' SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J---This sinile order shall dispose of Writ Petition No,617 of 2005 titled "Ahmed Textiles (Pvt.) v. Mst. Saddiqan Bibi", Writ Petition No,1950 of 2005 tilted "Crescent, Sugar Mills Ltd v.
Aqeel Ahmad", Writ Petition No,16635 of 2005 titled "Crescent Sugar Mills Ltd v. Commissioner Workmen's Compensation", Writ Petition No,16934 of 2005 titled "Crescent Sugar Mills Ltd v.
Commissioner Workmen's Compensation", Writ, Petition No,16938 of 2005 titled "Crescent Sugar Mills Ltd v. Commissioner Workmen's Compensation" Writ Petition No, 18996 of 2005 titled "Crescent Sugar Mills Ltd v. Commissioner Workmen's Compensation" and Writ Petition No,19479 of 2005 titled "Crescent Sugar Mills Ltd v. Commissioner Worlanen's Compensation as common question of law and fact is involved in all these petitions.
2. Facts necessary for the disposal of these petitions are that applications for group insurance benefits payable under Standing Order 10-B of Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, were filed before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation.
Petitioners resisted the applications by filing written replies, various preliminary objections were raised and the assertions of the applications were controverted on facts. An objection as to the jurisdiction of respondent No .2 (Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation), was raised with the prayer for the dismissed of the application for want of jurisdiction. Learned Commissioner assumed jurisdiction and passed the impugned order. The order of the Commissioner is assailed through instant writ petition on the ground that the claim regarding the benefits of group insurance under Standing Order 10-B of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 is competent before Labour Court and Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation has no jurisdiction in the matter.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the provisions of Standing Order 10-B (5) provide the manner/procedure, for determination and recovery of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and not the forum. The forum is the Labour Court under I.R.O.
1969. Learned counsel has referred to the case of "Amir Khan through his legal heirs v. Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation" (1990 SCMR 1206), to contend that to seek benefit under S.O. 10- B the applicant has ta take his grievance to the Labour Court under section 25-A of the I.R.O.
1969. The case of PLD 1982 Quetta 87 was referred to further support the contention that provisions of S.O. 10-B regulate the procedure and not the forum under Workmen's Compensation Act.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, has fully supported the impugned order and has submitted that provisions of section 10-B (5) regulate the procedure as well as the forum and in support of his contention he has referred to the case of "Muhammad Habib Khan v. Pakistan Tabacco Company Ltd. And another" (PLD 1991 SC 183) and M/s Crescent Textile Mills v.
Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and another" (1980 PLC 222). Besides, M/s Shahid Anwar Bajwa and Munawar Ahmad Javed, Advocates rendeted their valuable assistance, on Court's call.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. The controversy with regard to jurisdiction of forums cited above, has been considered in the above referred two distinguished judgments of the apex Court, besides various other judgments of other superior Courts. These judgments are reported as 1990 SCMR 1206, PLD 1991 SC 183, PLD 1982 Quetta 87, 1990 PLC 880, 1980 PLC 222, 1980 PLC 224, 1980 PLC 752 (i), 1980 PLC 239, 1987 PLC 536, 1987 PLC 538 and the unreported judgment in Writ Petition No,27676 of 1997. The law laid down by the superior Courts, needs a careful analysis to clarify and determine the forum for the compulsory insurance claims under Standing Order 10-B (5) of the Ordinance VI of 1968. Before proceeding further the facts of the above referred two judgment need mention. Both the judgments have been delivered on somewhat different grounds in different circumstances, distinguishing both the judgments from each other, on the questions of law and facts.
(1) As far as the law laid down by the august Supreme Court in Amir Khan's case (1990 SCMR 1206) is concerned, the question of jurisdiction or determination of forum was not directly in issue as the grievance of the appellant in that case was primarily against the termination of his service and it was thereafter that he withdrew his appeal under the impression that he would prefer his claim under the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act. The claim was filed under S.O. 10-B, since the injury or disability was not attributable to occupation, the claim was not tenable under Workmen's Compensation Act, that is why the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to hold that when cause of action arose, employee was serving in public limited company, being governed under the provisions of S.O.10-B. He had to take his grievance to Labour Court under section 25-A of the I.R.O.
1969, for such benefit being secured to the employee. It is clear from fair construction of cited judgment that the main crux of consideration before the apex Court was to extend to the employee a benefit to which he was otherwise entitled under S. 0.10-B and the question of jurisdiction of Commissioner Compensation in terms of clause (5) of S.O.
10-B was not in issue stricto senso, before the august Court, nor the arguments were advanced by the parties in this respect.
(2) While in the case of Muhammad Habib Khan (PLD 1991 SC 183), the question of jurisdiction with regard to Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, in terms of clause (5) of S.O. 10-B, was directly in issue as the employee had suffered from disability during extended period of his service, as a result thereof he was retired permanently from service. His claim was allowed by Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and the contention that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim under S.O. 10-B was repelled by the august Court.
7. The judgment in the case of Amir Khan (supra) is of the Hon'ble Bench comprising of three Hon'ble Judges, while the judgment in the case Muhammad Habib Khan (supra) is by two Hon'ble Judges. The judgment of a larger Bench is to be preferred comparing to the judgment of smaller Bench. However, in the former case, the question of jurisdiction of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, regarding grant of group insurance benefit under S.O. 10-B (5) was not discussed in the judgment nor the Court has given its finding on this particular question. A precedent case should have resemblance and be identical with the circumstances of the case, going to be decided. The Court has to see the circumstances of the cited case, the live issues involved in it and the principles of law formulated with regard to such issues. The ratio decidendi is the reason or ground of a judicial decision. It is the ratio decidendi, which makes a decision a precedent for the future. Ratio decidendi and its binding character remained under discussion amongst jurists and the Judges. Keeton in Elementary Principles of Jurisprudence (page 106), treats, ratio decidendi of a decision, as the principle of law formulated by the Judge for purpose of deciding the problem before him. Lord Hoslbury in "Quinn v. Leathem" (1091 AC 495) observed: "Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law but govern and are qualified by the particular facts in the case in which such expressions are to be found." In the leading case of Qualcast "Wolverhampten Ltd. v. Haynes" (1959 AC 473), it was laid down that ratio decidendi may be defined as a statement of law applied to the legal problems raised by the facts as found, upon which the decision is based. The other elements in the decision are not precedent. The judgment is not binding (except directly on the parties) nor the findings of facts.
' Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case "Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem" (1994 SCMR 2213) has held that case is only an authority for what it actually decides and cannot be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it.
' This means that even where the direct facts of an earlier case appeared to be identical to those of the case before the Court, the Judge is not bound to draw the same inference as drawn in the earlier. A judgment is thus precedent for what it actually decides. Mere identical facts or the circumstances in two cases would not make the decision as precedent of the earlier case binding unless the Court in earlier case has directly decided a questivon.
8. A precedent has to be viewed according to the rule of "sub silentio". When the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the Court or present to its mind. The Court may in certain cases consciously decide, in favour of a party on a certain point considering that the party is entitled to relief on another point as well. The Court might have not decided the earlier question in favour of particular party, if the second point in favour of such party never existed. In such circumstances logically the existence of second point was outcome of the decision on the earlier question. The decision on earlier point, is not an authority, as the former question was decided as sub silentio. A decision sub silentio has no precedential value. I find support from the case of "Sheikh Muhammad Rafique Goreja v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and others" (2006 SCMR 1317).
9. In the light of the above discussion and taking benefit by the guidelines laid down by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of "Abdul Bari v. Malik Amir Jan and 4 others" (PLD 1998 SC 50) with all respects, I am of the view that reliance of petitioner on (1990 SCMR 1206), in view of the law discussed above, is inapt and is not attracted to the facts of case in hand.
10. Without prejudice to the above, bare perusal of section 25-A of I.R.O. 1969 and clause (5) of S.O.
10-B makes the picture crystal clear in the following terms:--
(i) By express provisions almost all the incidents of Workmen's Compensation Act have been brought into play by the introduction of Clause (5) of S.O. 10-B and by necessary implication the words occurring in clause (1) "arising out of contingencies not covered by Workmen's Compensation Act" and in Clause (3) "the amount for which each workman shall be insured shall not be less than the amount of compensation in Schedule-IV to the Workmen's Compensation Act" and again the whole wording of Clause (5) needs a careful consideration as it clearly manifests the forum for determination and settlement of insurance Claims, is of Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation appointed under Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.
(ii) The jurisdiction of the Labour Court on the other hand is governed by section 35(5)(d) of the I.R.O. 1969 (now under section 44 (4)(d) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002). A Labour Court, by virtue of Clause (d) of subsection (5) of section 35, is to exercise powers and functions as are or may be conferred or assigned to it by or under I.R.O. 1969 or any other law. The jurisdiction has been conferred upon Labour Court under various provisions of law
(a) S.7(6) of the Ordinance VI of 1968:-- No Court other than a Labour Court established under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969) shall try any offence under the Ordinance.
(b) S.O. 11-A-Closure of establishment:-- ' Notwithstanding anything containing in Standing Order 11, no employer shall terminate the employment of more than 50% of the workmen or close down the whole of the establishment without prior permission of the Labour Court in this behalf, except in the event of fire, catastrophe, stoppage of power, supply epidemics or civil commotion.
(c) S.O. 12 (3).---The services of a workman shall not be terminated, nor shall a workman, be removed, retrenched, discharged or dismissed from service, except by an order in writing which shall explicitly state the reason for the action taken. In case a workman is aggrieved by the termination of his service or removal, retrenchment discharge or dismissal, he may take action in accordance with the provisions of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 (XXIII of 1969) and thereupon the provisions of the said section shall apply as they apply to the redress of an individual grievance.
(d) Section 25-A (4) of the I.R.O. 1969:-- 'Worker may take the matter to the Labour Court and where the matter is taken to the Labour Court it shall give a decision within seven days from the date of the matter being brought before it as if such matters were in an industrial dispute." ate jurisdiction has also been conferred on a Labour Court under section 17(1) of the Payment of Wages Act (IV of 1936) which reads as under:-- "S.17(1)---Appeal.---An appeal against the direction made under subsection (3) or subsection (4) or section 15 may be preferred within thirty days of the date on which the direction was made, before the Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969) within whose jurisdiction the cause of action to which the appeal relates, arose."
11. The provisions of section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 provide for payment of compensation to a workman or a person under disability to be deposited with the Commissioner and no direct payment is deemed to be payment of compensation. The provisions of S.O. 10-B (5) provide for manner. Section 8 provides for deposit and the fact that the jurisdiction of Labour Court under Standing Orders etc. Is conferred through express terms while there is no such express provision for entertaining the claim of group insurance with the Labour Court, shows the intention of the legislature that according to the provisions of S.O. 10-B it is the forum as well as the procedure of Commissioner for Compensation qua the benefits under group insurance. This view is in consonance with the view expressed in Crescent Textiles case (1990 PLC 222) and (1980 PLC 239), Pakistan Engineering Company's case (1980 PLC 752), H. Nizam Din and Sons' case (1987 PLC 536) and Coxad Fing's case (1985 PLC 880).
12. The word "manner" as appearing in Standing Order 10-B has been dealt in the case of "M/s. Crescent Textile Mills, Karachi v. The Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, West Division, Karachi and another" (1980 PLC 239). The Court concluded that manner would include the forum which has to determine the dispute or claim." A similar view has been taken by this Court in Writ Petition No,27676 of 1998 titled as "Kohinoor Industries Ltd. v. Muhammad Yaqoob and another" wherein Mr, Karamat Nazir Bhandari, J.,.As his Lordship then was after considering the dictum of law laid down by Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgment (1990 SCMR 1206 and PLD 1991 SC 183), held that Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation has jurisdiction to entertain the claim under Standing Order 10-B (5).
13. From the above it is clear that if the legislature intended to confer upon Labour Court the jurisdiction under Standing Order 10-B, same should have been conferred in express terms as it was done under section 7 (6), Standing Orders 11-A and 12(3) of Ordinance VI of 1968. The intention of the legislature is clear that the claim under S.O. 10-B (5) is to be entertained by the Commissioner for Compensation appointed under Workman's Compensation Act, 1923.
14. For the foregoing, I have no hesitation to hold that only Commissioner Compensation has the jurisdiction to entertain the claim of Workman or his/their legal heirs, for claim of Group Insurance under S.O. 10-B of the Ordinance VI of 1968.
15. Now reverting back to the merit of the case, learned Labour Court has decided the matter in accordance with law without any legal infirmity. Evidence of the parties has been appraised properly and after viewing the case from various angles the impugned order was passed. I do not see any infirmity in the impugned order of the Court in closing the right of defense of the petitioner for additional evidence, as various opportunities were granted but the appellant failed to avail the same.
16. For what has been discussed above, the impugned order does not call for interference in the constitutional jurisdiction. These petitions have no force and are dismissed accordingly, with no order as to costs.