' M. SOHAIL IQBAL BHATTI, J.--- Through this order I am inclined to decide the instant review application as well as R.A.No,5/2014 (Iltaf Hussain and others v. Market Committee, Rawalpindi and others) as through both the review applications order dated 11-2-2014 passed in W.P. No,161 of 2011 and W.P. No,215 of 2011 respectively by this Court has been sought to be reviewed by the petitioners.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioners were proceeded against the relevant provisions of Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 and different penalties were imposed upon the petitioners through order dated 13-1-2011. This Court had dismissed the writ petitions on the question of maintainability in view of the bar contained in Article 212(2) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners while advancing his arguments submitted that the petitioners were not civil servants and it was erroneously held by this Court that the writ petitions were barred under Article 212(2) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to the judgment reported in 2012 PLC (C.S.) 948 (Lahore High Court) (Tanveer Hussain v. Director, Agriculture (Economics and Marketing), Punjab, Lahore and 3 others) while submitting that the employees of the Market Committee could not be termed as employees of Provincial Government when they held a post in connection with the affairs of the Province and, therefore, could not invoke the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. To further strengthen his arguments the learned counsel has relied upon PLD 2013 Lahore 413 (Liaqat Ali Chugtai v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Railways and 6 others).
4. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners and have gone through the record.
5. There is no cavil to this proposition that the employees of Market Committee cannot be considered as a civil servant but I am afraid that the judgments referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners are entirely on different premises and are not relevant to this case.
6. In 2012 PLC (C.S.) 948 the petitioner had assailed the orders passed by the authorities setting aside the promotion of the petitioner. This Court held that since the petitioner was not a civil servant Writ Petition is maintainable and bar contained in Article 212 of the Constitution shall not be attracted. In PLD 2013 Lahore 413 this Court held that the assessm ent of fitness and suitability were excluded from the ambit of the Service Tribunal; therefore bar contained under Article 212 of the Constitution was not attracted.
7. In the present case the petitioners being employees of Market Committee were proceeded against under Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006. The legislature in its wisdom has not used the word civil servant in the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 but in Section 2 (h) the word employee has been used which reads as under:--- "employee' means a person
(i) in the employment of a corporation, corporate body, autonomous body, authority, statutory body or any other organization or institution set up, established, owned, managed or controlled by the Government, by under any law for the time being in force or a body or organization in which the Government has a controlling share or interest and includes the chairman and the chief executive and the holder of any other officer therein; and
(ii) in government service or who is a member of a civil service of the province or who holds a civil post in connection with the affairs of the province or any employee serving in any Court or Tribunal set up or established by the Government, but does not include a Judge of the High Court or any Court subordinate to the High Court, or any employee of such Courts;"
8. Subsection (i) of section 2(h) of the Act ibid clarifies the situation that employee mean a person in the employment of a corporation, corporate body, autonomous body, authority, statutory body or any other organization or institution.
9. The petitioners being employees of the Market Committee squarely fall within the definition of an 'employee' given in PEEDA Act, 2006 and since they were proceeded against the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006; the Act ibid in itself provides a mechanism for redressal of their grievance under section 19 of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 which reads as under:-- "Appeal before Punjab Service Tribunal. --- (I) Notwith standing anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any employee aggrieved by any final order passed under sections 16 and 17 may, within thirty days from the date of communication of the order, prefer an appeal to the Punjab Service Tribunal established under The Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 (Pb. Act, IX of 1974).
(2) If a decision on a departmental appeal or review petition, as the case may be, filed under section 16 is not received within a period of sixty days of filing thereof the affected employee may file an appeal in the Punjab Service Tribunal within a period of thirty days of the expiry of the aforesaid period, where-after, the authority with whom the departmental appeal or review is pending, shall not take any further action."
10. Sub-clause (1) of Section 19 of PEEDA Act, 2006 clarifies the situation that, "any employee"
(emphasis is provided by me) aggrieved by any final order may, within thirty days from the date of communication of the order, prefer an appeal to the Punjab Service Tribunal.
11. The above legal position makes it abundantly clear that any employee proceeded against under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 has been provided a forum for the redressal of his grievance and, therefore, the bar contained in Article 212(2) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 is fully attracted in the present case. Article 212(2) is re-produced as under:--- "Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, where any Administrative Court or Tribunal is established under clause (1), no other court shall grant an injunction, make any order or entertain any proceedings in respect of any matter to which the jurisdiction of such Administrative Court or Tribunal extends [and all proceedings in respect of any such matter which may be pending before such other court immediately before the establishment of the Administrative Court or Tribunal (other than an appeal pending before the Supreme Court, shall abate on such establishment)".
12. The petitioners need not to be civil servants to invoke the jurisdiction of Punjab Service Tribunal being the employee of the Market Committee when proceeded under the PEEDA Act, 2006.
13. Order XLVII, rule 1, C.P.C. gives right to a party to apply for review if he is aggrieved by the orders or decrees or decisions mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of rule 1 on three grounds, namely discovery of new and important matters or evidence which after exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reasons. Reliance is placed on 1999 SCMR 2189 (Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad v. Muhammad Tariq Pirzada and others). It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan that where the order sought to be reviewed did not suffer from any ambiguity or legal error the review petition must be dismissed and where the matter has been fully considered in the order/judgment of the court it could not be allowed to re-argue through a review application. I am agreed with this proposition of law that where a decision was given without considering some statute then its reconsideration is justified but where the statutory provisions have been considered and an interpretation was given thereon, merely because another view was possible would not justify the review of the order.
14. For what has been discussed above, the present case is not a fit case for exercise of review jurisdiction. Resultantly, both the review petitions are dismissed in limine.