The facts as are relevant for the disposal of this petition may briefly be stated as follows :----- The petitioner was employed as Security Assistant by the P. I. A. On terms and conditions laid down in Service Agreement dated 12-11-1971. He applied on 26-6-1974, for free concessional air passage for himself, his wife, his son Master Muhammad Alam Khan and his married daughter Sultan Jehan and her two minor sons. In the application for air passage he gave wrong age of his son as 14 years, who was in fact aged 18 years, described his married daughter, as spinster and aged 13 years and his grand children as his sons. An enquiry into the matter was set afoot on the letter of one Samar Khan dated 17-7-1974 which mentioned that the petitioner had obtained free and concessional air passage by making false declaration. A preliminary investigation was made by one Aijaz Hussain who recorded the statement of the petitioner. After investigation the petitioner was served with a show-cause notice dated I8-9-1974. He submitted his written explanation which was found unsatisfactory and, therefore, he was served with a charge-sheet dated 26-10-1974. In reply to the same he pleaded guilty, requested for early decision and stated that he did not require any personal hearing. Notwithstanding the same, an Enquiry Officer was appointed who afforded necessary facility of defence to the petitioner. On the receipt of the investigation report a second show-cause notice dated 3rd December 1974 was issued to the petitioner and he was offered opportunity of personal hearing. In reply to the same dated 6-12-1974 the petitioner stated that he bad admitted the mistake which, according to him, `indicated his fairness' and he asked for taking a lenient view in the matter. The petitioner, was however dismissed from service on 2-I-1975. He filed a departmental appeal against the order of dismissal on 24-1-1975 and further representation on 13-2-1975. The petitioner was granted interview by the Chairman of the Corporation on 4-4-1975, and was informed on 5-4-1975, that his request for re-employment could not be considered and the order of dismissal from service could not be rescinded. The petitioner, even before receipt of this reply, filed an application under section 25-A of the I. R. O. In the Court of Junior Labour Court on 1-4-1975. The learned Junior Labour Court formulated 4 points for consi--deration as under;----
(1) Whether the applicant had availed of the air passage in respect of his divorced daughter.
(2) Whether he was aware of the conditions and rules about air passage tickets to the employees at the time of filing the Form for concessionary tickets.
(3) Whether the enquiry conducted against him is fair and he was afforded chance of leading defence evidence, second show-cause notice, personal hearing etc.
(4) Whether he was rightly dismissed from service for dishonest and illegal action of the applicant.
After recording evidence of the parties the learned first respondent answered all the four issues in the affirmative and rejected the petitioner's application by order dated 23-10-1975. The learned first respondent, however, directed that since the petitioner had been adequately punished, on account of his dismissal, he should be paid his legal dues, that is, gratuity,, bonus and earned leave etc. The petitioner's appeal against the said order was dismissed by the second respondent on 22-1-1976, who additionally held that the application of the petitioner was itself not maintainable because he had failed to send any grievance notice to the Corporation.
The petitioner has challenged the two orders dated 23-10-1975 and 22-1-1976 passed by the first and second respondents through this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution.
2. I beard Mr. Muhammad Sharif and Mr A. A. Shareef learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondent No. 3 respectively, who very ably argued their cases and also filed written arguments.
3. The first question dealt with by the learned second respondent pertains to the maintainability of petitioner's application itself under section 25-A of the I. R. O., 1969. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that this question was not agitated before the Junior Labour Court and petitioner's application was partly allowed by the second respondent with regard to legal dues. In the first place, it is not correct that the first respondent had allowed the petitioner's application, which in fact was rejected. However, it was observed, rather ex gratia, that since the petitioner had been adequately punished he should be paid legal dues. The learned counsel next contended that this objection was not liable to be considered by the second respondent since the Corporation had not appealed against the order of the Junior Labour Court. The contention of the learned counsel is without any substance because this issue was legal and was raised as a preliminary' objection by the contesting respondent before the Appellate Labour Court. In order to meet the finding of the second respondent on this issue. Mr. Muhammad Sharif contended that there was no provision of second appeal in the Service Code of the P. I. A. And as such the so-called second appeal filed on 13-2-1975 was not competent and was, therefore, in the nature of a representation which was made within statutory period of three months from the date of dismissal namely, 2-1-1975. As no decision was communicated to the petitioner within 15 days, an application under section 25-A could be filed within two months from the expiry of 15 days from 13-2-1975 or say two months from 28-2-1975 which could be done up to 28-4-1975. The application which was filed before the Labour Court on 1-4-1975 was, therefore, in time. It is settled law by now that no notice of grievance as prescribed in subsections (1) to (4) of section 25-A of the 1. R. O. Is required to be given to the employer in the case of termi--nation of service if the same had taken place not earlier than two months before 7-11-1972. As respects termination of service taking place on any date after 'I-I1-1972 also no such notice was required to be served and all such cases could be taken to the Labour Court within two months of the commencement of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 1973 ' which came into force w. e. f. 9-2-1973. The question closely connected with the question of maintainability of the application is concerning limitation under section 25-A of the I. R. O.
Approximately after three months from the date of the order of his dismissal which was, therefore, not within time and could have been dismissed on that short ground also. The conclusion of the learned second respondent on this point, though somewhat differently arrived, is substantially correct as it was held that petitioner's application was not maintainable. The question of limitation is one which, though raised or not, the Court is under duty to notice and there is no question of waiver in the matter.
4. On merits of the case it may be mentioned that it has not been urged in the petition nor was so argued before me that the departmental enquiry held in the matter was not fair and legal and necessary procedure was not followed. In fact, a preliminary investigation was conducted in the first instance in which the petitioner was examined. It was only after a case had been made out that a show-cause notice was issued to him and thereafter, although the petitioner specifically stated that he did not want to avail of the opportunity of personal hearing or a second show-cause notice, the department appointed an Enquiry Officer and afforded opportunity of defence to him.
The findings of fact arrived at in the matter are not open to question in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction, and, therefore, it was not necessary to go into further investigation of facts. But since the learned counsel for the petitioner has linked up certain facts with questions of law, the same will also be disposed of presently.
5. For the purpose of appreciating the legal contentions raised by . Mr. Muhammad Sharif it is necessary to advert to certain facts. Free and concessional air passage is admissible to the P. I. A.
C. Employees and their families on P. I. A. Routes as per rules approved from time to time, as per rule 14.02.01. According to relevant Administrative Order No. 25 of 1961 dated 24-5-1961, "wife/husband and legitimate dependents, school/ college going children up to 24 years of age of the P. I. A. Employees" are entitled to avail of 90 % rebated passage. The such concession is granted to the person concerned upon making an application on a prescribed 'request form' which contains a declaration to be signed by the applicant :--- "I hereby render myself liable to dismissal from Corporation's Service in case any of the above particulars are found incorrect."
It is an established position on record that the particulars furnished in the said form were incorrectly supplied by the petitioner inasmuch as he falsely gave the age of his son Muhammad Alam as 14 years, although he was aged 18 years. He described his married daughter as miss and incorrectly mentioned her age as 13 years as against 22 years. Fie further made a misstatement by mentioning his two grand children as his own sons. All these misstatements cannot be justified by any amount of argument and it is needless to say that the petitioner miserably failed in explaining his conduct in this regard. It was for the said reason that initially he pleaded guilty and asked for expeditious disposal of his case. By virtue of the false declaration given by him in the passage application, there is no gain--saying that he rendered himself liable to dismissal from Corporation's service: The enquiry, however, was conducted as required under Standing Order No. 15 of the West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance, wherein clause (b) of subsection (3) provides as under :----- "Theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the employer's business or property."
The petitioner was given show-cause notice dated 18-9-1974 for misrepresentating facts and making false statement as also for violating the Corporation's Rules, punishable under the P. I. A. C.
Service Code. He was also charge-sheeted for misrepresentation and fraud as per charge-sheet, which ultimately led to his dismissal. The charge-sheet contained all the particulars of fraudulent acts amounting to misconduct and at the very outset the petitioner bad pleaded guilty as stated by him in his reply to the charge-sheet. In the face of these grim facts, Mr. Muhammad Sharif, learned counsel for the petitioner, thought it convenient to argue the petition on purely legal points by stating that the genesis of the offence, alleged against the petitioner was of misrepresenting facts for obtaining rebated air passage for the persons unauthorised for such concession. Section 9.02.02 of the P. I. A. C. Service Code which defines misconduct is in almost identical terms as clause (b) of subsection (3) of section 15 of the Standing Orders Ordinance which reads as follows :----- "Section 9.02.02 (b).-Theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the Corporation's business or property."
6. In the background of the above facts learned counsel referred to the definition of the word 'family' as contained in section 2.01.12 of the, P. I. A. C. Service Code. The same is as under :--- "Family.-Includes the employee's wife (one only)-husband, legitimate children and step-children residing with and wholly dependent upon him."
Relying on the above definition it was contended that in view of the nature of definition where the word 'include' was used, the same was neither clarificatory nor exhaustive and the-same, therefore, did not exclude persons who otherwise may fall within the ambit of the definition. The learned counsel contended that since Sultan Jehan had been divorced, or was otherwise deserted by her husband, she happened to be a dependent of the petitioner, and, therefore, fell in the family fold of the petitioner along with her minor children. Reliance was placed on several decisions in (1928) 51 All. 40, (1928) 4 Luck. 101, 46 T L R 411, 52 A11. 369, (1950) 2 K B 204, (1935) 16 Lah. 782, where the word 'family' came to be interpreted under different provisions of law. However, this contention of the learned counsel though ingenious, is of no help because the definition of the word 'family' contained in the Service Code cannot be considered in isolation because for the purpose of entitlement of rebated air passage relevant provision is contained in the Administrative Order No. 25 of 1961 referred to hereinabove. The other contention of the learned counsel, based as it was, on the interpretation of the word `family', contained in section 2.01.12 of the Service Code to the effect that the words, "residing with and wholly dependent upon him" occurring in the said section applied only to step--children of the P. I. A. C. Employee, is in the circumstances, irrelevant. Besides, the lower appellate Court clearly held that the petitioner had failed to prove that his daughter Sultan Jehan had been divorced by her husband. The learned counsel could not challenge this finding by reference to any document on the record. He only relied upon a letter dated 28-5-1974 purported to have been written by Noor Khaliq, the husband of Sultan Johan, to the petitioner. This letter does not mention that Noor Khaliq had divorced Sultan Jehan., All that it mentioned was that "from his side he had left the petitioner's daughter". This assertion by no stretch of imagination can be termed as 'Tallaq' within the meaning of law. Learned First Appellate Court, therefore, was right in holding that under Muslim Law a daughter when married passed to her husband and there was no obligation on the members of her natural family to maintain her. In this context, the contention that Sultan Jehan was dependent upon the petitioner is devoid of any force.
7. Mr. A. A. Shareef, learned counsel for the respondent contended that the basic question as to whether the petitioner bad acted dishonestly and fraudulently or not, bad been examined at as many as three stages by the Enquiry Officer, tae Junior Labour Court and lastly by the appellate Court and the finding of facts that arrived at in this petition could not be challenged and set aside.
It is trite law as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Hussain Munir v.
Sikandar (PLD 1974SC 139) that it was wholly wrong to consider that the constitutional provision of Article 199 was designated to empower the High Court to interfere with the decision of a Court or Tribunal of inferior jurisdiction, merely because in its opinion the decision is wrong. D When there is a jurisdiction to decide a matter then there is a jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly and the fact that the decision is incorrect does not render the decision without jurisdiction. However, in this case on examination of facts also it cannot be said that the decision of the learned two Courts below was incorrect in any manner.
8. The upshot of the above discussion is that no fault can be found with the impugned orders and the petition is, therefore, dismissed but there will be no order as to costs. Before parting with the judgment I must add that both the learned counsel rendered valuable assistance to me and the arguments of Mr. Muhammad Sharif, learned counsel for the petitioner, in the face of difficult factual position were really ingenious and deserve compliment.