' By this short order we intend to dispose of the following Constitutional petitions in all of which common questions fall for consideration:
1. Writ Petition No,25713 of 1997
2. Writ Petition No .25712 of 1997
3. Writ Petition No,19006 of 1997
4. Writ Petition No,989 of 1998 (Multan)
5. Writ Petition No,24690 of 1997
6. Writ Petition No,20988 of 1997
7. Writ Petition No 19964 of 1997
8. Writ Petition No 19963 of 1997
9. Writ Petition No,3929 of 1998.
2. On 20-8-1997, the President of Pakistan promulgated Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997) whereby Special Courts for trial of terrorists were set up. The validity and wires of this enactment have been questioned in these petitions inter alia on the ground that as a similar law already. Exists in the form of Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, no second law was necessary nor could it have been framed, that the promulgation of the Act was beyond the Federal Legislative competence and that the Act militates against the independence of judiciary, guaranteed by Article 175 of the Constitution. Apart from the At as a whole, certain provisions of the Act have also specifically been challenged on the touchstone of fundamental rights.
3. Writ Petitions Nos.20998 of 1997, 19984 of 1997, 19963 of 1997 and 19006 of 1997 have been filed probono publico by the respective petitioners who have no personal interest in the matter.
However, in Writ Petition No,25713 of 1997, Mehram Ali petitioner has challenged his conviction by the Appellate Tribunal and the trial Court. In Writ Petitions Nos.989 of 1998 (Multan) and 24690 of 1997, Falak Sher and Basem Laeeq petitioners are presently being tried by different Special Courts for different offences and they have assailed their trial by filing these petitions.
4. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, learned Attorney-General for Pakistan and the learned Advocate-General, Punjab, we have reached the following conclusions for which detailed reasons shall be furnished later on.
(i) That the challenge of the petitioners to the legislative competence of the Parliament to enact Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 is wholly without basis. The subject clearly falls in the Concurrent Legislative List given in the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, particularly items Nos.1, 2, 4, 46 and 47. From the material placed on record and the facts and circumstances obtaining on the record, we are of the view that terrorism had reached such a stage that it has become threat to the State itself. Consequently, the Parliament could legislate on this subject under item No,1 of the Legislative List also.
' It is a settled principle of law that the entries in the Legislative List are to be construed liberally and widely and not in a narrow pendentic sense. (See Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1997 SC 582, Sohail Jute Mills Ltd. And others v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1991 SC 329 and Messrs Haider Automobile Ltd. v. Pakistan PLD 1969 SC 623.
(ii) There was ample justification both under the Constitution and the law for creation of Special Courts for trying terrorists. While so holding, we cannot lose sight of the fact that since the recent past there have been subversive and terrorist activities on a large scale which have shaken the country as a whole and have created a sense of fear and despondency in the citizens. The figures supplied by the learned Advocate-General, Punjab in this behalf have shaken our conscience and we can only lament that had effective measures been taken earlier, the precious lives might not have been lost.
(iii) While it is true that to be treated in accordance with law and law alone is the right of every citizen, but it is equally true that there is no right in absolute terms without a corresponding obligation. Every person who claims to have a Fundamental Right must also show that he has performed his obligation towards the State as required by Article 5 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. While interpreting a law like, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, this aspect and the purpose for which the Act has been enforced must be kept in mind. To protect the life and liberty of every citizen is the fundamental duty of the State and efforts made by it in discharge of this obligation for curbing terrorism should not be hampered with by the Judiciary, whose role is only to see that the Legislature while enacting law does not over-step its Constitutional limits. In view of the circumstances prevailing in the country, no legitimate exception can be taken to the creation of Special Courts with a view to provide speedy justice in cases of terrorism.
(iv) The contention, that as Courts constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, 1975 already exist, Special Courts could not be created, loses sight of the fact that the Courts constituted under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 have limited jurisdiction and are meant for trial of persons charged with commission of terrorist acts and that too only in areas where declaration of intent has been issued by the Federal Government under section-3 of the Act. Be that as it may, there is no bar under the Constitution or the law for setting up more than one Special Courts and if the competent Legislature has so enacted, we cannot question its wisdom as our jurisdiction is limited only to finding out as to whether any provision of the Constitution or the Islamic Injunctions has been violated by enacting this law.
(v) There is nothing in the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 which goes against the Islamic principles of administration of justice which are not only sacred but are also very dear to us. While interpreting any law on the subject, the same has to be given due consideration as ordained by the Constitution itself especially the principles of public policy.
(vi) Coming now to the question as to whether certain provisions of the Act militate against the Constitution or erode the independence of Judiciary, we must express our dismay that while enacting this law, the principles enunciated in the Full Bench judgments of this Court in the cases of Imran v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Special Court No, VI, Multan and 2 others PLD 1996 Lah. 542 and M/s. Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. And 2 others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 were not kept in view which provide not only that no person can be inducted into Judiciary except in consultation with the Hon'ble Chief Justice but also that there should be security of service for the holder of the office in order to enable him to administer fair and free justice. There is nothing in this Act which guarantees any security of service to the Judges. We endorse and reaffirm the view taken by the Full Bench and hold that without providing security of service to the Judges, their appointment would not be legal and valid.
(vii) We have pondered over the question as to what should be the effect of the above declaration on the sentences rendered and orders passed by these Courts. In this respect, we are clear in our mind that these orders, judgments and sentences 'cannot be invalidated on two grounds; firstly, because of doctrine of de facto exercise of power which is now part of our corpus juris. (See Lt.-Col. Farzand Ali and others v. Province of West Pakistan PLD 1970 SC 98, Malik Ghulam Gillani v. Province of Punjab PLD 1979 Lah. 564, Abdul Salam Qureshi and another v. Judge Special Court of Banking for Sindh and another PLD 1984 Kar. 462 and Malik Asad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1998 SC 33 and secondly, because of the reason that these convictions and orders have gone through the process of appeal which have been heard and decided by a Tribunal comprising of two Judges of this Court nominated by the Hon'ble Chief Justice and about whom it cannot be said that they did not enjoy the security of service. It is well-established principle of law that once an order is subject- matter of the appeal, the order of the Trial Court merges into the appellate judgment and it is the judgment of the Appellate Court or Tribunal which alone remains in field. (See F.A. Khan v. The Government of Pakistan (PLD 1964 SC 520). While on this question we may state that the composition of Appellate Tribunal has not been questioned before us nor any prejudice has shown to occur to the petitioners.
(viii)In the case of Mahram Ali, the convictions and sentences were appealed against but his appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal comprising of Hon'ble Chief Justice and our learned brother M. Javed Buttar, J. Who on reappraisal of evidence came to the conclusion that his conviction was justified on 3 counts. It cannot be said that Hon'ble Judges comprising the Tribunal did not have any security of service. Consequently, even if there be any defect in the appointment of Judges of Special Courts, it would not vitiate the conviction of the petitioners which has been rendered finally by the Appellate Tribunal.
(ix) As regards the objection to section 26 of the Act which makes a confession before the Police admissible in evidence, suffice it to say that generally speaking, evidence is a matter of procedure and the question of admissibility is quite different from its credibility. Every confession made by an accused before a Police Officer would have to stand the test of strict scrutiny by the Trial Court as also the Appellate Tribunal. Although proviso to section 26 provides some guarantee but we are of the view that in order to ensure that the provision in question is not misused certain additional safeguards should be provided, which, should be that ordinarily the confession should be recorded in the presence of a Magistrate but if he is not available for some reasons which shall have to be stated by the Police Officer, the confession shall be recorded in the presence of a Superintendent of Police, who shall not be from the same Division in which the investigation is being carried out. The same view was taken in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 Supreme Court Cases 569). We may also at this state reiterate that the confession to be recorded by the Police Officer under the new law has been made merely admissible but is not conclusive. This confession shall be scrutinised by the Courts and in any case, it does not carry more value than extra judicial confession.
(x) As regards the objection that the High :Court and the Supreme Court have been deprived of their jurisdiction, there is noting either in the Islamic Law or in the Constitution which says that the Appellate forum must be either the High Court or the Supreme Court. Be that as it may, even if the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal is considered to be final in terms of section 31 of the Act, the power of judicial; review vesting under Article 199 of the Constitution is not whittled down and remains available against the judgment and orders of the Appellate Tribunal, provided a case for interference within the scope thereof is made out. We may, however, add that the learned Attorney-General for Pakistan has stated before us that in cases where the judgment of the Trial Court is reversed by the Appellate Tribunal, a further right of appeal would be made available both to the State as also to the convict by making suitable amendment in the law.
(xi) Similarly, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that the Act is being retrospectively applied in violation of Article 12 of the Constitution is baseless. The acts of which the petitioners are found or alleged to have committed were offences at the time of commission of those offences and carried the same punishment which has been awarded to them by the Special Court/Appellate Tribunal and as such there is no violation of Article 12 of the Constitution. It is a trite law that forum is a matter of procedure and no one can claim any vested right in it. Consequently, the mere fact that the petitioners were liable to be tried by the Special Court constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, 1975 and after the promulgation of the present Act, by the Special Courts under the provisions stated therein, does not militate or offend, against the Constitutional provisions especially when no prejudice has been shown to have been caused to the accused. All this discussion appears to be academic inasmuch as section 38 itself provides that the punishment for the offences committed before the promulgation of the Act would be the same as authorised by law at the time when the offence was committed.
(xii) Mr. Muhammad Asghar Rokari, the learned counsel appearing for Mehram Ali has contended that though he was charged with Qisas but he has been punished under Diyat. The learned counsel himself conceded that it is permissible for a Court to punish a person for lesser offence though he has been charged with higher offence.
(xiii)Some of the learned counsel have challenged the validity of section 4 of the Act which allows the Federal Government to call armed forces and civil armed forces in aid of civil powers. No possible exception can be taken to this provision as a similar provision exists in Article 243 of the'
Constitution as also Cr.P.C.
(xiv) A strong exception has been taken by some of the learned counsel to section 5 of the Act which, according to them, violates Islamic right of privacy and also vests unbridled power in the Police to shoot down any person. Under Article 14 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the right to privacy is to be guaranteed as a fundamental right and it is indeed one of the cherished rights vesting in any individual. As is evident from Article 14, the right is subject to law and must yield to the ground realities. In order to curb the terrorist activities effectively, such powers have to be vested in the Police. Even Cr.P.C. Contemplates use of such powers and there is nothing new in section 5. However, while upholding section 5, let a note of warning go to all concerned that in case section 5 is misused for ulterior purpose or even otherwise is abused, the person responsible for the same would have to face the consequences. Furthermore, if in a given case it is demonstrated that 'the power has been exceeded those responsible for the same can be taken to task but as a general principle we cannot strike down the Act on the mere apprehension that it may be misused especially none of the cases before us nothing has been placed on record to show the misuse of power.
(xv) As regards the appellate provisions, though Appellate forum has been mentioned as a Tribunal, it has all the trappings of a Court and judicial power can be vested in it. (See Iftikhar Ahmad v. The Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. Etc., PLD 1986 Lahore 69, which was affirmed in M/s. Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Banking Tribunal etc. PLD 1996 Lahore 672. Neither under the Constitution nor tinder any principles of Islamic Law there is any compulsion when an appeal lies to a higher forum it must lie to the High Court. There are many instances where the appeal is provided to an Appellate forum. The apprehension that the jurisdiction of the High Court has been ousted by making this law is again based on misconception as notwithstanding finality given to the judgments and orders passed under the Act, the same can be judicially reviewed by the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution. Furthermore, so far as the Trial Courts are concerned, the High Court has the power to supervise and control their working as provided by Article 203 of the Constitution.
(xvi) We are also not impressed by the contention that the Executive has been given unbridled power to choose as to whether a particular accused would be tried by the Special Court constituted under this Act or Special Court under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, 1975 or the ordinary Court. This contention fails to take notice of section 32 of the Act which overrides any provision of the law for the time being in force and if a person is accused of having committed terrorist act under section 6, that case can only be tried by the Special Court constituted under the present Act and not any other Court.
(xvii) The other argument raised by the learned counsel to which notice may be taken is that under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, the Government has been given unbridled power to amend the Schedule so as to exclude or include any offence in it. According to them, this amounts to application of legislative power by the Legislature in favour of the Executive which could not be done. This contention is without any force. In law there is no bar on the Legislature to delegate some of its functions to some outside agency like carrying out amendments in the Schedule.
However, what is prohibited is, the unbridled and naked or excessive delegation of these powers.
There is nothing new in the Act as regards the delegation of power to amend the Schedule as similar power exists in many other laws like Customs Act, 1969 which has been upheld by Superior Courts in many cases including that of Zaibtun Textile Mills Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue and others PLD 1983 SC 358. Furthermore, it is misconception on the part of the petitioners to assume that the power to amend the Schedule is naked or unbridled or unguided. In this respect while amending the Schedule, the Legislature has confined itself within the limits laid down in section 6 of the Act. If any offence is included in the Schedule which has no concern directly or indirectly with the Terrorist Acts, obviously the amendment would be ultra vires.
(xviii) As regards trial in absentia, the learned Attorney-General has conceded before us that no trial in absentia can be held. Appropriate measures shall be taken within a period of two months to amend or repeal section 19 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.
(xix) So far as the oath for non-Muslim Judges is concerned, it requires modification inasmuch as, they cannot be asked to decide, the cases according to their own religious belief which may come in conflict with the Injunctions of Islam or the Constitution. Section 16 should be suitably amended so as to I provide that in case of non-Muslim Judges, they shall take oath to decide the S cases in accordance with the Constitution, law and their conscience.
' We by majority four to one (Karamat Nazir Bhandari, J. Dissenting) hold that the convictions and sentences awarded by the Appellate Tribunal and the Special Court are legal and valid and these petitions are, therefore, dismissed to that extent and the pending trials shall continue. If the remedial measures as suggested are not taken within the period fixed by us, the Act shall cease to operate. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Sd.)
' Malik Muhammad Qayyum, J.
(Sd.)
' Raja Muhammad Sabir, J.
(Sd.)
' Amir Alam Khan, .1.
(Sd.)
' Faqir Muhamamd Khokhar, J.
' I have appended separate note regretting my inability to agree with my learned brothers for the reasons stated therein.
(Sd.)
' Karamat Nazir Bhandari, J ' KARAMAT NAZIR BHANDARI, J.---For detailed reasons to be recorded later on, I hold inter alia and dispose of Writ Petitions Nos.19963 of 1997, 19984 of 1997, 20998 of 1997, 24690 of 1997, 25712 of 1997, 25713 of 1997 and 989 of 1998, as follows:
(i) The objection to the enactment of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (hereinafter called the Act), on the ground of absence of competence of the Parliament is overruled as it has not been shown that the Parliament/Majlis-e-Shoora is not competent in any manner to enact the law. On the contrary, I find that the subject of the Act is covered under and is related to Items Nos.1, 2, 4, 16, 46 and 47 of Concurrent Legislative List, Part II of the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution.
(ii) The power contained in section 5(2)(iii) to enter and search without warrant any premises is absolute, unqualified and unguided and, therefore, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Legislature has to lay down necessary conditions such as contained in Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, to place check on the powers of the Police Officer. The power in the present form is liable to be misused.
(iii) Similarly power under section 10 of the Act to enter and search the 1 premises merely on subjective satisfaction of the Officer of the Police etc. As to existence of reasonable grounds for suspicion is unbridled, arbitrary and unguided and, therefore, in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. This power to enter and search the premises for recovery of material or record has to be checked and made dependent upon conditions such as laid down in section 98 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.
(iv) Keeping in view the principle of trichotomy of State/Soverign power and independence of judicial organ and particularly provisions of Articles 2-A, 175 and 203 of the Constitution read with the judgments of the Superior Courts like Sharaf Faridi and others v. The Federation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 1989 Karachi 404, Imran v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Special Court No,VI.
Multan and others PLD 1996 Lah. 542, Government of Sindh v. Sharaf Faridi and others PLD 1994 SC 105, Government of Balochistan v. Azizullah Memon and others PLD 1993 SC 341 and Khalil-uz- Zaman v. Supreme Appellate Court, Lahore and others PLD 1994 SC 885, the conclusion is unavoidable that no Court, Authority or Tribunal meant to exercise judicial power, can be established under the Executive control. For a Court or Tribunal to be a "a Court" and to be able to exercise judicial power, it must be independent of all Executive influence. The composition of Special Courts and appointment of Presiding Officers to such Courts, as laid down in sections 13 and 14 of the Act, does not satisfy the Constitutional requirements and, therefore, I would hold that the Special Courts are illegally constituted. Appointment after consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court is merely one requirement ensuring the proper composition of the Courts. Since the other criteria like security of service and supervision of the Courts by the High Court etc. Are not fulfilled, the composition of the Special Courts is bad. The Legislature has to provide for security of service, terms and conditions, supervision by High Court etc. In the Act and not by Executive fiat.
(v) Provisions for oath by Judge of a Special Court under section 16 of the Act, to my mind is cosmetic and redundant. In any case, if such a provision has to be made, a Judge has to be bound to decide the case according to Constitution and law and not "according to his conscience and belief." as has been provided in section 16 of the Act, for a non-Muslim Judge.
(vi) The provisions of subsections (10), (11) and (12) of section 19 of the Act relating to trial in absentia have to be struck down as the same are in violation of the law declared by this Court in Zia Ullah Khan and others v. Government of Punjab and others PLD 1989 Lah. 554 as upheld by the Supreme Court. Both learned Attorney-General and Advocate-General conceded this proposition.
(vii) Constitution and establishment of Appellate Tribunal under section 24 of the Act and provision of appeal to this Tribunal under section 25, instead of to the High Court, in my humble opinion is unconstitutional. For over a century now the High Courts under various legal dispensations have been acting as highest criminal Appellate Court in the Province. It has enjoyed this status and power under Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, Letters Patent, 1919, Government of India Act, 1935, Constitutions of 1956, 1962, Interim Constitution, 1972 and Constitution of 1973. No valid reason has been disclosed justifying departure from this age old legal position.
(viii) The establishment of Appellate Tribunal has no sanction under Article 175 read with Article 212.
It is also violative of Article 185 of the Constitution, as it denies recourse to a convict under the Act to approach the Supreme Court under the said Article while convicts by Court of Session or even by Special Courts under Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act of 1975, have the right of recourse to the ultimate Court in the country. To my mind, this is also discriminatory and violative of Article 25 of the Constitution. See Government of Balochistan through Additional Chief Secretary v. Azizullah Memon and others PLD 1993 SC 341; Inamur Rehman v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1992 SCMR 563 and Shrin Munir and others v. Government of Punjab and another PLD 1990 SC 295.
(a) Even the State may face difficulty when it will find that against an order of acquittal recorded by Appellate Tribunal, it has no remedy as even the State cannot approach the Supreme Court under Article 185 of the Constitution against the judgment of Appellate Tribunal.
(b) Similarly the conviction recorded for the first time by the Appellate Tribunal, on appeal against acquittal by the Special Court under the Act, cannot be challenged in Supreme Court under the Act, although such a convict by High Court, can appeal to the Supreme Court as a matter of right.
How can, by any device, law-giver deny what has been conferred by Article 185?
(c) It will be noticed that Article 185 of the Constitution although describes and lays down the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but at the same time is creating right of appeal and petitions for leave to appeal from the judgments and orders of the High Court. The intent of this Article cannot be negatived by establishing Appellate Tribunal under section 24 of the Act, even though it may be consisting of two Honourable Judges of the Court.
(d) In any case, making the nomination to the Appellate Tribunal by the Chief Justice conditional on notification by the Government is unconstitutional as it encroaches upon the independence of Judiciary and of the Chief Justice enjoyed by him under the High Court Rules and Orders and the Constitution.
(e) Effort has been made to equate Appellate Tribunal with High Court for the purpose of confirmation of death sentence passed by Special Court, but no provision has been made to provide for difference of opinion between Honourable Members of Tribunal.
(f) It will also defeat the declared object of quick disposal, since a judgment of the Appellate Tribunal is liable to be challenged in Constitutional Jurisdiction under Article 199, involving more Judges, over one and the same issue and more time.
(ix) Making confession before Deputy Superintendent of Police admissible under section 26 of the Act is departure from the age old provisions and accepted position as laid down in the Evidence Act, 1872, as well as Qunun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. But I am inclined to agree with the submission of the Attorney-General that the provision only makes the ( confession admissible and does not bind the Special Court to act upon it. However, the Legislature may consider the advisability of magisterial presence at the time of making of confession before the Deputy Superintendent of Police or some other measure so as to obviate the fear of extracting confessions by use of third degree methods or torture, a course prohibited by Articles 13 and 14(2) of the Constitution. Till then, it is hoped, the Special Court will be extremely slow in relying upon such a confession.
(x) Power to amend the Schedule given in section 34 of the Act, to me seems to be a case of conferment of legislative power on the I Government, which cannot be done. The Legislature cannot efface itself. In any case, it seems to be a case of excessive delegation as the section does not lay down the guidelines for the Government.
(xi) Section 38 to the extent that it makes an offence covered by section 6 of the Act, committed prior to the enforcement of the Act, triable under the Act, is unconstitutional and violative of Article 12.
(xii) The provisions of this Act and that of Suppression of Anti-Terrorist Activities Act, 1995 overlap and there is need for the Legislature to clearly identify the boundaries for the harmonious operation of the two Acts.
(xiii)As laid down in Hakim Khan and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Interior and others PLD 1992 SC 595; Zeheeruddin and others v. The State and others 1993 SCMR 1718; Al- Jehad Trust and Raeesul Mujahideen Habib-ul-Wahabb-ul-Khairi and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1996 SC 324 and Mahmood Khan Achakzai and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1997 SC 426, the provisions of the Act cannot be invalidated by this Court on the ground of repugnance to the Injunctions of Qur'an and Sunnah. If at all, that can only be done by the Federal Shariat Court.
2. Since I am holding the establishment and constitution of Special Courts under sections 13 and 14 and that of Appellate Tribunal under section 24 as unconstitutional; logically the conviction and sentence of Mehram Ali, petitioner in Writ Petition No,25713 of 1997, has to be declared as without lawful authority. This conviction and sentence cannot be saved on the principle of 'de facto incumbency' as the defect is not in the eligibility and appointment of the Presiding Officer (Sardar Mashkoor Ahmad, Advocate), but in the establishment and constitution of the Court itself. Question of prejudice is not material in such a case nor such an illegality will save the judgment under section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. The very trial is vitiated and coram non judice.
Further, even the appeal has not been heard and decided by the High Court, the only competent forum under the Constitution, as noted above.
3. I would, resultantly, allow Writ Petition No,25713 of 1997 and hold petitioner's conviction and sentence vide judgment and orders dated 15-9-1997 and 14-10-1997 to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The result will be that challan/charges against this petitioner shall be deemed to be pending I and will now be tried by duly constituted and competent Court.
4. Other petitions challenging the ongoing proceedings before the Special Court are also allowed and the criminal charges against such petitioners will be tried by duly constituted and competent Courts. All the petitions are disposed of in the above terms.
5. In the end I would like to place on record my appreciation of the assistance rendered by the learned counsel and the learned Law Officers.
(Sd.)
' Karamat Nazir Bhandari, J