CH. MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM ZIA, J.---The instant appeal by leave of the Court has arisen out of the judgment and decree of the High Court dated 2.4.2014 whereby while accepting the appeal filed by the real-respondents, the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Muzaffarabad has been set- aside to the extent of extension of time for depositing the decretal amount and the suit filed by the appellant, herein, has been dismissed.
2. According to the summary of facts, Muhammad Azeem Khan, plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for declaration cum-perpetual injunction with alternate plea of prior purchase against the defendant- respondent in the Court of Civil Judge Muzaffarabad on 22.2.2005. He also assailed the sale-deed executed on 23.11.2000. The counter suits bearing No. 248 titled Raja Muhammad Akram Khan v.
Muhammad Azeem and others and No. 51 titled Muhammad Nazir and others v. Imtiaz Khan and others, were filed on 25.8.2003 and 5.4.2005, respectively, in the same Court pertaining to the same land. The trial Court, after due course of law, vide consolidated judgment dated 11.8.2005, decided the controversy raised in the pleadings. The trial Court while accepting the plaint filed by the plaintiff-appellant in the suit No.22 issued a decree on the basis of the right of prior purchase against Raja Muhammad Akram Khan, (now through legal heirs), respondent herein, regarding the land bearing khasra Nos.13, 81, measuring 3 kanal, 11 marla, khasra No.52, measuring 3 kanal, 10 marla, khasra No. 69, measuring 1 kanal, 5 marla and khasra No. 112 measuring 2 kanal, 12 marla, total land measuring 10 kanal, 18 marla, situate at Mozia Dopatta. It was directed by the trial Court that if the plaintiffs deposits the amount of Rs.500,000/- along with the expenses incurred on sale- deed amounting to Rs.55,700/- within a period of 1-1/2 months, the decree shall be deemed final and the sale- deed shall be deemed cancelled, otherwise, the plaintiff's suit shall be deemed automatically dismissed. However, suit No.248 was dismissed being not proved, whereas suit No.51 filed by Muhammad Nazir was proved on legal grounds and the decree dated 28.2.2003 was set- aside while declaring the sale-deed dated 23.11.2000, ineffective, however it was concluded by the trial Court that as the decree on the basis of right of prior purchase has already been granted, thus, the sale-deed dated 23.11.2000 shall be deemed restored and no counter decree shall be granted in the suit titled Muhammad Nazir V. Lmtiaz Khan and others.
3. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff-appellants challenged the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 11.8.2005 to the extent of decretal amount through an appeal in the Court of District Judge, Muzaffarabad. However, against the judgments and decrees passed in other suits i.e. Nos. 248 and 51, no appeal was filed. The appeal was made over to the Additional District Judge Muzaffarabad for disposal under law. During earthquake, Court building collapsed and the record of the case was destroyed. An application for reconstruction of record was moved by the plaintiff-appellant on 4.6.2007. The learned Additional District Judge vide order dated 7.2.2011 accepted the application of the appellant for reconstruction of the record. The record of appeal was reconstructed and arguments in the case were heard.
4. After, necessary proceedings, the learned Additional District Judge, Muzaffarabad dismissed the appeal vide judgment and decree dated 28.11.2011, however, the Court extended the time for depositing the decretal amount within a period of 1 1/2 month. The judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge dated 28.11.2011 was assailed in appeal by the respondents herein before the High Court on 7.12.2011 which has been accepted through the impugned judgment in the manner indicated in paragraph 1, herein above.
5. Mr. Abdul Rashid Abbasi Advocate, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, after narration of brief summary of facts submitted that the impugned judgment of the High Court is result of misconception of law and the facts. The High -Court has failed to justify the difference between the expressions 'suit value' and 'value of the subject matter' especially with reference to the provision of section 36 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Courts and Laws Code, 1949, which determines the forum of appeal in such like matters. He further submitted that according to the statutory provision of section 36 of the Courts and Laws Code, the forum of appeal has to be determined with reference to the value of the suit made in the original plaint and not on the basis of the value of the subject matter, the amount of decree or relief sought by the parties. So far as the reliance placed on the judgment of this Court in the case reported as Muhammad Din and others v. Nusrat Begum and another 1995 CLC 1558 is concerned, is also misconceived. Neither in that case this Court has enunciated any such principle of law on the subject, on the basis of appreciation of relevant statutory provisions, nor the proposition was raised in detail or discussed, rather the main reason prevailed with the Court was of non-furnishing of the certified copy of the decree with the appeal.
Therefore, the impugned judgment of the High Court is not consistent with the principle of law and administration of justice, hence, is not sustainable. He further submitted that as the High Court has not decided the appeal on merits, consequently, in view of the appellant's submission, while accepting the appeal, the case be remanded to the High Court for decision on merits according to law. In support of his version, he placed reliance on the cases reported as Muhammad Hussain v.
Muhammad Afsar and 5 others /001 YLR 3280, Ilahi Bakhsh and others v. Mst. Bilqees Begum PLD 1995 SC 393 and Muhammad Nawaz v. Sher Muhammad PLD 1987 SC 284.
6. Conversely, M/s. Muhammad Yaqoob Khan Mughal and Raja Muhammad Arif Khan, Rathore, Advocates, the learned counsel for the respondents defended the impugned judgment and submitted that the same is based on the principle of law laid down by this Court in the case reported as Muhammad Din and others v. Nusrat Begum and another 1995 CLC 1558. Thus, the High Court has not committed any illegality. They further contended that according to the nature of the relief prayed for in the appeal, the value was beyond the competence of the District Judge in the appellate Jurisdiction. Thus, the High Court has not erred while dismissing the appeal through the impugned judgment. However, they agreed that if at all, the version of the appellant prevails, then the case may be remanded to the High Court for decision on merits.
7. We have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and also examined the record for proper perception of the legal and factual proposition involved in this cash. According to the statutory provisions of section 36 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Courts and Laws Code, 1949, in such like cases, the forum of appeal has to be determined on the basis of the value fixed in the original plaint. It will be useful to reproduce here the up-to-date amended provision of section 36 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Courts and Laws Code, 1949, which reads as under:-- "36. Appeals:---(1) Save as otherwise provided by any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal from a decree or order of a District Judge or Additional Judge exercising original jurisdiction shall lie to the High Court.
(2) An appeal from a decree or order of a Subordinate Judge shall lie:-
(a) to the District Judge where the value of the original suit in which the decree or order was made, does not exceed Rs.100,000/-; and
(b) to the High Court in any other case.
(3) Where the function of receiving any appeal, which lies to the District Judge under subsection
(2) has been assigned to an Additional Judge, the appeal may be preferred to the Additional Judge. (4) The High Court may, by notification, direct that all appeals that lie to the District Judge from all or any of the decrees or orders passed in an original suit by any subordinate Judge shall be referred to such other subordinate Judge as mentioned in the notification, and the appeals shall thereupon be preferred accordingly; and the Court of such other Subordinate Judge shall be deemed to be a District Court for the purpose of all appeals so preferred."
' A bare reading of the above reproduced statutory provision dearly speaks that for determination of the forum of appeal, the main consideration is the value of original suit. In this case, the value of plaint filed by the appellants is fixed as following:-- 8.The valuation of suit has not been disputed by any of the parties. According to the provision of the statutes dealing with the subject, known as the 'Court Fees Act, 1870' and 'Suit Valuation Act, 1887', the mode for determination of the value of suit for the purpose of jurisdiction and Court Fee has not been disputed by any of the parties.
9.In view of the peculiar facts of this case, the proposition emerged as to whether for determination of the forum of appeal, the consideration will be the value fixed in the suit or the value of subject matter. In our considered opinion, the expressions 'suit value' and 'value of the subject matter' are distinct and different. This proposition came under consideration of this Court in a case reported as Muhammad Khan and another v. Muhammad Sharif and another [1999 YLR 1308], wherein, it has been held that:- "10. The perusal of the above mentioned authorities would reveal that none of the same is relevant to the proposition involved in the present case. In the aforesaid cases, the question of 'valuation of the suit' for the purpose of jurisdiction and the court-fees in the trial Court was subject-matter of consideration in view of the provisions contained in sections 3 and of the Suits Valuation Act read with section 7 of the Court-fees Act. In some of the said cases the question was as to whether the valuation of the suit should be same for the purpose of jurisdiction and the court-fees and what would be the forum of appeal against a decree passed by the trial Court, i.e., whether appeal would lie to the District Judge or to the High Court. None of the authorities cited above deal with the meanings and connotation of expression 'value of the subject-matter of the dispute' employed in section 42(11)(d) of the Interim Constitution Act, 1974. Obviously, none of the above cited authorities deal with the question as to whether the value of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction or court- fees can be regarded as 'the value of the subject-matter of the dispute', as envisaged in the aforesaid constitutional provisions. Thus, the above mentioned authorities do not substantiate the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that expression 'value of the subject-matter of the dispute' occurring in section 42(11)(d) of the Interim Constitution Act would be which is fixed as a jurisdictional value of the suit under sections 3 and 8 of the Suits Valuation Act or rules framed thereunder."
Thus, it is settled in the light of the appreciation of the statutory provision as well as principle of law enunciated by this Court that for determination of forum of appeal against the judgment of trial Court, (Sub-Judge/Civil Judge), the value of the suit is of basic consideration and not the value of subject matter. This proposition is further clarified by this Court in a case reported as Muhammad Hussain v. Muhammad Afsar and 5 others 2001 YLR 3280 which has rightly been relied upon by the counsel for the plaintiff-appellant. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:- "5 We have given due consideration to the arguments advanced at Bar. The moot point in the case is as to whether the learned Sub- Judge was justified in holding that as separate value of house was no mentioned in the sale-deed he was competent to proceed with trial of the suit. Irrespective of the fact whether any separate value of the house was not recorded in the sale-deed, it was imperative on the plaintiff to fix the jurisdictional value according to the relevant law of the land. In the instant case, the court-fees and jurisdictional value were to be fixed in view of the provisions of the Court fees Act, the Suit Valuation Act and the rules framed under section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act. The jurisdictional value of the house was to be fixed according to the value of the same. According to the evidence led before the trial Court, it is amply clear that the market value of the house was more than Rs.25,000/- if the market value of the land determined on the basis of land revenue is added to it, the jurisdictional value of the suit would be further increased. Thus, we are of the opinion that in view of the jurisdictional value ascertainable on the basis of evidence recorded by the trial Court, the suit was not triable by the Sub-Judge.
6. We agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that the High Court was not correct in holding that the appeal filed by the appellant for the reduction of the amount was not competent before the District Judge but one filed by the respondents challenging the preemption decree passed in favour of the appellant was within his jurisdictional competence. In view of the provisions of subsection 2(a) of section 36 of the Courts and Laws Code, 1949, the forum of appeal is to be determined on the jurisdictional value given in the plaint and not the subject-matter of the appeal.
Section 36(2)(a) is reproduced as under:- "36. (1) ...........................
(2) An appeal from a decree or order of a Subordinate Judge shall be:-
(a) to the District Judge when; the value of the original suit in which the decree or order was made, does not exceed Rs.5000/-.
(b)
' It is evident that the value fixed in the original suit is to be considered, while determining the forum of appeal. Thus, in the present case the appeal filed by the appellant herein, lay to the District Judge because according to the appellant the jurisdictional value of the suit was Rs.100/- though thatwas controverted by the respondents. Even, otherwise, both the appellant and the respondents filed appeals before the District Judge, they are debarred from challenging his competence to hear the same in view of the provisions contained in section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act which stipulates that if objection regarding overvaluation or under-valuation of a suit or appeal is not raised in the trial Court before or at the time of framing the issues and in the appellate Court in the memorandum of appeal, the same cannot be raised afterwards. Thus, we are of the opinion that in view of the respective contentions of the parties, both the appeals were competent before the District Judge. However, as the suit filed was not within the jurisdictional competence of the Sub- Judge the decree of pre-emption passed in favour of the appellant has rightly been set-aside by the District Judge and the appeal against the same to the High Court was also rightly dismissed.
Therefore, the appeal filed by the appellant before the District Judge for the reduction of the pre- emption amount is inconsequential in the instant case."
' On this legal proposition, almost there is unanimity and consensus among the Courts of the subcontinent. The apex Court of Pakistan in a case reported as Muhammad Nawaz v. Sher Muhammad PLD 1987 SC 284 while appreciating the pari-materia provisions has observed as under:--
6. There is no dispute before us that the value of the suit for purposes of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court in the original suit was Rs.200 as recorded in the impugned order of the High Court.
Section 18 of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, which determines the forum of the appeal in respect of decrees and orders passed by the Civil Judges, provides as under:-- 'Appeals from Civil Judges:--(1) Save as aforesaid an appeal from a decree or order of a Civil Judge shall lie -
(a) to the High Court if the value of the original suit in which the decree or order was made exceeds twenty five thousand rupees; and
(b) to the District Judge in any other case.
(2)
' While construing the aforesaid provisions of section 18 Nasim Hassan Shah, J, in the case of Illahi Bakhsh made the following observations:-- 'It is important to observe that the expression employed in section 18(1)(a) is "value of the original suit". The term "value" according to clause (h) of section 2 of the Ordinance is explained thus: "value" used with reference to a suit means the amount or value of the subject matter of the suit. This shows that the forum of appeal is to be decided according to the value of the subject-matter fixed in the original suit. It means that irrespective of the amount for which the decree is ultimately passed the appeal will lie to the High Court or the District Judge according to the value of the original suit. In most of the suits the value for the purposes of court- fees and jurisdiction is determined on the basis of the claim in the suit or on the market value of the property. However, in certain cases like suits for possession or pre-emption the value for the purposes of court-fee is fixed notionally on the basis of the land revenue or the net profits and for purposes of jurisdiction the value of such suits is notionally so fixed, under the rules framed under section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act. With these observations we respectfully agree and no argument was advanced before us to disagree with the interpretation placed in this case on the provisions of section 18 of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962. All the relevant provisions beating upon the question for the determination of the forum of appeal in cases relating to suits for preemption in respect of agricultural land have been exhaustively examined and the case law reviewed in the aforesaid decision. As already stated the present case also relates to a suit for preemption in respect of agricultural and consequently the value of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction was determinable in accordance with rules framed by the Provincial Government under the Suits Valuation Act and not with reference to the market value of the subject matter of sale or the sale consideration. As already observed the jurisdictional value of the suit in this case was much below Rs.
25.000 and the respondent (defendant) did not raise any question either in the trial court or before us that the suit was improperly valued, In terms of the decision in the case of Ilahi Bakhsh, therefore, the forum of appeal was fixed and cannot change merely because the court has directed an amount in excess of Rs. 25,000 (or Rs. 50,000) to be paid as a condition for grant of decree for preemption. On the plain language of Section 18 of the Civil Courts Ordinance the forum of appeal is determinable with reference to the value of the original suit in which the decree appealed against is passed and not with reference to the amount payable by the decree-holder by way of conditions imposed upon the ultimate decree granted in his favour. It may be mentioned that a decree in preemption suit is required by Order XX Rule 14, C.P.C. To direct, inter alio, that "purchase money", shall be paid into court before a date specified in the decree. Without going into the question whether the court has power to include the value of the improvements made in the subject matter of the suit (as that question does not arise in this case), as purchase money to be deposited by the preemptor decree holder, it is quite plain that in the present case the direction to deposit the value of the improvements was made in obedience to the requirements of Order XX Rule 14, C.P.C. Therefore, since the market value of the subject matter of a suit for preemption in respect of agricultural land has been held to be immaterial qua the question of proper forum of appeal, the direction to pay a sum of money as the value of improvements made in the land after the sale would likewise not alter the value of the suit in any manner so as to affect the question of the forum of appeal. The distinction sought to drawn by the appellant for challenging the finding with regard to the value of the improvements for the purposes of determining the jurisdictional value of appeal is, therefore, not valid. The appeal under the Civil Procedure Code does not lie from a finding on an issue but from a decree or a part thereof. Consequently the decree having been passed in a suit of which the jurisdictional value is determined and fixed, the forum of appeal will not be altered merely because the aggrieved plaintiff/pre-emptor, seeks to challenge the decision of the original court in respect of the claim regarding the improvements made in the subject matter of sale which is sought to be taken over by the pre-emptor under the terms of the decree."
' The same view has also been elaborately expressed in the case reported as Ilahi Bakhsh and others v. Mst. Bilqees Begum PLD 1995 SC 393 (sic) elaborately on the basis of appreciation of almost pari materia provisions dealing with the subject matter specially with reference to the pre- emption suits and the principle of law has been enunciated in the following terms:-- "...To appreciate this submission it is necessary to examine the position of the law upto the promulgation of the Ordinance II of 1962 and then to examine whether the said position stands altered by the said Ordinance?
' The term "pre-emption suit" is a suit for possession of a property in dispute on payment of its sale price or market value. A decree enforcing the pre-emption right must direct the vendee to deliver possession of the property to the pre-emptor plaintiff on condition and subject to the plaintiff paying the sale price or market value of the property in Court for the benefit of the vendee (vide Order XX, Rule 14 C.P.C.) The decree must further direct that if the plaintiff does not pay the said amount within the time specified in the decree then the suit shall stand dismissed. The direction in the decree relating to payment of the amount in Court cannot be enforced by the vendee- defendant or by the vendor-defendant if the plaintiff is unwilling to do so. It follows that the original value of the pre-emption suit is the value of the property involved in the litigation unless there is any provision in the Suits Valuation Act which is inconsistent with this mode of computing jurisdiction value.
' In the present case the property in dispute is an agricultural land. Paragraphs (v) & (vi) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act read:--
(v) In suits for the possession of land, houses and gardens-according to the value of the subject- matter; and such value shall be deemed to be- where the subject-matter is land, and
(a) where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite share of an estate, paying annual revenue to Government, or forms part of such an estate and is recorded in the Collector's register as separately assessed with such revenue, and such revenue is permanently settled-ten times the revenue so payable :
(b) where the land forms as an entire estate, or a definite share of an estate, paying annual revenue to Government, or forms part of such estate and is recorded as aforesaid; and such revenue is settled, but not permanently- five times the revenue so payable ;
(c) where the land pays no such revenue, or has been partially exempted from such payment, or is charged with any fixed payment in lieu of such revenue, and net profits have arisen from the land during the year next before the date of presenting the plaint-fifteen times, such nett profits: but where no such nett profits have arisen therefrom the amount at which the Court shall estimate the land with reference to the value of similar land in the neighbourhood.
(d) where the land forms part of an estate paying revenue to Government, bat is not a definite share of such estate and is not separately assessed as above mentioned the market-value of the land; Explanation.---The word "estate" as used in this paragraph means any land subject to the payment of revenue for which the proprietor or farmer or raiyat snail have executed a separate engagement to Government or which in the absence of such engagement, shall have been separately assessed with revenue:
(e) for houses and gardens.---Where the subject-matter is a house or garden-according to the market-value of the house or garden: ' Under the above provisions the valuation for purposes of court-fee in this case is to be made on the basis of land revenue, that is, ten times the revenue payable on the land in suit and the court- fee, in such a suit is not to be computed or calculated on the basis of its market-value. It will be observed that while under paragraph (v) (e) and (vi) of section 7 of the Court-fees Act, a pre-emption suit relating to a house or a garden is to be valued according to the value of the subject-matter, i.e. According to its market value or sale-price; the Legislature for reasons best known to it has laid down that such a suit relating to agricultural land is to be valued on the basis of land revenue payable. This valuation is, as already mentioned, for purposes of court-fee only.
' Coming now to the jurisdictional value to be fixed in a pre-emption suit relating to agricultural land, this value is fixed in accordance with the provisions the Suits Valuation Act, 1887. Section 3 of this Act reads:-- '(1) The Provincial Government may make rules for determining the value of land for purposes of jurisdiction in the suits mentioned in the Court Fees Act, 1870, section 7, paragraphs (v) and (vi), and paragraph (x), clause (d).
(2) The rules may determine the value of any class of land, or of any interest in land, in the whole or any part of a local area, and may prescribe different values for different places within the same local area.'
' The suit in the instant case falls expressly within the terms of Section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act.
The Provincial Government has framed under Suits Valuation Actfor determining the value of land for purposes of jurisdiction in suits mentioned in the Court Fees Act, Section 7, paragraphs (v) and
(vi) paragraph (x), clause (d). The relevant rules may be reproduced below:--
1. Suits for possession of land.-- ' In suits for the possession of land the value of the land for purposes of jurisdiction, shall be held to be as follows:-- ' where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite share of an estate paying annual revenue to Government or form part of such estate and is recorded as aforesaid, and revenue is settled out not permanently---thirty times the revenue so payable'.
Explanation ......................
2. Land assessed to land Revenue'In suits to enforce a right of preemption in land, the value of the land for the purposes of jurisdiction, shall be calculated by 'the preceding rules.'
' It is, thus, obvious that the value for the purpose jurisdiction in a suit for pre-emption shall be held to be thirty times the land-revenue. As already indicated the value for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction in the present case was fixed on the basis of the above-mentioned provisions.
Undoubtedly, the notional value fixed according to the above rules is in certain cases far less than the market value, as is clear from the difference in the two values in the present case. (The market value being rupees two lacs while the notional value is only Rs.4,56030). However, there is no provision in the Suits Valuation Act laying down that the jurisdictional value of a suit can ever be altered. It follows that the value so fixed is not tentative but is fixed once for all. Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, which lays down that the value of a suit on ad valorem basis shall be the same for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction, specifically excludes its application to a pre-emption suit.
' A Division Bench of the West Pakistan High Court [Lahore Bench) in a well-considered judgment, in the case of Mumtaz Begum v. Zulfiqar Ali (PLD 1960 Lahore 1088) held that in suits for pre-emption the jurisdictional value of the appeal remains the same as determined under the Suits Valuation Act and the rules framed thereunder notwithstanding the amount determined by the Court on payment of which the decree for pre-emption is passed, in so holding all the leading cases on the subject were examined, namely, Muhammad Afzal Khan v. Nand Lal [16 PR-1908 (FB)], Iftikhar Ali v.
Thakar Singh (83 P.R. 1912), Malha and others v. Bishin Singh and others (AIR 1925 Lah. 41), Jogdish Ram v. Mst. Chinto and others (AIR 1936 Lah 133) and Sham Singh v. Jagat Singh and another (AIR 1938 Lah. 765).
' However, it has been contended that the provisions contained in Section 18 of Ordinance II of 1962 has altered the situation. It would, therefore, be appropriate to reproduce the provisions of Section 39 of the Punjab Courts Act, before adverting to Section 18 of the Ordinance II of 1962. The relevant portion of Section 39 reads:-- '39. (I) Save as aforesaid, an appeal from a decree or order of a subordinate Judge shall lie-
(a) to the District Judge where the value of the original suit in which the decree or order was made did not exceed five thousand rupees; and
(b) to the High Court in any other case.'
' This brings us to Section 18 of Ordinance II of 1962. Section 18, to the extent relevant, reads as under:-- ' Save as aforesaid an appeal from a decree of-a Civil Judge shall lie
(a) to the High Court if the value of the original suit in which the decree or order was made exceeds Rs. 50,000/-.
(b) to the District Judge in any other case.
(2) It is important to observe that the expression employed in Section 18(1)(a) is value of the original suit, The term "value" according to clause (h) of section 2 of the Ordinance is explained thus. "value" used with reference to suit means the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit.
This shows that the forum of appeal is to be decided according to the value of the subject-matter fixed in the original suit. It means that irrespective of the amount for which the decree is ultimately passed the appeal will lie to the High Court or the District Judge according to the value of the original suit. In most of the suits the value for the purposes of court-fees and jurisdiction is determined on the basis of the claim in suit or on the market value of the property. However, in certain cases like suits for possession or pre-emption the value for the purposes of court- fee is fixed notionally on the basis of the land revenue or the nett profits and for purposes of jurisdiction the value of such suits is notionally so fixed, under the rules framed under section 3 the Suits Valuation Act. The value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction, in this case, was fixed at Rs.
4,56030 and no objection was to this amount. The forum of appeal has, as discussed above, also to be determined by this value.
' It is, no doubt, open to the legislature to fix the value of the subject-matter of the suit either at its market value or at any notional or artificial figure. When the legislature decides to fix a jurisdictional value of the subject-matter of a suit, then that value must regulate not only the forum of the suit but also the forum of the appeal. Thus, the Court of the lowest grade with jurisdiction of this value will be competent to entertain and decide the suit and the appeal will similarly lie to the Court having jurisdiction to entertain appeals of this value.
' A pre-emption suit or an appeal in which the right of pre-emption asserted is no exception.
However, a pre-emption suit has one special feature. It cannot be decreed without a direction regarding payment of market value or sale-price by the pre-emptor decree-holder. It is therefore open to the legislature to fix the value of a preemption suit at the market value or a sale-price of the property in suit or at a notional figure. The legislature has, indeed, fixed the market value or sale-price (as the case may be) as the value of the suit when the property involved is a house or a garden but in case of a suit for pre-emption relating to agricultural land the legislature has fixed a notional value instead of its market value or sale-price for purposes of computing as jurisdictional value. In view of this expression of the legislative intent it is not open to a Court of law to take into consideration the market or sale price of the land simply because the pre-emption decree must contain a direction with regard to the payment of the market value or sale price of the subject- matter of the suit-land.
' There can hardly be any doubt that the legislature while enacting the Court Fees Act and the Suits Valuation Act was aware of this special feature of a pre-emption suit, namely, that a direction has to be made in the decree that the market value or sale-price must be paid by the pre-emptor, and yet it chose to ignore the market value or the sale price for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction in suits relating to agricultural land though it retained it in suits relating to a house or a garden. It is therefore, not open to us to take notice of a value which the legislature has chosen to ignore for this purpose.
' A perusal of the provisions of Section 18 of Ordinance II of 1962 also does not provide anywhere that the forum of appeal is to be determined on the basis of the sale price or the market value of the land. It only lays down that this to be determined on the basis of the value of the original suit.
The value of the suit in such a case being the one which is notionally fixed, as already explained above, it will be the same value which will determine the forum of appeal"
10. So far as the reliance placed by the High Court on the judgment of this Court in the case reported as Muhammad Din and others v. Nusrat Begum and, another [1995 CLC 1558], is concerned, it appears to be result of misconception. In the referred case, this proposition was neither directly raised, appreciated nor resolved therefore, in this regard, no principle of law has been enunciated by this Court in the referred judgment. According to the Constitutional provisions, only the principle of law enunciated is having the binding force.
11. Consequently, for the above stated reasons and enunciated principle of law, we are constrained to accept this appeal, set-aside the impugned judgment of the High Court while concluding that the appeal before the District Judge was competently filed. Reluctantly, the case is remanded to the High Court With the direction to decide the same afresh on merits according to law after hearing the parties.
With these observations, this appeal stands disposed of. No order as to costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.