' This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan calls in question the judgment dated 5-6-1985 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Kasur, whereby he dismissed the revision petition against the order dated 11-3-1980 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kasur, whereby he dismissed the objection petition filed by the petitioner under Order XXI, rule 99, C.P.C.
2. The facts relevant for disposal of this petition are that Sh. Muhammad Saeed deceased the predecessor-in-interest of respondents Nos.1 to 25 .Filed an application for ejectment against Sardar Muhammad respondent No,26 herein on the ground of default who denied the tenancy and claimed to be the owner of the disputed property through adverse possession. In view of pleadings of the parties, the learned Rent Controller framed a preliminary issue whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties. This was decided in favour of Sh. Muhammad Saecd the original landlord on 4-2-1969. Consequently, the learned Rent Controller Kasur vide order dated 13-6-1969 accepted the application and ordered eviction of respondent No,26 herein. This order was upheld in appeal by the learned Additional District Judge vide his judgment dated 7-2- 1970.
3. Thereafter, Haji Muhammad Hussain petitioner submitted an application under Order XXI, rule 99, C.P.C. Before the Executing Court stating therein that he purchased land bearing Khasra No,5569, Plot No,3 situate in Ward No,1, Khudian, Tchsil and District Kasur, vide registered sale-deed dated 24-5-1969, but neither the original transferee nor his sons served any notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 on the occupant of the land namely Sardar Muhammad (respondent No,26 herein). It was also stated that Sardar Muhammad filed a suit for declaration that he was a statutory tenant under the applicant who was impleaded as one of the defendants. During the pendency of the said suit Sardar Muhammad vacated the site in question as , well as the superstructure thereon and the applicant was in possession in his own right as an owner under a title deed. This application was resisted by Sh. Muhammad Saeed the original decree-holder who took the plea that subject-matter in the ejectment proceedings was different than the one purchased by the petitioner which was a vacant land and consisted of 9/1-2 Marlas whereas the property in dispute, which was subject-matter of the ejectment proceedings was a constructed one and rented out to the judgment debtor in 1957. It was also pleaded that the petitioner and Sardar Muhammad judgment-debtor were closely related to each other and the ejectment petition was filed with ulterior motive and with active connivance of the judgment- debtor. The possession of the petitioner in the property in dispute was also denied. The executing Court in view of pleadings of the parties, issues struck thereunder and evidence led by them, rejected the objection petition vide order dated 11-3-1980 and held that the decree-holder was entitled to be put into possession of the property in dispute by the judgment-debtor under the order passed by the learned Rent Controller on 13-3-1969 and if subsequent to that on 24-5-1969, the objector purchased the plot he is to recover the possession from the decree-holder and not from the tenant who never attorned to him. On appeal, the learned Additional District Judge, Kasur, after re-appreciating the evidence on record, held that the petitioner objector at the time of ejectment order dated 13-3-1969 had no right to be made party in the suit as he was not owner by then and the ejectment order was operative against Sardar Muhammad respondent therein and he was bound to deliver possession to the decree-holder. It was also held that Sardar Muhammad collusively handed over the possession to the petitioner and possession obtained in that manner would not confer any right to resist execution proceedings. On these premises, it was observed that once the decree-holder obtains possession, the petitioner can file a suit for possession on the basis of his title deed. Resultantly the execution petition was dismissed by order dated 5-6-1985.
4. Mr Abdul Hameed Malik, learned counsel for the petitioner relying on Quality Steel Corporation v.
Ch. Muhammad Tufail (1984 CLC 2255) and Muhammad Yasin v. Sheikh Ghulam Murtaza (PLD 1981 SC 163), contended that the objection petition regarding determination of disputed question of title is competent before the Rent Controller, who is to execute the order of ejectment as decree of the civil Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner strongly relied on the following observation made in the precedent case:- "A Controller has no power or control over a decree of a Civil Court except for this deeming provision. Where a power to execute an order in the manner of a decree of a Civil Court is conferred then on the ordinary rule of interpretation all the powers necessary or enjoyed by the executing authority for effectively and completely executing a decree of a Civil Court shall be available to the Controller. The deeming cannot stop short or boggle. To hold that the Controller will have the power to execute the order as a decree of the Civil Court but will have no power to decide objections to the order, and to its executability, will amount to in fact denying the Controller the very power to execute the decree itself. Such cannot be the result or the effect of the deeming clause. It has to be given full effect and the logical consequence of the empowering provision must follow."
5. There is no cavil with the proposition of law canvassed by learned counsel for the petitioner that an executing Court has the power to entertain and adjudicate an objection petition filed by a person claiming through the judgment-debtor even before their physical dispossession from the property. What remains to be seen is whether this principle is applicable to the facts of this case.
Here a concurrent finding of facts has been recorded by the Courts below that Sardar Muhammad collusively handed over the possession to the petitioner during the course of execution proceedings. The petitioner and the judgment-debtor are closely related to each other and have been working together as Commission A Agent. Furthermore, the subject-matter of the property in the ejectment proceedings was a constructed shop whereas the petitioner claimed to have purchased a vacant site through registered sale-deed dated 24-5-1969. Thus visualised, the claim lodged by the petitioner under Order XXI, rule 99, C.P.C. Was not bona tide and was rightly rejected by the Courts below. In view of the above the petitioner is not entitled to any equitable relief ' in the exercise of discretionary constitutional jurisdiction. The petition, therefore, I fails and is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.