' NAZIR AHMAD BHATTI, J.-By this writ petition, under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, Zar Khan, petitioner, has prayed for setting aside the judgment, dated 14th September, 1978 of Labour Court, Haripur, respondent No, 2, and the judgment, dated 17th March, 1979 passed in appeal, by the Labour Appellate Tribunal, N.-W.F.P., Peshawar, respondent No, 3.
2. The factual background giving rise to this writ petition is that the petitioner Zar Khan was an employee of the Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, working as an Accountant in the Abbottabad Branch of the Bank. The petitioner was charge-sheeted on 14th April, 1975 on various grounds by the Assistant Vice-President of the Bank, respondent No, 1, whereafter departmental enquiry was held and the petitioner was dismissed from service vide order, dated 12th July, 1975. The petitioner served a grievance notice on 29th September, 1975 as envisaged by section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, on the respondent personally but the latter neither gave a receipt nor made any reply to it. Consequently, the petitioner moved a petition on 14th October, 1975 before the Labour Court challenging the aforesaid order of dismissal. The case was heard by the Labour Court at Peshawar and the said Court accepted the petition, set aside the order of dismissal of the petitioner and reinstated him in service. The Labour Court held, vide its judgment, dated 30th September, 1976, that the Enquiry Officer had not recorded evidence in the presence of the petitioner herein, nor had given him an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and had obtained only written statements from the witnesses, and as such, the enquiry was held in an illegal manner. Aggrieved by this judgment, the respondent No, 1, filed an appeal before the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal, N.-W. F. P., Peshawar, on 7th October, 1976. This appeal was accepted by the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal, N.-W.F.P., Peshawar, vide judgment, dated 22nd November, 1976 and the case was remanded back to the Labour Court for decision on maintainability of the petition after giving the finding, whether or not the grievance notice had been served by the petitioner upon the respondent No, 1 in accordance with the requirement of section 25-A of the aforesaid Ordinance. The learned Labour Court came to the conclusion that the petitioner had served the grievance notice on the respondent as required by law and ordered that the petition was maintainable vide its judgment, dated 14th February, 1977. The respondent No, I, feeling aggrieved once again, filed another appeal before the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal, N.-W.F.P., Peshawar, and the latter was pleased to accept the appeal vide judgment, dated 13th June, 1977 and remanded the case again to the Labour Court to record evidence and then to decide whether a grievance notice had been served by the petitioner upon respondent No, 1 or not. The learned Labour Court, which was at that time presided over by Mr. Karim Khan Marwat, Additional District Judge, Haripur, recorded evidence pro and contra the point and then by its judgment, dated 14th September, 1978 came to the conclusion that the petitioner had not served any grievance notice upon his employer, respondent No 1, and so dismissed the petition of the petitioner. This time Zar Khan, the petitioner herein, feeling aggrieved by the said judgment, went in appeal before the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal, N.-W.F.P., Peshawar, chaired by Mr. Justice Mian Burhanuddin at that time. The learned Tribunal agreed with that finding of the Labour Court and dismisses the appeal of the petitioner vide judgment, dated 17th March, 1979. The petitioner, herein, has challenged, by this writ petition, filed on 6th August, 1980, both the latter judgments.
3. The only point, urged by Mr. Mushtaq Ali T ahir Kheli, learned counsel for the petitioner, was that whether any grievance notice had been served upon his employer by the petitioner or not and that the Mercy petition made by the petitioner to the President of the Bank on 31st July, 1975 or the petition before the Labour Court, could be treated as a grievance notice under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. On the contrary, Mr. Fazel Hussain, learned counsel for respondent No, 1, has contended that the question whether the notice has been served by the petitioner upon respondent No, 1 or not, had been gone into by the learned Labour Court and the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal and that being a question of fact and concurrent findings of the aforesaid two Labour Courts thereon, this question could not be agitated in the writ petition. His other contentions were that it was not the case of the petitioner before the Labour Forums that the Mercy petition is treated as a grievance notice and as such he could not make out a new case in writ petition. It was further urged by the learned counsel for respondent No, 1 that the petitioner had not come up with clean bands, was estopped by his own conduct and that the writ petition suffered from laches.
4. Insofar as the question whether a grievance notice was served is concerned, we find that both the learned Labour Forums came to the conclusion that no such notice had been served upon the employer by the petitioner. In this respect, the learned Labour Court had recorded more than sufficient evidence from both the sides. A copy of a notice, dated 29th September, 1975 was produced before the Labour Court but the petitioner failed to establish that he had sent or delivered this notice to the employer. It transpires that the petitioner managed somehow or other to procure the receipt register of the Bank, tore the first page from it and made forged entries in this register in order to show that a grievance notice had been served by him upon his employer.
The said register was also produced before us as well which had earlier been produced before the learned Labour court. The perusal of that register showed that entries with regard to receipt of communications in the Bank were made on two pages of the register, one page showed the serial number, date of receipt, name of the sender and the second page, which was opposite to the first page, showed the contents of the communications received, whereas the copy of one page of the receipt register produced in evidence before the Labour Court shows that the contents of the communication, contrary to the practice of the Bank, had also been shown on the first page and these entries existed on that page in regard to this communication only, which would show that this entry was subsequently manipulated. We are conscious of the fact that the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, would not adjudicate upon the facts alleged before the competent forums or evidence produced therein, but we have adverted to the aforesaid facts only to show that from the evidence produced in the case, both the learned Labour forums were correct in forming the opinion that the petitioner had failed to serve a grievance notice upon his employer. It has now become a well established principle of law that the High Court would not re-appraise the evidence in its writ jurisdiction and would not set aside a concurrent findings of facts of the competent forums. In this connection, reference may be made to the case of Mir Ajab Khan v. Secretary, Food, Punjab and 2 others and the case of Ghulam Muhammad and another v. Mst. Noor Bibi and 5 others . We would, therefore, repel this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
5. Insofar as the other point of the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, it may be stated that no doubt no special form of a grievance notice is specified in section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and there are reported cases of Superior Courts whereby a Mercy petition or an appeal to the higher authorities was treated as a grievance notice but there are also reported judgments of Superior Courts wherein it has been held that an appeal or a Mercy petition to the higher authorities or the authority above the employer could not be treated a grievance notice. In the case, reported in 1981 PLC 605 it has been held that no particular form or procedure of a grievance notice has been provided by section 25-A for its compliance and that petition, appeal or application submitted within time can be regarded compliance of grievance procedure and Mercy petition submitted after departmental appeal could be regarded as sufficient compliance of section 25-A. In the case of Muhammad Ozair Qureshi v. Chairman, National Construction Company Limited, Karachi and others it was held that first appeal to Chairman could be treated as a grievance notice as no specific form is prescribed to bring grievance to notice of employer. On the contrary, in the case reported in 1982 PLC 389 it was held that departmental appeal to Appellate Authority could not be treated as grievance notice and in the case reported in 1982 PLC 920 it was held that grievance notice is to be served upon employer and not upon final Appellate Authority and that representation to President of Bank could not be treated as a grievance notice. It shall thus be seen that although no specific form of a grievance notice is provided in section 25-A of the Ordinance, however, it is clear that the notice is to be served upon the employer and not on any higher or Appellate Authority. Moreover, a Mercy petition, an appeal, or a petition to the Labour Court, cannot be treated as grievance notice. We are inclined to agree with the latter two reported cases, because having anxiously applied our minds to the provisions of section 25-A and the itported cases, we are of the considered opinion that a grievance notice is a document independent of a Mercy petition or an appeal to the Appellat Authority and it has to be served upon the appointing authority and not to an authority higher than the appointing authority. We would, 'therefore, not accept this contention either.
6. There is yet another aspect of this matter that this was not the case of the petitioner before the learned Labour Forums that his Mercy petition or the petition to the Labour Court be treated as grievance notice. On the contrary, in the writ petition, it is being urged that the said two documents be treated as grievance notice for the purpose of section 25-A. This would show that the petitioner has set up a new case in the writ petition. A person can challenge the findings of a competent forum in writ jurisdiction only with regard to the circumstances which were placed before those forums. He cannot make out, and he also cannot be allowed to make out, in the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court, a new case or a case other than the one placed before the competent forums. In a writ petition, aggrieved person would be that person who has put forth any plea before a forum and the latter fails to exercise jurisdiction with regard to that or has decided a1 2 3 matter without having any jurisdiction to adjudicate upon it but if a matter is not placed before a forum, it cannot be asserted that that forum failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it or exercised jurisdiction not vested in it. We would, therefore, hold that the petitioner could not make out a new case in a writ petition which is different from the one pleaded before the competent forums. In this connection, we draw support from Messrs Bakhsh Textile Ltd. v. Pakistan and others , Obaidullah Khan v. Labour Court No, V, Karachi etc. , Mst. Fatima and another v. Assistant Commissioner/Collector, Shujabad Sub-Division and another , Allah Dia v. Settlement Commissioner (Lands) and others and Messrs Merck Sharp and Dhome of Pakistan Limited v. Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal and 2 others . We would, therefore, repel this contention as well.
7. The Bank, on coming to know that the receipt register had been taken out and a page had been torn from there, lodged an F. I. R. No, 97 on 3rd May, 1978 in Police Station Cantt : Abbottabad, under sections 420/ 466/471 and 204, P. P. C. In this F. I. R. The petitioner was implicated alongwith certain other officials of the Bank. It transpires that on coming to know of this criminal charge against them the petitioner and the other employees made a compromise with the Bank whereby the petitioner admitted that he had given up service of the Bank and that they had compromised the criminal case. This writ compromise was produced in the Court of a Magistrate where it was accepted and the criminal case against the petitioner and others was allowed to be withdrawn under section 494, Cr. P. C. This compromise was effected on 13th January, 1980 and the case was allowed to be withdrawn on 30th January, 1980. By this compromise, the petitioner himself admitted that he had left the service of the Bank which would show that he was not an aggrieved person for the purposes of the writ petition. The petitioner was, therefore, estopped by his own conduct to come up with this writ petition. In this connection, reference with' benefit may be made to Muhammad Ismail v. Abdur Rashid and 2 others , Pakistan through Chairman, Railways v. The Punjab Labour Court No, 2, Lahore and 2 others , Muhammad Hadayatullah v. Haji Allah Ditta and others and United Bank Limited Lahore v. Government of the Punjab and 2 others .
8. The petitioner has not mentioned in his writ petition that he ha made a compromise with the Bank wherein he had voluntarily left the service. This would show that the petitioner has not come up to this Court with clean hands. A criminal case was registered against him and he had not disclosed it in his writ petition as also the compromise effected by him in that criminal case. He is guilty of suppression of facts. In such an eventuality, the High Court would not grant any relief to a petitioner howsoever void the impugned action may be, whereas no illegality or irregularity of any kind has been shown in the orders of the learned Labour Forums impugned in this writ petition. In this connection we would rely upon Raz a Khan v. Vice-Chancellor, N.-W. F. P., University of Engineering and Technology, Peshawar , Zafarullah v. Board of Intermediate and Secondary Educatibn and another , Ali Muhammad and others v. Admission Committee, University of Engineering and Technology, Peshawar and another , and Safiullah Khan and another v.
Settlement Commissioner, Punjab, Lahore and S others .
9. We also find that the last impugned order of the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal, N. W. F. P., Peshawar, was made on 17th March, 1979 and the writ petition was filed after expiry of about 17 months. The petitioner has failed to account for this delay. Sufficient time elapsed when the petitioner thought to challenge the impugned orders through this writ petition. The writ petition is also barred by laches on the part of the petitioner. Even on this score, we would not be willing to grant him any relief.
10. For the aforesaid reasons, we would dismiss this writ petition with no order as to costs. 1979 SCMR 425 1980 SCMR 933 1982 PLC 174 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1 2 3 1982 SCMR 497 1981 PLC 321 1981 CLC 1755 1982 CLC 1908 1982 PLC 148 1983 SCMR 168 1982 CLC 711 1982 CLC 1477 PLD 1982 Lah. 384 1982 SCMR 560 1982 SCMR 571 PLD 1982 Pesh. 106 1982 SC MR 853