MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J.---Present appeal, under section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. Proceeds against judgment and decree dated 11-11-2002, whereby the learned Judge Banking Court decreed appellant's suit for the recovery of Rs.62,55,000 with costs of suit against defendants Nos.2 and 3.
2. The appellant bank filed the suit for recovery of Rs.36,987,864 (C.O.S. No.181 of 1998) against the respondents/defendants, inter alia, pleading that three financial facilities were provided to respondent No.1; in consideration thereto respondent No.1 executed charge documents while respondents Nos.2 and 3 signed personal guarantees; those facilities were restructured/rescheduled and thereupon respondents Nos.2 and 3 executed fresh personal guarantees, however, all the respondents failed to liquidate the outstanding liabilities, which necessitated filing of the suit. Respondent No.1 filed the application for leave to defend the suit (P.L.A. No.10-B of 1999), while respondents Nos.2 and 3 instituted joint petition seeking leave to defend the suit (P.L.A. No.11-B of 1999). The learned Banking Judge of this Court passed an interim decree for recovery of Rs.36,987,864 against respondent No.1 but granted unconditional leave to defend the suit to respondents Nos.2 and 3, vide composite order dated 16-11-1999. Consequent thereto, respondents Nos.2 and 3 filed their written statements, pleading therein that as per guarantee dated 23-1-1997, their liability is limited to the extent of Rs.62,55,000. Following issues were framed:- "1. Whether the guarantee given by defendants Nos.2 and 3 stands discharged? OPD
2. Relief."
The parties produced the evidence and certain documents were admitted in evidence and exhibited. In the ultimate analysis, the learned Judge Banking Court, while deciding Issue N0.1 against respondents Nos.2 and 3, proceeded to pass a decree for the sum of Rs.62,55,000, as per the guarantee dated 23-1-1997 (Exh.D1) against them together with costs of the suit vide impugned judgment and decree dated 11-11-2002, hence the present appeal.
3. As noted above, interim decree was passed against the respondent No.1 as far back as on 16-11- 1999, therefore, its service was not required in this case. Learned counsel so stated on 11-9-2006.
Despite service through proclamation in the newspaper i.e. "Nawa-i-Waqt" dated 7-8-2006 and "Nave ed-ePakistan" dated 14-8-2006, none has entered appear nce to represent respondent No.3, thus he was proceeded ex paite vide order dated 11-9-2006.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant, while referring to the impugned judgment, states that it is contradictory inasmuch as on the one hand Issue No.1 was decided against respondents Nos.2 and 3 and on the other hand, instead of passing decree for the suit amount, the learned Judge Banking Court passed the decree for the amount mentioned in the guarantee (Exhal). He has added that the impugned judgment is devoid of reasons. Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondent, while referring to guarantee dated 23-1-1997 (Exh.D. 1) submits that at the maximum, respondent No.2 could be held liable for an amount of Rs.62,55,000 and that this is the case of novation of contract.
5. Notwithstanding the respective contentions raised by the learned counsel, we have examined the impugned judgment and find that the same is devoid of reasons and lacks all characteristics of valid and legal judgment and judicial order. Learned Judge Banking Court, after recording the contentions, in paras.4, 5 and 6 of the judgment, has abruptly held in para.7 of the judgment, that "on the basis of the documents on record and the documents discussed above, the contention of the defendants Nos.2 and 3 that the guarantee stands discharged is not proved, so Issue No.1 is answered against the defendants Nos.2 and 3" and decreed the suit. It is evident from perusal of para.7 of the judgment that no reasons or findings were A rendered by the learned Judge Banking Court for reaching to such conclusion. Impugned judgment is sketchy, slipshod and devoid of reasons, it is not at all a "speaking order" and cannot be called a "judicial order" within the parameters set up by law. The tenor of the impugned judgment amply manifests non-application of judicial mind and casual and cursory approach of the learned Judge Banking Court. Even it has been enjoined upon an executive authority, as per section 24(A) of General Clauses Act, 1897 (inserted by General Clauses (Amendment Act, 1997, Act No.XI of 1997) to give reasons for making the order.
6. Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan has time and again disapproved passing of such perfunctory orders/ judgments. It is settled law that "judicial order" must be speaking order manifesting by itself that the Court has applied its judicial mind to the issues and points of controversy involved in the causes. In any way the impugned judgment, which is not a speaking order and devoid of reasons is not sustainable in law being in contravention of law declared by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in various cases, like Adamjee Jute Mills Ltd. v. The province of East Pakistan and others (PLD 1959 SC (Pak) 272), Gouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller Import and Export and 2 others (PLD 1970 SC 158), Mollah Ejahar All v. Government of East Pakistan and others (PLD 1970 SC 173) and Muhammad Ibrahim Khan v. Secretary, Ministry of Labour and others (1984 SCM R 1014).
7. In the above perspective, without touching the other contentions of the learned counsel, we feel that such judgment is not sustainable in law, thus, we are inclined to set it aside.
8. In view of the above, present appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and decree dated 11-11-2002 is set aside with no order as to costs. Resultantly, appellant's suit as against respondents Nos.2 and 3 shall be deemed to be pending before the learned Judge Banking Court, who shall decide the same, afresh, in view of the available record, after hearing the parties and of course in accordance with law.