MUHAMMAD SHAN GUL, J.---Through this judgment, this Court inten ds to decide the titled constitutional petition filed to challenge an order dated 09.06.2021 passed by a learned Additional District Judge, Lahore whereby he dismissed the application for interim relief filed by the petitioner . This miscellaneous application was filed along with an appeal under . Order XLIII C.P.C. against the acceptance of an application by the trial court under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. filed by the respondents. A suit for declaration along with permanent and mandatory injunction filed by the respondents and in which interim relief has been granted is still pending and an appeal filed by the petitioner against grant of interim relief is also pending but the application under section 151 C.P.C. for grant of interim relief in appeal has been dismissed vide order dated 09.6.2021 and which is why the petitioner has approached this Court in constitutional jurisdiction.
2. The factual matrix is as follows: the petitioner claims that he being a bona fide purchaser of property No.14 measuring 9 marlas and 86 sq.ft. (2 portions of land measuring 6 marlas and 3 marlas and 86 Sq.ft. respectively) got executed two sale deeds bearing No.4471 dated 10.5.93 and No.85971, dated 30.6.96 in the name of his brother Ashfaq Hussain as a Benamidar . The petitioners' brother Ashfaq Hussain died in 2010 while the petitioner continued to enjoy the uninterrupted possession of the portions -of land in issue. However , in 2020, according to the petitioner , the widow and children of petitioners' brother Ashfaq Hussain turned greedy and started blackmailing the petitioner by asking him to get out of the property since it was in the name of his brother Ashfaq Hussain. This led the petitioner to file a civil suit for declaration and cancellation of sale deeds with consequential relief of permanent injunction which is still pending adjudication in the court of Mr. Abdul Hafeez, Civil Judge, Lahore wherein a status quo order dated 23.1.2021 has been passed. While granting status quo by means of order dated 23.1.2021 the learned Civil Court appointed a Local Commission to determine and identify the person in actual possession of suit property . The Local Commission visited and inspected the site and submitted its report confirming the factum of petitioners' possession. This report has been appende d as Annex-D with the present constitutional petition. The respondents did not appear to defend the afore-referred civil suit but rather filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction on their own and which suit is pending adjudication in the court of Ms. Ayesha Alamgir , learned Civil Judge, Lahore. The request of the respondents for grant of interim injunction was declined by the learned Civil Judge vide order dated 27.1.2021, appended as Annex-E with this constitutional petition. The respondents filed a civil appeal challenging the dismissal of their application for temporary injunction.
The petitioner appeared before the appellate court and the Presiding Judge dispos ed of the appeal with a direction to the civil court to decide the , application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. within a period of 15-days and directed the contesting parties to maintain status quo with respect to the suit property . This order has been appended as Annex-F with this constitutional petition. Unnerved and bent on causi ng confusion through multiplicity of suits, the respondents filed yet another suit for declaration along with permanent injunction (during pendency of one suit filed by the petitioner and one filed by them) in respect of the same property and obtained another order .
This is evident from a perusal of Annex-G with the present constitutional petition. Whether this suit was maintainable in view of the provisions of section 10, C.P .C. is also open to argument till now!
3. That the first suit filed by the respondents in which they had also filed a civil appeal and in which the appellate court had remanded the matter back to the civil court to decide the application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. was heard by the civil court on 01.6.2021 and was adjourned to 04.6.2021 for appropriate orders. The petitioner kept clamoring before the civil court that in presence of the report of Local Commission establishing possession of the petitioner and in view of the status quo order passed in his favour in the initial civil suit filed by him there was no reason for granting interim relief. The learned civil court did not pay any heed to the cries of the petitioner and proceeded to allow the application filed under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. for temporary injunction vide order dated 04.6.2021. The learned civil court also framed issues in the matter on the said date and this suit is still pending. The petitioner filed a civil appeal against the order dated 04.6.2021 and along with this appeal the petitioner also filed an application for seeking interim relief by means of suspension of order passed by the civil court. The appellate court vide order dated 09.6.2021 admitted the appeal for regular hearing but rejected the application under section 151, C.P .C. for suspension of operation of the impugned order in the following terms:- "However while adverting to the appended application for grant of interim relief. There is no justification for suspension of operation of impugned order dated 24.6.2021. In these circumstances, this request the appellant is hereby turned down. Now to come up for summoning of the respondents to the date fixed.
4. The petitioner has laid a challenge to this order dated 09.6.2021 on the premise that if the appellate court deemed it appropriate to admit his appeal then it ought to also have granted the interim relief in the matter by means of suspension of the impugned order . He adds that one look at the order convinces the reader that the same has been passed without any reason whatsoever and, therefore, the order falls short of satisfying the test of rationality . He submits that the absence of reasons renders this order susceptible to interference in judicial review .
He adds that since no reason has been given in the order for rejecting applicatio n under section 151 C.P.C. the petitioner is in the dark about the reaso ns prevailing with the appellate court and is, therefore, handicapped in laying a proper challenge to such a decis ion. He submits that the instances of near abuse of process of law and courts committed by the respondents and alluded to in the constitutional petition (see the facts recorded in the preceding narrative) were not even recounted in the impugned order and that the appellate court has merely dismissed his application without providing any grounds for dismissal or for that matter reasons for not countenancing the application so filed by the petitioner . Rounds of by submitting that a mere 'no' does not suffice.
Also submits that any reasonable discour se or exercise that attempts to identify , address and solve an issue must contain reasons for reaching a conclusio n. And that the chain between conclusion and fact is held together by reasons. Adds that the facts about the possession of the petitioner , the report of Local Commission, the repeated filing of suits by the respondents and applicability of section 10, C.P.C. were factors that ought to have been addressed before rejecting outrightly the application filed by the petitioner under section 151, C.P .C.
5. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, initially supported the impugned order by submitting that the main appeal is still pending and the petitioners' case is more in the nature of much ado about nothing. He then contended that the grant of interim relief is discretionary , therefore, there was no reason for the appellate court to recount reasons for denying interim relief and that such reasons will be provided as and when the pending appeal filed by the petitioner is adjudicated. He further submits that any interlocutory order does not have to contain reasons and, therefore, the present constitutional petition was not maintainable.
6. When the counsel for the respondents was confronted by this Court with the question that since the appeal filed by the petitioner was not a regular first appeal under section 96, C.P.C. which had to be admitted as par for the course but an appeal under Order XLIII C.P.C. which could only have been admitted if the court admitting it found it to be an arguable case warranting appellate interference and, therefore, the Court ought to have provided reasons for rejecting the application under section 151 C.P.C. since the appellate court had itself admitted the appeal, the learned counsel for, the respondents did a volte face and took a nosedive and submitted that he shall not oppose the present petition if this Court were to remand the matter back to the appella te court with a direction to re- adjudicate the application under section 151, C.P.C. along with the appeal filed by the petitioner under Order XLIII, C.P.C. within a period of 15-days.
7. As is evident from a perusal of the impu gned order dated 09.6.2021, the same does not at all qualify as a judicial order . It is trite and settled that a judicial order has to contain reasons so as to allow the reader to understand and comprehend the grounds/reasons preva iling with the court or tribunal, as the case may be, in arriving at a conclusion. Any reasonable judicial discourse or exercise on the judicial side that attempts to identify and address an issue must contain reasons for reaching a conclusion. The reasons given for a decision or an order explain the justification or logic for such a decision or order . The reasons give satisfaction to the person against whom a decision has been given about the decision not being arbitrary , whimsical and take the matter out of the realm of subjectivity . Reasons enable an affected party to gauge, consider and examine whether an appeal or any further challenge is in order . The requirement of giving reasons, therefore, operates as an important check on abuse of powers. Reasons enable a court or a tribunal to decide whether there are any legitimate grounds for it to interfere with the decision. Reasons can be said to be the heartbeat of every conclusion since these introduce clarity , regularity , reasonableness and rationalit y in a decision and a decision indeed becomes lifeless without such reasons. It is trite, as held in the famous case of Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union Limited (1971) 2 QB 175, "that the provision of reasons in a decision is- one of the fundamental principles of good administration."
8. It is equally established that a speaking order means an order that speaks for itself and an order can only speak through the reasons rendered in support thereof. In fact provision of reasons in support of an order or a decision is so well entrenched in modern day jurisprudence that it will not be wrong to label reasons as the un-conspicuous third pillar of natural justice, the other two being audi alteram partem and nemo judex in causa sua. It is only when the decisions and orders reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions drawn that such opinions can be held to be just and reasonable and not otherwise.
9. While no particular form of recording or provision of reasons is required, it suffices if the adjudicating authority records reasons which are proper , relevan t, germane, intelligible and proportionate. Bhagwati, C.J., in AIR 1976 SC 1785 "Siemens Engineering v. Union of India" has categorically ruled that, 'the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is a basic principle of natural justice (like principle of audi alteram partem) which must inform every judicial or quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretense of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law." In S.N. Mukharjee AIR 1990 SC 1984, it has been held, "keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principle of natural justice, the requirement to record reasons can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice." And as Lord Upjohn aptly held in Padfield (1968 AC 997), "if he does not give any reason for his decision, it may be, that the court may be at liberty to come to the conclusion that he had no good reasons of reaching that conclusion and order a prerogative writ to issue accordingly ."
10. It may be added here that the provision of reasons in an order or a decision is an essential attribute thereof and the chain between conclusion and fact in a decision is broken if there are no reasons provided to support the conclusion. Our own Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in "Hyderabad Development Authority through M.D., Civic Centre, Hyderabad v. Abdul Majeed and others" (PLD 2002 SC 84) has held at paragraph No.5 as follows:- "5..... It would be advantageous to note that judicial pronouncement (judgment) by a Judicial Officer should be based on the evidence/material available on record and reasons must be outcome of the evidence available on record and on the basis of such reasons conclusion should be drawn and if the order lacks of these ingredients it cannot be termed to be a judicial verdict (judgment) in stricto senso and at the best such pronouncement can be termed to be an administrative order incapable to settle controversy judicially between the parties."
11. A Division Bench of this Court in "Khurram Farooq v. Bank Al-Falah Limited and another" (2018 CLD 1417 ) has held as follows at paragraph No.16:- "16. Moreover , the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has time and again disapproved passing of perfunctory orders/judgments. It is settled law that 'judicial order' must be speaking order manifesting by itself that the Court has applied its judicial mind to the issue s and points of controversy involved in the cases. Where the order is passed without application of judicial mind, the same is in contravention of law and is not sustainable. A plethora of judgments by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan as well as this Court has been passed on this issue. Reliance in this regard can be placed on the case titled Adamjee Jute Mills Ltd. v. The Province of East Pakistan and others (PLD 1959 SC (Pak) 272), Gouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller Import and Export and 2 others (PLD 1970 SC 158), Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others (PLD 1970 SC 173), Muhammad Ibrahim Khan v. Secretary , Ministry of Labour and others (1984 SCMR 1014 ), Habib Bank Limited, Lahore v. Messrs Creative Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. (2007 CLD 244), Messrs Faisal M.B. Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Equity Participation Fund (2006 CLD 183), Khalid Shahbaz Chaudhry v. Prime Commercial Bank Ltd. (2005 CLD 629), Messrs Mohib Exports Ltd. v. Trust Leasing Corporation Ltd. (2005 CLD 581), Messrs Sun Rise Textile Ltd. v. Prime Commercial Bank Ltd. ( 2005 CLD 126 ) and Messrs Chancellors Overseas v . Muslim Commercial Bank Limited ( 2004 CLD 81 1).
12. The term 'reasons' has not been defin ed in any statutory law but in common parlance or in terms of reasonable prudence, the presence of reasons is what confirms whether an order or a decisio n is reasonable and confirms to the requirement of reasonableness. In order to be reasonable there should be an umbilical link between the conclusions and the material on which such conclusions are based. The condition to give reasons introduces clarity and excludes arbitrariness. A reasoned order may be said to be an absolutely desirable condition associated with judicial dispensation. Reasons substitute subjectivity with objectivity and failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice.
13. The Indian Supreme Court in "Smt. Swaran Lata Ghosh v. Harendra Kumar Banerjee and another" (AIR 1969 SC 1167) has held at paragraph No.6, "recording of reasons in support of a decision of a disputed claim serves more purposes than one. It is intended to ensure that the decision is not result of whim or fancy , but of a judicial approach to the matter in contest: it is also intended to ensure adjudication of the matter according to law. A party to the dispute is ordinarily entitled to know the grounds on which the court has decided against him, and more so, when the judgment is subject to appe al. The appellate court will then have adequate material on which it may determine whether the facts are properly ascertained, the law has been correctly applied and the resultant decision is just."
14. Another rationale for reasons is that the affected party can know why a decis ion has gone against him. The mysterious face of a sphinx is inconsistent with a judicial or quasi-judicial exercise. Right to reasons is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system and is indicative of application of mind by the decision maker .
15. While Articles 4, 9 and 10-A of the Constitution are enough to provide a footho ld to the concept of provision of reasons in judicial, quasi-judicial and even administrative orders and decisions, Article 14 of the Constitution which speaks about the right to dignity may also be compromised if reasons are not forthcoming in a decision or an order .
Article 14 of the Constitution provides for protection of dignity and in case an order or a decision is passed without reasons then the said Article may also be invoked to attack such an order or a decision on the basis that the order or decision so passed treats and addresses a living person as an object or a non-living thing. Therefore, and arguably , the right to reasons may also be premised as a concomitant right of the right to dignity . It is indeed arbitrary and condescending to have a persons' status redefined without an adequate explanation of reasons for such change.
16. Even in England, where there is no written constitution in place and where unlike Pakistan (section 24-A, General Clauses Act) there is no general duty to give reasons short of statutory prescription ordering reasons, the rule for providing reasons, just as the rule of audi alteram partem, post Ridge v. Baldwin 1964 AC 40, has come of age. In (1994) 1 AC 531, Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department exp Doody , Lord Mustill judged that the Home Secretary must give reasons for his decision. He argued that decisions made using a statutory power must be reached fairly, because all statutory powers are granted with the implicit assumption that they will be wielded fairly. As a result, he concluded it will often be necessary to allow a person to make representations, and therefore to allow them to know what they are responding to, they must be permitted to hear the reason." In (1991) 4 All ER 310 Regina v. Civil Service Appeal Board, Ex parte Cunningham, "The court considered the effect of a disciplinary board failing to give reasons. If it is important that there should be an effective means of detecting the kind of error [by way of judicial review] which would entitle the court to intervene then the reasoning may have to be disclosed. Donaldson Li said: 'when a statute has conferred on anybody the power to make decisions affecting individ uals, the court will not only require the procedure prescribed by statute to be followed, but will readily imply so much and no more to be introduced by way of additional procedural standards as will ensure the attainment of fairness." In (1994) 1 All ER 651 Regina v. Higher Education Funding Council, ex-parte Institute of Dental Surgery , it has been held, "The giving of reasons may among other things concentrate the decision maker's mind on the right questions."
17. Paul Craig, the Chair of Public Law at Oxford University , in his Book on Administrative Law 7th Edition has stated as follows: There are a number of advantages in the provision of reasons for decisions. Firstly , reasons can assist the courts in performing their supervisory function. Substantive review based on relevancy , propriety of purpose or proportionality is much easier to apply if the agency's reasons are evident. Secondly , an obligation to provide reasons will often help to ensure that the decision has been thought through by the agency . Thirdly , the provision of reasons can help to ensure that other objectives of administrative law are not frustrated. If, for example, we grant consultation rights in certain areas, then a duty to furnish reasons make it more difficult for the decision maker merely to go through the motions of hearing interested parties without actually taking their views into account. Finally , it is arbitrary to have one's status redefined without an adequate explanation of the reasons for the action. The provision of reasons can, by way of contrast, increase public confidence in the administrative process and enhance its legitimacy . A duty to provide reasons can, therefore, help to attain both the instrumental and non-instrumental objectives that underlie process rights."
18. As can be seen, absence of reasons renders any right of appeal or judicial review nugatory . Furthermore, reasons have a direct and rational nexus with procedural fairness.
19. However , there is another side to the coin and commentators and jurists have also stated that there were certain factors that .militated against the giving of reasons in that it could place an undue burden on the decision maker , demand the articulation of inexpressible value judgments and offer an invitation to the litigious to comb reasons for grounds of challenge. But even such commentators have acknowledged and admitted that modern day jurisprudence is geared towards openness and that there is a perceptible and conspicuous trend towards greater transparency in decision making. The giving of reasons is widely regarded as one of the cardinal principles of good administration in that it encourages a careful examination of relevant issues, the elimination of extraneous considerations and consistency in decision making. Likewise, the giving of reasons may protect the decision maker from unjustified challenges, because those adversely affected are more likely to accept a decision if they know why it has been taken. To use a cliche, 'justice will not be done if it is not apparent to the parties why one has won and the other has lost.' Fairness surely requires that the losing party should be left in no doubt why it has lost. A reasoned decision is also necessary to enable the person prejudicially affected to know whether a ground of appeal or review is available to him. If those entitled to be heard have no right to know how a decision has been reached, the legally conferred opportunity of hearin g may well go down as an empty ritual. Furthermore, without reasons, it is extremely dif ficult to detect errors!
20. In the matter before this Court, it is evident that the order dated 09.6.2021 passed by the appellate court while dismissing the application filed by the petitioner under section 151, C.P.C. contains no reasons whatsoever . Not even a single reason. Such an order cannot possibly be allowed to exist on account of what has been discussed in the preceding narrative. Furthermore, the peculiar surrounding circumstances in the form of the report of Local Commission establishing the factum of petitioners' possession, the repeated filing of suits by the respondents arguably in violation of section 10, C.P.C., the report of the Local Commission, the grant of interim relief in the presence of already granted interim relief, as also the question of abuse of process of Court, ought to have been adverted to and discussed in the order because all such factors have a bearing on the issue.
21. In this view of the matter , the order dated 09.6.2021 to the extent of rejecting application under section 151, C.P.C. filed by the petitioner is set aside and the application under section 151, C.P.C. shall be deemed to be pending before the appellate court which shall, not later than 15-days, decide the application under section 151, C.P.C. along with the main appeal filed under Order XLIII, C.P.C. and pending before him. Both, the petitioner and respondents, shall be heard and a reasoned order shall be passed.
22. As aptly held in ex parte International Sporting Club (1982) QBD 304, "it is the function of the professional judges to give reasons for their decisions. This Court would look askance at the refusal by a judge to give reasons for a decision............ It may well be if such a case should arise this Court would find that it had power to order the judge to give reasons for his decision."
23. This petition is allowed in the above terms.