' JAVED IQBAL, J.---This is a Constitution petition preferred under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Islamic. Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution) on behalf of Muhammad Masroor Zaman, District and Sessions Judge/Special Judge (Central) Rawalpindi assailing different steps taken at the direction of Hon'ble Chief Justice, Lahore High Court, Lahore being mala fide and un-Constitutional including the action taken by District and, Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi whereby a surprise visit was made and certain record taken into possession, issuance of show cause notice and initiation of disciplinary proceedings of Lahore High Court Lahore and Notification of even number dated 7-2-2011 qua repatriation of the petitioner to Lahore High Court Lahore.
2. Mr. Habib-ul-Wahab-ul-Khairi, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court entered appearance on behalf of petitioner and contended with vehemence that the learned District and Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi was not competent to conduct raid cf the Court of learned Special Judge (Central)
Rawalpindi being under the administrative control of Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs and the removing of files from the Court of learned Special Judge (Central) Rawalpindi was not only unlawful but highly objectionable as surprise visit was made to humiliate the petitioner who was performing his duties entirely to the satisfaction of his superiors with unblemished record of service. It is next contended that only Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs was competent to initiate action in case of any complaint and the District and Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi was not authorized legally to take cognizance of any complaint having no jurisdiction whatsoever and no concern with the Court of learned Special Judge (Central) Rawalpindi. It is next contended that the action taken by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi was nothing but serious interference in the judicial performance of the petitioner being Special Judge (Central) Rawalpindi which amounts to flagrant misuse of authority which in fact was never conferred upon District and Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi. It is next contended that such interference is based on mala fides due to allotment/possession of the official accommodation by the learned Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi which in fact was meant for learned Special Judge (Central) Rawalpindi. It is next contended that the surprise visit/raid got conducted was violation of the provisions as enumerated in Article 10-A of the Constitution and infringement of Fundamental rights as conferred upon the petitioner by the Constitution which could not have been infringed merely on the ground that petitioner is a Special Judge (Central) Rawalpindi and in view of its repercussion and overall impact on the judiciary, the provisions as enumerated in Article 184(3) of the Constitution can be invoked as it has become a matter of public importance. It is next contended that the factum of mala fides, ill will and grudge has been ignored by the learned Lahore High Court and the services of petitioner were got repatriated without any lawful justification in contravention of the relevant service laws and settled norms of justice because initially the appointment of petitioner as Special Judge (Central) Rawalpindi was for a period of three years which could not have been curtailed by the learned High Court Lahore. Mr. Habib-ul- Wahab-ul-Khairi, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court remained highly critical about the initiation of disciplinary action against the petitioner being untenable, without any substance,' mala fide and an attempt to spoil the career of the petitioner and District and Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi remained instrument in initiation of disciplinary action to settle the past account with the petitioner. It is also contended that even Lahore High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the District and Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi to make a surprise visit and procure record from the Court of learned Special Judge (Central) Rawalpindi which exclusively falls under the administrative domain of Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs. In' order to substantiate the above contention Mr. Habib-ul-Wahab-ul-Khairi, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of petitioner has referred various authorities, which are as under:- 2007 SCMR 1328 (Capital Development Authority v. Mrs. Shaheen Farooq), Salahuddin Tirmzi v.
Election Commission of Pakistan (PLD 2008 SC 735), Muhammad Bashir v. Station House Officer (PLD 2007 SC 539), Shahid Orakzai v. Pakistan Muslim League (2000 SCMR 1969), Amatul Begum v.
Muhammad Ibrahim Shaikh 2004 SCMR 1934, Zahur Ellahi v. State PLD 1977 SC 273, PLD 2010 SC 878, Zulfiqar Ali Babu v. Government of the Punjab (PLD 1997 SC 11), Gul Usman Ahmero (2000 SCMR 866), Bank of Punjab v. Haris Steel Industries PLD 2010 SC 1109. Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry v. President of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 61), Mubashir Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 265), Mehram Ali v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 1445), Asad Ali v.
Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 161), Federation of Pakistan v. Zafar Awan, Advocate (PLD 1992 SC 72), Zafar Awan v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (PLD 1989 FSC 84) and Federation of Pakistan v.
Nasrullah Khan Wazir (2005 TD (Service) 49.
3. Mr. Muddassir Khalid Abbasi, learned Assistant Advocate-General, Punjab entered appearance along with Muhammad Akram, Deputy Registrar (Confidential) Lahore High Court, Lahore and Mr. Dil Muhammad Khan Alizai, learned Deputy Attorney General also remained present on behalf of Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs. It is mainly contended by learned Assistant Advocate General that the provisions as enumerated under Article 184(3) of the Constitution cannot be invoked and thus the petition is not maintainable because no question of law of public importance is involved which is sine qua non for such invocation and it is nothing but an individual grievance and all the contentions raised before this Court could have been raised conveniently before the Inquiry Officer who is an Hon' ble Judge of the High Court and hence the question of any prejudice or injustice does not arise. It is also contended that in view of the provisions as enumerated in Article 203 of the Constitution, the learned High Court has the authority to supervise and control of the Courts subordinate to it which includes initiation of disciplinary action irrespective of the fact whether Judicial Officers are posted against the cadre/ex-cadre posts or otherwise and the Hon'ble Chief Justice is fully authorized to direct any Officer subordinate for inspection of any of the courts and any other order in this regard can be made as may be deemed fit and proper which cannot be questioned by the petitioner being learned Judge (Central)
Rawalpindi who is under the administrative control of Lahore High Court, Lahore being his parent Institution.' It is next contended that as per well entrenched legal practice, the Administration Judge of 'Lahore High Court has also been assigned the task to monitor performance of all the Judicial Officers who are posted against ex-cadre posts and besides that all such Judicial Officers are bound to send their reports qua disposal of cases to the Lahore High Court Lahore. It is next contended that a regular inquiry has been initiated against the petitioner along with the charge sheet which has never been challenged but on the contrary petitioner has furnished his explanation and proceedings are under way. The learned Assistant Advocate-General has assured that proper opportunity of hearing would be afforded to the petitioner and all the points agitated before this Court would be dilated upon and decided by the learned, Judge of High Court. It is further submitted that the petitioner may approach the Hon'ble Chief Justice being competent authority and finally to the learned Judicial Tribunal for the redressal of his grievances, if any, and no order may be passed by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction as conferred upon it under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. In support of his arguments, the learned Assistant Advocate General has placed reliance on case titled Pakistan Muslim League (N) v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2007 SC 642).
4. We have carefully examined the respective contentions as agitated on behalf of the parties in the light of relevant provisions of the Constitution and record made available. It transpired from the scrutiny of record that petitioner was appointed as Special Judge (Central) Rawalpindi on deputation basis for a period of three years in his pay and scale by means of Notification dated 23- 7-2009 issued by the Government of Pakistan, Law and Justice Division which is reproduced herein below for ready reference:-- "GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN LAW AND JUSTICE DIVISION Islamabad, the 23rd July, 2009 NOTIFICATION ' No,F.3(1)/2003-A.III:---In exercise of the powers conferred by Sections 3 and 4 of the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958 (XL of 1958), the Federal Government is pleased to appoint Mr. Muhammad Mansoor Zaman, District and Sessions Judge as Special Judge, (Central), Rawalpindi on deputation basis for a period of three years in his own pay and scale from the date he assumes charge of his office or until further orders, whichever is earlier.
(Anwer Zeb) Section Officer The Manager, Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, Islamabad."
5. It reveals from bare perusal of the above reproduced notification that admittedly the petitioner was deputationist whose services were placed at the disposal of Government of Pakistan for posting as Special Judge (Central) Rawalpindi on deputation basis for a period of three years in his own pay and scale by means of notification dated 24-7-2009 issued by the Lahore High Court, Lahore. The parent Institution is undoubtedly Lahore High Court Lahore. There is no doubt that surprise visit was made by Mr. Mahmood Maqbool Bajwa, learned District and Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi and certain judicial files were taken without preparation of any inventory. However, a careful scrutiny of the entire record would reveal that this was so done at the instruction of Member Inspection Team, Lahore High Court Lahore and admittedly no such direction could have been given without having prior approval of Hon'ble Chief Justice. In fact the surprise visit was made pursuant to a complaint made by one Tahir Ali Jaffary to Member Inspection Team, Lahore High Court Lahore on 2-12-2010 alleging therein that in spite of his best efforts he could not get the copy of judgment dated 22-11-2009 whereby the complainant was acquitted in a case got lodged vide F.I.R. Bearing No,224 of 2007 under sections 18/22 of the Immigration Ordinance, 1979. It was further alleged in the complaint that judgment was not found available in the judicial file and accordingly the prescribed proforma filled in this regard for having a copy was sent back to the complainant. A note written by Mr. Mahmood Maqbool Bajwa, the then learned District and Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi is available on record which is indicative of the fact that he was directed telephonically by the learned Member Inspection Team, Lahore High Court, Lahore for requisition the record of the above mentioned case. It has further been observed that the matter was brought to the notice of Hon'ble Chief Justice of Lahore High Court on 6-1-2011 who directed as under:-- "Let Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi visit and submit detail report."
6. Tt is to he noted that report of learned District and Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi dated 6-1-2011 was also brought into the notice of Hon'ble Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court by whom the following direction was given:-- "Explanation shall be called for from the Judicial Officer."
7. The Member Inspection Team also visited the Court of petitioner and furnished a comprehensive report and no substantial difference could be observed in the report sent by learned District and Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi and the one prepared by learned Member Inspection Team. Let we make it clear at this juncture that the Member Inspection Team also visited the Jail and to check the authenticity and the contents of complaint moved by Tahir Ali Jaffary.
8. The only question which needs determination would be as to whether any action initiated pursuant to the direction of Hon'ble Chief E Justice of Lahore High Court, Lahore could have been challenged by invoking the provisions as enumerated in Article 184(3) of the Constitution which is reproduced herein below for ready reference:-- "184(3) Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 199, the Supreme Court shall, if it considers that a question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter I of Part II is involved, have the power to make an order of the nature mentioned in the said Article."
9. A bare reading of the above reproduced Article would reveal that it has been couched in a very simple and plain language and thus hardly needs any scholarly interpretation. The jurisdiction as conferred upon this Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution can be exercised only where a question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights is involved meaning thereby that the question of public importance is sine qua non for invocation of the provisions under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. This is not the first occasion when we are examining the provisions as envisaged in Article 184(3) of the Constitution. It is well settled by now that "while construing Article 184(3) the interpretative approach should not be ceremonious observance of the rules or usages of interpretation, but regard should be had to the object and the purpose for which this Article is enacted, that is, this interpretative approach must receive inspiration from the trait of provisions which saturate and invigorate the entire Constitution, namely, the Objectives Resolution (Article 2-A), the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State policy so as to achieve democracy, tolerance, equality and social justice according to Islam. ##TE# (I.A. Sharwani v. Government of Pakistan 1991 SCMR 1041, Khuda Bakhsh v. State PLD 1988 SC 413." While dilating upon the provisions as enumerated in Article 184 (3) of the Constitution, it was observed in case of Syed Zulfiqar Mehdi and others v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation through M.D., Karachi and others (1998SCMR 793) as under:-- "8. In order to confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain a petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, it is necessary that two jurisdictional requirements must be established. Firstly, that the question raised in the petition is a question of public importance and secondly, it relates to the enforcement of a fundamental right guaranteed under Chapter 1, Part II of the Constitution (see.
Wasey Zafar v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1994 SC 621; and Shahida Zaheer Abba' si v. President of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 632). The expression 'public importance' was interpreted in the case of Manzoor Elahi v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1975 SC 66) as follows:-- "Now, what is meant by a question of public importance. The term 'public' is invariably employed in contradistinction to the terms private or individual, and connotes, as an adjective, something pertaining to, or belonging to the people; relating to a nation, State or community. In other words, it refers to something which is to be shared or participated in or enjoyed by the public at large, and is not limited or restricted to any particular class of the community. As observed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Hamabai Framjee Petit N. Secretary for India-in-Council (ILR 39 Born 279) while construing the words 'public purpose' such a phrase, 'whatever else it may meats must include a purpose, that is an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned' . This definition appears to me to be equally applicable to the phrase 'public importance'.
' The learned Attorney-General is clearly right in saying that a case does not involve a question of public importance merely because it concerns the arrest and detention of an important person like a Member of Parliament. In order to acquire public importance, the case must, obviously raise a question which is of interest to, or affects the whole body of people or an entire community. In other words, the case must be such as gives rise to questions affecting the legal rights or liabilities of the public or the community at large, even though the individual, who is the subject-matter of the case may be of no particular consequence.
' Seen in this light, there can be little doubt as to the public importance of the questions arising in this case I think I will not be far wrong in saying that it is not often that a single case raises so many questions of public importance touching the liberty of the citizen. In all systems of law which cherish individual freedom and liberty, and which provide Constitutional safeguards and guarantees in this behalf, any invasion of such freedom in circumstances which raise serious questions regarding the effectiveness and availability of those safeguards, must be regarded as a matter of great public importance."
10. In $hahida Zaheer Abbasi v. President of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 632), one of us (Justice Saiduzzaman Siddiqui), after examining the scope of the observations of this Court in Manzoor Elahi and Ms. Benazir Bhutto's cases held as follows:- "From above quoted passages, it is quite clear that whether a particular case involved the element of 'public importance' is a question which is first to be determined by this Court with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case. There is no hard and fast rule that an individual grievance can never be treated as a matter involving question of public importance. Similarly it cannot be said that a case brought by a large number of people should always be considered as a case of 'public importance' because a large body of persons is interested in the case. The public importance of a case is determined as observed by this Court in Manzoor Elahi's case (supra), by decision on questions affecting the legal rights and liberties of the people at large, even though the individual who may have brought the matter before the Court is of no significance. Similarly, it was observed in Ms. Benazir Bhutto's case (supra), that public importance should be viewed with reference to freedom and liberties guaranteed under Constitution, their protection and invasion of these rights in a manner which raises a serious question regarding their enforcement irrespective of the fact whether such infraction of right, freedom or liberty is alleged by an individual or a group of individuals."
11. We now proceed to examine the controversies raised by the petitioners in the above cases in the light of the above stated principles. The issues arising in a case, cannot be considered as a question of public importance, if the decision of the issues affects only the rights of an individual or a group of individuals. The issue in order to assume the character of public importance, must be such that its decision affects the rights and liberties of people at large. The objective "public" necessarily implies a thing belonging to people x large, the nation, the State or a community as a whole. Therefore, if a controversy is raised in which only a particular group of people is interested and the body of the people as a whole or the entire community has no interest, it cannot be treated as a case or public importance. "
10. Article 184(3) of the Constitution was also discussed in a comprehensive manner in case of Jamat-e-Islami through Amir and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2008 Supreme Court 30) and it was observed as follows:--
31. There are two essential conditions for invoking the jurisdiction of Supreme Court of Pakistan under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. The first condition is that subject matter of the petition under this Article must be of public importance and second condition is that it must relate to the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part-II, Chapter-1 of the Constitution.
We, therefore, in the light of law laid down by this Court on the subject, would like to examine the question whether the present petitions qualify the above test to entertain the same under Article 184(3) of the Constitution.
32. This Court in Shahida Zaheer Abbasi v. President of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 632) interpreted the expression "public importance" as under: -- " it is quite clear that whether a particular case involved the element of "public importance" is a question which is to be determined by this Court with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case. There is no hard and fast rule that an individual grievance can never be treated as a matter involving question of public importance. Similarly it cannot be said that a case broughi by, a large number of people should always be considered as a case of "public importance" because a large body of persons is interested in the case. The public importance of a case is determined as observed by this Court in Manzoor Ellahi's case, supra, by decision on questions affecting the legal rights and liberties of the people at large, even though the individual who may have brought the matter before the Court is of no significance. Similarly, it was observed in Benazir Bhutto's case, supra, that public importance should be viewed with reference to freedom and liberties guaranteed under Constitution, their protection and invasion of these rights in a manner which raises a serious question regarding their enforcement, irrespective of the fact whether such infraction of right, freedom or liberty is alleged by an individual or a group of individuals."
33.. In Zulfiqar Mehdi v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (1998 SCMR 793), the expression "public importance" was discussed in the following manner: "8. In order to confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain a petition under Article 184 (3) of the Constitution, it is necessary that two jurisdictional requirements must be established. Firstly, that the question raised in the petition is a question of public importance and secondly, it relates to the enforcement of a fundamental right guaranteed under Chapter 1, Part II of the Constitution (see Wasey Zafar v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1994 SC 621; and Shahida Zaheer Abbasi v. 'President of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 632). The expression 'public importance' was interpreted in the case of Manzoor Elahi v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1975 SC 66) as follows:- "Now, what is meant by a question of public importance. The term 'public' is invariably employed in contradistinction to the terms private or individual and connotes, as an adjective, something pertaining to, or belonging to the people; relating to a nation, State or community. In other words, it refers to something which is to be shared or participated in or enjoyed by the public at large, and is not limited or restricted to any particular class of the community. As observed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Hamabai Framjee Petit v. Secretary for India-in-Council (ILR 39 Bom 279) while construing the words 'public purpose' such a phrase, 'whatever else it may mean must include a purpose, that is an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned' . This definition appears to me to be equally applicable to the phrase 'public importance' .
' The learned Attorney-General is clearly right in saying that a case does not involve a question of public importance merely because it concerns the arrest and detention of an important person like a Member of Parliament. In order to acquire public importance, the case must, obviously raise a question which is of interest to, or affects the whole body of people or an entire community In other words, the case must be such as gives rise to questions affecting the legal rights or liabilities of the public or the community at large, even though the individual, who is the subject-matter of the case may be of no particular consequence. (Emphasis provided).
34. This Court in Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan (PLD 1993 SC 473) examined the scope of Article 184(3) of the Constitution with reference to the question of public importance and enforcement of fundamental rights as under:- "3. In order to appreciate the above controversy, it may be advantageous to quote above clause
(3) of Article 184 of the Constitution, which reads as follows.-- "184(3).---Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 199, the Supreme Court shall, if it considers that a question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II is involved, have the power to make an order of the nature mentioned in the said Article."
' A perusal of the above-quoted clause indicates that without prejudice the provisions of Article, 199 of the Constitution, which confers a Constitutional jurisdiction on the High Courts, the Supreme Court has been empowered to make an order of the nature mentioned in the above Article 199 provided the following two conditions are fulfilled:--
(i) a question of public importance is involved;
(ii) with reference to the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Chapter 1, Part II of the Constitution, i,e, Articles 8 to 28."
' It was further held that:- "Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan pertains to original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and its object is to ensure the enforcement of fundamental rights referred to therein. This provision is an edifice of democratic way of life and manifestation of responsibility casts on this Court as a protector and guardian of the Constitution. The jurisdiction conferred by it is fairly wide and the Court can make an order of the nature envisaged by Article 199, in a case where a question of public importance, with reference to enforcement of any fundamental right conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II of the Constitution is involved. Article 184(3) is remedial in character and is conditioned by three prerequisites, namely-
(i) There is a question of public importance.
(ii) Such a question involves enforcement of fundamental right, and
(iii) The fundamental right sought to be enforced is conferred by Chapter 1, Part II of the Constitution:"
"3. First, we may understand the nature of Article 184(3). This provision confers power on the Supreme Court to consider questions of public importance which are referable to the enforcement of any Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution and enumerated in Chapter 1 of Part II.
This power is without prejudice to the provisions of Article 199 which confer similar owner with certain restrictions on the Hi h Court. The power conferred depends upon two questions; one, that the case sought to be heard involves question of public importance and two, the question of public importance relates to the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. It is not every question of public importance which can be entertained by this Court, but such question should relate to the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. This provision confers a further safety and security to the fundamental rights conferred and guaranteed by the Constitution, This shows the importance which Fundamental Rights have in the scheme of the Constitution. They cannot be curtailed or abridged and any provision of law or action taken which violates Fundamental Rights conferred by The Constitution shall be void. The nature of jurisdiction and the relief which can be granted under this Article is much wider than Article 199. It confers a power to make an order of the nature mentioned in Article 199. The word 'nature' is not restrictive in meaning but extends the jurisdiction to pass 'an, order which may not be strictly in conformity with Article 199 but it may have the same colour and the same scheme without any restrictions imposed under it. Article 184 is an effective weapon provided to 'secure and guarantee the fundamental rights. It can be exercised where the Fundamental Right exists and a breach has been comminuted or is threatened. The attributes of Article 199 of being an aggrieved person or of having an alternate remedy and depending upon the facts and circumstances even laches cannot restrain the power or non-suit a petitioner from filing a petition under Article 184 and seeking' relief under it. The relief being in the nature mentioned in Article 199 can be modified and also consequential reliefs can be granted which may ensure effective protection and implementation of the Fundamental Rights. Even disputed questions of facts which do not require voluminous evidence can be looked into where Fundamental Right has been breached. However, in case where intricate disputed questions of facts involving voluminous evidence are involved the Court will desist from entering into such controversies. Primarily, the questions involved are decided on admitted or prima facie established facts which can be determined by filing affidavits. Evidence in support of allegations can be taken orally in very exceptional cases where the breach is of a very serious nature affecting large section of the country and is of great general importance." (Emphasis provided)
35. In Syed Wasey Zafar v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1994 SC 621), this Court having made comparison of Article 184(3) of the Constitution with Article 199 of the Constitution, observed as under:- "3. The above petitions have been filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Constitution. The above provision reads as follows:- "(3) Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 199, the Supreme Court shall, if it considers that a question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II is involved, have the power to make an order of the nature mentioned in the said Article."
' A perusal of the above-quoted provision of the Constitution indicates that without prejudice to the provisions of Article 199, the Supreme Court has been conferred with the power to entertain a petition under the above provision directly if the following two conditions are fulfilled:--
(i) The case involves a question of public importance; and
(ii) The question so involved pertains to the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Chapter 1 of Part II of the Constitution."
36. In Shahida Zahir Abbasi v. President of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 632) the provisions of Articles 184(3) and 199 of the Constitution were interpreted' in the following manner:-- "From the above discussion it is quite clear that the use of the expression without prejudice to the provisions of Article 199' in the opening part of Article 184(3) merely indicated that the power of the High Court under Article 199 ibid was left intact and has not been affected by conferment of jurisdiction on this Court to deal directly under Article 184(3) of the Constitution with a case which involved a question of public importance relating to enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed under Chapter 1 of Part II of the Constitution. The language of Article 184(3) does not admit of the interpretation that provisions of Article 199 stood incorporated in Article 184(3) of the Constitution. Therefore, this Court while dealing with a, case under Article 184(3) of the Constitution is neither bound by the procedural trappings of Article 199 ibid, the nor by the limitations mentioned in that Article for exercise of power by the High Court in a case. The provisions of Article 184(3) of the Constitution are self-contained and they regulate the jurisdiction of this Court on its own terminology. The exercise of jurisdiction by this Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution is not controlled by the provisions of Article 199 of the Constitution. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the contention of the learned Attorney-General that provisions of Article 199 ibid are to be read as part of Article 184(3) of the Constitution and therefore, exercise of power by this Court under the latter mentioned Article of Constitution is subject to limitation mentioned in Article 199 ibid. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution is not affected in any manner either by the provisions of section 133 of the Act or by the conditions contained in Article 199(3) of the Constitution. The jurisdiction of this Court in a case under Article 184(3) of the Constitution arises on existence of two conditions mentioned in this Article. Firstly, that the Court considers that the matter brought before it involves a question of public importance, and secondly, that it relates to enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Chapter 1, Part II of the Constitution. Apart from these two jurisdictional requirements, no other consideration are relevant for exercise of power by this Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution." (Emphasis provided).
39. There is no cavil to the principle that original jurisdiction of this Court under Article 184 (3) of the Constitution cannot be exercised in a matter brought before it unless it is of public importance involving the enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by Part-II Chapter 1 of the Constitution (Articles 8 to 28) and in absence of any of the above condition, this Court is not supposed to entertain a petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. The object of Article 184(3) of the Constitution is the enforcement of the fundamental rights referred therein and no question, other than relating to the enforcement of a fundamental right, can be brought before this Court for determination in its original jurisdiction and an aggrieved person may avail other remedies open to him under the law. This Court will not entertain a petition under Article 184(3) if infringement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part II, Chapter 1 of the Constitution is not involved as the remedy under this Article is only for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The validity of any law or a provision of Statute if is challenged on the ground other than being in contravention of fundamental rights, the Supreme Court would not entertain such challenge in the proceedings under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, even if , the law is found in contravention of some provisions of the Constitution. The rule is that Supreme Court will not interfere under this Article unless it is satisfied that infringement of the right being complained is the fundamental right and there is a breach of such right. The constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution also cannot be invoked for the correctness of a judgment of the Court in which a question of law was decided unless it is established that in consequence to the judgment of this Court, a fundamental right falling in Part II Chapter 1 of the Constitution has been violated. The Supreme Court indeed has power to rectify its own mistake but the provision of Article 184(3) of the Constitution is invokeable only in the matter of public importance relating to the enforcement of fundamental rights. The question relating to the determination of the legislative competence or vires of a particular enactment can only be gone into in the jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution if a case is made out for interference of this Court by establishing that the law enacted was beyond the competence of the legislature which was not covered by the legislative list and also has invaded the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part-II, Chapter-1 of the Constitution. There is always presumption in favour of constitutionality of an enactment and Courts are not supposed to struck down a law merely on technical grounds, therefore, a question relating to the correctness or validity of an order and judgment of the Supreme Court which has otherwise attained finality, cannot be entertained in the proceedings under Article 184(3) of the Constitution but the Court may in at appropriate case in which a fundamental right is being infringed, can entertain an original petition as right to move the Supreme Court in a case of violation of fundamental right is itself a fundamental right. It is thus essential that existence of a fundamental right and its breath actual or threatened, must be established to entertain a petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. The power of the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution for enforcement of fundamental right is not confined to the extent of issue of prerogative writs and also is not necessarily circumscribed by the conditions to limit the exercise of power rather this Article is wide enough to consider the question of public importance relating to the violation of fundamental rights.
41. In the light of foregoing discussion, there can be no departure to the Constitutional mandate that unless a matter of public importance concerning with the enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by Part II, Chapter-1 of the Constitution is involved in a petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, it is not entertainable. In the present case, the matter to the extent of the Presidential election is certainly has public importance but we have ,not been able to digest that the questions raised therein really relates to the enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by Part II Chapter-1 of the Constitution (Articles 8 to 28). The expression "enforcement" has predominant significance with reference to "fundamental rights" and reliance may be placed on; (1) Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan and another (PLD 1988 SC 416), (2) Federation of Pakistan v.
Muhammad Saifullah Khan (PLD 1989 SC 166), (3) Benazir Bhutto v. President of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 388), (4) Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan (PLD 1993 SC 473), (5) Zafar Ali Shah v. Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan (PLD 2000 SC 869), (6) Aftab Shahban Mirani v.
President of Pakistan (1998 SCMR 1863), (7) Muhammad Rafiq Tarrar v. Mukhtar Ahmed Junejo (PLD 1998 Lahore 461), (8) Malik Asad Ali and others v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 161), (9) All Pakistan Newspapers Society v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2004 SC 600), and (10) I. A. Sharwani v.
Government of Pakistan (1991 SCMR 1041)".
11. We have also examined cases titled Zafar Ali Shah v. Pervez Musharraf (PLD 2000 SC 869), Qazi Hussain Ahmad v. Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive (PLD 2002 SC 853), Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad Khan (PLD 1995 SC 66), Wattan Party v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2006 SC 697), Wasim Sajjad v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2001 SC 233), Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan (PLD 1993 SC 473), Amanullah Khan v. Chairman Medical Research Council. (1995 SCMR 202), Zulfiqar Mehdi v. Pakistan. International Airlines Corporation (1998 SCMR 793), All Pakistan Newspapers Society v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2004 SC 600), State Life Insurance Employees Federation v. Federal Government of Pakistan (1994 SCMR 1341), Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif v.
Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2004 SC 583), Muhammad Siddique v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 2005 Supreme Court 1), Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416), Javed Jabbar and 14 others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2003 Supreme Court 955). "The ratio of the judgment referred hereinabove is that unless the matter is of public importance relating to the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part II, Chapter 1 of the Constitution (Articles 8 to 28), the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 184 (3) of the Constitution, cannot be invoked. The mere importance of a matter, without enforcement of any fundamental right or reference to a fundamental right without any public importance, will not attract the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. Consequently, we having considered the matter in the light of the law laid down by this Court in the judgments referred hereinabove, find that these petitions under Article 184(3) of the Constitution are not maintainable and we are not persuaded to agree with the assertion that in view of the nature of dispute and importance of the matter, the Court may ignore the objection and decide these petitions on merits. This may be pointed out that in the light of constitutional mandate as contemplated in Article 184(3) of the Constitution this Court may not entertain a direct petition under Article 184(3) in a matter not involving the enforcement of any of fundamental rights mentioned therein. The question raised in the present petitions do not as such relate to the fundamental rights conferred by Part II, Chapter 1 of the Constitution and most of these questions even otherwise are speculative and presumptive in nature at this stage. There is clear distinction between Article 199 and Article 184(3) of the Constitution and this Court has repeatedly held that in the matters which do not involve enforcement of the fundamental rights of the public at large as envisaged in Article 184 (3) of the Constitution, a direct petition in original jurisdiction is not entertainable." (Jamat-e-Islami v.
Federation of Pakistan PLD 2008 SC 30).
12. On the touchstone of the criterion as mentioned herein above, we have examined the question as to whether in this case the provisions as enumerated in Article 184(3) of the Constitution can be invoked? The answer would be in negative for the simple reason that for all practical purposes the petitioner is under the administrative control of Lahore High Court Lahore and besides that now he has got no lien against the post of Special Judge Central, Rawalpindi being deputationist and his services have already been repatriated, By no stretch of imagination the learned Lahore High Court Lahore can be directed to refrain from initiation of any disciplinary action as this aspect of the matter exclusively falls within its domain of jurisdiction.
13. As mentioned herein above the petitioner has been repatriated and posted as OSD. The petitioner has also furnished his explanation to show cause notice and the proceedings are in progress which cannot be declared arbitrary or ab initio void at this stage as it depends on the evidence which is to be recorded by the Inquiry Officer. However, in view of serious allegations qua mala fides, dispute regarding allotment/ retention of house and all the applications moved so far to the Member Inspection Team by the petitioner shall be examined by the learned Inquiry Officer in order to avoid the possibility of any injustice to the petitioner including letters No,06/SJC/2011 dated 7-1-2011, No,477/SJC/2010 dated 28-6-2010, No,619/SJC/2010 dated 5-8-2010, No,629/SJC/2010 dated 10-8-2010, No, 754/SJC/ 2010 dated 25-10-2010, No,17/SJC/2011 dated 15-1- 2011 and No,19/SJC/2011 dated 31-1-2011. There is no doubt in it that there was a dispute on Government accommodation and therefore, the letters addressed by Mr. Mahmood Maqbool Bajwa, the then learned Sessions Judge may also be considered which are available on record i,e, No,4227/1182 dated 5-8-2010, No,4329/HBI dated 23-8-2010. Beside's that the affidavit filed by Muhammad Ikram son of Meharban Khan, UDC and Iqbal Umar son of Rehmat Ali, Reader of Special Judge Central shall also be examined. Proper opportunity of hearing shall be afforded to the petitioner and his version be kept in juxtaposition while evaluating the evidence as it is well entrenched principle of natural justice. It was directed by this Court that no final order shall be announced but no stay order was granted qua the proceedings which may be finalized as early as possible and the petitioner, in case of grievance, may approach the forum concerned available in the hierarchy for its redressal, if so desired.
14. The upshot of the above discussion is that the petition being not maintainable is dismissed.