' RANA BHAGWANDAS, J.--- This appeal with the leave of the Court is directed against High Court of Sindh judgment dated 30-9-1998 dismissing first rent appeal against the rejection of ejectment application filed by the respondent in respect of demised Commercial Plot No,E/62, Unit No,5, Latifabad, Hyderabad.
2. Appellant sought eviction of the respondent on the ground of default in payment of rent and bona fide personal requirement for use and occupation of the premises by her son as well as daughter. Tenancy between the husband-predecessor-in-interest of the appellant and respondent came into being through an unregistered rent agreement dated 30-12-1990 on monthly rental of Rs,1,600 and payment of Rs,20,000 as security deposit, refundable after the expiry of tenancy for 11 months. Respondent, however, continued to remain in occupation of the premises despite repeated notices by the appellant to vacate the premises.
3. Eviction proceedings were resisted by the respondent and, in his lengthy written statement, he denied the allegation of default and personal requirement, as agitated by the appellant.
Additionally he pleaded that in terms of para. 5 of the rent agreement, the premises were let out for commercial purposes i.e, installation of a flour mill, therefore, the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to proceed with the ejectment application.
4. On the pleadings of the parties, issues on the questions of maintainability, default and personal requirement were struck by the Controller. Both the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective contentions. In the ultimate analysis, learned Rent Controller, Hyderabad, through order, dated 10-4-1994 dismissed the ejectment application. Rent Controller accepted the plea of the respondent that the premises being commercial in nature and let out for the purpose of installation of a flour mill would not fall within the definition of "building" or "premises" as defined in clauses (a) and (e) of section 2 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance, 1979). On the issue of default and personal requirement also the Rent Controller accepted the version of the respondent-tenant and non-suited the appellant.
5. In appeal, learned Judge in Chambers of the Sindh High Court mainly dilated upon the question of maintainability of the ejectment application, in view of the peculiar nature of the business, for which the premises was let out on rent to the respondent. Upon interpretation of the expression "building", "land" and "premises", as defined in section 2(a) (e) & (h) of the Ordinance, 1979, learned Judge came to the conclusion that the demised premises not falling within the ambit of the terms referred to above, Rent Controller was justified in taking the view that he had no jurisdiction in the matter. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, against which leave to appeal was granted to consider whether the High Court was justified in holding that the premises did not fall within the definition of "building", "land" or "premises" and, therefore, ejectment application was not maintainable.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant at great length, who has taken pains to persuade us to hold that it was only a shop premises and, though let out for business premises in violation of terms of grant/lease, there was no evidence on record to justify a finding of fact that in fact a flour mill was installed in the premises or business of flour mill was actually carried on by the respondent. He also addressed arguments on the issues of default and personal requirement of the appellant but, as both the issues were not agitated before the High Court, we would refrain from adverting to these submissions of the learned counsel, which cannot be legally considered.
7. At the hearing, respondent-Muhammad Ibrahim Shaikh, whose attendance was procured after hectic efforts and repeated process through different modes, consuming a good deal of time, frankly stated at the Bar that no doubt premises were let out for the purpose of establishing flour mill and in fact he had put in a small "Chakki" for grinding wheat etc. And selling flour (Atta), which business continued for a long period of time but for the last about ten months he has discontinued that business and started the business of furniture manufacturing in the demised premises by hiring some carpenters and wood workers.
8. Technically the Controller and the High Court may be correct that the premises having been let out for establishing a flour mill, ejectment proceedings before the Controller were not competent, the fact remains that had the appellant invoked the jurisdiction of civil Court for ejectment/dispossession of the respondent under the Transfer of Property Act she would be entitled to seek such relief on the ground of expiry of the term of tenancy. Likewise, had the jurisdiction of the Controller been rightly invoked, in addition to the grounds of default and personal requirement, appellant would be entitled to obtain relief on the ground of conversion of property for using the property for a purpose other than that for which it was let out. As admittedly the tenancy was created for a fixed period of 11 months and the litigation has dragged for more than 12 years, we think it would be just, fair and reasonable to allow this appeal and to set aside the judgments rendered by the forums below. However, any order of remand, at this belated stage, would only add to the miseries and agony of the parties, which must be avoided at all costs unless absolutely called for. In order to do complete justice in the case in hand, we are of the considered view that respondent is not entitled to retain the premises on technical grounds and the appellant can be extended the relief of ejectment, which would be otherwise admissible under the ordinary law by reason of efflux of period of tenancy. Needless to observe, this Court, being at the apex of judicial hierarchy in the country and vested with the extraordinary jurisdiction within the contemplation of Article 187 of the Constitution and empowered to issue such directions, orders or decrees as may be necessary for doing complete justice. This Court would also be competent to mould the relief in the changed circumstances of the case in order to secure the cause of justice. It may further be observed that we are not bound by the technicalities of procedure, which are always meant for advancing the cause of justice rather than to thwart the ends of justice as held by this Court time and again.
9. For the aforesaid facts, reasons and circumstances, we would allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgments and direct ejectment of the respondent, who would be entitled to refund of security deposit of Rs,20,000 at the time of vacating the premises. On his request, he is allowed ninety days period to hand over vacant possession of the premises to the appellant subject to payment of rent and utility charges for this period, failing which he shall be liable to eviction without any prior notice. No order as to costs.