' Khurshid Alam, the petitioner, rented House No, 13/E (old No, 15/B), Street No: 22-A situate near Chaubacha Sahib Mustafa Abad (Dharampura) Lahore, from the respondent at a monthly rent of Rs, 70 in 1971.
2. In March, 1980 the respondent filed an application before a Rentontroller at Lahore seeking eviction of the petitioner on the grounds of default in payment of rent, impairing of the utility of the tenanted house by the tenant and the said house being needed by the respondent for his bona fide personal use.
3. The petitioner, of course, resisted the ejectment petition and controverted the allegations contained therein.
4. Necessary issues arising out of the parties' pleadings were framed by the learned Controller. The parties led evidence in support of their respective contentions before the Controller. Vide his judgment dated 17-5-1981 the learned Controller found the issues regarding default in payment of rent and damage to the tenanted premises by the tenant against the landlord while he found that the landlord needed the house for his bona fide personal use. Consequently ejectment of the petitioner was ordered from the house in question.
5. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the learned appellate authority but his appeal too was dismissed on 6-10-1981,
6. The aforementioned orders passed by the Controller and the learned appellate authority have been called into question through the present constitutional petition.
7. It has been mainly urged that the respondent landlord sought ejectment of the petitioner from the tenanted house inter alia on the ground that the landlord had already proceeded on L. P. R., therefore, he needed the house for his personal use although in fact, he was still in service and had not proceeded on L. P. R. According to the contents of the ejectment petition the respondent- landlord had simply alleged that he was nearing his retirement and was at the moment residing in the official accommodation. He has also led evidence including his own testimony to show that he has a large family of eight members for which the present accommodation in his possession was insufficient. The learned appellate authority has upheld this plea of the landlord.
8. It is obviously a question of fact that if the landlord needed the tenanted premises for his personal bona fide use. In Muhammad !Shag v. A. R. Khan (1), it has been held that the learned Controller or the appellate authority should accept requirement of landlord, if reasonably proved on record, without imputing bad faith, unless strong circumstances to contrary exist. In Fazio v. Wall Muhammad and others (2), it has been ruled that a concurrent finding of fact in absence of any omission or misreading of evidence did not warrant interference by Superior Courts. In Muhammad Younus v. Dr. S. Muzammil Ali (3), it has been found that in absence of reliable evidence in rebuttal, concurrent findings on question of personal requirement cannot be interfered with in second appeal by the High Court. It has further been held in this case that if a landlord owns more than one residential buildings or shops which he has rented out, it is for him to decide which of the residential buildings or shops he would like to occupy provided such choice is not prompted on account of bad faith.
9. On behalf of the petitioner, however, reliance has been placed on Swati Qaum v. Painda Khel and others (4), it has been held that High Court in exercise of its powers of judicial review is competent to quash any decision taken by a competent authority by ignoring or misreading material evidence. No misreading of evidence, however, has been pointed out in the circumstances of the instant case. In Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others (5) it has been ruled that it was wholly wrong to consider that the constitutional provision was designed to empower the High Court to interfere with the decision of Court or a tribunal of inferior jurisdiction, merely because in its opinion the decision is wrong. In that case, it would make the High Court's jurisdiction undistinguishable from that exerciseable in full-fledged appeal, which plainly is not the intention of the Constitution makers. When there is jurisdiction to decide a particular matter then there is jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly and the fact that the decision is incorrect does not render the decision without jurisdiction.
10. In the light of what has gone above it is concluded that no exception can be taken to the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the learned Controller and the learned appellate authority on the question of bona fid A personal need of the respondent in regard to tenanted premises.
There is nothing on records to suggest that such finding of fact was in any manner
(1) 1982 CLC 562 (2) 1981 SCMR 901
(3) 1981 CLC 327 (4) 1981 SCM R 318
(5) P L A 1974 SC 139 ' based on misreading of evidence. Such a decision cannot be interfered with in exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court. In this view of the matter the writ petition is dismissed.
The petitioner, however, is allowed one month's time effective from today for vacating the premises. No order is made as to costs.