' CH. IJAZ AHMAD, J.---We intend to decide the following appeals by one consolidated judgment having similar facts and law:--
(1) R.F.A. No,104 of 1999.
(2) R.F.A. No,105 of 1999.
(3) R.F.A. No,106 of 1999.
(4) R.F.A. No,107 of 1999.
2. The brief facts out of which the aforesaid appeals arise are that the appellants secured loan from the respondent-Bank. Agreements/documents were also executed between the parties.
According to the terms and conditions of the agreements/documents the appellants had to repay the loan to the respondents within prescribed period. The appellants failed to discharge their liabilities in terms of the agreements/documents between the parties. Respondent-Bank filed different suits for recovery against the appellants qua various amounts in terms of the agreements executed in each case between the parties before the Banking Tribunal which were subsequently transferred to the Baking Court. The Banking Court passed the impugned judgments and decrees on 22-1-1999. Hence the present appeals.
3. Learned counsel of the appellants submits that constitution of the Banking Tribunal was declared ultra vires by the Full Bench of this Court in Chenab Cement's case PLD 1996 Lahore 572. The operation of the judgment was suspended by the learned Single Judge of Honourable Supreme Court on the appeal filed by Federation of Pakistan vide order dated 24-7-1996. Subsequently said order was modified by the Honourable Supreme Court on 14-10-1996. The Federation of Pakistan had withdrawn the appeals as is evident from order dated 12-6-1997 as the relevant laws had been amended. Learned counsel of the appellants further submits that suits were filed by the respondent-Bank before incompetent Tribunal, therefore, the same could not be transferred by operation of law before the Banking Court. As such judgments and decrees of the Banking Court are without lawful authority. He further submits that impugned judgments and decrees do not contain any reason, therefore the same are liable to be set aside.
4. Learned counsel of the respondent-Bank submits that question of law has been finally decided by this Court and held that the Banking Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter in support of his contention he relied upon the following judgments:-- ' Soneri Bank Ltd. v. Raja Weaving Mills KLR 1997 CC 742, U.B.L. v. Hinna Export Company 1998 PSC 78, Messrs Sind Tech. Industries v. Messrs Investment Corporation 1998 SCMR 1533, A. Habib Ahmad v.
Hongkong Banking Company 1999 CLC 1953, Syed Farasat Ali Shah v. A.B. L. 2002 OLD 759, Muhammad Umar Tarar v. Judge Banking Court 2002 CLD 1663, Equity Participation Fund v. Messrs Pakistan Mobile 2003 CLD 206 and Syed Farasat'Ali Shah v. A.B.L. 2003 CLD 952.
' He further submits that Banking Court decreed the suits after application of mind as is evident from the contents of the impugned judgments and decrees. He further submits that judgments and decrees are in accordance with the law laid down by the superior Courts in the following judgments:-- ' Tri-Star Polyester Ltd. v. Citibank 2001 PSC 57, Pakland Cement Company v. Citibank 2001 SCMR 1341, Muhammad Umar v. Muqarab Khan 1968 SCMR 983, Fine Textile Mills Ltd. v. Haji Umar PLD 1963 SC 163, Muhammad Ramzan v. Citibank NA 2001 CLC 158, Ghazala Arif v. Union Bank 2000 CLC 1201, Messrs U.B.L. v. Redco Textile Ltd. 2000 CLC 968, M.C.B. Ltd. v. Rizwan Textile Mills 1998 MLD 529, National Bank of Pakistan v. Muhammad Ashraf Sanik PLD 1987 Lahore 17, U.B.L. v. Central Cotton Mills Ltd. 2001 MLD 78, U.B.L. v. Mian Aftab Ahmad 2001 MLD 1332, Ghulam Sarwar v. National Bank 2001 CLC 522, ANZ Grindlays Bank v. Saadi Cement Company PLD 2001 Karachi 2017, Qatar Airways PLC v. ANZ Grindlays Bank 2000 CLC 1455, First Grindlays Modaraba v. Pakland Cement 2000 CLC 2017, National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs West Pakistan Tanks 2000 CLC 896, Agrofoster (Pvt.) Ltd. v.
Judge Banking Court PLD 1999 Karachi 398, Citibank v. Tariq Mohsin PLD 1999 Kar. 196, Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Marvi Laboratories 1999 MLD 3456, National Bank of Pakistan v. Punjab Buildings PLD 1998 Karachi 302, Nasimuddin Sidiqui v. U.B.L. 1998 CLC 1718, U.B.L. v. Sind Tech Industries 1998 CLC 1152, A.B.L. v. Mehran Oils Mills PLD 1988 Karachi 360, A.B.L. v. Messrs Kassam Corporation 1987 MLD 742 and Haji Ali Khan v. A.B.L. 1992 CLC 1906.
5. We have given our anxious consideration to the contentions of the learned counsel of the parties.
And perused the record.
6. It is settled principle of law that parties are bound by their pleadings. The appellants have not taken a single ground in the grounds of appeal before this Court that Banking Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter. Therefore, appellants' counsel is not allowed to raise this plea that Banking Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter. In arriving to this conclusion we are fortified by the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Mst. Murid Begum v. Muhammad Rafiq PLD 1974 SC 322. Even otherwise question raised by the learned counsel of the appellants has been taken note of, condusively decided and repelled in reported case Tariq Shahbaz Chaudhry v. Bank of Punjab 2004 CLD 207.
7. It is better and appropriate to reproduce operative part of the impugned judgment and decree to resolve the controversy between the parties to the extent whether the impugned judgments and decrees have been passed by the Banking Court after application of mind or not:-- "The documents appended with the plaint fully support the contentions of the plaintiff's counsel while the defendants have not put anything on the record in support of their contentions and also have not denied the factum of availing the finance facility. The other objections raised by the defendants in the application for leave to defend are of casual and routine type. Hence I do not feel myself in agreement with the learned counsel for the defendants and dismiss the application for leave to defend the suit. Suit as against defendant No,1 has already been proceeded ex parte vide order dated 18-1-1999."
By mere reading of aforesaid operative part of the judgments and decrees of the Banking Court along with grounds of application for leave to appear and defend the suits, it is crystal clear that the Banking Court has passed the impugned judgments and decrees without application of mind which is condition precedent that the Judicial Officer has to pass the judgments and decrees after application of mind as the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Gouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller of Import and Export PLD 1970 SC 158 and Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Govt. Of East Pakistan PLD 1970 SC 173. Relevant observations an as follows:-- ' PLD 1970 SC 158 "Such an order, we regret to say, does not disclose a proper application of mind of the High Court to the merits of the case that was before it. As was pointed out by this Court in the case of Adamjee Jute Mills Limited v. The Province of East Pakistan."
' PLD 1970 SC 170 "To deal with the second contention first, there is no doubt that the High Court's order which is unfortunately perfunctory gives the impression of a hasty off-hand decision which, although found to be correct in its result, is most deficient in its content. If a summary order of rejection can be made in such terms, there is no reason why a similar order of acceptance saying "there is considerable in the substance in the petition which is accepted", should not be equally blessed.
This will reduce the whole judicial process to authoritarian decrees without the need for logic and reasoning which have always been the traditional pillars of judicial pronouncements investing them with their primary excellence of propriety and judicial balance."
' It is pertinent to mention here that after addition of section 24-A in the General Clauses Act it is the duty and obligation of public functionaries to pass the order even in the executive side with reasons as the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Messrs Airport Support Service's case 1998 SCMR 2268. It is settled principle of law that each and every case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances as the law laid down in Trustees of Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem 1994 SCMR 2213. The case-laws relied by the learned counsel of the respondent are distinguished on facts and law.
In view of what has been discussed above, we accept all the appeals, set aside the impugned decrees and remand the cases to the Banking Court to decide the same afresh in terms of the aforesaid direction. Parties are directed to appear before the Banking Court on 27-9-2004 who is directed to decide the matter afresh after application of mind within 2 months after the said date even at the cost of day to day proceedings. The parties and their counsel are directed to cooperate with the Banking Court so that the matter be concluded within the stipulated period. In case any of the party/its counsel fails to cooperate with the Banking Court then Banking Court is directed to invoke the penal provisions against the said party. No order as to costs.