SHAFI-UR-REHMAN, J.-These petitions are by the declarant-owners and the alienees seeking leave to appeal against a consolidated judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, Quetta, dated 27-12- 1979, whereby the Constitutional Petitions filed by them were dismissed.
2. Mst. Aisha petitioner is the wife, and Yusaf Ali petitioner is the son, of the Chief of the Magsi Tribe.
They owned extensive agricultural lands, mostly barren at that time, in Sub-Tehsil Jhal Magsi. From June 1967 to the year 1970 they made a number of alienations, nineteen by Mst Aisha and eleven by Yusuf Ali, some in the nature of Sale to rank outsiders, others, of sales and gifts, in favour of their own domestic servants, gifts in favour of their brothers, grand sons' wives and grand-daughters etc, There was a third category of alienations which were affected through correction of revenue record. On the promulgation of Land Reforms Regulation 115 (hereinafter referred to as the Regulation) certain alienations already completed were made void unless they were proved to the satisfaction of the Commission to be bona fide and for consideration. The owners whose holding exceeded the ceiling prescribed were required to file the necessary declarations. Mst. Aisha and Yusuf Ali filed such declarations and all these alienations were scrutinized and approved by the various authorities including the then Land Commissioner, the matter concluding with his order dated 13.8-1973. There after the Chairman, Federal Land Commission by way of suo motu revision under para. 29 of the Regula--tion proceeded to re-examine the alienations and after notice to these two declarants held that these alienations were not bona fide transactions and were void under the law. This determination by the Chairman Federal Land Commission led the petitioners to invoke the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. Their Constitutional petitions were dismissed on the ground that the decision given was with jurisdiction and was not assailable on any of the grounds taken up by the petitioners.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners seeks leave on the following grounds: --
(i) The decision of the Chairman, Federal Land Commission is itself void for the reason that acting singly he could not exercise the powers possessed by the Commission as a body under para. 29 of the Regula--tion. For this argument reliance has been placed on Sardar Ashiq Muhammad Khan Mazari and 3 others v. Chairman, Federal Land Commission, Islamabad, and 4 others PLD 1977 Lah.
461 ; Mir Haji Ghulam Murtaza Khan Talpur and another v. Chairman, Federal Land Commission PLD 1978 Kar. 919 and Khair Muhammad v. Chairman, Federal Land Commission PLD 1979 Kar. 210.
(ii) The validation sought to be achieved by the curative provisions of Ordinance XXIX of 1978 could not, and in fact did not, cure the illegality that existed in the order of the Chairman, Federal Land Commission.
(iii) The power possessed and exercisable under para. 29 of the Regulation was in fact exercised by its Member Mr. Channa when be scrutinized these alienations and recommended that the Chief Land Commissioner should review it. As the secrutiny, determination and direction had the effect of exhausting the power possessed by a Member under para. 29 it was not exercisable at a subsequent date by the Chairman, Federal Land Commission.
(iv) Notwithstanding the fact that the Chairman Federal Land Commis--sion mentioned in the impugned order that be was taking up these cases suo motu, in fact he was acting on a reference made by the Chief Land Commissioner Baluchistan who, on the facts of the case, should be taken to be an aggrieved person and for that reason any reference made by him beyond sixty days of the final adjudication was hit by the bar of limitation as prescribed in one of the provision to para. 29 of the Regulation and as interpreted in the case of Sardar Ashiq Muhammad Khan Mazari PLD 1977 Lah. 461.
(v) No notice at all was given to the alienees who had on account of the alienations already made acquired a vested right and as such not only the principles of natural justice were violated, the express provision of law contained in para. 29 of the Regulation conferring such a power was also ignored.
4. It has been brought to our notice that these petitions are barred by 23 days and there is an application for condonation of delay. The reason given therein is that an application for a copy of the judgment was made promptly, within the same week, but no date for its delivery was given to the applicants and they had been inquiring about its preparation and ultimately received the copy on 28th of April, 1980. They filed the petitions on 15-5-1980 computed from the date of preparation of the 15-5, of the judgment which happens to be 25-2-1980, the petitions would be barred, but on the facts disclosed if it is taken to be the date of delivery the copy It would be within time. On the facts stated we are inclinedsubject to all just expections,to condone this delay
5. It is true that the Members, Federal Land Commission, and even its Chairman, were held not competent individually, on the words of the authorization, to act singly. The conferment of the power under para. 29 of the Regulation was taken to be on the group as such and not on the individuals making that group. It is not necessary at this stage to go into the correctness of the view because, taking notice of the decisions and assuming the alleged infirmity, a curative statute (Ordinance No. XXIX of 1978) was enforced. It takes note of the omission, the infirmity or the lacuna and proceeds to validate if, and in so far as, the decisions given suffered from that particular infirmity and no other. The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the infirmity was of a nature, which could not be cured by validating legislation. The power of the Legislature to legislate retrospectively and such retrospectively could extend to curing of past errors, omissions and neglect is not disputed but the contention is that the decisions which were coram non judice could not be brought back to life. We are not aware of any such limitation on the powers of the Legislature in enacting curative or validating statutes. Such statutes, on the other hand, have the sole object of curing past errors, a omissions and neglect and it is intended to give legal effect to a past act ineffective because of non-compliance with legal requirements. A similar argument was advanced before this Court in the case of Dossa Limited, Karachi v. Province of Punjab (1973 SCMR 2) and was dealt with in the following words "The last contention, namely, that the Ordinance of 1971 could not validate something which was void ab initio in terms of the Act of 1949, loses sight of the fact that it is open to the Legislature to confer retros--pective operation on the laws made by it. A reference to the provisions of this Ordinance leaves no doubt that the law-maker expressly made its operation retrospective with the avowed object to conferring validity on a demand which was not valid under the original Act of 1949. "
The avowed object of the curative act now under consideration was to rectify the illegality that had crept in and had been taken note of in the decision referred to There being no impediment or fetters on the legislative power to achieve such a cruative effect the same cannot be defeated by an argument not based on any principle or provision of law.
6. The order on the strength of which it is said that the power possessed under para. 29 of the Regulation already stood exhausted has not been placed on record. It is not possible, therefore, to interpret it or to determine its effect on subsequent proceedings. A reference to it is found in the order of the Chief Land Commissioner which only shows that the Member, Federal Land Commission, instead, of exercising his authority under para. 29 of the Regulation referred the case to the Chief Land Commissioner for review.There was no exercise of the power possessed was neither exercised nor stood exhausted so as not to be available to the Chairman Federal Land Commission to deal with the dispute.
7. The Chief Land Commissioner cannot be considered to be an aggrieved person for the purposes of para. 29 of the Regulation. On the contrary, he was a statutory functionary, somewhat subordinate in the administrative heirarchy compared to Federal Land Commission, discharging functions under the same law. Any reference by him will be more a reference by statutory functionary than by an aggrieved party. This fact is fully borne out by the fact that the Chairman, Federal Land Commission expressly proceeded to determine the matter in suo motu proceedings and not as initiated on the application of an aggrieved party. It is not the case of the petitioners that in his taking up such a sup motu proceedings there was any bar.
8. The effect of Para 7 (i) (b) of the Regulation was that all alienation made between the 1st March, 1967 to the 19th day of December, 1971 (both days inclusive) on the express words of the statute "shall be and shall b deemed always to have been void and the land so transferred or the land on which the right, interest or encumbrance wag so created shall be deemed always to have been owned or possessed as the case may be by a person by p whom it was owned or possessed immediately before that date". Notwith--standing this statutory provision, hearing to the alienees and the declarants by the reviewing authorities was considered to be the requirement of natural justice (vide instructions of the Chief Land Commissioner contained on pages 230 and 255. Of Manual of Land Reforms in the Punjab, Vol. I, June, 1976 Edition). Hearing to the affect party was prescribed by para. 29 of the Regulation in the form of a proviso which is as follows :- "Provided further that no order shall be passed under the paragraph revising or modifying an order affecting any person unless such person has been afforded an opportunity of being heard."
9 That declarants were heard by the Chairman, Federal Land Commis--sion but the alienees were not heard. The High Court dealt with this aspect of the case of the alienees in the following words : "The jurisdiction of the Commissioner was limited to the extent of examining the declarations filed under M. L. R.
115. There is thus no force that the principle of natural justice has been violated in the present case."
10. The alienee petitioners were, however, heard in the High Court and by us, and they had to meet the findings of fact that the sale consideration was by all standards inadequate, that management continued even after the sale to vest in the vendors, and the alienations were all anticipatory, crowded between the period 8-10-1969 to 29-5-1971 and the land throughout remained barren and uncultivated. We find that these factors could validly form the basis for determining the bona fide or otherwise of these transactions. They have been made by the Chairman, the basis for the determination. The petitioners/alienees have not at any stage of the proceedings leading to this petition and even before us, tried to meet any of these grounds. We are not, in the c1rcurnstances, persuaded to interfere as substantial justice has been done in the matter. Leave to appeal is, therefore, refused in all these matters.
We find no merit in these petitions which are all dismissed.