S. A. NUSRAT, J.-By this judgment we propose to dispose of Constitutional Petitions Nos. 1203/75, 39/76, 658/76, D-96/77, D-294/77 and D-337/77, in which impugned orders were passed by the Chairman, Federal Land Commis--sion, sitting singly, and Constitutional Petitions Nos. 551/75, 558/75, 354/76, 533/76, 534/76, 541/76, 542/76, 753/76, 794/76, D-112/77, D-205/77, D-146/77 and D- 194/77, in which impugned orders were passed by a Member, Federal Land Commission also sitting singly.
2. We had already disposed of several petitions in which impugned orders happened to be passed by a Chairman or a Member of the Federal Land Commission sitting singly and in doing so we had followed an order of a Division Bench of this Court dated 24-2-1976 allowing Constitutional Petition No. D-1056/75 on the ground that a Chairman or a Member of the Federal Land Commission sitting singly was not competent in law to hen and dispose of revision application under para. 29 of the Land Reform Regulation, 1972. We accordingly proposed to decide other pending petition involving the same point as hithertofore, but Mr. Shah Jamil Alam, learned Deputy Attorney-General, appearing on behalf of the Federal Land Commission, asked for a detailed hearing with a view to place his own point of view in the matter. Accordingly we have heard him on behalf of the Federal Land Commission and out of the several Advocates appearing for the petitioners, Mr. Muhammad Ali Saeed addressed us in the matter.
Mr. Shah Jamil Alain contended that it was not incumbent upon us to said order of a Division Bench of this Court dated 24-2-1976 as the same did not contain any reasons and therefore it was not binding upon us. In the alternative he suggested that if we felt bound upon the said order we should refer the matter to a larger Bench.
The learned Deputy Attorney-General further contended that there was conflict of opinion with regard to the interpretation of Notification No. 7/18/72/Cord.-I, dated 23-10-1973 in accordance whereof the Chairman or Member of the Commission had been acting in exercise of powers under para. 20 of the Regulation. In this connection he referred to a judgment of the Lahore High Court in the case of Sardar Ashiq Muhammad Khan Mazari v. Chairman, Federal Land Commission (PLD 1977 Lah. 461) in which a learned Single Bench of that Court held that the authority delegated under the said notification was not exerciseable by Chairman sitting singly and hence order passed by him was completely devoid of jurisdiction. A contrary view was, however, expressed by another Single Bench of that very Court in an unreported judgment dated 29-3-1977, passed in Writ Petition No. 361 of 1977 in the case of Muhammad Hussain and others v. Federal Com--mission. The learned counsel further pointed that the order of the Division Bench of this Court dated 24-2-196 was under appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan and likewise the Supreme Court had granted leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore (High Court in the case of Sardar Asbiq Muhammad Khan Mazari.
3. Mr. Muhammad Ali Saeed, learned advocate, however, contended that the order of the Division Bench dated I 24-2-1975, amounted to a judgment as it decided the issue with regard (to the jurisdiction of the Chairman, Federal Land Commission to act and exercise power conferred upon him tinder the notification in question under paragraph 29 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972. Mr. Shah Jamil Aslam, learned Deputy Attorney-- General frankly conceded that the order dated 24-2- 1976, passed by the Division Bench of this Court amounted to a judgment as it decided the issue notwithstanding the fact that reasons were left to be recorded separately.
In view of the above concession made by the learned Deputy Attorney-- General it is to be seen whether it is necessary to refer the matter to a larger Bench as canvassed by him. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Province of East Pakistan v. Sirajul Haq Patwari (PLD 1966 SC 654) deprecated the practice of overruling of a, pronouncement on a point of law by a Full Bench as being not conducive to the maintenance of the integrity of High Court as a single source of law. At page 920 of the report their Lordships were pleased to lay down the following rule of propriety :----- "But, indeed, it cannot conduce to maintenance of the integrity of the High Court as a single source of law, or indeed, to harmony in the performance of their difficult duties by the Judges thereof, if over--ruling of a pronouncement on a point of law by a Full Bench were to become a mere matter of preponderance o members in favour of the overruling Bench. By clause 36 of the letters patent of High Court of East Pakistan it is provided that "any function to be performed by the High Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction may be performed by any Judge or by any Division Court thereof, appointed or constituted for such purpose. The meaning plainly is that a decision given by a Single Judge or a Division Court possesses the full force of a decision of the High Court, and is subject only to modification or correction by a proper appeal to the Supreme Court, except in the few cases where provision is made by the letters patent for an appeal or other mode of variation within the High Court in which case the latter decision would possess a full force of a decision by the High Court, and would be amenable to appeal to this Court."
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the decision of the Division Bench of this Court, dated 24-2- 1976 in Constitutional Petition No. D-1056 of 19.75 is binding upon us and we propose to follow the same. The alternate proposal for referring the matter to a larger Bench has also not appealed to us in view of the rule laid down by the Supreme Court referred to above. In any case the said order of the Division Bench of this Court is already in appeal before the Supreme Court and the pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the point in issue must be awaited, more particularly because there exists conflict of opinion on the matter in the jurisdiction of the Lahore High Court also.
For the foregoing reasons, I we would allow the petitions and set aside the impugned orders passed. By the Chairman or a Member of the Federal Land Commission, as the case may be in each of the above-mentioned constitutional petitions. However, there will be no orders as to costs.