have been impugned.
7. ' To begin with reference may first be made to the application under Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C, filed by defendants Nos. 1 to 3 who are applicants in Revision Application No.108 of 1975. In this application rejection of the plaint filed in Suit No. 1951 of 1974 was sought on the following grounds:--
(i) That the suit was barred under sections 4(3), 22, 25 and 26 of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the 1958 Act).
(ii) That the status of the property in dispute having been determined by the competent authority, the plaintiff/Administrator, Evacuee Trust had no right to challenge it in suit, particularly when on the plaintiff's own motion, the question of re-determination of the property's status was still pending before the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property.
(iii) That the plaint does not disclose cause of action.
(iv) That the suit has not been instituted in the name of proper authority.
(v) That the suit is hopelessly time-barred.
(vi) That the plaint has been grossly undervalued.
(vii) That the trial Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. For appreciating the above grounds, it may be advantageous to reproduce various sections of 1958-Act mentioned in the said grounds: S.4(3)-- "If a question arises whether an evacuee property is attached to a charitable, religious or educational trust or institution or not, it shall be referred to Chief Settlement Commissioner whose decision thereon shall be final and shall not, except as provided in subsection(4), be called in question in any Court; provided that no order under this subsection shall be passed without giving the persons interested a reasonable opportunity of being heard."
8. S.22: "Finality of orders.-- Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by any officer appointed under this Act, shall not be questioned in any Court."
9. S.25: "Bar of jursidiction:-- ' Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no civil Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Central Government or an Officer appointed under this Act is empowered under this Act to determine, and no injunction, process or order shall be granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act."
10. S.26:--"Protection of action taken in good faith:- ' No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Central Government or any person appointed under this Act in respect of anything which in good faith is done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act or of any rules or orders made thereunder."
11. ' As provided in subsection (3) of section 4 referred to above, the Chief Settlement Commissioner alone has jurisdiction to decide if a particular evacuee property is or is not a trust property and his decision in this regard is final and cannot be called in question in any Court except in appeal to the High Court under subsection (4) of the said section. It is also clear from sections 22 and 25 hereinabove that every order made by any officer appointed under the 1958-Act is immune from scrutiny of any Court. Furthermore no civil Court has jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Central Government or an officer appointed under the 1958-Act has power to determine and no injunction, process or order shall be granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken, or to be taken in exercise of power conferred by or under the said Act. Similarly section 26 hereinabove provides that no person appointed under the 1958-Act will be dragged in any suit, prosecution, or other legal proceeding in respect of any thing done by him in good faith made thereunder. Thus, the above sections have left me in no doubt that civil Court has absolutely no jurisdiction in respect of orders passed by an officer under 1958-Act.
12. ' The question arises if in view above legal position the two orders: one dated 26-8-1968 whereby the Deputy Settlement Commissioner transferred the disputed premises to the deceased Moosa Bhai and another dated 12-12-1968 by which the Settlement Commissioner declared the said property as non-trust property, can be assailed in the suit filed in the civil Court. It seems that both these orders have been impugned on the ground that Moosa Bhai on whose initiative the said orders were passed was dead at the time of passing thereof. The learned counsel for the Administrator, Evacuee Trust almost repeated his arguments he had advanced in the two Courts below. His argument was that the civil Court possessed the jurisdiction to go into the question whether by withholding the death of Moosa Bhai from Settlement Authorities the said orders had been obtained through fraud and misrepresentation. In support of his arguments the learned counsel had cited two authorities 1974 SCMR 356 and PLD 1970 SC 180, which as held by the trial Court were in applicable in the instant case. The said Court, therefore, held that the suit was barred not only by section 4(3) but also by sections 22 and 25 of the 1958-Act.
13. ' However the learned Additional District Judge while dealing with the appeal filed against the judgment of trial Court placed reliance on the Supreme Court authority (apparently referring to 1974 SCMR 356) wherein it was held: "It is a well-established principle that even where the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is barred and conferred upon special tribunals, civil Courts being courts of ultimate jurisdiction will have the jurisdiction to examine the acts of such forums to see whether their acts are in accordance with law or are illegal or even mala fide."
14. ' Keeping the dictum laid down in the above authority, the learned Additional District Judge observed: "So if the jurisdiction assumed by the authority appointed under the statute is the exercise of legal jurisdiction within the limits of the statute, the civil Court has no jurisdiction but if the authority has acted in excess of jurisdiction, which otherwise statute does not confer upon him or it does not follow the fundamental judicial procedure of acts done in disregard of the provisions of the statute from which any male fide is to be inferred, the civil Court being the Court of ultimate jurisdiction has jurisdiction to examine the acts of that forum."
15. ' On the basis of the above reasoning the learned Appellate Judge found that no case was made out to show that finality attached to the acts of the Settlement Authorities could be interferred with by the civil Court. He therefore came to the conclusion: "So if the proceedings took place before the Chief Settlement Commissioner and the Settlement Commissioner who gave finality to the order in the presence of the counsel of the Trust itself, then to draw such conclusion of male fide will also be unnecessary conjecture and also no evidence of male fide is specifically alleged against the Settlement Authorities, obviously, therefore, on that exercise of jurisdiction, the civil Court has no juris diction. Proceeding further the learned appellate Judge held: "So if the allegations made by the Evacuee Trust Committee are supposed to be true in the plaint, which as the ratio of decisions have shown that the plaint prima facie is to be taken as true for the purpose of cause of action, then the next question of Limitation comes which governs the suit."
16. ' Thus in the opinion of the learned appellate Judge since the Settlement authorities have neither acted without jurisdiction nor in excess of jurisdiction nor male fide the civil Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with their orders. However according to him as the factual allegations of fraud and misrepresentation made in the plaint are taken to be true for the purpose of disclosing cause of action, the civil Court can go into that factual aspect of the case. While agreeing with the conclusions reached by the lower appellate Court inasmuch as that civil Court can exercise its jurisdiction to investigate the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, I would put the scope of civil Court's interference in such a case in different way. If the plaintiff succeeded 'in establishing that the Settlement Authorities had passed the impugned orders under the influence of fraud and misrepresentation, it would follow that the said authorities would not have otherwise exercised their jurisdiction and therefore the orders that was induced by fraud and misrepresentation could be struck down by civil Court as being without jurisdiction and hence void.
17. ' The next question that arises is whether filing of the suit was at all called for and if not whether the civil Court would be justified to interfere. As provided in subsection (4) of section 4 of the 1958-Act, the decision of the Chief Settlement Commissioner as to determination of the status of Evacuee property being trust property or not could be challenged in appeal before High Court. In fact the appeal had been filed against the impugned order of the Settlement Commissioner declaring the disputed property as non-trust property and it was during the pendency of the appeal that it came to the notice of the Administrator, Evacuee Trust that Moosa Bhai was dead at the time of passing of the Settlement Commissioner's order. This being so, the appeal could have been pursued on an additional ground of Moosa Bhai's death. It could have been argued that the order of the Settlement Commissioner was void as it was made in favour of the dead person. Instead of doing so, the appeal was withdrawn which was accordingly dismissed as such.
18. 'Furthermore it appears that on enactment of Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Control)
19. Act, 1975, the power to decide the status of evacuee property being trust property or not is vested in Chairman, Evacuee Trust Properties vide section 8(1) of the said Act. It is an admitted position that the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Properties had been moved for redetermining the status of the disputed property and he was still seized of the matter when the suit had been filed. Therefore it was argued on behalf of the applicants that during pendency of the matter before the Chairman resort could not be made to filing of the suit. The argument was obviously not without force. Thus neither the appeal which had been preferred from the impugned order and was pending before High Court was pursued on additional ground of Moosa Bhai's death nor the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Properties before whom the matter was pending for redetermination of the status of the disputed property was allowed to pronounce his verdit. In these circumstances the filing of the suit was uncalled for.
20. ' Apart from above, it seems the Chief Settlement Commissioner was moved for the necessary declaration as to the status of the disputed property not only in the name of deceased Moosa Bhai alone but others too had joined hands for obtaining the said declaration. This is clear from the order dated 12-12-1968 of the Settlement Commissioner. The title of the order clearly shows that Moosa Bhai and others were appel lants (applicants) before the Settlement Commissioner. The order further shows that among those present at the time of the hearing was "Mr.S. Saeed. A.Rizvi, Advocate Karachi for the petitioners Moosa Bhai others " If Moosa Bhai alone had made the application, the word "others" would not have followed his name. The argument of the learned counsel for the Administrator, Evacuee Trust is not tenable so far as that in absence of the detailed description of "others" it was not possible to hold that deceased Moosa Bhai and others had jointly approached the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Since the above order is indicative of the fact that joint application was made to the Chief Settlement Commissioner in the name of Moosa Bhai and others, it made no material difference if Moosa Bhai was not alive at the time of passing of the above order.
21. ' Even otherwise the death of Moosa Bhai did not affect the validity of the declaration made by the Settlement Commissioner. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Chief Settlement Commissioner was moved only in the name of Moosa Bhai who was then not alive, that by itself would not be enough to hold that the order of the Settlement Commissioner was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation. The important question to be considered in this connection is what material was placed before the Settlement Commissioner for the purpose of deciding the status of the disputed property and on what basis he had passed the impugned order. It is not the case of the Administrator, Evacuee Trust that the Settlement Commissioner was influenced by any fraudulent material nor is it alleged on his behalf that the Settlement Commissioner passed an erroneous order on the basis of any such material. It is clear from the order that the Trust Committee had filed its reply to the application and had full opportunity to represent its side before the Settlement Commissioner. In fact no allegation has been made by the Administrator, Evacuee Trust on that score. The perusal of the order shows that after due consideration of the material produced by both sides, the Settlement Commissioner declared the disputed property as non-trust property. All documents referred to and relied upon by the plaintiff/Administrator, Evacuee Trust in the suit have laid emphasis only on the allegation that the death of Moosa Bhai was suppressed and the above order of the Settlement Commissioner was obtained in the name of the dead person. As has been pointed out above the death of Moosa Bhai did not in any manner affect the merits of the case put forth before the Settlement Commissioner nor did it render the latter's order invalid.
22. ' The learned counsel for the Administrator submitted that since the Settlement Commissioner took cognizance of the case and declared the property in question as non trust property on the motion of the dead person, the order produced in result was patently without juris diction and hence void.
23. In this connection the learned counsel relied upon the case of Hakim Abdul Rahim Khan and 3 others v. Isa PLD 1973 Lah. 652 and argued that since the death of Moose Bhai was suppressed and the litigation was pursued in his name, the orders passed on such misrepresentation of the fact were vitiated and nullity. Suffice it to say that the orders passed in the instant case were not by Court and as such above authority is not applicable. Even otherwise as has been stated above the litigation in this case was pursued not in the name of Moosa Bhai alone but in the name of Moose Bhai and others. 1 am also not impressed by the above argument of the learned counsel. It is obvious that the Settlement Commissioner had exercised his jurisdiction under subsection (3) of section 4 of the 1958-Act. The said subsection provides that if a question arises whether an evacuee property is attached to charitable, religious or educational trust or institutions or not" it shall be referred to Chief Settlement Commissioner whose decision thereon shall be final". The learned counsel for the Administrator, Evacuee Trust attempted to construe the words mentioned within inverted commas to mean that unless the question about any evacuee property being trust property or not is referred to the Chief Settlement Commissioner by some person, he cannot entertain the case on his own and take decision with regard to the property's status. According to him in the instant case since the requisite reference was made to the Chief Settlement Commissioner by the dead person, the exercise of his power was without jurisdiction and hence the order passed in result was a nullity. The learned counsel was unable to point out any law or rule requiring any specified person or Agency to refer the question of declaring any evacuee property as trust property for decision of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. In absence of such provision the reference may be received by the Chief Settlement Commis sioner from any source which may even be anonymous. All that the words "shall be referred" used in subsection (3) of section 4 hereinabove emphasize is that the Chief Settlement Commissioner has exclusive power to decide the questions of above nature once they have come to his notice. There appears no law or rule indicating that any such reference is required to be made in formal manner by any specified person or Agency. I am, therefore, of the view, that as soon as it comes to the notice of the Chief Settlement Commissioner that there exists controversy or confusion with regard to the status of any evacuee property being trust property or not, he may and can even act on his own and resolve such controversy or confusion. For taking such decision, no formal reference or application would be necessary. Viewing the case from that angle, the order of the Settlement Commissioner in question would remain unaffected even if the information with regard to death of Moosa Bhai in whose name the application was made to the Chief Settlement Commissioner was withheld from the latter. Consequently the plaintiff/Administrator, Evacuee Trust had no cause of action for filing the suit under consideration.
24. ' Even if the suit was competent, the plaintiff/Administrator, Evacuee Trust owed an explanation why it took him for more than 51 years to file the same. According to his own showing the knowledge about the death of Moosa Bhai came to his notice in April 1969 when he withdrew his appeal pending before the High Court. However he filed the suit in December 1974. Apart from the fact that there is absolutely no explanation for this delay in filing the suit, the suit is hopelessly time-barred. To decide the question of Limitation reference may be made to Article 14 and Article 95 of the Limitation Act. According to Article 14, for setting aside any act or order of an officer of Government in his official capacity limitation prescribed is one year from the date of the act or order. The orders sought to be invalidated in the suit, were passed on 12-12-1968 and 26-8-1968 and as such the suit should have been filed latest by 25-8-1969. However it was argued that since the aforesaid orders were obtained through fraud and misrepresentation the Article 14 was not applicable. In case a decree obtained by fraud is sought to be setaside or any other relief is to be obtained on the ground of fraud appropriate Article applicable in such a case is Article 95. As provided in this Art three years period from the date when the fraud becomes known to the party wronged is allowed for obtaining the desired relief. Even if the period of limitation is computed under the latter Art, still the suit would be barred by more than two years.
25. ' It was next urged on behalf of the plaintiff/Administrator, Evacuee Trust that for setting aside a void order period of Limitation is of no consequence. According to him the suit can be filed for setting aside the void order at any time without restriction of limitation. He submitted that the orders sought to be set aside were without jurisdiction and hence null and void. No period of limitation was therefore applicable. Of course there is no dispute with the proposition that for setting D aside a void order period of limitation is not to be observed. But the question is if the orders referred to above were really void orders. The order passed in utter lack of jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction E is called a void order. On the other hand if the authority possess the necessary jurisdiction but in exercise of such jurisdiction passes a, wrong order, the said wrong order can not be regarded as void order.
26. ' In the case reported as Nawab Raunaq All etc. v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others PLD 1973 SC 236, it was held:-- "To amount to nullity, an act must be non-extistent in the eye of law, that is to say, it must be wholly without jurisdiction or performed in such a way that the law regards it as mere colourable exercise of jurisdiction or unlawful usurpation of jurisdiction."
27. ' In the same context the learned counsel for the applicants has also placed reliance on several authorities to show that there is a marked difference between void order and voidable order. The learned counsel submitted that although no time limit is prescribed for undoing of the void order, the voidable order has to be invalidated within the prescribed period of limitation. The first case relied upon by the learned counsel is of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore v. Raja Muhammad Fazil Khan and others PLD 1975 SC 331. In this case Supreme Court has distinguished the 'void' order from the 'voidable' order in the following words:-- "The first question which arises in this connection is whether an order obtained by practising fraud on the Court, tribunal or authority concerned is a void order or only voidable. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by Waheeduddin Ahmad, J., in the case of All Iqtidar Shah Dara, that an order obtaining by fraud is not void, but only voidable. It remains operative as long as it is not set aside, rescinded, or recalled, by a competent authority in proper proceedings. An order is to be treated as void only when it is made by a Court, tribunal, or other authority, which had no jurisdiction either as regards the subject matter, the pecuniary value or the territorial limits where the dispute arose. Such an order would amount to "a usurpation of power unwarranted by law" and accordingly it would be a nullity.
28. ' If, on the other hand, an order is made by a Court or authority having the necessary jurisdiction it is not an order void ab initio, but an order which may be set aside on sufficient cause being shown in this behalf."
29. ' On the same point another case on which reliance, has been placed is of the Chairman, District Screening Committee, Lahore and another v. Sharif Ahmed Hashmi PLD 1976 SC 258, wherein it was held: -- "There is great looseness in the use of the words "void" and "voidable" and very often they are used interchangeably. Nevertheless there is a clear distinction between things "void" and "voidable" though the two terms are not infrequently used without special regard for the difference or distinction particularly where such distinction is of no consequence or where the attention of the Court is not particularly directed to this distinction. The expression "void" in the strict or accurate sense means" absolutely null" that -is to say incapable of ratification or confirmation and of no effect whatever. The word "voidable" on the other hand is something which could be avoided or confirmed and which is not absolutely void. In other words what is voidable has some force or effect, but whicy may be set aside or annulled for some error or inherent vice or defect."
30. ' The third case in the series is of Messrs Conforce Ltd v. Syed Ali Shah etc. PLD 1977 SC 599 wherein the Supreme Court was pleased to observe:-- "However, in view of the frequency with which gross negligence is sought to be condoned on the plea that the impugned order was void or without jurisdiction, we would observe that a void order or an order without jurisdiction is only a type of an illegal order passed by a Court and the fact that it has been passed and that it may, therefore, create rights cannot be altered by describing it as void or without jurisdiction."
31. ' The view expressed in the above case of Conforce Ltd.. was followed in the case of S.Sharif Ahmed Hashim v. Chairman, Screening Committee, Lahore and another. In this case the Supreme Court (1978 SCMR 367) has expressed its view as follows:- "The petitioner is aggrieved by these observations. According to, him, the impugned order, was void because it was ultra vices of the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Rules, 1959. But he did not deny that the second appellant, who had passed the impugned order, was the authority competent to retire him under the rules. And Gul, J., was of the view that an order, howsoever illegal, was not void if it was passed by a Tribunal which had the power to entertain the type of claim which it had decided. Now the expressions "void order" and "orders without jurisdiction" are overworked expressions and have been subject to divergent judicial interpretations. This has hardly furthered the develop ment of the law, and in Conforce Ltd. v. Syed Ali etc. PLD 1977 SC 599 this Court approved of an observation by Lord Reid in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foregin Compensation Commission and others (1969)2 A C 147 that it would be better to use these expressions "in the narrow and original sense of the Tribunal being entitled to enter on the inquiry in question" and on the whole the construction placed upon the expression "void order" by Gul, J., is in consonance with the view taken in Conforce's case."
32. 'If the two orders sought to be set aside in the suit are examined in the light of the rules laid down in above authorities, there will be no difficulty to hold that they are not void orders. They can at worst be termed as voidable orders.
33. It is not denied that exclusive jurisdiction vested in the Chief Settlement Commissioner under section 4(3) of 1958-Act to decide the character of any evacuee property to be trust property or not. The impugned order dated 12-12-1968 was passed by the Settlement Commis sioner in exercise of such jurisdiction. As has been pointed out above the mere fact that the jurisdiction of the Chief Settlement Commissioner was invoked in the name of dead person, would not render the said order as invalid as on merits it is not shown that the authority passing the said order was misled by fraud or misrepresentation. Even if it be assumed that the jurisdiction of the Settlement Commissioner was invoked in the name of a dead person, still the decision of the said authority as the status of the evacuee property being non-trust property for which he possessed the requisite. jurisdiction and which he took after due consideration of the material placed before him by both sides could not be regarded as wrong muchless void.
34. ' In the case of Brig. (Rtd.) F.B.Ali and another v. The State PLD 1975 SC 506 it was held:-- "There can be no doubt that if a Tribunal or a Court acts wholly without jurisdiction, its actions would be a nullity but it does not necessarily follow from this that even what it does with jurisdiction will also be rendered void, because the Tribunal or Court has at the same time done something which was without jurisdiction. If it is possible to separate what has been done with jurisdiction from that which has been done without jurisdiction without any prejudice to any one, then what is done with jurisdic tion can not be invalidated or declared as null and void."
35. ' In view of above authority since decision of the Settlement Commissioner as regards the status of the evacuee property was the result of his exercise of exclusive jurisdiction he possessed the said decision could not be declared as null and void. Even if the order of the Settlement Commissioner was in the nature of voidable order it was to be set aside within the limitation period of three years.
36. Since the suit was filed after more than 54 years from passing of the said order, the suit was time barred.
37. ' As for the other order dated 26-8-1968 passed by the. Deputy Settlement Commissioner, transferring the disputed premises to the dead person, suffice it to say that P.T.D. in respect of the said property was issued in the name of Jamal Bhai and others and not in the name of the deceased Moosa Bhai. There is nothing to show that the suit property was transferred to Jamal Bhai and others not in their own right but as successors-in-interest of the deceased Moosa Bhai. In absence of such evidence, even if the impugned order was issued in favour of the dead person, it was of no legal effect. The objection to such order is therefore misplaced.
38. ' For the reasons given in the foregoing paragrahps the Revision Applications No.108 of 1975 and 118 of 1975 must succeed. Therefore I need not go intj the objections of the applicants that the suit was under valued or that it was not brought in the name of proper authority. Accordingly I allow these revisions applications. In consequence the Revision Application No. 231 of 1975 is dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs.