ZAFFAR 14USSAIN MIRZA, J.-The question of law which requires to be determined in this appeal is whether an appeal lies to the High Court from a decree passed by a civil Court in a suit to enforce a right of pre-emption, valued at below Rs. 50,000 but directing payment of a sum exceeding Rs.
50,000 by the decree-holder (pre-emptor) as value of improvements in the subject-matter of sale.
2. The question arises in the facts and circumstances which so far as relevant may be briefly stated. Agricultural land measuring 1 Kanal 2 Marlas situated in village Danda Shah Bilawal, Tehsil Tallagang, District Chakwal was owned by one Shera son of Zaman, who sold the same by means of a registered sale-deed, dated 6th April, 1980, for a conNidera--tion of Rs. 25,000. The appellant brought a suit to enforce the right of pre-emption in respect of the aforesaid sale in the Court of Civil Judge, Tallagang, on the ground of his being a collateral of the vendee. A rival claimant for pre-emption also filed a suit but that fact is not material.
The vendee resisted ;he suit of the appellant on various pleas but it is only relevant to mention that he raised the plea to the effect that he had effected improvements on the suit land, which plea was the subject--matter of Issue No. 7 framed by the trial Court. So far as the appellant was concerned, there was no dispute between the parties about the bona fides of sale consideration mentioned in the sale-deed. By judgment dated 12th May, 1982, the trial Court passed a decree in favour of the appellant for possession through pre-emption directing that he will be liable to deposit a total sum of Rs. 95,999 comprising Rs. 25,000 as sale price and As. 70,999 as the value of the improvements made on the land in the form of constructions raised thereon by a specified date failing which his suit shall be deemed to have been dismissed.
3. The appellant, in obedience to the directions given by the Court deposited Rs. 25,000 towards the sale price within the stipulated time mentioned in decree but as he was aggrieved by the decision of the Court as regards the payment of the amount towards improvements, he presented an appeal before the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi, as F. R. A. No. 39 of 1982. This appeal was admitted to regular hearing by a Division Bench of the Court but when the appeal came up for final disposal the learned Judges suo motu raised the question of competency of the appeal directly before the High Court and after hearing the counsel passed order, dated 6th October, 1985, in the following terms:- "The suit is valued for the purpose of jurisdiction at Rs. 200 and in decree sheet the value is shown as Rs. 25,000, therefore, this appeal is returned to the appellant to be presented to the proper Court."
4. Although the appellant was dissatisfied with the aforesaid order, according to him he had no option but to receive the appeal back and present it before the District Judge, Chakwal. He then came up before this Court for leave to appeal, which was granted in order to consider whether the decision of this Court reported as l1ahi Bakhsh and others vMst. Bilqees Begum (PLD1985SC393would not govern the present case. In that case it was held that for ascertaining the forum of appeal in land suits, including suits to enforce right of pre-emption the value of the original suit for purposes of jurisdiction will be the determining factor and not the market value or the sale price of the subject-matter of the suit. The distinguish--ing feature on the basis of which it was contended that the case of llahi Bakhsh would not be attracted was that since the appellant challenged the grant of certain amount (more than Rs. 50,000) as the value of improve--ments made by the vendee, therefore, whatever the jurisdictional value of the appeal for the purposes of challenging the other findings, the jurisdictional value for purposes of the amount of improvements allowed to the respondent/vendee would have to be calculated separately and therefore by virtue of section 18 of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, the appeal lay before the High Court.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length. On behalf of the appellant the arguments taken note of in the leave granting order have been reiterated and for the respondent reliance has been placed on the case of Illahi Bakhsh as a complete answer to the contentions raised in support of the appeal.
6. There is no dispute before us that the value of the suit for purposes of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court in the original suit was Rs. 200 as recorded in the impugned order of the High Court.
Section 18 of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962. Which determines the forum of the appeal in respect of decrees and orders passed by the Civil Judges, provides as under:- "Appeals from Civil Judges.-(I) Save as aforesaid an appeal from a decree or order of a Civil Judge shall lie-
(a) to the High Court if the value of the original suit in which the decree or order was made exceeds twenty-five thousand ru--pees; and
(b) to the District Judge in any other case.
(2) .
(3) .
While construing the aforesaid provisions *of section 18---Nasim Hasan Shah, J. In the case of I11ahi Bakhsh made the following observations:- "It is important to observe that the expression employed in sec--tion 18 (1) (a) is `value of the original suit' The term `value' according to clause (h) of section 2 of the Ordinance is explained thus: "value" used with reference to a suit means the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit. This shows that the forum of appeal is to be decided according to the value of the subject.
Matter fixed in the original suit. It means that irrespective of the amount for which the decree is ultimately passed the appeal will lie to the High Court or the District Judge according to the value of the original suit. In most of the suits the value for the purposes of court-fees and jurisdiction is determined on the basis of the claim in the suit or on the market value of the property. However, in certain cases like suits for possession or pre-emption the value for the purposes of court-fee is fixed notionally on the basis of the land revenue or the net profits and for purposes of jurisdiction the value of such suits is notionally so fixed, under the rules framed under section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act."
With these observations we respectfully agree and no argument was advanced before us to disagree with the interpretation placed in this case on the provisions of section 18 of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962. All the relevant provisions bearing upon the question for the determina--tion of the forum of appeal in cases relating to suits for pre-emption in respect of agricultural land have been exhaustively examined and the case-law reviewed in the aforesaid decision. As already stated the present case also relates to a suit for pre-emption in respect of agricultural land and consequently the value of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction was determinable in accordance with rules framed by the Provincial Govern--ment under the Suits Valuation Act and not with reference to the market value of the subject-matter of sale or the sale consideration. As already observed the jurisdictional value of the suit in this case was much below Rs. 25,000 and the respondent (defendant) did not raise any question either in the trial Court or before us that the suit was improperly valued. In terms of the decision in the case of llahi Bakhsh, therefore, the forum of appeal was fixed and cannot change merely because the Court has directed an amount in excess of Rs. 25,000 (or Rs. 50,000) to be paid as a condition of grant of decree for pre-emption. On the plain language of section 18 of the Civil Courts Ordinance the forum of appeal is deter--minable with reference to the value of the original suit in which the decree appealed against is passed and not with reference to the amount payable by the decree holder by way of conditions imposed upon the ultimate decree granted in his favour. It may be mentioned that a decree in pre-emption suit is required by Order XX, rule 14, C. P. C. To direct, inter alia, that "purchase money", shall be paid into Court before a date specified in the decree. Without going into the question whether the Court has power to include the value of the improvements made in the subject--matter of the suit (as that question does not arise in this case), as purchase money to be deposited by the pre-emptor decree-holder, it is quite plain that in the present case the direction to deposit the value of the improve--ments was made in obedience to the requirements of Order XX, rule 14, C. P. C. Therefore, since the market value of the subject-matter f a suit for pre-emption in respect of agricultural land has been held to be immaterial qua the question of proper forum of appeal, the direction to pay a sum of money as the value of improvements made in the land after the sale, would likewise not alter the value of the suit in any manner so as to affect the question of the forum of appeal. The distinc--tion sought to be drawn by the appellant for challenging the finding with regard to the value of the improvrrnents for the purposes of determining the jurisdictional value of appeal is, therefore, not valid. The appeal under the Civil Procedure Code does not lie from a finding on an issue but from a decree or a part thereof. Consequently the decree having been passed in a suit of which the jurisdictional value is determined and fixed, the forum of appeal will not be altered merely because the aggrieved plaintiff/pre-emptor, seeks to challenge the decision of the original Court in respect of the claim regarding the improvements made in the subject --matter of sale which is sought to be taken over by the pre-emptor under the terms of the decree.
7. For the foregoing reasons we have come to the conclusion that the rule laid down in llahi Bakhsh's case governed the present case and therefore, the High Court rightly declined to entertain appeal on the basis that the value of the suit to which the decree was passed was such that the appeal lay to the District Judge. In the result this appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. s. Q./M-51/s Appeal dismissed.