1. SAJJAD AHMAD, J.-This order will dispose of six Civil Appeals Nos. 36 to 41 of 1969, which arise out of a common judgment delivered by a Division Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore Seat, in five first appeals brought before it by the appellant herein (The Province of West Pakistan) under section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter described as the Ordinance), against certain orders of the Industrial Court in respect of an award given by it in an industrial dispute between the Pakistan Western Railway and the 94 respondents herein, who are ticket examiners working under the aforesaid Railway, and a writ petition filed by the latter (Writ Petition No. 363 of 1965) to ensure the continued validity of the aforesaid award. While the appeals filed by the appellant were dismissed by the High Court as incompetent, the writ petition of the respondents was accepted and a direction was made that the award of the Industrial Court was binding on the parties, which could be varied to the disadvantage of the respondents only if the appellant was able to show to the Industrial Court that a change of circumstances .had taken place which warranted a review of the whole situation.
2. To appreciate the legal issues on which this Court had granted leave to appeal to the appellant, it is necessary to refer briefly to the history of the dispute between the parties. The North-Western Railway Union and the United Union of the North-Western Railway Workers, raised a number" of demands on behalf of the Railway Workers, including a demand numbered 76, relating to the status of the respondents (the ticket-examiners) as members of the "running staff" and entitled 3 the same privileges as, enjoyed by the Engine-drivers, firemen, guards in charge, conductor- guards, etc., etc; As an industrial dispute developed, conciliation proceedings were resorted to answer section 5 of the Ordinance which did not bring about an accord and the matter was then taken to the industrial Court for adjudication under section 5(5) of the Ordinance. The Industrial Court gave an award on the 30th of January 1962, holding in favour of the respondents that they belonged to the category of the "running staff". The award was published in the Gazette Extraordinary of West Pakistan on the 11th of August 1962. Under section 14(3) of the Ordinance, such an award comes into operation on such date and remains in operation for such period not exceeding one year as may be specified in the award. The further operation of the award is controlled by the proviso added to this subsection and subsections (4) and (5) of section 14, which are as follows :- "The Proviso.-Provided that before the expiry of the said period the Court may, upon an application of any party bound by the award, by an order :-
(i) extend the period of operation of the award by any period not exceeding one year at a time as it thinks fit; so, o however, that the total period .of operation of any award does not exceed three years from the date on which it came into operation, or
(ii) terminate the period of the award so specified or extended, on a date .fixed by that order on the ground of material change in the circumstances on which the award was based.
3. Subsection (4).-Nothing contained in subsection (3) shall apply to any award which, by its nature, terms or other circumstances, does not impose, after it has been giveneffect to, any continuing obligation on the parties bound by the award.
4. Subsection (S).-Notwithstanding the expiry of the period of operation under subsection (3), the award shall- continue to be binding on the parties until the expiry of two months from the date on which a notice in writing of an intention to terminate the award is given by one of the parties to the other party or parties to the award."
5. As already stated above, the award in question was published on the 11th of August 1962, and its initial period of operation was to come to an end on the 10th of August 1963, subject to extension as mentioned in the proviso cited above. However, before the expiry of the period of one year, the appellant purporting to act under subsection (5) of section 14 of the Ordinance, issued a notice on the 10th of June 1963, to the General Secretary, Pakistan Western Railway Union, stating therein, inter alia, that the operation of the award will cease after the expiry of its present term of one year on the 10 of August 1963, in regard to certain items, one of which related to the treatment of the respondents as members of the "running staff". The Special Ticket Examiners' Association 'as well as two Railway Workers' Unions, on the other hand, submitted an application to the Industrial Court on the 13th of July 1963, for extension of the period of the award. On the 7th of August 1963, the Industrial Court ordered that the notice given by the railway administration two months before the expiry of the statutory period of one year, was premature and was of no legal effect and that the award was binding on the parties till such time as the railway administration chose to give a valid notice as required by law. The railway administration failed-- to serve a fresh notice for theth termination of the award and the Court by its order dated the 23rd of November 1963, extended the period of the award by another one year. The period was further extended by the Industrial Court by one more year, i e. up to the 10th of August 1965, by its order dated the 11th of November 1965, which was published in-the Gazette Extraordinary of West Pakistan on the 9th of March 1965. One of the five appeals in the High Court (F. A. O. No. 172 of 1964) was directed against the order of the Industrial Court dated the 7th of August 1963, whereby it had held that the notice issued by the railway administration was premature and invalid.The other two Appeals (Nos. 178 of 1964 and 57 of 1965) were filed against the extensions granted by the Industrial Court for the operation of the award, from the I lth of August 1963 to 10th of August 1964 and again from the 11th of August 1964 to 10th of August 1965, respectively. No independent or separate prayer was sought in the other two appeals, which were probably filed merely to include certain parties which were omitted from the other appeals. None of the appals, however, questioned the legality of the original award, the reason being that according to the provisions of subsection (4) of section 12 as it then stood, complete finality was conferred on the pronouncements of the Industrial Court which could not be called in question even in the High Court and the Supreme Court. The right of appeal against the award of the Industrial Court was first created by Ordinance LXXIX of 1962 which came into force on the 29th of October 1962, whereby subsection (4) of section 12 was replaced and subsection (5) was added to read as follows :- "(4) Any decision of the Court other than an award, shall be final and shall not be questioned in any manner by or before any judicial or other authority.
(5) Any award published under subsection (2) or sub--section (2-B) may be appealed against to the 'High Court by any party to the dispute within thirty days of the publication of the award, and the decision of the High Court in such appeal shall be final."
6. It was conceded in the High Court and the point is not contested before us that Ordinance LXXIX which came into force on the 29th of October 1962, giving a right of appeal the High Court against the award of an Industrial Court, is not retrospective in its operation. However, it was argued before us, like it was done in the High Court, that the question whether or not the period of award should be extended, constituted an "industrial dispute" as defined in clause (h) of section 2 of the Ordinance and it was maintained that the extension of the period of the award on two occasions duly published in the official Gazette amounted to a fresh award each time giving rise to a right of appeal to the appellant. The High Court has rejected this contention and, in our opinion, rightly so, as the extension of an award does not relate to the determination of the terms of the employment or the conditions of the work of any workmen, to fall within the definition of an industrial dispute as contained in clause (h) of section 2 of the Ordinance aforesaid, which reads.:-- " `Industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employees and employees or between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of work of any person."
7. The industrial dispute between the parties had been finally determined by the award which was gazetted on the 11th of August 1962 and which achieved finality at the time that it was pronounced.
8. The extension of the award was limited merely to the extended term of its operation and did not amount to a resurrection of the industrial dispute which had ended with the award. While considering the question of extension, the Industrial Court was merely concerned to see whether any material change in the circumstances had occurred to disallow its extension.
9. The learned counsel also referred us to the definition of an award as contained in section 2, clause (b), which is as follows:- " `Award' means the determination by an Industrial Court of any dispute or any matter relating thereto and includes an interim award."
10. It was contended that the question of the extension of the award was a matter relating to an industrial dispute and as the order of the Industrial Court extending the period of the award amounted to an award it was appealable as such. The learned Judges in the High Court did not accept this contention and we agree with their reason that the phrase "any matter relating thereto" in this definition is to be read "ejusdem generis" with the word "Industrial dispute" to cover only controversies with regard to the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of work of any person under subsection (5) of section 12 of the Ordinance. Only the award which is published under subsection (2) or subsection (2-B) can be appealed against to the High Court by any party to the dispute within 30 days of the publication of the award. The award referred, to in this provision is the one given in consequence of as application made to the Industrial Court under subsection (5) of section 5 after failure of the conciliation proceedings and is required to be published in the official Gazette unless the relevant Government considers it inexpedient on public grounds to give effect to the whole or any part of it. It is clear, therefore, that the award intended by subsection (2) or subsection (2-B) is the one which culminates after the initiation of proceedings, firstly, before a Conciliation Officer and then before the Industrial Court under subsection (5) of section 5. In the case of extension of the period of an award no question of any conciliation proceedings arises and no proceedings under subsection (5) of section 5 of the Ordinance take place. Whether the period of the award is to be extended or not, is left to the discretion of the Industrial Court and is to be judged according to the circumstances and the situation prevailing at the time.
11. The appellant's appeal in the High Court directed against the order of the Industrial Court dated the 7th of August 1963, whereby it was held that the notice issued by the Railway Administration was premature, was, on the face of it, in a worse position' and wholly untenable as that order could not be considered as an award or an interim award in any sense. It was merely an interim order by which a further opportunity was provided to the Railway Administration to issue a valid notice to the respondents. The appeals of the appellant in the High Court were, therefore, rightly rejected as incompetent.
12. Coming now to the writ petition filed by the respondents, it seems that it was necessitated by the apprehension of the respon--dents that after the termination of the maximum period of three years of the duration of the award as provided by clause (1) of the proviso to section 14(3) of the Ordinance, the Railway Administration will deprive them of the privileges and allowances to which they were entitled under the award as members of the running staff. That this apprehen--sion was not without a basis, was apparent from the fact that the Railway Administration admitted in para. 10 of its written statement filed in the writ petition that since the maximum period of three years of the award expired on the 10th of August 1965, the administration had issued instructions for the stoppage of the operation of certain items with effect from the 11th of August 1965, including items concerning the payment of mileage allowance to the respondents. The Divisional Superintendent, Railway, Lahore, by his letter No. 961-E/1/PT-3-Award/P-4 dated the 5th of August 1965), had directed by a reference to a letter of the Vice-Chairman dated the 31st of July 1965, that the award given by the Industrial Court will cease to be in operation with effect from the 10th of August 1965, and the special ticket examiners were to be paid emoluments in accordance with the instructions which obtained before the Industrial Court had given the award. In the writ petition the relief claimed by the respon--dents was a declaration that .the Railway Administration was not permitted by law to treat them on any other basis or to deal with them, except on the basis that they are the members of the running staff. The High Court did not give them the relief precisely in those terms but held that the award given by the Industrial Court dated the 10th of August 1962, in relation to P, Demand No. 76 (i.e., the respondents' demand as members of the running staff in the railway administration) is still binding on the parties and that it can be varied to their disadvantage only if the appellant is able to show to the Industrial Court a change of - circumstances warranting a review of the whole situation. Sub section (5) of section 14, already cited above, makes it abundantly clear that notwithstanding the expiry of the period of the operation of the award under subsection (3), which means also that notwithstanding that the maximum period of three years of the award has run out, it shall continue to be binding on the parties until the expiry of two months from the date on which a notice in writing of an intention to terminate the award is given by one of the parties to the other party or parties to the award. In our view, the High Court has rightly held that the award will continue to have a binding efficacy until, as required by this provision a valid notice is served. It is admitted that no notice was served by the administration on the respondents in this behalf. As no notice has been issued so far, the award already given by the Industrial Court continues to be in operation. It is unnecessary to decide at this stage as to what would be the effect of a notice if one is issued by the Railway Administration to the respondents to terminate the operation of the award without any allegation of a material change in the circumstances to justify review of the whole situation which will be a matter, in the first instance, for the Industrial Court to decide if and when taken before it.
13. The result is that these appeals stand dismissed with no order as to costs.