DECISION This is an appeal under subsection (3) of section 37, of the industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance), against m, order dated the 20th of February 1971, whereby the learned, Chairman of the Second Sind Labour Court, Karachi, confirmed its ad interim injunction order restraining the appellant Union from going on strike. The facts giving rise to the present appeal briefly put are these.
2. The Union gave a notice on 21st November 1970. The Collective Bargaining Agent communicated its views under section 26 of the Ordinance to the Bank that an Industrial Dispute was likely to arise.
On 30th November 1970, the Collective Bargaining Agent gave a notice under section 28 of the Ordinance of their intention to go on strike. In the meantime, the Collective Bargaining agent had made an application under section 34 of the Ordinance on 24th November 1970, that the Court may b; pleased to order the Bank to withdraw the lock--out of some of the workers of the Union, The Collective -Bargaining Agent had also made at application under section 45 of the Ordinance along with the said application under section 34 of the Ordinance. The Collective Bargaining Agent was to go on strike from 16th February 1971. The Bank thereupon made an application under section 45 of the Ordinance on 12th February 1971, to the Court restraining the Union from going on strike from 16th February 1971. The learned Court passed an ad Interim order on 12th February 1971, restraining the Union from resorting to strike. The interim order was made absolute ors 20th February 1971, giving rise to the present appeal.
3. Mr. Jafri, the learned Representative for the respondent, raised a preliminary objection that the order under appeal not being an award appeal lay against the impugned order. On the other hand Mr. Amanullah Qureshi, the learned Repre--sentative for the appellant contended that the impugned order amounts to an award within the meaning of the definition of award as given under section 2 of the Ordinance.
4. In order to appreciate the contention of the learned Representatives for the parties, it would be useful to reproduce the definition of award. It means: `award' means the determination by a Labour Court, Arbitrator or Appellate Tribunal of any Industrial Dispute or any matter relating thereto and includes an interim award;".
Mr. Qureshi laid emphasis on the words, "any matter relating thereto", occurring in the definition reproduced above. It was contended by Mr. Qureshi that the order restraining the Union from resorting to strike is a matter which relates to the industrial dispute and, therefore, is covered by the definition of "award" and, therefore, the impugned order was clearly appealable.
5. As to what is the meaning of the words "any matter relating thereto," was the subject-matter of interpretation in a recent case before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the case of the Province of West Pakistan v. Syed Moharram Ali and 93 others (1970 PLC 408). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court of Pakistan came to the conclusion that "any matter relating thereto" must be read as "ejusdem generic" with the words "Industrial Dispute" to cover only controversies with regard to the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of work of any persons within the meaning of the definition of industrial dispute. The order restraining the Union from going on strike cannot be said to be a matter relating to or connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of work of any person. I am-- clearly of the view that the order made by the learned Court restraining the Union from resorting to strike is merely a decision within the meaning of subsection (3) of section 37 of the Ordinance. In this connection, it would be useful to repro--duce subsection (4) of section 37 of the Ordinance. It runs as under:- "All decisions of a Labour Court, other than awards referred to in subsection (3) of this section, and sentences referred to in subsection (3) of section 36, shall be final and shall not be called in question in any manner by or before any Court or other authority."
6. The Legislature had made a clear distinction between award and decision. Decisions of the Labour Court have been given finality. The Appellate Tribunal under the provisions of the Ordinance cannot go beyond the power that has been conferred upon it. In these circumstances, I would hold that no appeal lies. It is accordingly dismissed.
7. Mr. Amanullah Qureshi, the learned Representative for the appellant had very strenuously contended that the appli--cation under section 45 of the Ordinance was not maintainable, as the ingredients of section 45 of the Ordinance were not made out when the application under section 45 was made contended that one of the essential conditions of Ordinance is, before the Court could exercise prohibit the continuance of strike, that the in existence, that is, when the application the strike must have commenced. It is true that technically speaking section 45 of the Ordinance wag not appli--cable to the circumstances of the present case. A reference to the application giving wasp note made impugned under section 45 order, however, shows that the application of the ordinance' but it was also made under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Labour Court has all the power of the civil court under subsection (2) of section 36 of the Ordinance for adjudicating and determining any industrial dispute and it would be deemed to be a civil Court with all the powers vested under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (Act V of 1908). Mr. Qureshi was unable to cite any authority to support the proposition that the Labour Court could not, under the provisions of Code oil civil Procedure, restrain the Union from resorting to strike. As the appeal fails on the ground that the impugned order was not appealable, I need not examine this question elaborately. It will be sufficient to state that the learned Court, if the circum--stances mentioned under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Article 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure are made out, it can restrain the Collective Bargaining Agent from resorting to strike. With these observations I dismiss