The appellant was appointed in Habib Bank Limited. Quetta, the first respondent herein, as Grade-III officer on 10th October,`1979 and was posted as an officer at Panjgoor. He absented himself from duty whereupon, a show-cause notice was issued to him on 21st September, 1981. He filed a reply to the same explaining that he had been ill during the period of his absence from duty. He also produced Medical Certificate which indicated that he had nervous tension and required some rest.
However the explanation was not found satisfactory and his services were terminated on 25th October, 1981. He filed an appeal and also a review petition to the respondent but the same were also dismissed. Thereafter, he issued notice under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the I. R. O.) calling upon the respondent to re-instate him in service and there being no response by the respondent, he filed an application under section 25-A of the I.R.O. Which was contested by the respondent. Among others the respondent raised follow--ing objections to the maintainability of the application in the Labour Court ; (a) that Standing Orders Ordinance was not applicable to the employees of the Bank as they were governed by the Wage Commission Award ; (b) that the appellant was not a `Workman' as his initial appoint--ment was that of an Officer, the nature of duties was supervisory, and the salary drawn by him was Rs.1,646 per month ; (c) no right guaranteed or secured to the applicant having been violated and the termination of service being termination simpliciter, the application was not maintain--able.
2. The Labour Court-III heard the application and dismissed the same vide order dated 25th September, 1982 hence this appeal.
3. This fact was prominently at issue before the Labour Court as to whether the appellant was a workman or not, and as it goes to the root of the case, I would take it up first. Mr. W.N Kohli, Advocate for the appellant raised three-fold contention to argue that the appellant was a `Workman'. His first submission was that the appellant did not enjoy the powers of `hiring and firing' etc. And himself worked as a subordinate of the Manager Incharge of Panjgoor Branch of the Bank, therefore, he fell within the category of `Workman' as defined by the I.R.O. As well as the Standing Orders Ordinance. He further submitted that he normally per--formed the duties of maintaining, supervising and checking ledgers etc. Which equated him with an ordinary clerk of the Bank. With regard to the salary also, his argument was that his basic salary should have been taken into account which comes to Rs. 625 per month omitting the remaining amount which was paid to him by way of allowances. I find myself unable to agree with these contentions. In my opinion, the powers of hire and fire cannot be regarded sole criterion for judging whether a person A was or was not a workman. There is possibility of various such high positions in which an officer may have nothing to do with such powers, ye by dint of the duties that he performs and the salary that he draws, he is an officer and not a workman. Similarly, the nature of work done by an incumbent can also not be the sole criterion for drawing a line of distinc--tion between the clerical staff and the officers. As far as the banks are concerned. The nature of business is such that from a ledger keeper to the incharge of the bank, every body can be termed a clerk. May be one is less glorified than the other, for each one of them has to make some contribution in these kinds of jobs, though its nature may differ from clerk to clerk and from clerk to an officer in a bank, as explained by Mr. Tariq, learned counsel for the respondents, from a clerk to the Manager, all incumbents perform almost the same duties, but the difference is that clerks would make entries in the ledger, while the officer next higher to them would check the entries made and record kept. He may also some--times perform the functions of a clerk when need be.
Lastly the person incharge of the bank would put his signatures on the entries recorded and the records maintained by various categories of staff and officers at the end of the day. It cannot, therefore, be said that since all except the Manager of the Bank are performing more or less the same duties, therefore, they all belong to one category. If that be so, then why these distinctions between clerks and officers of various categories why not all of them be appointed and given salaries of clerks. In the instant case, the appellant was appointed directly as an officer of Grade-III at a basic salary of Rs. 625 per month plus allowances and he undisputedly carried home Rs. 1,646 per month at the time of termination of his services and these facts are enough to place him outside the category of workman. Besides this the Wage Commission has also not recognized Grade-III officers as workmen. It is evident from the category of workmen mentioned by them which omits such officers. In this connection I was referred United Bank Limited Kar. Etc. v.
Muhammad Ali (1985 PLC 1050) by Mr. W.N. Kohli, Advocate where an officer of Grade-III of the United Bank Limited whose nature of duties was not supervisory and the pay was also Rs. 800 was held to be covered by the definition of workman. The facts of the two cases are not identical. In the instant case, it has not come on record that the appellant was doing any clerical job. On the other hand, it is established. That he was working as an Officer and his salary was Rs. 1,646 per month.
The citation is thus inapt. Mr. Tariq, learned counsel for the respondents relied upon Hafeez-ur- Rehman's v. Vice-President U. B. L., Sukkur (1982 PLC 294). This case also pertained to a Bank Officer and similar ground seems to have been agitated before the court namely that he did not hold power of attorney etc., there--fore, he was outside the category of officers ; but notwithstanding such argument, the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind held that whether or not he held the power of attorney, he was not a workman because of his appointment as an Officer. I am in full agreement with this view The nature of job to which a person was appointed would play a pivotal role in determining his status both for the purpose of I.R.O. And the West B Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. Similar view was taken by the same Tribunal to Kifayat Hussain v. U B.L. (1982 PLC 116) and it was held that when a member of the clerical staff was promoted as an officer of Grade-III, the promotion was indicative of the fact that he was to perform duties of higher responsibilities and was expected to perform better in the new capacity, therefore, in the absence of any indication that despite his promotion as an officer, he was required to perform clerical duties, it could be safely held that he was in the Officer's category and was thus not competent to agitate his grievance under section 25-A of the I.R.O. In the case in hand, not only the first appointment and posting of the appellant was as an Officer of Grade-III but wages that he drew were also much more than Rs. 800 per month. Mr. Kohli's argument that the actual salary was Rs. 625 per month should be taken into consideration and not the allowances, is fallacious per se In section 2 (xxviii) (b), the word used is wages and not basic salary. As such, entire emolument would be relevant, when it was to be seen as to whether or not an employee was covered by the category of supervisor etc. By virtue of his salary being Rs. 800 per month or above.
For the reasons given above, I hold that the appellant was not a work--man and was not, as such, entitled to file application under section 25-A of the I.R.O. The appeal is thus dismissed with costs.