MUHAMMAD JAFER NAIM, J.-The petitioner is aggrieved by the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal dated 28-4-1979 whereby the order of the Labour Court dated 11-2-1979 was set aside. The facts as stated in the petition are that respondent No. 1 Amir Khan was an employee of the petitioner. He was declared unfit medically and his services were terminated. The respondent made an application to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court for his re-instatement which was dismissed. He made second application to the Labour Court on 23-10-1977 for a claim of Rs. 20,000 against the peti--tioner $n account of Group Insurance. This application of the respondent No. 1 was contested and the Presiding Officer, Labour Court by his order dated 11-2-1979 dismissed the application on the grounds that the application was time-barred and that respondent No. 1 Amir Khan had no locus standi to file the application. The respondent No. 1 filed an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal (respondent No. 2) which was allowed by order dated 28-4-1979 in which it was held that the application of the respondent to the Labour Court was not time-barred and by this order case was remanded to the Labour Court to proceed further in the case.
2. This petition has been filed on the grounds that the respondent No. 1 was not entitled to the payment of any amount by way of Group Insurance ; that the application of the respondent before the Labour Court was time---barred and the decision of the Appellate Tribunal was incorrect. It is also contended that the appeal filed by the respondent was time-barred yet no findings have been recorded by the learned Appellate Tribunal in this behalf The respondent No. 1 filed counter- affidavit to the petition in which it is maintained that the decision of the .Labour Appellate Tribunal was proper and that the application of the respondent before the Labour Court was proper as the law applicable would be one that is applicable in respect of claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and as such the application was within time On the point of limitation of appeal it is maintained that the appeal was filed within time and since no objection was taken at the time of arguments before the learned Appellate Tribunal this question has not been touched by the learned Appellate Tribunal.
3. The counsel of the petitioner urged half-heartedly that the appeal before the Labour Court was time-barred. The counsel of the respondent had made a statement at the bar that this objection was not pressed when appeal was heard by the Labour Appellate Tribunal and therefore the learned Appellate Tribunal did not give any findings on this point. Without going into the question of the legality or maintainability of the application of the respondent under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 we can examine the question of limitation for appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. The application of the respondent was dismissed by the Labour Court on 11,2-1979 and the appeal was filed on 18-3-1979. Appeal could b filed within 30 days of the passing of that order according to section 27 (3) o the Industrial Relations Ordinance. The respondent might have spent of few days in obtaining copy of the order of the Labour Court or there would have been any other reason for not filing appeal within prescribed time. The petitioners have not produced copy of the order of the Labour Court filed by the respondent along with the appeal or his application for copy to show thatsuch period was not spent by him for obtaining copy. This point was also not raised before the Appellate Tribunal as stated by Mr. Iftikhar and this is why there is no mention of this fact in the order of the Appellate Tribunal. The counsel of the petitioner was unable give the dates of application made for copy by the respondent and the date of delivery of copy.
Without that material such question cannot be resolved and the contention of the peti--tioner's counsel does not merit any consideration.
4. The counsel of the petitioner further urged that respondent had no locus standi to file an application before the Labour Court and that the petitioner was not liable to make payment to the respondent on account of Group Insurance. He has also contended that the application before the Labour Court should have been filed within the statutory period as prescribed under section 25 (a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance.
5. The West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance coming into 'force in 1968 introduced a scheme for Compulsory Group Insurance. The relevant provision is contained in sec--tion 10-B of the West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 which is as under :- "10-B. Compulsory Group Insurance.,-(I) The employer, shall have all the permanent workmen employed by him insured against natural death and disability and death and injury arising out of contingencies not covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (VIII of 1923) or the provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965 (W. P.) Ordinance No. X of 1965."
The contention of Mr. Basharatullah counsel for the petitioner is that this provision was not applicable in respect of employment of respondent No. 1 for the reason that the Standing Orders do not apply to the Industrial and Commercial Establishments carried on by of under the authority of the Federal or any Provincial Government and where statutory rules of service conduct or discipline are applicable to the workmen employed therein. He has gone to suggest that Standing Orders will not be applicable to the case of respondent No. 1 since that would be hit by the provision to section
(4) (c) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation was created under the Pakistan Industrial Development Corpora--tion Act of 1950. This Corporation was dissolved by the Central Government under the Industrial Corporation Dissolution Order, 1962. The West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation came into existence under the Provincial Industrial Development Corporation (West Pakistan) Ordinance of 1962 which was parent Organization of the present Corporation. As far as. This Corporation is concerned first portion of the Proviso of section 1 (4) (c) of the West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 is satisfied that inas--much as that the establishment is carried on under the authority of the Federal Government.
6. Section 23 of the Provincial Industrial Development Corporation (West Pakistan) Ordinance, 1962 gives powers to the Provincial Government to make rules for carrying out the purpose of the Ordinance generally. Clauses (c) and (d) of subsection (2) of section 23 of the Ordinance provide authority to the Government to make rules specifically for terms and conditions of employment.
These provisions are as under :- 2.-(c) The recruitment of officers, advisers and employees of the Cor--poration ;
(d) the terms and conditions of service of the officers, advisers and employees of the Corporation, including the functions of the advisers." .
The Provincial Government has powers to frame rules for the employee thereof and in exercise of these powers such rules were framed known as the West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation Service Rules, 1964-65. These facts now satisfy the second requirement of subsection
(1) (4) (c) of the West Pakistan Standing Orders, 1968. This Proviso is therefore fully applic--able to the employment of the present respondent No. 1. Operation of West Pakistan (Standing Orders)
Ordinance, 1968 is excluded in his case.
6. The other contention of the counsel of the petitioner is that the application before the Labour Court was time barred and the decision of the Appellate Tribunal in this behalf is not correct. The counsel of the respon--dent No. 1 Mr. Iftikhar Ahmed contended that the application was within time as it was not an application strictly within the provisions of sec--tion 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance. His contention was also that in case assuming that the worker bad expired no application could be filed by his heirs under section 25-A of the Ordinance and so time limit for application under section 25-A of Ordinance, could not hit the application of the heirs in such circumstances as it would not be an application from a worker. This argument being strange itself is also destructive of the plea that Labour Court could grant the relief. The counsel of the respondent No. 1 forgets that the special provision of redress of any grievance provided under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance is only in respect of rights accruing there--under.
The effect of this proposition would be that as soon as the application goes beyond the pail of section 25-A of the Ordinance, the Labour Court would not be competent to grant any relief, may it be an application from a worker or his heirs.
7. If a worker feels himself aggrieved he has to give a notice to his employer within 3 months of the date on which such grievance arises accord--ing to section 25-A (1) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. The employer is required to give a decision within 15 days of the receipt of such notice. If such decision is not communicated or if the worker is dissatisfied with such decision the matter may be taken to the Labour Court within two months of the communication of the decision of the employer or failure of the employer to give such decision. Whenever the worker wishes to move the Labour Court under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, he has to adopt the procedure prescribed within the specified period. There is neither any other forum for him nor any other provision except section 25-A x of the Industrial Relations Ordinance for obtaining relief as it was in respect of a right secured under West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders), 1968. The Labour Court in the present case had dismissed the application of the respondent No. 1 on this point as well.
8. The counsel of the petitioner supported the order of the Labour Court while the counsel of the respondent No. 1 urged that the application was within time. He referred to section 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and subsection (5) of section 10 (6) of the West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. His contention was that time allowed for filing an applica--tion for a claim of Group Insurance before the Labour Court would be the same as is allowed for a claim before the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The provisions of section 10 (1) of the Workmen's Com--pensation Act are as under;-- "10. Notice and claim.-(I) No claim for compensation shall be enter--tained by a Commissioner unless notice of the accident has been given in the manner hereinafter provided as soon as practicable after the happening thereof and unless the claim is preferred before him within three years of the occurrence of the accident or, in case of death, within three years from the date of death."
If the claim is in respect of compensation recoverable under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 that claim can be entertained by a Commissioner under that Act within 3 years from the date of the occurrence or from the date of death. The application of the respondent is not in respect of a clam under the Workmen's Compensation Act, but for Group Insurance under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 for which the proper Court is the Labour Court. Section 10-B (5) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 is as under :- "10-B.-(5) All claims of a workman or his heirs for recovery of money under clause (4) shall be settled in the same manner as is provided for the determination and recovery of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (VIII of 1923). "
The procedure for determination and recovery of compensation has been provided in this clause.
This provision is procedural and regulates the procedure for the settlement of claims of a workman in respect of Group Insurance for the purposes of determination and the recovery of compensation. The West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 has no provision in itself for determination of the amount of Group Insurance or method of recovery of such amount. The provisions contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act are to be borrowed for this purpose.
When a claim for Group Insurance is filed, provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act have to be resorted to for purpose of determining the amount of Group Insurance and recovery thereof.
The amount of compensation under Work--men's Compensation Act can be recovered as arrears of Land Revenue under section 31 of the said Act and similarly the amount of Group Insurance. This provision of Standing Orders does not provide a complete procedure for deciding a claim to Group Insurance nor does it prescribe the forum for such a claim. Reference can be made to the provision of Workmen's Compensa--tion Act in matters relating to settlement of claims of Workmen for Group Insurance as far as the determination and recovery of compensation are concerned and nothing more. The induction of this subsection in the West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, does not mean that entire pro--visions of Workmen's Compensation Act have to be transported to the pro--ceedings before the Labour Court for the purpose of recovery of Group Insurance. The learned counsel of the respondent No. 1 has urged that it is a reference by Legislation and so even the provision of section 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Act will be incorporated to proceedings initiated by application for recovery of Group Insurance. If that had been so then specific mention should have been made about it and in that case possibly the jurisdiction of the Labour Court too would have been ousted and in its place the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act would have been the authority for recovery of claims in respect of Group Insurance. The provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act are applicable to the proceedings before the Labour Court in respect of Group Insurance claim only to a limited purpose viz. Determination and recovery of compensation and not beyond it. For the purpose of making any claim therefore before the Labour, Court section 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Act will not be attracted. Although Legislation by reference is a recognized mode of Legislation but we cannot introduce by interpretation anything which is not included in sub--section (5) of section 10-B of the Standing Orders. The Legislature had allowed a restricted application of the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act to the proceedings for recovery of Group Insurance. The applica-- tion for recovery of Group Insurance amount under section 25 (a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance cannot be deemed to be an application under section 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The contention of the' respondent's counsel that the application was within time is not correct. The counsel of the petitioner has also urged that reference to section 29 of the Limitation Act was also not proper. Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act is relevant for the purpose of the present case which is as under :-- "29.-(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefore by the First Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefore in that Schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law."
In the present case period of limitation has already been prescribed by the Industrial Relations Ordinance so only those provisions of the Limitation Act are made applicable which are specified in clause (a) of subsection (2) of section 29 of the Act and remaining provisions of the Limitation Act do not, apply. This does not mean that we can apply provisions contained in sec--tion 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Act to the proceedings before the Labour Court under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance with the help of section 29 of the Limitation Act. The application of the respondent No. 1 was time barred. Ordinarily recovery of money by way of claim in respect of contractual liability is statutory obligation. A suit is the ordinary and normal remedy within the jurisdiction of a Civil Court but certain statutes have provided specific remedies in respect of class of persons or nature of claims and special Tribunals have been created for that purpose. A' remedy of a worker in respect of the Group Insurance claim is a departure from the common law remedy and specific and speedy remedy is provided , for in the form of application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 where the worker can go to seek redress of his grievance if such grievance comes within the provision of section 25-A of the Ordinance. The Labour Court or for that matter the learned Appellate Tribunal get jurisdiction to redress the grievance and grant the relief provided such claim was within the four corners of the statute. The Labour Court as well as the Labour Appellate Tribunal have been given statutory jurisdiction and that has to be exercised within the four corners of the statutes. A particular case has to be filed in a particular manner and within a particular time under the Industrial Relations Ordinance and the Tribunals created under the Industrial Relations Ordinance will exercise their respective jurisdiction only when the case is of the nature prescribed therein or is filed within the time specified therefor. The nature of the claim, the person who files the claim, the time during which it has to be filed and the manner in which such claim has to be filed are all jurisdictional facts and ascertainment and assessment of these facts determines the jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is always relative to the facts and circumstances and the term alone is meaningless. If any one of these com--ponent is missing the jurisdiction of the Tribunal will be defective. Jurisdic--tion can be exercised when all these facts exist together. If the case is not one which is of the nature provided for in section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance or it is not filed within the prescribed time provided therefor or is filed by a person who is not a workman, the special Tribunal created under the nature will have no jurisdiction to entertain a case of that nature. The special Tribunal does not possess inherent power as are available to a Civil Court and it bas to act within the scope of the statute under which it has been created. As soon as it steps out of the four corners of the statute the, act will be one of defective or excessive exercise of jurisdiction and question--able under the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. The observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Raunaq Ali's case PLD 1973 SC 236,may be quoted with benefit. The relevant observation is as under :- "This is no doubt correct, but it is also now well established that where an inferior Tribunal or Court has acted wholly without jurisdiction or as Rubinsein puts it in his book on `Jurisdiction and Illegality' taken any action beyond the sphere allotted to the Tribunal by law and, therefore, outside the area within which the law recognizes a privilege err,' then such action amounts to a `usurpation of power unwarranted by law' and such an act is a nullity : that is to say, `the result of a purported exercise of authority which has no legal effect whatsoever'. In such a case, it well established that a Superior Court is not bound to give effect of it, particularly where the appeal is to the latter's discretionary jurisdiction. The Courts would refuse to perpetuate, in such circumstances something which would be patently unjust or unlawful."
The order of the learned Appellate Tribunal not falling within the ambit of section 25-A and section 37 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance is one with-- out jurisdiction and is declared as such. The petition is allowed and parties are left to bear their own costs.
S. A. H.