' Petitioner Obaidullah Khan son of Abdullah Khan, resident of Muhammadi Masjid Ahle-Hadees, Chandani Chowk, Paposh Nagar, Karachi, seeks to challenge the orders, of the Junior Labour Court No, 5, dated 11th January 1975, passed on his application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and of the Labour Court No, 5, dated 17-10-1975, passed in appeal.
2. The facts leading up to the filing of the petition are as under :-
3. The petitioner was employed part time as Accountant by Messrs Rehman Metal Industries in their principal office in November 1968, and was placed in regular employment as such with effect f,rom February, 1969, after he had carried out the bulk of work of pending arrears from April 1963. There was no letter of appointment showing terms and conditions of his employment but he was verbally given to understand by Abdul Rahman, a partner of the Firm that his starring salary would be Rs, 400 per month alongwith allied- benefits with effect from February 1969. According to the petitioner he was further given to understand that there would be facilities of earned leave at 1/11, bonus and free medical aid or cash payment in lieu thereof. With regard to increments the petitioner in his main petition. Has stated as under :- "Under certain terms and conditions it was stipulated that the salary of the petitioner shall be increased alongwith other allied benefits according to the profits of the newly established Firm which had started production in August 1968."
' It is further the case of the petitioner that respondent No, 3, was honour bound to make payment of compensation for the arrears of pending work of five years alongwith bonus and annual increment, encashment of leave, etc. Dependent upon the profits of the Firm.
4. With regard to the nature of his duties it is the case of the petitioner that he looked after the work of accounts, preparation of Balance-Sheet and its closing and analysis in the main (Principal) office. He was given the further work of imports sales and also of attending as representative of the Firm in the various offices such as Bank, the office of Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and offices of the indenters. Besides he was also assigned the job of checking the Stock and Process Registers and checking of costs and ratio of consumption etc. At the factory site and to submit such reports to the Firm. His claims for compensation etc. Had been put off on the pretext of awaiting assessm ent order from Income-tax Authorities. In his omnibus petition which runs to 92 closely typed pages the petitioner who is not represented by any lawyer and who has drafted the petition himself has endeavoured to show that the firm was in sound financial position and had gained what he terms as 'huge net profits' for the period ending 31st March 1971, amounting to Rs, 2,05,665.31, after clearance of heavy pending liabilities of Rs, 1,81,253,71, pertaining to interest on German loan, exchange risk and overdue interest etc. It is, however, his case that after downfall by Dacca (East Pakistan) the respondent has taken back the work of administration, imports, sales, etc. From him and a dispute arose in the month of August 1912, while he was closing the accounts for the financial year 1971-72. The respondent had ordered him to replace new sets of books of Accounts from 1963-64 to 1970-71, by increasing for time high the ratio of consumption of raw- materials, other than M. S. Wire red coils, which are the basic raw-material; wages disbursement, and to show low position of money in hand as well as the value of assets for creating wrong evidence for the Income-tax assessment which had not been made since the" beginning due to "double dealing" by the respondent firm. He refused to oblige and after that he came a persona non grata with the firm. It is further the case of the petitioner that after orders of Nationalisation of certain Industries by the Government, the record, registers etc. Of the firm were kept at the residence of Abdul Rahman partner and he was compelled to work there. Since November 1972, the firm tried to get rid of him and furnishing of records etc. Was completely stopped deliberately (page 10 of the main petition). However, he has stated in his petition that last date of checking work, which could be verified from the Stock and Process registers of the factory was 3rd April 1973.
Attempts on his life by administering poison in the lunch provided to him at the residence of Abdul Rahman were made on 2nd and 4th April 1973. His entry was illegally barred on the pretext of arbitration from 17-4-1973, and a letter dated 15-5-1973, wrongly alleging his absence was served on him. Petitioner, however, reported for duty on 24-5-73, when he received transfer order of that date posting him in the factory, which was used for barring his entry in his main office where the records were being destroyed. He was addressed show-cause letter dated 23-7-1973, as to why his services be not terminated. The petitioner made reply dated 30-7-1973, which is also the grievance notice of petitioner to the respondent firm of which a copy was sent to the Directorate of Labour Sind. The Director of Labour sent notice and ,held meeting on 10-8-1973. It is the case of petitioner that the attendance register was not produced to support the baseless charges of absence without leave. He received letter dated 10-8-1973, from Director Labour advising him to seek remedy of the grievance from Junior Labour Court under section 25-A, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. No reply to the grievance notice dated 30-7-1973, had been received and, therefore, the petitioner filed application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, on 28-8-1973.
5. In the application, besides narrating the factual position already referred to above he enclosed his pending claim for Rs, 9,300 and further stated that long before downfall of Dacca the Income- tax Authorities, Karachi Zone were very much compelling for Assessment of the firm but the respondent had always tried to keep it as a pending matter. He further pointed and that the respondent firm was gaining Rs, 500 to Rs, 1,000 profit and was increasing the liabilities day by day and trying to decrease the capital and had been harassing him unnecessarily. In the end he warned that unless he was spared from victimization the consequences would be bad where the respondent was concerned.
6. In the application besides narrating the factual position already referred to above the reasons for failure to report for duty of the factory, were mentioned as order :-
(a) That transfer and posting in the factory meant demotion and was a punishment which could not be awarded without a charge-sheet and enquiry.
(b) That protection of his fife was involved.
(c) That the nature of work at the factory was different and it was too late for him as an old man to learn a new trade.
' Finally it was contended that the intention of respondent was to squeeze him out financially and otherwise. It may here be observed that the only relief sought was with regard to recovery of alleged dues and there was no prayer for re-instatement. He claimed dues as under :-
(1) Rs, 9,300-Accumulated papers serialised and Books of account completed for years 1963-64, 1964-65, 1965-66, 1966-67 and 196768.
(2) Rs, 1,900 as bonus for 4 years 1968-69, 1969-70, 1970-71 and 1971-72.
(3) Rs, 3,600 towards increments at Rs, 50 per month for 1969-70, Rs, 100 per month for 1970-71 and Rs, 150 per month for the year 1971-72.
(4) Rs, 1,900 claimed as arrears of encashment of earned leave for years 1968-69, 1969-70, 1970-71 and 1971-72 (calculating leave due as 33 days -but charging for 30 days).
7. With regard to the above-mentioned claims of the petitioner, there are concurrent findings of fact by firstly the Junior Labour Court, secondly again another Junior Court after remand of the case, and finally of the Sind Labour Court in appeal. Obviously, the petitioner failed to prove his claims none of which were based on any documentary evidence. For instance, with regard to claim for increments in the pay even the Petitioner in the instant petition has not been able to show as to how the same have been claimed. Admittedly it was his case that there was verbal commitment on the part of the firm that as and when the gains through production as justified, there would be a raise in salary. Even he himself was not able to State with certainty as to the formula under which the pay increase would have been due to Itim and the other workers. The only claim which could 'he properly ascertained in it with regard to arrears of salary during the period that according to him he was on leave with permission of the firm. However, the different contentions of the petitioner and the respondent firm in this regard are those of fact and since there are concurrent findings of the three forums below on the point that nothing is due to the petitioner, it is not for this Court in exercise of the special discretionary jurisdiction to go into the aforesaid matter of finding on fact; specially as there is nothing on record to show that there has been misreading or non-reading of the evidence on record.
8. With regard to the relief now sought in the instant petition about the re-instatement and declaration of the dismissal being illegal, since no such relief was sought in the application made under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and the plea was not taken in the demand notice given by the petitioner it is contended on behalf of the respondent-firm that such fresh relief and plea cannot be raised at this stage. The petitioner whose services had been terminated had submitted his grievance petition to the employees simply requesting payment of dues and not for re-instatement.
9. In the decision in Koh-e-Noor Battries Manufacture Company v. Lal Muhammad and another of the Labour Appellate Tribunal the same question came up for discussion. The Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind, held that the implication was that if he did not bring his grievance to the notice of the employer, L. Would lose his right under section 25-A of the Ordinance. It was observed as under :- "The intention of the Legislature in framing section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is two-fold. Firstly, an opportunity should be given to the employer himself to redress the grievance1 of the individual workman expeditiously, and secondly, that it is only in case of failure on the part of the employer to redress the grievance, that the latter, if he so desires, can approach the Junior Labour Court for his grievance."
In the instant case the grievance about the dismissal being illegal was reinstatement was not taken in the action of employer and further it was not taken before the Junior Labour Court or even the Appellate Labour Court and, therefore, it has rightly been contended on behalf of the respondent Firm that this plea cannot now be raised for the first time in this writ petition.
10. Mr. Latifur Rehman Sarwari, the learned counsel for the respondent firm has contended that under Article 199 of the Constitution the High Court is not empowered to interfere, with the decision of a Court or tribunal of inferior jurisdiction merely because in its opinion the decision is wrong. It is only in cases where there is complete lack of jurisdiction to decide a matter, that there is scope for interference. He has relied upon the decision of this Court in C. P. No, 78/76. In Abdul Farrukh v. The Presiding Officer, Junior Labour Court and 2 others, wherein it was held that the findings of fact arrived at. By Courts below were not open to question in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction. It was further observed as under :- "It is trite law as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Mohammad Hussain Muneer v.
Sikandar, that it was wholly wrong to consider that the constitutional jurisdiction of Article 199 was designated to empower the High Court to interfere with the decision of a Court or tribunal of inferior jurisdiction, merely because in its opinion the decision is wrong. When there is a jurisdiction to decide a matter then there is jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly and the fact that the decision is incorrect does not render the decision without jurisdictioh."
11. There is another defect which cannot be overlooked in this case as the impugned orders of the Junior Labour Court and the Sind Labour Court in appeal were passed on 11-1-1975 and 17-10-1975, but the instant petition was presented on 29-8-1978, i,e, after lapse of about 3 years. The certified copies of the impugned orders were in possession of the petitioner and it has been pointed out that it was not necessary for him to wait for getting certified copies for filing the instant petition. In any case it is apparent that even after all the certified copies were obtained about 6 months more were taken before the petition was filed. The only explanation given by the petitioner with regard to the delay is that the matter involved complicated questions of law and since he had no legal advice and had drafted the petition himself he had taken all the time. The legal position as will be discussed would show that sue an excuse cannot be accepted as it could be treated as a precedent to cover such inordinate delay by the simple assertion that a party could not afford to have legal advice.
12. Learned counsel for the respondent firm has cited a number of decisions in support of his contention that the petition does not deserve to be considered after such a long delay. In S. I. T. E.
Ltd. V. 1st Assistant Judge, Hyderabad and 4 others, where cause of action had arises on 5th March 1958, and writ petition was filed on 28th March 1959, the delay was considered fatal to the petition.
Similarly, in Standard Vaccum Gil Company v. The Trustees of Fort of Chitagong. The Dacca High Court decided that although law of limitation as such was not applicable to writ petition. It is well settled that High Court, will refuse to exercise its discretion to issue writ of mandamus or order of like nature, if the petitioners do not come to Court with due diligence and expedition. Reliance has also been placed on the decision of Dacca High Court in Akhtarud Din Jan v. Province East Pakistan and others where undue delay or laches were held to defeat prayer for claiming extraordinary relief.
13. In Mukhtar Hussain v. The District Manager, Provincial Transport Service, Lyallpur and others a petition seeking relief filed were then 3} years after passing of the impugned order was considered to have been filed after delay which amounted to acquiescence and laches. The learned counsel for the respondent also relied upon the decision of the Lahore High Court in Mubarrak Ali and others2 3 4 5 6 v. The Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and others, wherein it was held that delay and laches were good grounds for refusing to exercise discretion under Article 98. He has also referred to the Supreme Court decisions in Muhammad Hafeezullah v. Ghttlam Yasin and 2 others and The State of Pakistan v. Abdul Dayyan Khan on the point that delay in filing the petition is sufficient ground for denying relief.
14. In the circumstances stated the writ petition is dismissed but as the petitioner had no legal assistance, no order is being passed with regard to costs. 1975 PLC 196 PLD 1978 Kar. 867 PLD 1960 Kar. 825 PLD 1961 Dacca 288 PLD 1963 Dacca 1001 PLD 1976 Lab. 258 PLD 1966 Lah. 903 1970 SC MR 41 1972 SCMR 69