' NAIMUDDIN, J.-By an order dated 24-3-1983, passed in Constitutional Petition No. D-24 of 1983, the question 'whether Mr. Ahmed Ali U. Qureshi was not holding a post of District Judge on the date when the Special Court consisting of him was constituted under section 5 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 (Ordinance XIX of 1979) (hereinafter called the Ordinance), was directed to ""be heard as preliminary question. Since this question was involved in a number of cases all were directed to be fixed for hearing together. The Registrar, High Court of Sind, was directed to place the service 'record of Mr. Ahmed Ali U.
Qureshi before the Bench hearing this petition and other petitions involving the same question. By the same order the learned Deputy Attorney-General and the learned Advocate-General, Sind were directed to appear before the Bench.
2. We have heard Mr. Munawar Ghani learned counsel for the petitioner in this petition. Mr. S. Abbas Zia learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. G. H. Malik learned counsel for respondent No. 2 in Constitution Petition No. D-97 of 1983. Mr. Khalid M. Lshaque learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Mansoorul Arifin learned counsel for respondent No. 2 in Constitution Petition No. D-183 of 198 , Mr. Usman Ghani Rashid learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Syed Mainnoon Hasan learned counsel for respondent No. 5 in Constitution Petition No. D-1108 of 1981. Mr. Abdul Samad Khan learned cour.Sel for the petitioner and Mr. Iqbal Haider, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 in Constitution Petition No. D-149 of 1984 and Constitution Petition No. 20 of 1984 and Mr. Aziz A. Munshi, learned Deputy Attorney-Generut on Court notice.
3. So far as the fate of Constitution Petition No. D-24 of 1983, is concerned, it solely depends on the answer which is to be given to the question which is heard as preliminary question as Mr. Munawar Ghani has stated that there is no other point involved in this constitution petition. Therefore, this judgment will dispose of this constitution petition in its entirety.
4. So far as Constitution Petition No. D-97 of 1983, is concerned, Mr. S. Abbas Zia stated that besides the preliminary question which we are required to answer, he has to urge one more point in support of the petition namely, that the decree impugned in this constitution petition is illegal as in the suit in which the decree was passed, the plaint filed was not signed by proper person authorised to sign the plaint. We have, therefore, heard M. S. Abbas Zia on this point also and this judgment will also dispose of the said constitution petition as a whole for we propose to deal with this point too in this judgment. The other constitution petitions will be fixed for bearing on other points as ordered in those petitions.
5. Now, taking up the question we may first note certain facts noticed by us after going through the service record of Mr. Ahmed Ali U. Qureshi with regard to various posts he held on various material dates.
6. The first date to be noticed is 2nd August, 1972. When a corrigendum Bearing No. S-O-(iv) (Establishment)-7 (33)/72, was issued which shows that Mr. Ahmed All U. Qureshi, Additional District & Sessions Judge, Karachi was promoted as Officiating District and Sessions Judge and posted as Judge, Small Causes Court, Karachi against the existing vacancy. By another Notification No. S-(Genl-17-178), dated 16-3-1974, Mr. Qureshi was promoted and posted as Officiating District and Sessions Judge, Khairpur vice Mr. Hyder Shah. At that time he was Judge, Small Causes Court, Karachi. By another Notification No. V(8)-S0J/74, issued in exercise of powers conferred by sub. Section (I) of section 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the Government of Sind appointed Mr. Qureshi as Sessions Judge, Khan pur. Thereafter we find a communication bearing No. F- 1(19)/72-E, dated 30-11-1974, from the Section Officer, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Law & Parliamentary .Affairs (Law Division) addressed to the Chief Secretary, Government of Sind, Karachi, informing him that Mr. Qureshi has been approved for his appointment as the Deputy Solicitor in Law Division. The Chief Secretary was requested to relieve Mr. Qureshi immediately to enable him to take up his new assignment in that Division at Karachi. This notification was followed by another Notification bearing No. S-G-17-1/73/5149, dated 6-12-1974, whereby the Governor of Sind placed the services of Mr. Qureshi who was serving as District and Sessions Judge, Khairpur at the disposal of Government of Pakistan Law Division, for appointment as Deputy Solicitor with immediate effect. We may here quote this notification in extenso.
' Government of Sind Law Department "No. S. Genl-17-1/73, Governor of Sind is pleased to place the service of Mr. Ahmed Ali Qureshi, District Judge, Khairpur, at the disposal of Government of Pakistan, Law Division, for appointment as Deputy Solicitor with immediate effect.
(Sd.)
Munawwar All Khan, Secretary to Government of Sind, Law Department."
' Thereafter, by Notification No. 'F. 1(1)/76-E(V), dated 13-7-1976, Mr. Ahmed All U. Qureshi relinquished the charge of the post of Deputy Solicitor in the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs (Law Division) to officiate as Joint Secretary in the Law Division vide Establishment Division's Notification No. 20-3.76-A4 (iii), dated 9-7- 1976. He worked in the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs in that capacity for some time and thereafter by Notification bearing Pio. F. 48(1)/77-A (iv), dated 1-3-1977, he was appointed as Special Judge in Grade 20, with immediate effect for the Province of Sind. It was done in exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (1) of section 185 of the Custom, Act, 1969 (Act IV of 1969). At that time Mr. Qureshi was the joint Secretary in the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs (Law Division). At the same time by another notification bearing F.
48(l)/77-A(V), dated 1-3-1977, issued in exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (1) of section 9-A of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 (I of 1944), Mr. Qureshi was appointed as Special Judge within the territorial limits of the Province of Sind. By another notification of the same date bearing No. F. 48(1)/77- A(V1), in exercise of the powers conferred by sections 3 and 4 of the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958 (XL of 1958), Mr. Qureshi was also appointed as Special Judge (Customs & Taxation), with immediate effect, with jurisdiction to try offences under the said Act or under the Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922), in the Province of Sind. This notification was followed by another Notification bearing No. F. 48(1)77-A, dated 18-10-1977, whereby in exercise of the powers conferred by suosection (1) of section 44 of the Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977 (XII of i977) Mr. Ahmed All U. Qureshi was appointed as Special Judge for the Province of Sind which charge he took in the afternoon of 5-11-1977, by Notification No. F. 4 (1)179-A, dated 20-7-1979, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 31 of the Drugs Act, 1976 (XXXI of 1976) Mr. Qureshi was appointed as Chairman of the Drugs Court. About 16 months thereafter by Notification No. F. 45 (1)/79-A, dated 4-11.1980 in exercise of the powers conferred by section 5 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 (XIX of 1979), the Federal Government established a Special Court consisting of Mr. Qureshi with its Head Quarters at Karachi with effect from 1-11-1980, in the Province of Sind.
7. From the above-stated facts, it is clear that on 16.3-1974, Mr. Qureshi was promoted and appointed as officiating District Judge, Khairpur which rank he continued to hold though subsequently he was deputed to work' in various capacities mentioned hereinbefore.
8. It is however, argued by Mr. Khalid M. Ishaque that Mr. Qureshi should have been a district Judge on the date of the notification by which the Special Court consisting of him was established under section 5 of the Ordinance. His argument is that in section 5, the word used is 'is' which according to him, means that the person to be appointed as Judge of the Special Court should be a District Judge on the date of his appointment as such.
' It is further argued by Mr. Khalid M. Lshaque that no doubt Mr. Qureshi acted as Officiating District Judge at one time but that was not enough to qualify him for appointment as Special Judge. Mr Khalid submitted that he (the Special Judge) at the time of his appointment should have been actually working as District Judge.
' He was supported in the arguments by the counsel for the petitioners in other petitions.
9. In addition, it is submitted by Mr. Usman Ghani Rashid that to be qualified for such appointment Mr. Qureshi should have not only been a District Judge on the date of his appointment but should have continued to hold that post even after his appointment as Judge of the Special Court.
10. It is argued by Mr. Samad Khan that Notification No. F. 45(1)/79, dated 4-11-1980, establishing the Special Court was cancelled/withdrawn, and therefore, Mr. Qureshi ceased to be Judge of Special Court.
' We may at this very stage state that we are not required to deal this submission for what is questioned before us in the aforesaid petitions is the order, or decree passed by Mr. Qureshi.
11. On the other hand, Mr. A. A. Munshi, the learned Deputy Attorney-General has submitted that Mr. Qureshi not only once actually acted as District Judge but he continued to remain in that cadre. He further submitted that in any case, his judgments, orders and decrees are saved by de, cot doctrine.
12. It is submitted by Mr. Mansoorul Arfin that the word 'is' has often been construed as 'has been' and accordingly he argued that since Mr. Qureshi was promoted as District Judge and appointed as officiating District Judge, Khairpur, he was qualified to be appointed as Judge of Special Court.
13. The other counsel for the petitioners adopted the arguments of Mr. Khalid M. Ishaque.
14. Now, before we consider the submissions of Mr. Khalid M. Ishaque, it may be convenient to quote here first the provisions of section 5 of the Ordinance, which read as follows: "5. Establishment of Special Courts.-(1) The Federal Government may by notification in the official Gazette, establish as many Special Courts as it considers necessary, and where it establishes more than one Special Court, shall specify in the notification the territorial limits within which each one of them shall exercise jurisdiction under this Ordinance.
(2) A Special Court shall consist of a person who is a District Judge."
' In support of his submission that Mr. Qureshi should not only have been a District Judge once but should have actually held the post of District Judge on the date of establishment of the Special Court. Mr. Khalid M. Ishaque relied on the definition of 'District Judge' given in section 3, subsection (15) of the General Clauses Act,. 1897, which reads as follows: 'District Judge' shall mean the Judge of a Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, but shall not include a High Court in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction."
On the basis of the above-quoted definition, he argued that to be qualifed for appointment as Judge of Special Court, Mr. Qureshi should have been the Judge of Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction on the date of his appointment and since he was acting as Chairman of Drugs Court and not as a District Judge, be was not qualified to constitute Special Court on the relevant date.
15. We regret we cannot accept the argument that Mr. Qureshi should have actually held the post of a District Judge on the date of his appointment as the Judge of the Special Court for the word 'is' used in section 5 of the Ordinance should be construed liberally and should read 'has been' as having the meaning (in the past sense) such an interpretation is permissible the rules of interpretation of statutes (Six Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn., p. 228).
16. We may here refer to Mt. Mewa Kimwari v. Bourey and another (1), wherein the word 'is' used in section 35 of the Stamp Act, 1899, came up for consideration before Kendall, J.
' Before we quote the relevant observations, we may reproduce the provisions of section 35 of the Stamp Act, 1899, which reads as follows: "No instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence... Unless such instrument is duly stamped."
' Considering the above provisions and the word 'is' used therein Kendall, J. Observed at page 389 of the report as follows: "The question is, therefore, whether the word 'is' in section 35 may be so interpreted as to include the words 'has been'. In Chapter 9 of his work on the Interpretation of Statutes, Edn. 7, p. 198, Sir Peter Maxwell remarks as follows:- "Whether the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to...Some incovenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, by altering their correlation, by rejecting them altogether, or by interpolating other words, under the influence, no doubt, of an irresistible conviction that the Legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications thus made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used."
' In my opinion, the language of the Act is not absolutely intractable. It is not even necessary to depart from the rules of grammar or to do any violence to the language of the section. It is only necessary to interpret the word 'is' in a liberal manner and in the manner that it appears to me, the Legislature must have intended. I think that in the circumstances the document ought to be held to be admissible and the plaintiff ought to have an opportunity of pursuing his claim."
17. Reference may also be made to Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 48, p. 774 which states the meaning of the word 'is' as "the third person singular, present indicative of the verb "be", although the word has been used in the sense of "are" denoting the plural number. In its plain, ordinary, and usual sense, it denotes present tense, and it has been said that it is employed only in indication of that sense. However, it has also been said that, by reason of The context the meaning of the word may not be confined to the present. But it may have a future signification in the sense of "will be", or a past signification in the sense of "has been". (Underlining is ours for emphasis). For this meaning reliance is placed on the American cases of Louisville Southern R. Co. v. Lewis (2) and Stone v. Morgan (3).
17-A. Viewing the appointment of Mr. Qureshi in the light of the above meaning of the word 'is', we are of the opinion that since once Mr. Qureshil {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) AIR 1934 All. 388 (2) 41 S W 3 (4)
(3) 3 So. 580, 581 {{FOOT NOTE}} *Mere in statical ' had held the post of District Judge, that was sufficient to qualify him and it was not necessary that he should have actually held the post as District Judge on the date of his appointment.
' We are fortified in this view by the decision of the Supreme Court in South British Insurance Employees' Union v. The Sind Labour Court No. 4 and others (1), wherein the facts were that Mr. A. Hamid Balocb, a Senior Civil Judge was promoted as Additional District Judge and appointed as Presiding Officer of Labour Court and the question arose whether he was qualified for appointment as Presiding Officer. It was argued that since Mr. Abdul Hamid Baloch had not worked as Additional District Judge before assuming the charge of the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, he was not Additional District Judge and, therefore, was not qualified to be appointed as such.
' Repelling the argument, Anwar-ul-Haq, J. (as.He then was) who delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court observed at pages 50 and 51 of the report as follows: "The only requirement contemplated by this provision of law is that the person is a District Judge or an Additional District Judge at the time of his appointment. Mr. Baloch having been promoted to officiate as an Additional District Judge fulfilled this qualification, and could, therefore, legally be appointed to preside over the Labour Court, even by the same notification."
By the parity of reasoning, it was not necessary that Mr. Qureshi should have been acting as District Judge when the Special Court with him was constituted under section 5 of the Ordinance.
' Any reference to definition of the term District :fudge in the General Clauses Act loses its significance in the view that we have taken of the meaning of the word 'is', for Mr. Qureshi in fact had acted as District Judge, Khairpur which was the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction.
18. As regards the contention of Mr. Usman Ghani Rashid that the person to be appointed as Judge of Special Court should not only be a Judge of District Court but should continue in that post, it would suffice to say that the language of section 5 of the Ordinance does not warrant such an interpretation nor had any reasons been advanced or precedent cited to support the contention.
19. In any case the orders,judgments and decrees passed by Mr. Qureshi are saved by de facto doctrine. This doctrine gives validity to acts of judges de facto whatever defects there may be in the legality of. Their appointment. The doctrine is founded upon considerations of public policy and necessity, for the protection of the public and individuals whose interests may be effected thereby and to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief. We may here refer to a passage from Colley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th Edn., Vol. 2 p.
1357, which reads as follows: "No one is under obligation to recognize or respect the acts of an intruder and for all legal purposes they are absolutely void. But for the sake of order and regularity and to prevent confusion in the conduct of public business and in security or private rights the acts of Officers de facto are not suffered to be questioned because of the want of legal authority except by some direct proceeding instituted for the purpose by the State or by someone claiming the office de jure or except when {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) 1975 SCMR 49 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' the person himself attempts to build up some right, or claim some privilege or emolument, by reason of being the Officer which he claims to be. In all other cases the acts of an Officer de facto are as valid and effectual, which he is suffered to retain the office, as though he were an Officer by right, and the same legal consequences will flow from them for the protection of the public and of third parties. This is an important principle, which finds concise expression in the legal maxim that the acts of Officers de facto cannot be questioned collaterally."
' It is necessary to state here that Mr. Qureshi has not been made a party to these proceedings nor has any notice been issued to him. Only the orders or decrees passed by him have been questioned in the petitions.
20. The de facto doctrine has been recognized by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Lt.-Col. Farzand Ali ana others v. Province of West Pakistan through Secretary, Department of Agriculture. Government of West Pakistan Lahore (1). The learned Judges have observed therein as follows: "Upon these principles it was strenuously argued that the Third, Fourth and the Sixth Constitutional Amendments are now unassailable, because at any rate the allegedly disqualified respondents bad acted as de facto members, for, they bad acted under the bona fide belief that they were entitled to so act and had at least a fair color of title and they have also performed their duties with public acquiescence. They were no purely intruders. Therefore, their acts even apart from the provisions of sub-clause (d) of clause (1) of Article 110 were as good as those of de jure members of the National Assembly. There is a great deal of force in this contention and since this is not a direct attack upon their right to continue as members, their acts should not be invalidated merely because they could have been found in a proper proceeding under Article 98 (2) (b) to be disqualified from continuing as Members of the House. To do so collaterally in proceedings not taken to test the validity of their title directly would lead to serious inconvenience to the public and those individuals whose interests have been affected by the legislative measures enacted in the meantime. This de facto doctrine is a doctrine of necessity to bring about regularity and prevent confusion in the conduct of public business and promote security of private rights."
' This doctrine is also recognized by English Judges. In Milward v. Thatcher (2) at page 87 Buller ruled : "The question whether the judges below be properly judges or not, can never be determined, it is sufficient if they be Judges de facto. Suppose a person were even criminally convicted in a Court of Record, and the Recorder of such Court were not duly elected, the conviction would still be good in law, he being the Judge de facto."
' In Scadding v. Lorant (3), the question arose whether a rate for the relief of the poor was rendered invalid for the reasons that some of the vestry men who made it were vestry men de facto and not de jure. The Lord Chancellor said as follows: "With regard to the competency of the vestry men, who were vestry met. de facto, but not vestry men de jure, to make the rate, your Lordship {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1970 SC 98 (2) (1787) 2 T R 81
(3) (1851) 3 H L C 418 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' will see at once the importance of that objection, when you consider how many public officers and persons there are who were charged with very important duties, and whose title to the office on the part of the public cannot be ascertained at the time. You will at once see to what it would lead if the validity of their acts, when in such office, depended upon the propriety of their election. It might tend, if doubts were cast upon them, to consequences of the most destructive kind. It would create uncertainty with respect to the obedience to public Officers and it might also lead to persons, instead of resorting to ordinary legal remedies to set right anything done by the Officers, taking the law into their own hands."
22. The de facto doctrine has received judicial recognition in the United States of America also. In State v.
Gardner (Cases on Constitutional Law by Mc. Gonvey & Haward, p. 102) the question arose whether the offer of a bribe to a City Commissioner whose appointment was unconstitutional was an offence. Bradbury, J.
Observed: "We think that principle of public policy, declared by the English Courts three centuries ago, which gave validity to the official acts of persons who intruded themselves into an office to which they had not been legally appointed, is as applicable to the conditions now presented as they were to the conditions that then confronted the English Judiciary. We are not required to find a name by which Officers are to be known, who have acted under a statute that has subsequently been declared unconstitutional, though we think such Officers might aptly be called de facia Officers."
' The same was the view of Field, J., in Norton v. Shelby County (1). We may quote the same here: "The doctrine which gives validity to acts of Officers de facto whatever detects there may be in the legality of their appointment or election is founded upon considerations of public policy and necessity, for the protection of the public and individuals whose interests may be affected thereby. Offices are created for the benefit of the public, and private parties are not permitted to Inquire into the title of persons clothed with the evidence of such Offices and in apparent possession of their power and Functions. For the good order and peace of society their authority is to be respected and obeyed until in some regular mode prescribed by law their title is investigated and determined. It is manifest that endless confusion would result, if in every proceeding before such Officers there title could be called in question."
23. The doctrine has been followed by the Supreme Court of India in Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2). We may quote a passage from there which reads as follows: "A Judge, de facto is one who is not a mere intruder or usurper but on who holds office, under colour of lawful authority, though his appointment is defective and may later be found to be defective. Whatever the defect of his title to the office, judgments pronounced by him and act done by him when he was clothed with the powers and functions of the office, albeit unlawfully, have the same efficacy as judgments pronounced and acts done by a Judge de jure. Such is the de facto doctrine, born of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief. The de facto doctrine saves such acts. There is yet another {{FOOT NOTE}}
(2) AIR. 1981 SC 1473
(1) (1886) 118 U S 425a1,30 Led 178 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' rule also based on public policy. The defective appointment of a de facto Judge may be questioned directly in a proceeding to which he be a party but it cannot be permitted to be questioned in litigation between two private litigants, a litigation which is of no concern or consequence to the Judge except as Judge. Two litigants litigating their private titles cannot be permitted to bing the issue and litigate upon the title of a Judge to his office.
Otherwise as soon as a Judge pronounces a judgment a litigation may be commenced for a declaration that the judgment is void because the Judge is no Judge. A Judge's title to his office cannot be brought into jeopardy in that fashion. Hence the rule against collateral attack on validity of judicial appointments. To question a judge's appointment in an appeal against his judgment is, of course, such a collateral attack."
24. In the same case in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh Kuppuswami and Muktadar, JJ. Observed:- "Logically speaking if a person who has no authority to do so functions as a Judge and disposes of a case the judgment rendered by him ought to be considered as void and illegal, but in view of the considerable inconvenience which would be caused to the public in holding as void judgments rendered by Judges and other public Officers whose title to the office may be found to be defective at a later date. Courts in a number of countries have, from ancient times evolved a principle of law that under certain conditions, the acts of a Judge or Officer not legally competent may acquire validity."
25. Since in Constitution Petition No. D-24 of 198 3 this was the only point involved we, therefore, dismiss this petition. However, in the circumstances of the case we leave the parties to bear their own costs.
26. So far as Constitution Petition No. D-97 of 1983 is concerned, we would now discuss the additional point raised by the learned counsel. It was argued by Mr. S. Abbas Zia that the suit was decreed without there being a plaint signed by proper person. In this connection he referred to be plea raised in paragraph 3 of the petitioner's application under Order XLVII, rule 3, C. P. C. Which reads as follows : "The plaint has not been signed by a proper person under Order,XXIX, rule 1 read with Order VI, rule 14, C. P.
C. And, therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed."
It may firstly be stated that respondent No. 2 Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. Filed the suit, the plaint is verified by one Jabbar who claims to be the principal Officer and attorney of respondent No. 2 plaintiff and this claim is not denied in the application under Order XXXVII, rule 3, C. P. C. And in accordance with the provisions of rule 1 of Order XXIX, C. P. C. a plaint could be signed by a principal Officer. We may here quote rule 1 of Order XXIX, C.
P. C.
"1. In suits by or against a corporation, any pleading may be signed and verified on behalf of the corporation by the secretary or by any director or other principal Officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case."
' Therefore, the objection was without any substance.
27. Mr. S. Abbas Zia has relied on Messrs Muhammad Siddiq Muhammad Umar and another v. The Australasia Bank Ltd. (1). {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1966 SC 84 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' In this case a suit was instituted by the constituted attorney of a public limited liability company. It was held that he could only do so if he was duly authorised in that behalf and occupied one or other of the offices mentioned in rule 1 of Order XXIX of Civil Procedure Code.
In the present case, the question is not whether the suit was instituted by the properly constituted attorney or not but the question is whether the plaint was signed by one of those persons who are mentioned in rule 1 of Order XXIX, C. P. C.
' It is admitted fact as stated before, that the attorney claimed that h was one of the principal Officers of the Bank which claim has not been denied in the application for leave to defend or otherwise and, therefore, the plaint I properly signed.
28. In any case, the objection raised before the learned District Judge was in a different form and not in the form in which it is taken before us Even if we assume that the finding of respondent No. 1 on the point raised by the petitioner is not correct still the same cannot be considered in the jurisdiction for there is a clear distinction between an act wholly without jurisdiction and an act done in the improper exercise of that jurisdiction Where there is jurisdiction to decide, then as it has often been said there is jurisdiction to decide, either rightly or wrongly, and merely a wrong decision does not render the decision without jurisdiction. To amount to a nullity, an act must be non-existent in the eye of law; that is to say, it must be wholly without jurisdiction or performed in such a way that the law regards it as a mere colourable exercise of jurisdiction or unlawful usurpation of jurisdiction. (See Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali Etc. v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others (1) and Muhammad Husain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others (2).
' We, therefore, dismiss this petition too leaving the parties to bear their own costs. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1973 SC 236 (2) PLD 1974 SC 139 {{FOOT NOTE}}