1. ' The applicant has filed the application for enforcing its rights guaranteed and secured to it under section 40(5) of the I.R.O. This application seems to be under section 34 of the I.R.O., 1969.
2. ' Briefly the facts giving rise to this application are that an Award was given by the N.I.R.C. Which was to remain in operation upto 31-3-1984 and was binding on the parties- up to the said date. It so happened that the respondent union due to certain reasons wanted to terminate this Award before the date i.e. 31-3-1984 hence it gave the notice to the Government of Pakistan and also the Chairman of the applicant K.P.T, expressing their intention of termination of this Award for two months from the date of this notice dated 1-2-1984. Thereafter the respondent held a meeting on 29-3-1984 and submitted a fresh charter of demands on 1-4-1984. The applicant went to the N.I.R.C.
3. Under section 34 of I.R.O. On 4-4-1984 the Full Bench of the Hon'ble N.I.R.C. Issued status quo to restrain the respondent from serving the notice of strike. On 17-4-1984 the Hon'ble N.I.R.C. Passed an order to the effect that it does not have any jurisdiction and the management should apply to the Labour Court for enforcement of its rights guaranteed and secured to it in law. Hence this application praying therein that the Court should be pleased to hold that the Award dated 31-3- 1983 still continues to remain in operation and that the notice of termination of Award in terms of section 40(c) of the I.R.O., 1969 is to be served after and not before the expiry of the Award.
4. ' Alongwith the petition the applicants filed the present application for grant of stay and status quo.
5. On 29-4-1984 this Court had granted status quo with Notice to the respondent for 7-5-1984.
6. ' The respondents put in their appearance and filed their Reply Statement and an affidavit to object the confirmation of the status quo order. On 7-5-1984 the applicant have also filed a rejoinder on 9-5-1984. The matter was fixed for argument. Both the parties have filed their lengthy written arguments.
7. ' I have gone through the written arguments and perused the present stay application and the affidavits of the parties filed therefor. I have also gone through the entire law referred to by the learned representatives of the respective parties.
8. ' The learned representative of the respondent has raised an objection that the proper party has not been joined hence the petition is not maintainable at law. According to" him a Board of Trustees has been established under the K.P.T. Act which is a Corporate body under section 4 of the said Act. It is this Board which shall one and be sued. He further argued that in the instant case it should have been this Board which should file the present matter through its Chairman and not the Secretary. It is the settled law that in case of a Government the Secretary could sign the pleadings of Order XXIX, rule 1, C.P.C. Is clear. Even otherwise no suit could fail for non-joinder or misjoinder of necessary party. Admittedly, this is a very early stage of the matter and if necessity arises if any person could be joined in either at the request of the party to the suit/petition or suo motu by the Court itself.
9. ' The bone of contention in the matter is the notice dated 1-2-1984 given by the respondent to the applicant. According to the applicant this notice could not be given by the respondent before the expiry of the specified time of the award i.e. 31-3-1984. The short point which arises is whether the two months notice contemplating in terms of section 40(5) of the I.R.O., 1b69 terminating the Award be served during the period of operation of the Award or is to be served after the expiry of the Award.
10. ' During the operation of the Award both the parties are bound to respect the terms of conditions.
11. The industrial peace, too, demands that the sanctity should be attached to the Award as has been held in 1960 PLC 166. It is an established law that the award continues to be in force even after the expiry of the period specified until and unless it is terminated by any of the parties with two months' notice. Reliance in this respect can be placed on 1965 PLC 297. Earlier to this authority this was the view in 1969 PLC 509 and thereafter as held in 1970 PLC 408. Under the earlier law subsection (5) read as under: "An award operative under subsection (3) continues to be binding on the parties after the period of its operation till the expiry of two months notice from one party to the other of its intention to terminate the award."
12. ' But this seems to have been amended as it stands in section 40(5) of the I.R.O. Which reads as under: "Notwithstanding the expiry of the period for which an award is to be effective under subsection (3), the award shall continue to be binding on the parties until the expiry of two months from the date on which either party informs the other party in writing of its intention no longer to be bound by the award."
13. ' In the instant case before me had it been the former position then none of the parties could give notice of termination unless the specified time would expire. If this principle was applied then the present parties were bound even after the expiry date of the award i.e. 31-3-1984. But in view of the present law both the parties are at liberty to express their intention of termination even before the expiry of the specified time.
14. ' The notice dated 2-1-1984 given by the respondent to the applicants has created a confusion. The plain reading of this letter shows that respondent do not seem to terminate the award before the specified date of 31-3-1984 but seem to apprise the applicants that they will not be bound by the award after this date. In this letter the word "from date" has been used and not the "above-said date", which could only be understood that the intention of the respondent was to inform the applicants that they shall not be bound by the award after the specified date i.e. 31-3-1984. This has been admitted and stated by the learned representative of the respondent in his para. 6 of the written arguments.
15. '. After this notice the respondents have reiterated their position and finally informed the applicants of their intention to terminate award and also put forward their demands through their letter on 1- 4-1984 produced by the applicants as Annexure 'E'.
16. ' On the basis of the statement by the learned representative of the respondent that the letter dated 1-2-1984 was not a notice of termination but only to inform the applicants that the respondent shall not be bound by the award after 31-3-1984. The purpose of notice is nothing but to inform the other party of the proposed action which the first party intends to take on or after a particular date. The letter dated 1-4-1984 satisfies this legal requirement and no fresh notice is legally now required to be given to the applicants by the respondent. Thus the notice period, in the instant case before me, cannot be computed from 1-2-1984 but from 1-4-1984 when the respondents finally intimated the applicants. Therefore, if the notice time is taken from 1-4-1984 the period of two months would expire on 31st May, 1984 and till this date the award will be operative on both the parties. Any action taken by the respondent before this date would obviously, be a breach of award and illegal.
17. ' I am therefore, of a considered view that if the interim order is recalled before the said date of 31- 5-1984 the respondent are likely to violate the award.
18. ' Hence, keeping in view the circumstances of the case I direct that the status quo to continue till 31st of May 1984. The interim application is disposed of accordingly.