DECISION This is an appeal against the order of the Labour Court dismissing the application filed by the appellant under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance on the ground that he was not a 'workman'.
2. The appellant was appointed as an officer in the Bank and was granted power of attorney and wherein his duties were enumerated. He had, proceeded on medical leave from 15-2-1972. In June 1972 he claimed to have applied for further leave but he was served with a show-cause notice.
There was exchange of correspondence between the parties and finally he was dismissed from service on 19-9-1972. He made four representations to the respondents but of no avail. He, therefore, made an application to the Junior Labour Court on 8-4-1973 under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance.
3. The application was opposed and it was pleaded the appellant was not a workman and the application was time-barred. On the assessment of the evidence these grounds were upheld by the Junior Labour Court and the application was dismissed. An appeal was filed in the Labour Court. The appeal was allowed and the case was remanded for disposal after recording evidence.
Later on the respondent was declared ex parte but this order was vacated and the case was ordered to proceed on merit. An appeal was filed to the Labour Court and the order of the Junior Labour Court was set aside on the ground that it had no power. The respondent filed Constitutional Petition in the High Court and the order of the Labour Court was set aside directing the Junior Labour Court to decide the case on merit.
4. Subsequently the Junior Labour Court was abolished and the case was transferred to the Labour Court. Evidence was recorded and the there after the impugned order was passed. The question of limitation was not touched on the ground that it had already been decided by another Labour Court in appeal.
5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order the present appeal had been filed. On perusal of the record and proceedings of the case I see no reason to differ from the view taken by the Labour Court. The decision is entirely based on the nature of duties which were assigned and performed by the appellant. These duties are embodied in the power of attorney. A perusal of the duties leaves no room for doubt that the appellant cannot be treated to be a `workman'. In this view I am supported by the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan in the case of Standard Bank Ltd. Karachi v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Karachi and others (1974 PLC 138). It was also a case of a person holding the power of attorney of a Bank and it was held that the person who was performing the duties ennumerated in the power of attorney was not a `workman' but he was an `employer' and there--fore, no relief could be granted to him. The learned counsel for the appellant did not contend that the duties enumerated in the present power of attorney are in any 'way di8erent from the power of attorney in the reported case. Consequently the present case is fully covered by that decision. It may be pointed out that I was a party to that decision when I was a Judge of the High Court. I see no reason to take a different view.
6. It was further pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that previously the definition of the term `employer' included the power of attorney from a Bank. But in the present Industrial Relations Ordinance this has been excluded and therefore it must be presumed that the person holding the power of attorney could not fall within the category of an `employer' I am not impressed with this argument for the simple reason that the decision of the High Court was not based on the expression which has not been deleted but it was based on the duties which were embodied in the power of attorney and had to be performed by the person holding that power.
Moreover the word `Agent' appears in clause (e) of the definition of the term `employer' and in my view the word `Agent' would certainly include a person holding a power of attorney. It cannot be disputed that the person holding the power of attorney is all the same an `agent' and acts as such.
Conse--quently the deletion of the expression from the present definition hardly makes any difference. In fact such an expression was unnecessary in view of the word appearing in clause (e) of the definition, and it seems that it was deleted on that account.
7. In the result I maintain the order passed by the Labour Court and dismiss the appeal.