SHAFIUR RAHMAN J.---Leave to appeal was granted condoning the delay in filing it to examine whether the Chairman and or the Member of the Federal Land Commission could singly decide the matter and what is the effect of non-extension of the provisions of Ordinance No. XXII of 1981 [Chairman and Members of Federal Land Commission (Validation of Orders) Ordinance] to the provincially administered tribal areas from where the dispute between the parties had arisen.
2. Regulation No.123 called the Settlement of Immovable Property Disputes (Dir and Swat)
Regulation was enforced on the 12th April, 1972. It provided for settlement of disputes by Officers authorised by the Provincial Government. The dispute was first examined by the Land Disputes Enquiry Commission and then brought before the Deputy Commissioner who by an order. Dated 2nd October, 1972 decided the matter in favour of the appellant. The respondents' appeal was dismissed by Officer on Special Duty on 10th of October, 1973. The Member. Federal Land Commission by an order, dated 25th of March, 1976 revised the order and granted relief to the respondent to some extent. The revision power was exercised on the strength of authorisation under paragraph 5 of Martial Law Regulation 123. Review Petitions were filed by both the parties which were decided by the Chairman, Tribunal Land Disputes Dir Swat and Chitral at Mardan, on 25-6-1981, by a consolidated judgment/order Both the reviews were partially accepted and the following order was passed:-- "(4) The share of Mehmood Jan in the properties mentioned in all the three deeds has been validly sold to the Nawabzada and shall be treated as the property of the Nawabzada.
(5) The shares of the nephews of Mehmood Jan in the properties mentioned in the three deeds are held to have not been sold to the Nawabzada and shall be treated as the property of the petitioners who are newphews of Mahmood Jan."
By a Constitution Petition the appellant challenged the orders of the Member, Federal Land Commission and of the Chairman, Tribunal Land Disputes under Martial Law Regulation No.123 on various grounds but at this stage only two such grounds are being pressed. The first is, the Member, Federal Land Commission or its Chairman could not singly, exercise the revisional powers but he had to do so as a Commission alongwith other members and reliance was placed for the view on the decision of this Court in Mst. Aisha Begum and others v. Chairman, Federal Land Commission (1982 SCMR 1074). The other ground taken up is that the curative statute (Ordinance No. XXII of 1981) was not properly extended to the areas where this dispute had arisen. These two grounds were considered and rejected by the High Court in Writ Petition as well as Review Petition filed before it.
Hence this appeal.
3. No doubt, in the case of Sardar Ashiq Muhammad Khan Mazari and 3 others v. Chairman, Federal Land Commission and 4 others (PLD 1977 Lah. 461) the High Court had pronounced the authorisation of the Chairman and Members to be such as to require their functioning together as a body. It is also correct that the legislature had, without getting that view finally decided in appeal to the superior Court, had come out with a curative legislation so as to undo the effect of the judgment and make its intention in such conferment of power doubly clear. The fact, however, remains that whenever the conferment of power is by enumeration or designation of the officers or posts, such authorisation has to be read distributively unless intention to the contrary appears.
Instead of Chairman and Member, it could provide the District Judge and the Additional District Judge and nobody would contend that they have to function jointly and not individually. Secondly, if it were intended to confer the power to be exercised jointly, then more legalistic and accurate expression was available to the legislature and that was of using the expression `Commission' instead of the Chairman and the Members. These two Rules of interpretation clearly indicate that the conclusion drawn by the High Court in Ashiq Ali Mazari's case (PLD 1977 Lahore 461) was not correct. Besides, we find that by Ordinance No. XXII of 1981, a sort of validation has been attempted by section 2 thereof in the following words:-- "2. Validation.Notwithstanding any order or decision of any Court, any order passed by the Chairman or a Member of the Federal Land Commission at any time before the commencement of this Ordinance and purporting to be in exercise of the authority conferred on the Chairman and Members of the Commission by an order of the Federal Government under the Dir and Swat (Devolution and Distribution of Property) Regulation, 1972, the Dir and Swat (Settlement of Disputes of Immovable Property) Regulation, 1972, the Distribution of Property (Chitral) Regulation, 1974 (II of 1974) or the Settlement of Disputes of Immovable Property (Chitral) Regulation, 1974 (II of 1974), shall be deemed to have been validly passed and shall have, and shall be deemed to have had, effect accordingly."
This ground, therefore, is not of avail to the learned counsel for the appellant.
4. As regards the second contention that Ordinance No. XXII of 1981 was not extended to cover tribal territories in terms of Article 247 of the Constitution, the view taken by the High Court is correct. Its extension to the territory as such was not required. The object was to deal with a particular category of orders passed by certain authorities. Those authorities were designated. The types of orders passed by them were identified. The defects sought to be removed, were mentioned. It is one of the fundamental principles of interpretation of statutes that full effect has to be given by extending the scope, if possible, of remedial and curative statutes, once the defect sought to be corrected is identified and the nature of correction sought is not m doubt. On this view of the matter, no fault can be found for its non-extension to the tribal area in terms of Article 247 of the Constitution.
5. The appeal is found to be without merit and is dismissed with no order as to costs.