MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, J.----This is the Bunch of petitions filed by the tenant of their respective premises situated in a building called Anjuman-e-Imamia. The landlord filed eviction applications in the year 2006 on a common ground of default based on identical facts. The Rent Applications were contested by the tenants before the Rent Controller . Initially there were two sets of order . One dated 28-5-2009 and 24-8-2009 allowing the rent application and the other set of order dated 19-2-2010 dismissing the rent application. Some of the appeals therefrom kept: pending whereas in some of the appeals, wherein orders of allowing the application vide dated 24- 8-2009 were impugned were successfully challenged by tenant but on remand they were also dismissed on 19-2- 2010. Appeal against them were also filed by landlord and heard. Appeals against the order dated 24-8-2009, allowing application (which remained pending) were dismissed vide order 21-1-2 010 and appeals- against order dismissing application were allowed vide order 26-9-201 1. This bunch now impugns the orders of appellate court whereby in substance eviction applications were allowed. The chart of convenience is given as under:-- R.A. No.08 of 2006 First Rent Appeal No.52/2009 C.P. No.S-195/2010 Rent Application was allowed vide order dated 28- 5-2009Appeal was dismissed vide order dated 21-01-2019.Aziz Ahmed (tenant) v.
Anjuman-e-Imamia (Landlord)
R.A. No.16 of 2006 First Rent Appeal No.55/2009 C.P. No.S-196/2010 Rent Application was allowed vide order dated 28-5-2009Appeal was dismissed vide order dated 21-01-2019.Abdul Waheed (tenant) v.
Anjuman-e-Imamia (landlord).
R.A. No.1 1 of 2006 First Rent Appeal No.51/2009 C.P. No.S-205/2010 Rent Application was allowed vide order dated 28-5-2009Appeal was dismissed vide order dated 21-01-2019.Muhammad Ishaque (tenant) v. Anjuman-e-Imamia (landlord).
R.A. No.29 of 2006
1. Rent Application was allowed on 24-8-2009
2. On remand rent application was dismissed vide order dated 19-2-2010.1. First Rent Appeal No.94/2009 (filed by tenant) was remanded vide order dated 15-12-2009.
2. First Rent Appeal No.57/2010 (filed. By landlord) was allowed vide order dated 26-9-201 1.C.P. No.S-725/201 1 Khalid Noor (tenant) v.
Anjuman-e-Imamia (landlord).
R.A. No.14 of 2006 First Rent Appeal No.53/2009 C.P. No.S-726/201 1 Rent Application was dismissed. vide order dated 19-2-2010.Appeal was allowed tide order dated 26-09-201 1.Haji Abdul Majeed Khan (tenant) v. Anjuman-e-Imamia (landlord).
R.A. No.06 of 2006 First Rent Appeal No.52/2009 C.P. No.S-757/201 1 Rent Application was dismissed vide order dated 19-2-2010.Appeal was allowed vide order dated 26-09-201 1.Nazim Khan Ghori (tenant) v.
Anjuman-e-Imamia (landlord).
R.A. No.25 of 2006
1. Rent Application was allowed vide order dated 24- 8-2009
2. On remand rent application was dismissed vide order dated 19-2-2010.1. First Rent Appeal No.92/2009 (filed by tenant) was remanded vide order dated 15-12-2009.
2. First Rent Appeal No.54/2010(filed by landlord) was allowed vide order dated 26-9-201 1.C.P. No.S-758/201 1 Inayatullah (tenant) v.
Anjuman-e-Imamia (landlord).
R.A. No.27 of 2006
1. Rent Application was allowed vide order dated 24- 8-2009
2. On remand rent application was dismissed vide order dated 19-2-2010.1. First Rent Appeal No.93/2009 (filed by tenant) was remanded vide order dated 15-12-2009.
2. First Rent Appeal No.55/2010 (filed by landlord) was allowed vide order dated 26-9-201 1.C.P. No.S-759/291 1 Mehboob Bux (tenant) v.
Anjuman-e-Imamia (landlord).
R.A. No.30 of 2006
1. Rent Application was allowed on 24-8-2009
2. On remand rent application was dismissed vide order dated 19-2-2010.1. First Rent Appeal No.95/2009 (filed by tenant) was remanded vide order dated 15-12-2009.
2. First Rent Appeal No.58/2010. (filed by landlord) was allowed vide order dated 26-9-201 1.C.P. No.S-764/201 1 Muhammad Hanif (tenant) v.
Anjuman-e-Imamia (landlord).
R.A. No.28 of 2006 First Rent Appeal No.56/2009 C.P. No.S-862/201 1 Rent Application was dismissed vide order dated 19-2-2010.Appeal was allowed vide order dated 26-09-201 1.Muhammad Hanif (tenant) v.
Anjuman-e-Imamia (landlord).
Primarily , the questions before the trial court appellate Court were whether the (deponent) was empowered to file eviction application, which issue ultimately decided by appellate Court in favour of applicant/landlord/respondent and the Rent Controller since questioned the maintainability of applications, therefore, no specific findings were given as far as default is concerned. Consequently the issue of default was also addressed by the appellate Court as a court of first impression. Aggrieved of the decision of appellate Court these tenants have filed these petitions on the following grounds:
1. Whether the appeal before the appellate Court was time barred?
2. That the appellate Court should not have given the decision on merits as the Rent Controller never decided the application on merits and consequently right of appeal was denied to the petitioner by the appellate Court.
Heard learned counsel and perused the material available on record: Let us first examine the issue of maintainability of appeals before the appellate Court as it is claimed that they were barred by time.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Muhammad Nawaz v. Abdus Salam PLD 1997 SC 563, wherein the certified copies were prepared and completed on a particular date while the petitioner collected copies much later and almost took 04 months to collect the copies and there was no reasonable explanation provided for this inordinate delay in obtaining copy. Counsel next relied upon the case of Mian Muhammad Sabir v. Malik Muhammad Sadiq reported in PLD 2008 SC 577. Based on the above decisions, it is contended that the time requisite for obtaining copy of the order within the contemplation of section 12 of the Limitation Act means only the interval between the "date of application for supply of copy" and the "date when it is ready for delivery". Time between the date on which the copy was ready of delivery , and the date on which the applicant chooses to take delivery thereof, is not a portion time 'requisite' for obtaining copy. It is contended that the landlord failed to produce chit/receipt issued by the copying agency showing the date for preparation of certified copy inasmuch as no such date has been indicated in the application for the condonation of delay . Had the appellant produced the chit and then showed that the copy was not ready on the date indicated in the chit, the appellant could have taken shelter of section 12(5) of Limitation Act. Next the petiti oner has relied upon the case of Anisa Begum v . Atiq ur Rehman reported in 2007 MLD 1385 .
Respondent's counsel on the other hand relied upon the case of West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Karachi v. Aziz Qureshi reported in PLD 1973 Kar. 222, arising out of the judgment and order of the then High Court of W est Pakistan Karachi Bench Karachi.
The cases cited by learned counsel for the petitioner are distinguishable in the sense that the lis therein originates from Peshawar High Court and Multan Bench of Lahore High Court respectively whereas in the present case Sindh Civil Court Rules are applicable in so far as obtaining certified copy of judgment and decree is concerned. The relevant rules of Sindh Civil Court Rules are reproduced as under:--
323. Registration of application and estimate of copying and other fees:---(1) As soon as an order for a copy of translation has been made, the Record Keeper or under his supervision the Head Copyist, shall number and register the application in the order of its receipt in the Register of Application for copies and translations and shall enter on the application its serial number . He shall also at once, if possible, or during the same day but ordinarily not later than the following working day, ascertain the amount of copying, comparing and translation fees, when leviable, according to the scale prescribed in Chapter VIII, Appendix D and enter them on the application and communicate them to the applicant.
(2) No fees shall be charged for copying papers wanted for a public purpose by officers other than the Advocate General or the Government Pleaders of a Provincial Government or the Central Government or of the Government of Burma.
(3) The preparation of copies shall be undertaken in accordance with the serial order of applications unless otherwise ordered by the Judge.
Provided that on payment of an extra fee of four annas by a Court fee stamp upon the application and extra payment of half the copying fees and comparing fees, if any, an applicant should be entitled to obtain a copy, if possible, within 24 hours and in any case within 48 hours, of any document among the records of Court to which the application is made.
329. Copies how certified:-- Certified copies shall be endorsed with the following particulars:--
(1) the date of application for the copy;
(2) the date of estimate of fees;
(3) the date of deposit of estimate fees and the date of supply of stamp;
(4) the date of certification by the chief ministerial officer; and
(5) the date of delivery of the copy; They shall be certified at the foot to be a "true copy" shall bear the seal of the Court on each page, and shall be dated and subscribed in full with his name and official title by the chief ministerial officer of the Court. The certifying officer shall initial every alteration and iterlineations in the copy .
331. Posting of list of copies ready for officer delivery :--(1) A list of copies and translations ready for delivery shall be posted on the notice board of the Record Keepers' office.
(2) If a copy or translation is not claimed by the applicant within six months from the date of posting the aforesaid list, the copy shall be destroyed and the fact shall be noted in the remarks column of the Register of Applications for copies and translation.
(3) Where the applicant has applied that a copy should be sent to him by post; the copy shall be sent accordingly ."
The procedural requirement in obtaining certified copy of the order judgment, decree etc as described above requires that an intimation to the applicant is inevitable when copies are made ready in terms of Rule 331. In terms of Rule 331 a list of all those orders/judgment etc. copies of which are ready for delivery , shall be pasted on the notice board of the Record Keeper . This notice and/or intimation was never issued to the applicant who has applied for the certified copy. Under above cited rules i.e. Sindh Civil Court Rules there appears to be no concept of chit/receipt to be issued by the copyist to indicate the date of the delivery of the copy. Hence the ratio of the judgment in West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation is applicable and the time requisite includes the time till it was intimated to applicant and as there was no evidence that the applicant was intimated about the copy made ready on a date prior to the date it was received by the applicant, no adverse opinion would be drawn.
In view of the above, if time is calculated and the requisite time includes the time till it was intimated and in its absence till receipt of copy , such time is to be excluded as being requisite time and the appeals were within time.
The next question as raised by the petitioner is that the appellate court in fact acted as a trial court and decided the case on merit as a Court of first instance. The trial court dismissed the ejectme nt application except two Rent Application No.16/2006 and Rent Application No.11/2006 on the count that the applicant was not competent to maintain the application whereafter the issue No.2 (default) was rendered as redundant. In some of the cases in the first round of litigation the applications of the landlord were allowed and on appeals preferred by the tenant they were remanded to the same Rent Controller who then persuaded to dismiss the same. Surprisingly it was done by the same Rent Controller who earlier took a contrary view by allowing the applications. Be that as it may, in the second round of litigation when the Rent Controller dismissed the applications, the appeals were preferred by the landlord and they were allowed on 26-9-201 1. It is at this point of time when the question of default was taken into consideration without adjudicating as to what the period of default was? It was mere presumption that the rent was liable to be enhanced at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of the expiry of the first rent agreement for 11 months which was executed in the year 1984. Surprisingly , the period of default was not even pleaded in the application nor the evidence came in support thereof as to what the period of default was? A calculation sheet is attached with the applications where as applications itself shows the cause accrued to respondent/applicant in the year 2004 when applications were filed and not when it was allegedly due in the year 1985. Trial Court never gave finding and reasons of default whereas appellate Court did not specify the period of default, quantum' that remained unpaid etc. In the absence of specified date of default in the pleading, the tenants cannot be adjudged as defaulters.
Mr. Naimatullah Soomro learned counsel in the arguments concedes and stated that it may be taken up from the date of the cause of action disclosed in the application i.e. 2004. Even if that is taken into consideration, there is no substantive finding as to what the amount was which was required to be paid and was due. The payment of periodical lump sum rent was not denied but what is claimed that the enhanced rent was not paid. The doctrine of 10% actually originates from section 9 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 which is to be calculated on fair rent. Anyhow , even if parties have "mutually" agreed for enhancement at the rate of 10%, they remained quite for almost 20 years and whether or not it amounts to waiver or acquiesce, is yet to be decided, judicially . The trial Court and appellate Court on the basis of a general principle held that it is liable to be enhanced and since it is not enhanced and paid, therefore, they (tenants) have committed default. Though this exercise was not done by the trial court at all, for the first time this gene ral exercise was done by the appellate Court in holding that the rent ought to have enhanced at the rate of 10%. This Court while hearing petition as a third tier, cannot assume jurisdiction of appellate Court.
At the first instance when the trial Court was silent and the applications were dismissed as being not maintainable then the primary jurisdiction of the appellate Court would be to hear the appeal on the question decided and not which was not decided by the trial Court. By assuming the jurisdiction of trial court the right of appeal of aggrieved party was curtailed. Though we do not take anything away from the merit of the case if at all the rent was required to be enhanced but then in all fairness the question raised above required detailed reasoning from the trial Court.
Since this view of the appellate court came for the first time as there were no findings of the trial court at all, therefore, the petitioner is deprived of a right of an appeal as far as the findings of the appellate court on default is concerned. They filed the instant writ petition challenging the order passed by the appellate court on merit but the jurisdiction of this court is not the same as available to the appellate Court under section 21 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance.
I, therefore, allow the petitions to the extent the appellate, Court should have reman ded the case back to trial Court for a decision on merit including default as the rent applications were dismissed on the ground of maintainability without any findings on default. Trial Court however may frame issues and allow the landlord and tenants to adduced additional evidence and in any case may not consume more than three months to decide applications on merit.