Muhammad Sair Ali, J.--The petitioner is former Chairman/M.D. House Building Finance Corporation. He joined the corporation on two years contract on 1.5.1998. He was arrested on 18.10.1999. He remained in the custody of National Accountability Bureau w,e,f, 25.12.1999 and his whereabouts were not known. On a petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, and the consequent orders, the petitioner was ultimately produced before this Court on 18.05.2000 when time was sought to file challan against him in the Accountability Court. On 31.05.2000, the Chairman National Accountability Bureau filed a reference against the petitioner before the Accountability Court No, 4, Karachi. The allegations were that the petitioner recruited 88 persons without adhering to the mandatory procedure and without approval of the competent authority thereby causing wrongful loss of Rs, 56,88,525/- to the state exchequer. And that he criminally misappropriated the entertainment funds by sending gifts of fruit and nimco etc. valuing Rs, 1,05,000/- to persons unconnected with HBFC or its business. The petitioner being holder of a public office thus allegedly committed offences under Section 9(a)(iii)
(iv)(vi) read with Section 10(a) and (b) of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999 and Section 409 PPC.
2. The Accountability Court framed the charge on 16.08.2000. he petitioner pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
3. The prosecution examined PW.1, Muhammad Dawood, General Manager HBFC, PW-2, Karamat Ali Chief Manager (Services) HBFC, PW-3 Javed Ahmed Khan, Cashier HBFC, PW-4 Abdul Qadir, General Manager (Personnel) HBFC, PW-5 Muhammad Wasim, Assistant Manager (Audit Division)
HBFC, PW-6, Miss Nasreen Mehdi, General Manager (Audit and Instructions Division) HBFC PW-7 Syed Sohail Fahmi, Manager Allied Bank of Pakistan, FTC Branch, Karachi, PW-8 Rahila Anwar, Private Secretary to Chairman HBFC, PW-9 Muhammad Akram Tariq, Manager HBFC, PW-10, Mian Habib Ahmed, Assistant Director FIA, Investigating Officer and PW-11, Ghulam Farooq, Assistant Director F.I.A.; the second Investigating Officer.
4. The learned trial Court convicted the petitioner for commission of corruption and corrupt practices under Section 9(a)(iii) and (vi) of the Ordinance and sentenced him to five years R.I. and to pay a fine of Rs, 2,00,000/- or otherwise to undergo one year R.I. Benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C. was allowed. Under Section 15 of the NAB Ordinance of 1999; he was also disqualified to contest election and to hold public office for a period of twenty one years.
5. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the Sindh High Court. A learned Division Bench of the High Court partly allowed the appeal through judgment dated 17.05.2001. The petitioners conviction and punishment for offence under Section 9(a)(vi) of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999 on the charge of making wrongful appointments was set-aside.
6. On the. charge of misappropriation of Rs, 1,05,000/- from entertainment funds, the High Court held that the entertainment funds were provided for entertainment of the guests visiting the offices and these funds were to be utilized for such guests only under some principles but fruits and nimco etc were sent by the petitioner to political figures and Government officers who were neither visitors of HBFC nor were they concerned with the business of HBFC but all of whom were persons that were or could be helpful to the petitioner in retention of his job in HBFC. Petitioner's conviction for the commission of corruption and corrupt practices under Section 9(a)(iii) was maintained by the High Court. While maintaining the conviction, High Court reduced the sentence of five years to the period of imprisonment already undergone by holding that" after his arrest on 18.10.1999, the appellant was dumped and forgotten till his production on 18.05.2000 by Prosecutor General NAB, before the Hon'ble Supreme. Court under the directive of the apex Court". The fine was also reduced to Rs, 1,05,000/- which was equal to the amount spent on the purported gifts. The period of disqualification of the petitioner to contest election and to hold public office for 21 years was maintained.
7. The High Court's judgment dated 17.05.2001 dismissing petitioner's Criminal Accountability Appeal No, 18 of 2000 on the charge of misappropriation of entertainment funds, was challenged before this Court by seeking leave there against through Criminal Petition No, 232 of 2001. The leave petition was dismissed by this Court though judgment dated 13.9.2004 but period of 21 years disqualification to contest election or to hold public office was reduced to 10 years.
8. Through the present Criminal Review Petition No, 45 of 2004 the petitioner seeks review of judgment dated 13.09.2004. Mr. Muhammad Ikram Ch., ASC appearing for the petitioner contends that while deciding the above petition, evidence on record particularly that of PW-6, PW-8 and PW- 9 and the documents produced were not taken into account. And that the depositions of PW.6 and PW.8 etc. have a direct bearing upon the petitioner's culpability. Further that the petitioner was admittedly kept in illegal confinement by NAB etc from 18.10.1999 to 18.5.2000 when he was recovered and produced before this Court and the effect thereof on the trial was not determined.
The learned ASC submitted that the petitioners illegal detention for 7% months vitiated the investigation and the reference proceedings as mala fide and corumnon judice, which was enough to set-aside the conviction and punishment of the petitioner.
In the contrary arguments Mr. Abdul Baseer Qureshi, learned Additional Prosecutor General and the learned Deputy Attorney General appearing for the respondents' contended that the review was barred by time and the same could only be entertained under Rule 2 of Order XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules for 'an error apparent on record' and no such apparent error existed to justify the review as this Court had considered all the evidence in the matter.
10. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties as well as the record.
11. The objections of Mr. Abdul Baseer Qureshi, Addl. P.G. NAB and Mr. Khan Dil Muhammad Khan Alizai, DAG that the review petition is barred by limitation is frivolous. We find the petition to be within time. We have also examined maintainability of the review petition in the present case. The findings are recorded hereinafter.
12. In the case of Managing Director SSGC, Ltd. v. Ghulam Abbas (PLD 2003 S.C. 724) scope of review jurisdiction under Article 188 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan read with Order XXVI, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 was deductively defined by an Hon'ble five member Bench of this Court. Numerous judgments pronouncing the principles and parameters of the exercise of review jurisdiction were analyzed. Referring to the cases of Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad v. Muhammad Tariq Pirzada (1999 SCM R 2189) and Wasim Sajjad v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Cabinet. Division and others (PLD 2001 S.C. 233), the rule was reiterated that if nothing was overlooked nor had the Court failed to consider an important aspect of the matter, review petition was not sustainable. The observations in the case of Suba through legal heirs vs. Fatima Bibi through legal heirs (1996 SCM R 158) were repeated that review petition would be competent if "something which is obvious in the judgment had been overlooked and that if it would have been considered by the Court the final result of the case would have been otherwise". The present case directly attracts the above settled principles of law on the exercise of review jurisdiction. While passing the judgment under review this Court appears to have overlooked the all important evidence of PW-6, PW-8 and PW-9 and also the absence of prosecution evidence on the culpability of the petitioner in terms of offences of Section 9(a)(iii) and (vi) of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999.
13. We are in agreement with Mr. Muhammad Ikram Ch., learned. ASC for the petitioner that while rendering judgment dated 13.09.2004, evidence of PW-6 i,e, Nasreen Mehdi, PW-8 i,e, Rahila Anwar and PW-9 i,e, Muhammad Akram Tariq appear to have escaped attention of this Court. The statements of PW-6, PW-8 and PW-9 on the question of purchase of gifts valuing Rs, 1,05,000/- from the entertainment or discretionary funds, had direct bearing upon the determination of the guilt or otherwise of the petitioner. Had these depositions not escaped consideration of this Court, we feel result would have been different.
14. On the charge of misappropriation of entertainment or discretionary funds, PW-6 i,e, Nasreen Mehdi was the main and important witness of the prosecution being General Manager (Audit & Instructions Division) and then an Executive Director, Northern Region, HBFC.
She as PW-6 deposed that:-- "In December, 1998 special Team for audit front State Bank of Pakistan arrived at HBFC. The specific issues on which the said team arrived were (1) sending the gift items from HBFC (2)
I providedinformation and documents. Prior to arrival of that inspection team of State Bank of Pakistan the gifts in shape of fruit items were being sent to the dignatories from the funds allocated under the head of M.D's reserved funds of the budget of HBFC. M.D. HBFC was the only competent authority to utilize the said funds. M.D's reserved fund has not been explained any where as to which sort of expenditure is included in this head and therefore it was being utilized on the sole discretion of M.D. and if any head was not available to any expenditure it was debited from this head. Besides there is another allocation of fund under the head entertainment fund. When the said audit team of State Bank arrived in discussion they guided us that the items of gifts which are debited from the head of M.D's reserved fund must be. debited from the `entertainment fund' of the budget of HBFC. Thereafter the gifts in shape of fruits started debiting from 'entertainment fund'.
When the said gift items were being sent from M.D's reserved fund I was not Executive Director, Personnel & Services therefore 1 do not know what was the procedure at that time in utilization of the funds. On 12.11.1998 I was posted as Executive Director, P&S. The procedure of sending gifts during my period was that M.D. used to direct his personal staff about the names and gift items and the same were purchased and sent to the persons and dignatories and thereafter the bills were processed through Cashier and put up to me through proper channel and after my approval the same were paid to the person who had initially purchased those items. t is correct that during his tenure in the departments of HBFC there was substantive improvements.
In meeting of February, 2000 of Board of Directors there was no allegation against Siddiq-ul-Farooq regarding financial irregularities. Besides the visit of special team of State, Bank of Pakistan for audit there was an annual usual visit of Audit team of State Bank of Pakistan in HBFC and last year the post audit was up to the period of 1997.
Thereafter as usual annual post audit was done in HBFC. Payment of the gifts which were sent to the dignatories have been processed and the cheques have been issued and those bills which were put up and processed have been paid. I know that there are rules for utilization of entertainment funds and gifts in Federal Government. I cannot say if an amount of Rs, 500,000/- were allocated to the head of entertainment in HBFC budget 2000. I remember that in the budget of HBFC for the year 1999 there was an amount of Rs, 200,000/- for head entertainment'.
15.In the perspective of above quoted deposition of PW-6, our attention was also drawn to the sequential depositions of other witnesses particularly of PW-8 and PW-9 whose statements remained examined by this Court. On reading we found that PW-1 i,e, Muhammad Dawood, General Manager, HBFC said nothing on the charge relating to the gifts. PW-2 i,e, Karamat Ali, Chief Manager Services only referred to dealing with some bills for the purchase of fruits. PW-3 i,e, Javed Ahmed Khan, a junior Assistant dilated upon purchase of fruits etc. from the market for gifts and their dispatch to the recipients. Mr. Abdul Qadir, Chief Manager (personnel) HBFC deposing as PW- 4 said nothing as to the gifts but admitted in the cross-examination that over all there was improvement in the working of HBFC in all the departments. There was instructions from M.D. to us not to violate the rules and regulations in the work of HBFC". Muhammad Waseem i,e, Assistant Manager (Audit Division) appearing as PW-5 made no statement on the gifts. Syed Sohail Fehmi, Manager ABL, FTC Branch, Karachi (PW-7) deposed as to the cheque transactions from the account of the petitioner. Rahila Anwar, Private Secretary to the petitioner as PW-8 dilated upon purchase of fruits from discretionary funds of the petitioner as the Chairman/Managing Director. In the cross-examination she admitted that Mr. Siddiq-ul-Farooq had given some carpets to the retiring officers of HBFC as acknowledgement of their services as gifts ......... And that Mr. Siddiq-ul- Farooq wrote letter to State Bank to audit the accounts of HBFC andthat audit team inspected the accounts. Muhammad Akram Tariq (PW-9) Manager HBFC in his cross-examination admitted that in connection with the payments and sanction of the gifts, there was no objection from any one. He also said that during the tenure of Mr. Siddiq-ul-Farooq the image of HBFC and the recoveries were boosted. PWs-10 & 11 were the Assistant Directors of F.I.A. who deposed on the investigation process.
16.Section 9 (a) clauses (iii) and (vi) read as follows:--
(a) A holder of a public office, or any other person, is said to commit or have committed the offence of corruption or corrupt practices (i)
(iii) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use, or for the use of any other person, any property entrusted to him, or under his control, or willfully allows any other person so to do; or
(vi) .... (if he) misuses his authority so as to gain any benefit or favour for himself or any other person, or (renders or attempts to render) (or willfully fails to exercise his authority to prevent the grant, or rendition of any undue benefit or favour which he could have prevented by exercising his authority).
17. The allegations in the reference were for commission of corruption or corrupt practices by the petitioner under above quoted clauses (iii) and (vi) Section 9(a). The charges were also framed under both the above clauses. The trial Court also convicted and punished the petitioner for offences under above referred clauses (iii) and (vi). The learned Division Bench of the High Court however acquitted the petitioner of the charge under clause (vi) of Section 9(a) for causing colossal loss by making wrongful appointments etc but convicted, punished and disqualified the petitioner under clause (iii) for misappropriating discretionary funds. To maintain the conviction and punishment for the charge under clause (iii), the learned Division Bench of the High Court appears to have invoked ingredients of sub-clause (vi) and (iii) interchangeably, without maintaining the distinction existing therein. In view thereof, both the sub-clauses (iii) and (iv) of clause 9(a) ibid are concisely examined hereinafter.
18. Analyzing clause (iii) above, the proof of offence there under demands proof of dishonesty or fraudulent misappropriation or conversion of the entrusted property to his own use by the accused or for the use of any other person etc. etc. It is for the prosecution to initially prove existence of dishonesty, fraud, misappropriation or conversion of the entrusted property for bringing an accused within the mischief of offence under clause (iii). It is well settled that cases under the Ordinance are strict liability cases. Prima-facie case has to be established by the prosecution before drawing a presumption or inference against the accused under the Ordinance. It must be shown that the accused committed misappropriation deceptively or fraudulently or dishonestly with some ulterior purpose. In the present case there is no evidence of appropriation or mis- appropriation of discretionary/entertainment funds (Rs, 1,05,000/-) by the petitioner as Chairman/Managing Director with dishonest or fraudulent object to make some wrongful gains or to otherwise convert the said funds to his own use etc. In the absence of such proof, no offence under clause (iii) of Section 9(a) ibid, can be said to have been made out.
19. A perusal of Section 9(a)(vi) above shows that holder of a public office or any other person is said to commit the offence of corruption and corrupt practices if he mis-uses his authority in order to gain any benefit or favour for himself etc. or for any other person. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner abusing his official position as Chairman, HBFC and misusing his authority, sent gifts valuing Rs, 1,05,000/- to get personal gain or benefits or favour for himself from the recipients of the gifts.
20. The above rendered survey of evidence on record starkly brings out total absence, of evidence on dishonesty or fraud or appropriation/conversion for his own use or of misuse of authority for gain or benefit or favour derived by the petitioner from the recipients of the purported gifts of fruits or nimco etc. The prosecution based its case on probabilities, presumptions and illogical deductions and not on evidence of any dishonesty or fraud {required under clause (iii)} or of misuse of authority for personal gains, benefits or favours for himself or any one else (required under clause (vi).
21. We are conscious of the presumptions under Section 14(a) and (d) of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance against an accused in the offences under clauses (iii) and (vi) of Section 9(a) ibid and of his burden to prove innocence. Section 14(a) and (d) read as under:-- "(a) Where in any trial of (an offence under clauses (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of sub-section (a) of Section 9) it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained, or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain, for himself or for any other person any gratification, other than legal remuneration, or any valuable thing, or any pecuniary advantage from a person or any agent of a person, for any favour shown or promised to be shown by the accused, it shall be presumed unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted, or obtained, or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain, that gratification or valuable thing or pecuniary advantage for himself or some other person, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is specified in Sections 161 to 163 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (Act XLV of 1860), or, as the case may be, without consideration, or for a consideration which he believed to be inadequate.
(b)
(c)
(d)(In any trial) of an offence under (clauses (vi) and (vii) Section 9), the burden of proof that he used his authority issued any directive, or authorized the issuance of any policy or statutory rule or order (SRO) or made any grant or allowed any concession, in the public interest, fairly, justly and for the advancement of the purpose of the enactment under which the authority was used, directive or policy or rule or order was issued or grant was made or concession was allowed shall lie on (the accused), and the absence of such proof the accused shall be guilty of the offence, and his conviction shall not be invalid by the reason that it is based solely on such presumption: Provided that the prosecution shall first make out a reasonable case against the accused charged under clause (vi) or clause (vii) of sub-section (a) of Section 9)".
The above quoted Section 14(a) evidently places the initial burden on the prosecution to prove that an offence under clause (iii) of sub-section (a) of Section 9 has been committed by dishonest and fraudulent misappropriation or conversion for himself or any other person. It is on proof through evidence that the presumption against the accused arises thereby shifting burden on him to prove the contrary.
22. Similarly the proviso to Section 14(d) obliges the prosecution to first make out a reasonable case against the accused. This Court in the case of Khan Asfandyar Wali and others, u. Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Division, Islamabad and others (PLD 2001 S.C. 607) held that in case the prosecution succeeded in making out a reasonable case against the accused person to the satisfaction of the Court only then would the prosecution be deemed to have discharged prima- facie burden of proof, to shift onus on the amused to rebut the presumption of his guilt. The accused then would be required to show that he used his authority fairly, justly and in the public interest.
23. In this case no evidence whatsoever was produced by the prosecution to discharge its prima- facie burden to prove the offence under clause (iii) or to first making out a reasonable case against the petitioner for offence under clause (vi) of Section 9(a) (ibid). There is no evidence on record to show that:--
(i) Were there any rules or regulations or policy or practices for the exercise of authority in HBFC by the Chairman/M.D. to use discretionary or entertainment funds at his disposal;
(ii) Were the discretionary or entertainment funds dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriated or otherwise converted for his own use etc. by the petitioner; (iii)Were the recipients of gifts of fruits and nimco etc. valuing Rs, 1,05,000/- ;totally unconnected, or un-concerned with the Corporation or its business as political or non-political persons;
(iv) Was the authority misused by the petitioner "so as to gain any benefit or favour for himself or any other person";
(v) Did petitioner receive any gain, benefit or favour from the recipients of insignificant gifts of fruits or nimco and/or was it so intended; and (vi)Was the object or motive of sending fruits and nimco etc., to obtain gains or benefits or favours as to his person or office or retention of the office as alleged.
In absence of any prosecution evidence on the above stated essential factors, no presumption or assumption could be drawn under Section 14(a) and ,(d) ibid against the petitioner. Prosecution failed to prove or first make out a reasonable case against the petitioner under above referred clauses (iii) and (vi). The prosecution was unable to prove 'unreasonableness' or colorable use of administrative discretion by the petitioner to gain pecuniary or financial advantages or accumulation of wealth or assets or position or the misappropriation or misuse of authority for personal benefits or favours. Presumption of reasonability as well as relationability thus tilted against the prosecution. Absence of such evidence escaped the attention of this Court while pronouncing the judgment under review. From the circumstances and the evidence on record, what could be concluded was that during Musharraf regime, the petitioner was irrationally, unreasonably and falsely implicated in the present case because of his stated political liaison with the former Prime Minister i,e, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, his party or the Government.
24. The result thereof is that offences under Section 9(a)(iii) and (vi) of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999 are held not have been made out against the petitioner. Wherefore as recorded in the short order dated 30.09.2009, we allow this review and set aside judgment under review passed by this Court on 13.09.2004. Criminal Petition No, 232 of 2001 is also accepted and treated as an appeal. For the reasons recorded above, we accept the appeal as well. The impugned judgment dated 17.05.2001 of the High Court and judgment dated 30.10.2000 of the trial Court are set-aside.
25. Petitioner is acquitted of all the charges. His disqualification to contest election and to hold any public office is also set-aside.
Sd/- Judge I have added separate note. Sayed Zahid Hussain, J.--This review petition had come up for hearing on 30.9.2009 when on through consideration of the matter it was allowed by means of the short order announced in the Court which reads as follows:-- "On hearing Mr. Muhammad Ikram Chaudhry, learned ASC for the petitioner, Mr. Abdul Baseer Qureshi, learned Addl. Prosecutor General, Dr. Asghar Rana, Additional Deputy Prosecutor General and Khan Dil Muhammad Khan Alizai, Deputy Attorney General for the respondents, we allow this review petition and consequently accept the appeal as well. For the reasons to be recorded later, the impugned judgment and the judgment dated 17.5.2001 passed by learned Division bench of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi are set aside."
The reasons as is evident from the above order were to be recorded later. I concur with the conclusions recorded by his lordship Muhammad Sair Ali, J. however, as the ratio of acceptance of review petitions is minimal, I have recorded my views by means of this note as to the scope of power and parameters of review jurisdiction.
2. In order to appropriately understand and comprehend the jurisdiction and power of review vested in this Court under Article 188 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the provisions of Article 188 may here be reproduced: Art. 188. The Supreme Court shall have power, subject to the provisions of any Act of [Majlis-e- Shoora (Parliament)] and of any rules made by the Supreme Court, to review any judgment pronounced or any order made by it. As is evident from the perusal of the above it makes reference to the provisions of any Act of Parliament and of any rules made by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Article 191 enables the Supreme Court to make rules regulating the practice and procedure of the Court which power is subject to the Constitution and law. Supreme Court Rules, 1980 were framed under this enabling provision. Its Order XXVI deals with review. Rule 1 thereof is as follows:
1. Subject to the law and the practice of the Court, the Court may review its judgment or order in a Civil proceeding on grounds similar to those mentioned in Order XLVII, Rule 1. of the Code and in a criminal proceeding on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record.
It is thus obvious that the review jurisdiction is exercisable by the Court on grounds akin to those mentioned in Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure in civil proceedings and in criminal proceedings on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record.
3. Before embarking upon this subject any further, one may note the provisions of Rule 2 of Order X of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, i,e, "Subject to the provisions contained in Order XXVI a judgment pronounced by the Court or by a majority of the Court or by a dissenting Judge in open Court shall not afterwards be altered or added to save for the purpose of correcting a clerical or arithmetical mistake or an error arising from any accidental slip or omission." Such an assumed finality is again subject to the review power and jurisdiction of the Court. Of course it has to be so as the power of review emanates from the Constitutional provisions which have to be accorded supremacy.
4. "Review" as is understood, means according to the Law Lexicon, 2nd Edition 2008 by Justice Y.V.
Chandrachud, (page 1755) "a Judicial re-examination in a case a review is a proceeding which exists by virtue of statute." KJ Iyer in Judicial Dictionary, 14th Edition, describes the review as a " renewed study of material previously studied" "Remedy of review is of very limited scope and it can be availed only in respect of errors apparent on the face of the record." (page-949) According to Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth edition, "Review" means "to re-examine judicially" "A reconsideration; second view or examination; consideration for purposes of correction. "(page 1320)
In Muzaffar Ali a. Muhammad Shafi (PLD 1981 SC 94) it has been observed as follows:-- "Before proceeding further, it may be pointed out that right of review is a substantive right and is always a creation of the relevant Statute on the subject. See Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and others (PLD 1970 SC 1), where at page 5, it was held that:-- "The right to claim review of any decision of a Court of law, like the right to appeal, is a substantive right and not a mere matter of procedure. An appeal, as observed by Bronwell, L.J., in the case of Sandback Charity Trustees v. North. Stafford shire Railway Co. (1877) 3 BD 1-- "does not exist in the nature of things; a right to appeal from any decision of any Tribunal must be given by express enactment. This is equally true in case of review, because both appeal and review though they differ in scope, are substantive rights. As such,. neither of them is available unless it has been conferred by law."
Therefore once the remedy of review is provided by the statute [in this case by the. Constitution] the party concerned may invoke the same and claim its decision in accordance with the settled principles.
5. Since the scope of review power and jurisdiction has not been free of complexity, it has received attention of the Court time and again primarily for the reason that the indulgence by way of review is granted mainly owing to the natural desire to prevent irremediable injustice by a Court of last resort by some inadvertence or accident. Muhammad Amir Khan's case (PLD 1962 SC 335) lays down the principles for the exercise of review power and jurisdiction wherein all the Hon'ble Judges seized of the matter contributed and rendered their separate opinions. Cornelius C.J. observed at page 340 as follows:--"There must be a substantial or material effect to be produced upon the result of the case if, in the interests of "complete justice" the Supreme Court undertakes to exercise its extraordinary power of review of one of its own considered judgments. If there be found material irregularity, and yet there be no substantial injury consequent thereon, the exercise of the power of review to alter the judgment would not necessarily be required. The irregularity must be of such a nature as converts the process from being one in aid of justice to a process that brings about injustice. Where, however, there is found to be something directed by the judgment of which review is sought which is in conflict with the Constitution or with a law of Pakistan, there it would be the duty of the Court unhesitatingly to amend the error." Fazl-e-Akbar, J. after noticing number of precedents observed at page 352 as follows:--"I may further add that I know of no authority for the proposition that the Court has unlimited power to re-hear and re-open a case which has been finally decided. For the above reasons I am of opinion that the power of review should be exercised within the limits laid down in the case of Akbar Ali v. Iftikhar Ali (PLD 1956 FC 50). In other words 'a decision of this Court should be re-opened with very greatest hesitation and only in very exceptional circumstances'. "B.Z. Kaikaus, J. expressed his opinion at page 354 as follows:--" While I would prefer not to accept those limitations as if they placed any technical obstruction in the exercise of the review jurisdiction of this Court I would accept that they embody the principles on which this Court would act in the exercise of such jurisdiction. It is not because a conclusion is wrong but because something obvious has been overlooked, some important aspect of the matter has not been considered, that a review petition will lie. It is a remedy to be used only in exceptional circumstances." Hamood-ur-Rehman, J. added his valuable observation (page-361) that:--"I for my part would be inclined to hold that a review is by its very nature not an appeal or a rehearing merely on the ground that one party or another conceives himself to be dissatisfied with the decision of this Court, but that it should only be granted for some sufficient cause akin to those mentioned in Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the provisions whereof incorporate the principles upon which a review was usually granted by Courts of law in England. The indulgence by way of review may no doubt.be granted to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a Court of last resort as where by some inadvertence an important statutory provision has escaped notice which, if it had been noticed, might materially have affected the judgment of the Court, but in no case should a rehearing be allowed upon merits." (portions underlined by me for their import) In Evacuee Trust Property Board v. Sh. Hameed Elahi and another (PLD 1981 SC 108)
Dorab Patel, J. while dealing with Rule 2 of Order X of Supreme Court Rules, 1980 observed: "We may pause to point out that this rule is similar to Section 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and as we would not extend our inherent powers to a situation covered by a rule of this Court, the point for determination is whether this rule is a bar to our power to rehear an appeal which has been heard ex parte on account of a mistake of the Court. In our opinion, this rule is no bar to the rehearing of an appeal, because as was observed by Orders, J., in Somu Naidu's case, the bar to the rehearing of a case by provisions such as Section 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is attracted only when there has been a valid adjudication of the case before the Courts." (underline by me) In Pir Bakhsh v. The Chairman, Allotment Committee and others (PLD 1987 SC 145) Muhammad Haleem, C.J. dealt with this aspect in this way:- "This rationale behind this policy is the need to promote certainty, stability, and predictability of the law. This, however, does not mean that this rule is inflexible. In this context, it will be of advantage to sum up what Hamoodur Rahman, C.J., in the case reported as Asma Jilani v. Government of the Punjab (PLD 1972 SC 139), said I am not unmindful of the importance of this doctrine but in spite of a Judge's fondness for the written word and his normal inclination to adhere to prior precedents I cannot fail to recognize that it is equally important to remember that there is need for flexibility in the application of this rule, for law cannot stand still nor can we become mere slaves of precedents. It will thus be seen that the rule of Stare decisis does not apply with the same strictness in criminal, fiscal and constitutional matters where the liberty of the subject is involved or some other grave injustice is likely to occur by strict adherence to the rule." There are, therefore, exceptions to the rigid adherence to this rule, and I am of the view that this Court being the Court of ultimate jurisdiction has power to review its own judgments. "
Ajmal Mian CJ. in Abdul Ghaffar Abdul Rehman and others v. Asghar Ali and others (PLD 1998 SC 363) quite aptly summarized/summed up the principles inter-alia (a) that every judgment pronounced by the Supreme Court is presumed to be a considered, solemn and final decision on all points arising Out of the cases; (b) that simpliciter the factum that a material irregularity was committed would not be sufficient to review a judgment/order but if the material irregularity was of such a nature, as to convert the process from being one in aid of justice to a process of injustice, a review petition would lie; (c) that simplicity the fact that the conclusion recorded in a judgment/order is wrong does not warrant review of the same but if the conclusion is wrong because something obvious has been overlooked by the Court or it has failed to consider some important aspect of the matter, a review petition would lie; (d) that if the error in the judgment/order is so manifest and is floating on the surface, which is so material that had the same been noticed prior to the rendering of the judgment the conclusion would have been different, in such a case a review petition would lie; (e) that the Constitution does not place any restriction on the power of the Supreme Court to review its earlier decisions or even to L depart from them nor the doctrine stare decisis will come in its way so long as review is warranted in view of the significant impact on the fundamental rights of citizens or in the interest of public good; (f) that any formal application; (g) that under the Supreme Court Rules, it sits the Court is competent to review its judgment/order suo motu without in divisions and not as a whole. Each Bench whether small or large exercises the same power vested in the Supreme Court and decisions rendered by the Benches irrespective of their size are decisions of the Court having the same binding nature. In the same judgment an extract from a judgment dated 10.3.1991 passed in C.R.P. No, 1-K of 1989 (Begum Afsar Saeed and others vs. Ch. Abdul Aziz) has been cited which reads "From an examination of the aforesaid precedents of this Court, it seems settled that overlooking some important aspect of the matter from consideration or an erroneous assumption of a material fact affecting the conclusion reached in the judgment are valid grounds on which the review of a judgment can be permitted . "In Pakistan through Ministry of Finance Economic Affairs etc. v. Fecto Belarus Tractors Ltd. (PLD 2002 SC 208) it has been observed that "there is distinction between the review and rehearing and the attempt to reargue the appeal at review stage is not permissible. We are fortified in this view by the judgment of this Court reported as 1987 SCMR 350 and 1152, 1983 SCM R 177 and 1986 SCM R 1021. However, if the Court has overlooked some material question of fact or of law which would have a bearing on the decision or there is otherwise some apparent mistake or error on the face of the record, then of course the power of review can be exercised. As far as error apparent on the fate of the record is concerned, it should be so manifest, so clear as could not be permitted by any Court to remain on record. Such error may be an error of fact or of law but must be self-evident and floating on surface. The orders based on erroneous assumption of material facts, or without adverting to a provision of law, or a departure from undisputed construction of law and Constitution, may, however, amount to error apparent on face of record. It must have also a material bearing on the fate of the case. These propositions were enunciated by this Court in the judgment reported as PLD 1979 SC 741, 1975 SCM R 115 and PLD 1984 SC 67. In another case reported as 1988 SCMR 908 (Sikandar Abdul Karim v. The State) the expression "error apparent on the face of record" was interpreted. While discussing its connotation, it was held that where an error of law or fact is discovered in an order by reading the order itself without reference to any other material, such an error would fall within the category of "an error apparent on the face of record. Failure of the Court while passing an order to notice or take into consideration a statutory provision, which if so considered would have changed the final outcome of the case would also amount to an error apparent on the face of the order".
6.Recently in Federation of Pakistan and others v. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and others (PLD 2009 SC 644), Tassaduq Hussain Jillani, J. observed ''A Judge, be it a Civil Judge or a Judge of a Superior Court, is the protector of rights and an arbiter of conflicting .claims. A Judge of the Supreme Court besides., protecting the Constitution and its values is an interpreter of law and while doing so bridges the gap between the law and the society to ensure complete justice. When called upon, he or she also reconciles the two conflicting provisions in a Statute to give effect to the legislative intent. While deciding these petitions, we were conscious of this role of the Supreme Court. Accountability of holders of public offices with a view to disqualify those who are found guilty is a laudable object. But if this exercise is to be credible, it has to be across the board, has to be fair, and has to be regulated by the rule of law. A process bereft of these elements may boomerang and defeat the very purpose of the process initiated." (underline by me)
The crux of all the opinions of the great jurists is that in order to achieve the prime purpose of justice for all, whenever, it is brought to the notice of the Court that injustice has occurred as a result of some material evidence having escaped the notice of the Court, the same can be set right without reservation by way of review of judgment. It may be observed that in order to ensure "complete justice" this Court is vested with an additional power flowing from Art: 187 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
7. The entire edifice of judicial structure is founded upon the primary object and goal of administering and dispensing justice. The preamble of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 takes care of this aspect as follows:--'Whereas it is the will of the people of Pakistan to establish an order:-- "Wherein shall be guaranteed fundamental rights, including equality of status, of opportunity and before law, social, economic and political justice, and freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, subject to law and public morality."
Article 37 of the Constitution which falls in the chapter of Principles of Policy makes it obligatory for the State to "ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice".
"Justice" according to Black's, Law Dictionary, Sixth edition, means "proper administration of lawsto render every man his due." (page 864)
Justice (R) Fazal Karim in the preface of Judicial Review of Public Actions adopts the concept of 'justice" that means "to remain within one's proper sphere; and injustice means to overstep that sphere The Court's function, so for as a public authority is concerned, is to ensure that it does justice; it does not act unjustly by overstepping its 'proper sphere.'
8. At this juncture, the advice, having the status of code and command by Hazrat Ali (A.S) to Malik- e-Ashter, for the Judges can not be overlooked i,e, when they realise that they had committed a mistake they should not persist upon it and should not try to justify it. When truth is made clear to them or when right path opens up before them, they should not consider it below their dignity to correct the mistake made or to undo the wrong done." (Letter No, 53 at pages-491/501 of Nahjul Balagha). A.R. Cornelius J. had complied hundred Maxims of Fiqah. One of those is that "Wrong is to be undone" (No, 20)(PLD 1966 Journal 50) I may also refer here to what is stated by Justice Krishna Iyer in The Majesty of the Judiciary (page-2):-- "Justice Jackson of the U.S. supreme Court once remarked: "We are not final because we are infallible. We are infallible because we are final." Judges are humans though they are ordinarily of high standard and rarely commit serious solecisms, fundamental flaws and grave goofs. Justly, therefore, even High Bench "pronouncements do desiderate decisional review and correctional reversal. So we must abandon the populist superstition of judicial supremacy or curial papacy. Judges are under the Constitution, not over it." Sometimes incorrect decisions do have far reaching effects on the person concerned. Correctional reversal thus becomes absolutely essential to make correction of the same in order to avoid the injustice.
9. It is said and rightly so that to err is human. Possibilities of mistakes and errors creeping in the decision making may not be very often but can not out rightly be ruled out on occasions, especially the Courts becoming over conscious of heavy back log of cases and long lists of daily causes fixed before them. Skipping over or escaping the notice of the Court some material and important aspects is also not unusual. Once, therefore, such a mistake/error comes to the notice of the Court resulting in injustice it should not be hesitant or reluctant to make necessary correction to undo the injustice caused thereby. The entire theme of the above referred ideas expounded by the learned jurists is the avoidance of injustice. If in a case it is caused by any act or omission of the Court inadvertently, accidentally or otherwise there should be no hesitation to rectify and make necessary correction by undoing the same.
10.Muhammad Sidiqul Farooq, the petitioner was a Chairman/M.D. House Building Finance Corporation, who faced trial before Accountability Court No, IV Karachi on certain allegations. He was convicted u/S. 9(a) (iii) & (vi) of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999 and was sentenced to five years R.I. and. to pay a fine of Rs, 2,00000/-. In failing to pay the fine he had to further undergo one year R.I. He was given the benefit of S. 382(b) Cr.P.C. He was also disqualified to contest the election and to hold a public office for a period of twenty one years u/S. 15 of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999. On his appeal the High Court of Sindh set aside the conviction u/S. 9(a)(vi) of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999 and upheld the conviction u/S. 9(a)(iii) of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999, the sentence was however reduced to the period already under gone, and also reduced the fine to Rs, 1,05,000/- or in default to undergo three months R.I. The period of disqualification to contest the election and to hold public office was maintained. His criminal petition was dismissed by this Court on 13.9.2004 with the observation that "disqualification to contest the election and to hold public office is on higher side. Accordingly the same is reduced form 21 years to 10 years." This review petition was filed in this background.
11.Instant is the case wherein as noticed in the judgment of his lordship Muhammad Sair Ali, J. very material pieces of evidence such as the deposition of Nasreen Mehdi, (PW-6), Raheela Anwar (PW- 8) and Muhammad Akram Tariq (PW-9) escaped -due consideration by the Court. Such evidence was not only of material relevancy but also had the direct impact as to the fate of the matter before the Court: This error apparent on the face of the record and consequential injustice warranted reconsideration and review of the matter, which in the circumstances became the duty of the Court to do so. That was the reason persuading us to allow the review and accept the appeal.