This Revision arises from the judgment and decree dated the 17th of November, 1985, passed by the learned District Judge, Okara, whereby he dismissed the petitioner-plaintiff Mst. Amna Bibi's appeal.
2. It appears that both the spouses had brought suits against each other. The petitioner was seeking by this suit recovery of dowry or in lieu thereof Rs.17,500, and by another dissolution of her marriage. They effected a compromise by making a joint statement on 22-9-1985 whereby the petitioner gave up her claim of dower as also maintenance while the respondent divorced her.
There were further claims and counter claims. The petitioner demanded back dowry worth Rs.17,500 while the respondent asserted that he had to recover from her a sum of Rs. 11,000. They agreed by the said statement to be bound by the statement of a referee in order to settle those points. The referee clearly held that the petitioner lady had to pay a sum of Rs. 9,345, of course, he upheld her claim as to dowry which was lying intact with the respondent.
3. The petitioner lady felt aggrieved of the statement of the referee and preferred an appeal from the decree stating that she had not authorised either her father to sign the compromise dated. 22- 9-1985 or her counsel, and that the utmost the Court could do, was to have dismissed her suit rather than passed a counter-decree. The appeal failed as the learned District Judge found that the compromise statement was signed by her counsel who had enough authority to bind her.
4. Ch. Muhammad Hussain Awan, counsel for the petitioner relying upon Muhammad Akbar and another v. Muhammad Aslam and another (PLD 1970 SC 241) urged that the agreement to be bound by a third person's statement was not covered by any statutory provision, nor did it amount to adjustment of the suit in terms of Order XXII, rule 3, C.P.C. And that it was open to her to resile from it. He reiterated that the lady's father who thumb marked it was in fact not her authorised agent and a priori signing it by her counsel on the basis of instructions conveyed to him through her father was equally not enough. Lastly, he asserted that the compromise even as a contract could be disregarded. He emphasized that the amounts claimed by the respondent particularly Rs.6,000 were, if at all, advanced to her father and could have been recovered from him alone. In other words, the contention was that the daughter could not be made liable for the debts of the father and that the decree making her so liable was legally vitiated.
5. On the other hand, reliance was placed upon Dr. Ansar Hassan Rizvi v. Syed Mazahir Hussain Zaidi and 3 others (1971 SCMR 634) and Rehmat Ali and others v. Muhammad Yusuf (1985 CLC 72) in support of the plea that by virtue of the Vakalatnama filed by the petitioner in favour of her counsel, the latter was competent to sign the compromise statement and that she could not wriggle out of it. Likewise reliance was placed upon Attiqullah v. Kafayatullah (1981 SCMR 162) in which a compromise was held to be a contract as could not be rescinded or revoked, nor had the Court any option to bypass it on any purported exercise of resiling from it.
6. Muhammad Akbar's case no doubt enunciates that an offer to be bound by a third person's statement was not governed by any statutory provision, yet in all humility I feel Article 33 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, could be made applicable to it, and as statement of a third person it was tantamount to an admission of the party concerned. Article 113 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat provided that the matters admitted by a party need not be proved by producing evidence. This is how it will operate against the interest of the party, leaving no room to avoid its legal effect. Further, the latest case of Attiqullah from the Supreme Court itself seems to change the complexion of the law on the point. A compromise was held therein to be contract which could not be infringed by any party. It has to be enforced. Resilience from it would not be possible. Nor was there any substance in the contention that the counsel signing the compromise statement had no authority to do so. The two cases of Dr. Ansar Hussain Rizvi and of Rehmat Ali, referred to above, support the proposition that the counsel had not only actual but even implied authority to sign such a statement as to bind his client. The father's thumb impression signifying acceptance on her part may not be effective as he actually did not hold necessary authority on her behalf but the counsel's acceptance was quite effective.
7. The referee's statement held the daughter liable to pay among other sums, Rs.6,000 to the respondent on behalf of her father. Ordinarily she could not have been made so liable but the typical statement contemplated a final settlement between the parties in regard to their claims and counter-claims. The statement operated as admission, which admission could be legally made by anyone even in regard to the liability of a third person. In simpler words, she admitted to be bound by the debts of her father and, therefore, will have to clear them.
8.On this plane the compromise decree was neither appealable nor even revisable. The civil revision is dismissed.