' MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J.---The appellant, through the present appeal, by leave of the Court, has challenged the judgment dated 12-2-1998, whereby the learned Division Bench of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar dismissed his constitutional petition (Writ Petition No,810 of 1995).
2. Facts of the case as capitulated in the leave granting order are reproduced below.
"2. "Factual aspect of the case is that land measuring 14 Kanals, 17 Marlas situated in Mauza Daman (Akbarpura) Tehsil and Distict Nowshera was acquired by the Irrigation Department for the Scheme "Protection of Akbarpura village from floods in Bara Nala" on the basis of award dated 3-3-1966 of the Collector Acquisition, Peshawar. The case of the petitioner is that the acquired land was owned by the petitioner and on acquisition its compensation was paid to his predecessor. On 8-10-1990, the petitioner applied for restoration of the surplus land. The Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner recommended that the surplus land be returned to the owner from whom it was acquired on payment of the price to be fixed by the competent authority. Consequently, it was returned to the petitioner by the order of the Commissioner and Mutation No,1226 dated 5-7-1994 was also sanctioned in his name. Malik Muhammad Sadiq respondent agitated the matter in revision before the Senior Member, Board of Revenue, N.-W.F.P, which was accepted, the order of the Commissioner dated 12-6-1994 was set aside and the impugned Mutation No,1226 dated 5-7- 1994 was cancelled. The writ petition of the petitioner against the said order was dismissed through impugned judgment."
3. The appellant filed timed barred petition seeking leave to appeal (C.P. No,239P/1998) against the judgment dated 12-2-1998 together with an application for condonation of delay in filing the leave petition. On 12-6-2000. This Court while granting leave to appeal to the appellant observed that the point of limitation will be considered at the time of hearing of the appeal. Relevant portion of the leave granting order reads as follow:-- "4. We grant leave to consider "whether the Senior Member, Board of Revenue, in revision was legally justified in cancelling the mutation in favour of the petitioner after it was held by the Commissioner and the Deputy that the land was acquired from the petitioner and compensation was paid to him. Moreover, as the grounds of appeal before Member Board of Revenue, reveal it was not the case of the respondent that the land being Shamilat, therefore the proprietary body of the village and not the petitioner alone was entitled to its compensation. The petition is barred by time and this point will be considered at the time of hearing of the appeal." (underlining is ours).
4. Learned counsel for the appellant stated that impugned judgment was passed on 12-2-1998, the appellant applied for obtaining certified copy of the judgment on the same day, it was prepared on 21-2-1998 and the appellant secured certified copy on 1-10-1998 and filed the petition on 30-10- 1998. He contended that since the certified copy of the judgment was delivered to the appellant on 1-10-1998 and the petition was filed within 60 days from the date of delivery of the copy, therefore, civil petition was within time. He was further contended that "requisite time" under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act would be the period computed from date of application till date of delivery of certified copy and that copying agency did not issue any notice to the appellant informing him about readiness of the certified copy. He has referred to the case reported as West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Karachi v. Aziz Qureshi (1973 SCM R 555). Conversely, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellant deliberately failed to place on record chit issued by the copying agency indicating tentative date of preparation of the certified copy and the time of filing petition would run from the date of preparation of copy i,e, 21-2-1998 and not from the date of delivery. He referred to para-3 of the application for condonation of delay to contend that had the appellant been visiting the copying agency for obtaining certified copy as alleged, he would have definitely got the certified copy, as it was admittedly prepared on 21-2-1998.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and examined the material available on record. Even according to the narrative furnished by the learned counsel, (viz. The appellant applied for the certified copy on 12-2-1998, it was prepared and ready for delivery on 21-2-1998 and the petition was filed on 30-10-1998) the petition was barred by 8 months and 9 days. The stance of the learned counsel is that is if the time is computed from date of delivery of the certified copy of the impugned judgment, then the petition is within time. Learned counsel when asked as to why chit/receipt issued by the copying branch was not placed on record stated that he is not aware as to whether chit or receipt was issued by the copying agency or not as the certified copy was applied by the appellant. The learned counsel has also not been able to disclose about the date, which was given by the copying agency or indicated on the receipt issued by the copying agency to obtain certified copy. It is a matter of common knowledge that when a person applied for certified copy, the copying agency issues a receipt/chit indicating tentative date of preparation of certified copy and on that date and applicant is obliged to enquire from the copying agency as to whether the requisite copy is prepared or not. Interestingly, the appellant in his application for condonation of delay even did not mention the date given by the copying agency to the appellant for obtaining the certified copy of the judgment. This Court in a case reported as Fateh Muhammad and others v. Malik Qadir Bakhsh (1975 SCM R 157) has held that the time "requisite" for obtaining copy of order within the meaning of section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908, means only the interval between the date of application for supply of copy and the date when it is ready for delivery and that the time between the date on which the copy was ready for delivery, and the date on which the applicant chooses to take delivery thereof is not a portion of time "requisite" for obtaining a copy. Even section 12(5) of the Limitation Act is of no help to the appellant as he failed to produce the chit/receipt issued by the copying agency showing the date for preparation of certified copy, inasmuch as, no such date has been indicated in the application for condonation of delay. Had the appellant produced a chit issued by the copying agency and the copy was not ready on the date indicated in the chit, then the appellant could have taken shelter under section 12(5) of the Limitation Act. This Court under the similar facts and circumstances of the case reported as Zulfiqar Ali v. Superintendent of Police and others (2003 SCM R 1562) refused to condone the delay of nearly 50 days while in the present case the delay is of 249 days. The case of Zulfiqar Ali (ibid) applies to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand on all fours.
6. There is another aspect of the case. The appellant applied for certified copy on 12-2-1998 and he waited for a period of nearly eight months to inquire about the copy, as he obtained the copy on 1- 10-1998. The appellant after applying for the certified copy of the judgment went into a deep slumber and did not enquire from the copying agency about the fate of his application for the grant of certified copy for approximately eight months. Even if it be presumed that no chit/receipt was issued by the copying agency, the appellant was a prudent person should have acted with reasonable promptitude and diligent and should have approached the copying agency inquiring about certified copy within a reasonable time. The appellant was extremely negligent in securing the certified copy of the judgment and did not bother to inquire from the copying agency about the preparation of certified copy for nearly 8 months, which was ready for delivery on 21-2-1998.
Learned counsel for the respondents has rightly referred para-3 of the application for condonation of delay in which he appellant stated that he visited the copying branch several times for collecting the certified copy but was told that the same has not yet been prepared. Suffice it to say that the said assertion, on the face of it seems to be erroneous. Had the appellant visited the copying agency after 21-2-1998 he would have definitely got the certified copy as according to him it was prepared on the said date. It leads to the irresistible conclusion that the appellant never visited copying agency during the period from 21-2-1998 to 1-10-1998.
7. Seeing from any angle, the appellant has not been able to sufficiently explain the inordinate delay of 8 months and 9 days within the parameters of law. Thus the petition was grossly barred by time and we see no sufficient cause to condone this inordinate delay.
8. For foregoing reasons, the petition was barred by time which is hereby dismissed and leave granted, order is rescinded.