1. ' SAIDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.---The appellant while serving as an officer in Grade-III with the respondent-bank was charge-sheeted on 4-9-1984. The charge-sheet was followed by appointment of an Enquiry Officer, to enquire into the charges levelled against the appellant. The appellant was found guilty by the Enquiry Officer, and on the basis of the report of Enquiry Officer, the respondent-bank dismissed the appellant from service by order dated 24-1-1985. The appellant filed departmental appeal/representation against his dismissal from service which was rejected on 29-9-1985 but this order was communicated to the appellant on 16-10-1985. The appellant challenged his dismissal from service in Writ Petition No,955 of 1986 filed before the Lahore High Court on 19-2-1986. It is an admitted position in the case that by virtue of the decision of a Division Bench of Lahore High Court dated 10-4-1985 (Vice-President, National Bank of Pakistan, Gujranwala Zone and another v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and 7 others), the employees of Nationalised Banks were held disentitled to approach to a Labour Court under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, hereinafter to be referred as 'the Ordinance' only, in respect of their individual grievances. Similar view was expressed in many other cases decided by the Lahore High Court and the High Court of Sindh. The above view taken by the Lahore High Court and the High Court of Sindh was set aside by this Court in a large number of civil appeals which were heard together and disposed of by a common judgment dated 15-4-1987 reported as Iftikhar Ahmed v. President, National Bank of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 53). As a result of decision of this Court in the case of Iftikhar Ahmed v. President, National Bank of Pakistan, supra, the employees of Nationalised Banks, were held entitled to approach to a Labour Court under section 25-A of the Ordinance in respect of their individual grievances, notwithstanding the fact that their terms and conditions A of service were regulated by the award of the Wage Commission. In the above-stated background when Writ Petition No,955 of 1986 came up for hearing before the Lahore High Court, the appellant withdrew it and preferred a grievance petition under section 25-A of the Ordinance before the Labour Court on 7-10-1987. Alongwith the grievance petition, the appellant filed an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in preferring the grievance petition under section 25-A of the Ordinance. The Labour Court condoned the delay keeping in view the fact that do account of judgment of Lahore High Court there was confusion with regard to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court in respect of the grievance petition filed by the employees of nationlised Banks which stood settled by the judgment of this Court in the case of Iftikhar Ahmed v. President, National Bank of Pakistan, supra. Having condoned the delay, the Labour Court found that on merits, the appellant was entitled to be reinstated in service. The grievance petition filed by the appellant was , accordingly, allowed and he was directed to be reinstated in service with back benefits. The respondents Nos.3 to 5 challenged the decision of Punjab Labour Court No,3 before the Appellate Tribunal. The learned Appellate Tribunal took the view that the period to lodge a grievance petition by the appellant against his dismissal from service started from 17-10-1985 while Writ Petition No,955 of 1986 was filed by the appellant on 18-2- 1986. It was, accordingly, observed by the learned Appellate Tribunal that if the above Writ Petition (No,955/86) would have been presented within 2 months and 15 days from 16-10-1985 the question could arise whether the period spent before the Lahore High Court in pursuing the writ petition to be excluded under section 14 of the Limitation Act or not? It was further observed by the learned Tribunal that in the judgment of Lahore High Court which was relied by the appellant in seeking condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, it was held that in such matters the jurisdiction of National Industrial Relations Commission (hereinafter to be called as 'the Commission') extended and therefore, the right course for the appellant was to approach the Commission within 2 months and 15 days of the rejection of his departmental appeal which could be treated as grievance notice. On these premises, the learned Appellate Tribunal reversed the order of the Labour Court condoning the delay in preferring the petition under section 25-A of the Ordinance and held that the petition filed by the appellant under section 25-A of the Ordinance before the Labour Court was time-barred. The above reasoning of the Appellate Tribunal was upheld by the learned Judge in chamber while dismissing Writ Petition No, 10163 of 1991 filed by the appellant to challenge the order of the first Appellate Court. The learned Judge in chamber while upholding the order of the learned Appellate Tribunal rejecting the grievance petition of the appellant under section 25-A of the Ordinance as time-barred, observed as follows:-- "4. There is no cavil with the proposition laid down. In Ghulam Ali's case (supra). However, the writ petition filed by the petitioner in the High Court did not suffer from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature, in that, High Court was competent to determine in the writ petition filed by the petitioner whether or not the order impugned therein was without lawful authority. Here the petitioner did not seek adjudication of the dispute but on its own withdrew the writ petition.
5. Be that as it may, even if the time spent in the writ petition is excluded from consideration, the grievance petition was time-barred, in that, no explanation was given as to why the petitioner failed to approach the High Court for a period of over two months. Furthermore, the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal was competent to pass any order as it might deem fit. Here on the basis of facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal decided not to condone the delay. This was within his entitlement. It cannot be said that the discretion exercised by him in refusing to condone the delay was arbitrary or capricius warranting interference in the exercise of writ jurisdiction."
2. ' We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and are of the view that the learned Appellate Tribunal as well as the learned Judge in Chamber fell in error in holding that the delay in preferring the petition under section 25-A of the Ordinance was wrongly condoned by the Labour Court. It is a well-settled law that where a Court possessed the jurisdiction to condone the delay, the order of such a Court/Tribunal either condoning the delay or refusing to condone the delay will not ordinarily be interfered with by the Appellate Court. In the case of Water and Power Development Authority v. Zahoor Ahmed (1994 SCM R 960) this Court while considering the contention of the appellant in that case, that the delay in preferring the petition before Service Tribunal could not be condoned, repelled the contention and refused to examine the question of condonation of delay on the ground that the Service Tribunal did possess the jurisdiction to condone the delay which was exercised properly and as such this question could not be examined by the Supreme Court. Similarly in the case of Irtiqa Rasool Hashmi v. Water and Power Development Authority and another (1980 SCM R 722), this Court while considering the argument that the Service Tribunal wrongly refused to condone the delay in preferring the petition before the Service Tribunal observed as follows:- "4. The question whether limitation should not be condoned lies within the discretion of the authority before whom a matter is agitated and this discretion cannot be interfered with unless it has been exercised illegally or arbitrarily. This is not the case here. The result is that this petition must, therefore, fail which is dismissed hereby."
3. ' In the case before us, it is not disputed that at the time the service appeal/representation of the appellant was decided, the law as declared by Lahore High Court was, that the employees of nationalised banks could not approach the Labour Court under section 25-A of the Ordinance for redress of their individual grievances. Similar view was also prevalent in the other High Courts of the country but this controversy was finally set at rest by the judgment of this Court in the case of Iftikhar Ahmed v. President, National Bank of Pakistan, supra, wherein it was held, as follows:-- "12. There is no merit in this contention. So far as filing of grievance petitions is concerned there is no specific provision in the Ordinance which may be taken to support the distinction spelt out by the learned counsel. If the intention had been that the employees of institutions organized on all- Pakistan basis should approach the National Industrial Relations Commission alone for redress of their grievances there would have been some indication in the Ordinance itself. Not only there is no such indication in the Ordinance itself, the provisions of section 25-A which adumbrate the circumstances in which a Labour Court may be moved for redress have been extensively worded. It may perhaps be of interest to note here that even in respect of grievances arising out of unfair labour practices, curbing of which is a specific function of the Commission, the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts has not been ousted. However, that may be, there seems to be no justification for holding that an employee whose terms are governed by an award made by the Wage Commission cannot seek redress for his grievance before a Labour Court."
4. ' This decision though dated 15-4-1987 was reported in the January Issue of PLD 1988 and therefore, it is only after the decision of this case that the position stood clarified that an employee of the nationalised banks is entitled to approach the Labour Court under section 25-A of the Ordinance for redress of his grievance. In this view of the matter, we are clearly of the opinion that the condonation of delay by the Labour Court on an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, which was applicable to the proceedings C by virtue of section 65-B of the Ordinance, was neither arbitrary nor illegal so as to call for interference in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal. We may also mention here that the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal as well as by the learned Judge in Chamber that the appellant failed to approach the High Court for a period of over 2 months and therefore, the grievance petition was clearly time-barred and delay could not be condoned, is apparently based on misconception. As pointed out by us earlier, the appeal/representation of the appellant (which has been treated both by the Labour Court as well as Appellate Court as a grievance notice under section 25-A of the Ordinance) was replied on 16-10-1985. It is an admitted position in the case that on that day the law as declared by Lahore High Court was that no grievance petition D could be preferred under section 25-A of the Ordinance before the Court. The appellant filed his writ petition before Lahore High Court on 19-2-1986 which was admitted to regular hearing. However, it was withdrawn by the appellant on 14-9-1987 in view of the judgment of this Court in the case of Iftikhar Ahmed v. President, National Bank of Pakistan supra, and the grievance petition was preferred on 7-10-1987. It is, therefore, quite clear that there was no delay in preferring the grievance petition which was presented within 23 days of the withdrawal of writ petition from the High Court. The learned Appellate Tribunal as well as the learned Judge in Chamber, therefore, proceeded on wrong premises to consider the alleged delay in preferring the earlier writ petition filed by the appellant which was admitted by the High Court and was ultimately withdrawn in view of the decision of this Court in Iftikhar Ahmed's case, supra, as amounting to delay in preferring the grievance petition under section 25-A of the Ordinance. The learned Appellate Tribunal as well as the learned Judge in chamber in arriving at this conclusion failed to notice that on the date the representation/appeal of the appellant was rejected by the concerned authorities, the appellant could not file his grievance petition under section 25-A of the Ordinance before the Laboure Court in view of the law declared by Lahore High Court as well as the High Court of Sindh on the subject. Therefore, the first appellate Court as well as the learned Judge in Chamber were in error in holding that the delay in not preferring the writ petition within a specified period amounted to delay in preferring the grievance petition under section 25-A of the Ordinance.
5. As the order of learned Appellate Court as well as that of the learned Judge in Chamber had proceeded on entirely wrong premises, therefore, the conclusion that the delay was wrongly condoned by the Labour Court is not sustainable in law. We, accordingly, allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court dated 6-11-1991 and that of first Appellate Court dated 24-10- 1991 and remand the case to the Appellate Tribunal for deciding the appeal preferred by respondents Nos.3 to 5 on merits in accordance with the law. In the circumstances of the case we will make no order as to costs.