{{PAGE CUT}} ' At, who was employed as officer, Grade III, in the United spondents herein, was dismissed from service with effect 1980, on the charge of deliberately and purposely keep-himself a cheque for Rs, 30,000, which had been sent .1 thereby causing financial loss to the Bank. The dis:re based on the report of the Enquiry Officer who found rge fully established against the appellant. The appelthe orders of his dismissal before the learned VIIth rich has dismissed his grievance petition on the ground aft is not a workman and consequently his grievance .Aintainable. The appellant has now come up in appeal against the said decision of the learned Labour Court. Held by this Tribunal in the case of Johnson & Johnson abair Ahmad (1) that a person whose services have been not fall within the definition of a worker for the purpose admitted position that the appellant was given the usual power of attorney issued in favour of the officers. It has been held by this Tribunal in the cases of Mohammad Iqbal Soomro v. United Bank Ltd. (1), and Mohammad Ali Ghani Khan v. Habib Bank Ltd.Karachi (2), that an employee who was working as an officer in a bank and was holding a power of attorney is not a workman, but on the contrary falls within the definition of employer for the purposes of the I. R. O. In the latest case of Syed Kifyat Hussain v. United Bank Ltd., decided on 9th April, 1981, this Tribunal has held that an officer, Grade III, in the United Bank Ltd., despite the fact that he did not hold power of attorney in his favour was not a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders and is accordingly not entitled to maintain a grievance petition against the termination of his services. {{PAGE CUT}}
3. It was contended by Mr. Mumtaz Ali Siddiqi, the learned counsel for the appellant, that the appellant was employed to do clerical duties in that he was required to maintain several registers.
He, however, was unable to refer me to any evidence on record in support of his contention, although a pointed question in this behalf was put to him. It was also urged by Mr. Siddiqi that as the appellant did not have the power to hire and fire, consequently, he should be deemed to be a workman for' the purposes of the Standing Orders. It may, however, be pointed out that the power to hire and fire is not the determining or even the most material factor for deciding whether an employee is a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders. The determining factor is whether the employee is engaged to perform manual or clerical work. It was next submitted by Mr. Mumtaz Ali Siddiqi that the power of attorney given to the appellant was withdrawn from him about 1 1/2 years before the date he bad given evidence, as stated by the appellant in his testimony before the learned Labour Court. Even if this assertion of the appellant be correct, it will make no material difference, for firstly, the withdrawal of the power of attorney was evidently in consequence of the charges against the appellant which related to the period between 18th December, 1978 and 28th December, 1978 and subsequent suspension of the appellant in consequence of those charges, and secondly, as pointed out in the case of Syed Kijayat Hussain referred to above, it is the nature of duties which an employee is required to perform that determines whether he is a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders and not merely the holding of a power of attorney. As pointed out by their Lordships of the Lahore High Court in the case of Chairman Brooke Bond Ltd. v.
General Secretary, Union Karkunane Brooke Bond (3), the true test for determining whether an employee falls within the definition of workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders is to look to the direct, immediate and the substantial part of the work for which he is employed and not to sundry duties incidentally performed by him. The appellant admittedly was an officer of the bank and even if a part of his duties involved the performance of clerical duties, he would not be deemed to be a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders, unless the direct, immediate and substantial part of his duties involved clerical or manual work.
4. It was finally submitted by Mr. Siddiqi that as the appellant was not the head of the branch where he was employed but was working {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) 1978 PLC 360 (2) 1979 PLC 156
(3) P L 1) 1969 Lah. 717 {{FOOT NOTE}} under the manager, therefore. He should be deemed to be a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders. It has been held by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Talat Faroaq vs, Messrs Choloride Pakistan Ltd. (Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal K-145 of 1976, decided on 21st September, 1976), that merely because a person may be working under' someone else, he cannot be deemed to be a workman for the purposes of labour laws as even the General Manager of the company has to work under the Directors of the Company.
5. For the reasons discussed above, I see no merit in this appeal and accordingly dismiss the same in limine.