1. ' BASHARAT AHMAD SHAIKH, J.---Facts necessary for disposal of the appeal are that appellants, Muhammad Din and others purchased land measuring 180 Kanals 4 Marlas in. Village Kasgummah, Tehsil Bhimber, on 14th of January, 1988 from Javed Akthar. The sale was challegned on the basis of right of prior purchase by Mst. Nusrat Begum, respondent No,1. The suit was decreed by the learned Sub-Judge on 28th of February, 1991. Appeal was filed before the learned Additional District Judge by the plaintiff challenging the decretal amount but it was dismissed. Respondent Mst. Nusrat Begum, the pre-emptor, is the sister of vendor Javed Akthar and also a co-sharer in the suit land. Her case was that the land in dispute was sold for Rs,5 lakh and not for Rs,7 lakh, which had been shown in the sale-deed. Her suit was decreed but her plea about the amount of sale consideration was rejected. Therefore, her appeals before the Additional District Judge and the High Court were for reduction of decretal amount. The learned Judge in the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by Mst. Nusrat Begum on the sole ground that the amount which the plaintiff- respondent wanted to be reduced was Rs,2 lakh the appeal was maintainable before the High Court and not before the Additional District Judge. However, the learned Judge extended the time for making deposit of the decretal amount till 25th of April, 1994.
2. ' After the dismissal of the appeal by the High Court Mst. Nusrat Begum has not come up to this Court. Thus, the main part of the judgment of the High Court, in which it was declared that the appeal before the Additional District Judge was not competent and the second appeal to the High Court was time-barred, has become final. The only point which is to be resolved in this case is whether the High Court was right in extending the time for making the deposit of decretal amount.
3. ' When first appeal was filed, the operation of the order of the trial Court was suspended.
4. Consequently the learned Additional District Judge, while dismissing the appeal, on 24th of February, 1992 extended the time for deposit of the decretal amount till 31st of March, 1992. When second appeal was filed before the High Court the operation of the order in respect of deposit of decretal amount was again suspended. The High Court observed that the office of Additional District Judge, Bhimber and the office of the High Court failed to point out the legal defect which was apparent on the face of the record that the appeal had been filed before the Additional District Judge instead of the High Court and that subsequently the appeal filed in the High Court was time- barred. It was, therefore, held that the Courts were also responsible for the situation. For this reason the High Court extended the time for depositing the decretal amount.
5. In our view the ground recorded by the High Court is not sustainable. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court were not challegned through a valid appeal before the High Court. The appeal filed before the Additional District Judge had no existence in the eye of law. When the appeal was filed before the High Court it was stated that it was being filed against the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge confirming the decree. Passed by the Sub- Judge. Copy of the decree passed by the Sub-Judge was not attached with the appeal filed in the High Court, although certified copy of the judgment was duly filed. An appeal lies against the decree and if a certified copy of the decree is not attached with the appeal there is no valid appeal. This is in itself fatal. The other fatal defect is that the appeal filed in the High Court was hopelessly time-barred reckoned from the date of decree passed by the Sub-Judge but no explanation, valid or otherwise, was given to explain the delay nor an application for condonation was filed. It follows that there was no valid appeal before the High Court. In these circumstances the High Court was left with no power to grant extension in time. In extending the time the High Court has relied on a judgment of this Court reported as Qasim Hussain Shah v. Muhammad Gulzar (PLD 1984 SC (AJ&K) 150), in which it was held that the delay in depositing the decretal amount may be execused when an appellant had been misled and if it is not done it may perpetuate injustice. It was also observed by this Court that the High Court should have exercised the discretion in favour of the appellant. It was a case in which an appeal before the High Court was valid and the High Court was possessed with the power to grant extension. Since in the present case the appeal was not maintainable the precedent case has no relevance.
6. ' The petition for leave to appeal in this Court was filed by Muhammad Din and others, the vendees, on 4th of May, 1994. However., subsequently the suit land was transferred by Mst. Nusrat Begum to Javed Akhtar, therefOre, he has been impleaded, with the permission of the Court, as a respondent.
7. As an upshot of the foregoing discussion we accept the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court. The suit filed by Mst. Nusrat Begum shall stand dismissed. It is also ordered that the subsequent transfer of the suit land in favour of Javed Akhtar shall, also stand nullified.