' The appellant who served Pakistan Railways for quite long was lastly posed at Shelabhag as mate when on 11th July, 1979, he was found unauthorisedly absent from duty. Thus the 3rd respondent issued him a show-cause notice which was replied, admitting the charge. It was, however, explained that he absented himself under unavoidable circumstances. In view of such admission no enquiry was considered necessary under rule 3 of Railway Servants (Efficiency and Discipline)
Rules, 1975, and he was reverted as key-man. An appeal was filed against this order to the 2nd respondent who ordered his retirement from service. Subsequently on 5th January, 1980 he filed another appeal to the first respondent who modified earlier orders in view of his past clean record and decided that he would serve as Gangman at Quetta for one year and thereafter his original position of mate will be restored to him. The appellant did not comply with these orders and filed an application under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the I.R.O.) before the Labour Court, Quetta who dismissed it on 20th March, 1980 on the ground of non-observance of grievance procedure as described by section 25-A of I.R.O., hence this appeal.
2. Mr. S. A. M. Qadri, appearing for the appellant, assailed the impugned order on the grounds (i) that mercy petition filed by the appellant to the first respondent should have been treated by the Labour Court as notice of grievance, and (ii) that no enquiry having been held against the appellant, the order of his reversion as well as the orders passed subsequent thereto were illegal.
' With reference to the first ground, Mr. Qadri contended that no particular form or method was prescribed by section 25-A, I.R.O. With regard to grievance prozedure, therefore, all what an aggrieved worker was obliged to do was to intimate to his employer the grounds of his grievance before approaching the Court of law. He further argued that purpose behind introducing this provision of law, was that an employer should not be taken by surprise by Court proceedings ; rather he should get fair opportunity to decide his employee's case under Organization's own rules.
I agree with him to this extent that no particular form or procedure has been prescribed by section 25-A for its compliance in this respect. The intention of the Legislature would be clearer if we only peruse the contents of law, which I reproduce below:- "Section 25-A : Redress of individual grievances.-(l) A worker may bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force to the notice of his employer in writing, either himself or through his Shop Steward or (Collective Bargaining Agent), within three months of the day on which cause of such grievance arises."
It is manifest that it has been made obligatory upon the worker to bring his complaint to the notice of his employer first. The purposely behind it is two-fold, namely that (i) unnecessary litigation may be avoided, and (ii) cordial relations be ensured by setting the disputes on departmental level.
Therefore, it is not necessary that the intimation of an employee's grievance should be in a particular form. All what he has to do is to bring his grievance to his employer's notice. To fulfil this requirement of law a petition, appeal or application, submitted within time can be regarded compliance of grievance procedure. In this case, mercy petition submitted after the departmental appeal could be regarded sufficient compliance of section 25-A, I. R.
0. The view of the Labour Court is thus not tenable in law on this point. But admitting that the application should have been tried on merits, I find that no useful purpose would be served by the remand of the case as appellant has nothing to say after admission of the charge except that lenient view of the matter may be taken. This was his request before the departmental authorities also of which the first respondent considered and modified earlier punishment. Obviously neither the Labour Court nor this Court can substitute its views as to the quantum or nature of penalty.
Accordingly 1 find no merits in this appeal, on factual aspect.
3. However, before parting with the case I may observe that by his posting at Quetta, the appellant does not suffer either in terms of money or with regard to his facilities. Then the duration of his posting in the present capacity at Quetta is only one year of which substantial portion has already been passed by efflux of time.
' The appeal is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.