SHAHID BILAL HASSAN, J. Facts, in precision, are as such that the respondent instituted a suit for recovery under Order XXXVII, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the Code, 1908) against the present petitioner, wherein the petitioner was proceeded against ex parte and suit was decreed ex parte vide judgment and decree dated 09.01.2013. Allegedly, on 09.09.2015, the petitioner came to know about passing of the said ex parte decree, so after obtaining certified copies he filed an application under Order XXXVII, Rule 4, of the Code, 1908 along with an application for leave to contest as well as application for suspension of operation of the decree, on 12.11.2015. The said application was dismissed by the learned trial Court vide impugned order dated 28.11:2018; hence, the instant revision petition.
2. Heard.
3. In order to decide the instant petition, wherein the question of limitation is involved, the judgment reported as Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others (PLD 2015 Supreme Court 212) delivered by the apex Court of the country, has much relevance, wherein it has invariably and unequivocally been held:- ".............From the various dicta/pronouncements of the superior court, it can be deduced without any fear of contradiction that such law is founded upon public policy and State interest. This law is vital for an orderly and organized society and the people at large, who believe in being governed by systemized law. The obvious object of the law is that if no time constraints and limits are prescribed for pursuing a cause of action and for seeking reliefs/remedies relating to such cause of action, and a person is allowed to sue for the redressal of his grievance within an infinite and unlimited time period, it shall adversely affect the disciplined and structured judicial process and mechanism of the State, which is sine qua non for any State to perform its functions within the parameters of the Constitution and the rule of law. The object of the law of limitation and the law itself, prescribing time constraints for each cause or case or for seeking any relief or remedy has been examined by the courts in many a cases, and it has been held to be a valid piece of legislation, and law of the land. It is "THE LAW" which should be strictly construed and applied in its letter and spirit; and by no stretch of legal interpretation it can be held that such law (i.e. limitation law) is merely a technicality and that too of procedural in nature. Rather from the mandate of section 3 of the Limitation Act, it is obligatory upon the court to dismiss the cause/lis which is barred by time even though limitation has not been set out as a defence. And this shows the imperative adherence to and the mandatory application of such law by nature and is held to mean and serve as a major deterrent against the factors and the elements which would affect peace, tranquility and due order of the State and society. The law of limitation requires that a person must approach the Court and take recourse to legal remedies with due diligence, without dilatoriness and negligence and within the time provided by the law; as against choosing his own time for the purpose of bringing forth a legal action at his own whim and desire. Because if that is permitted to happen, it shall not only result in the misuse of the judicial process of the State, but shall also cause exploitation of the legal system and the society as a whole. This is not permissible in a State which is governed by law and Constitution. And it may be relevant to mention here that the law providing for limitation for various causes/reliefs is not a matter of mere technicality but foundationally of the "LAW" itself.............'
Moreover, in United Bank Limited and others v. Noor-Un-Nisa and others (2015 SCMR 380), wherein it was held:- `Under section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908, it is the bounden duty of every Court of law to take notice of the question of limitation even if not raised in defence by the other contesting party(s).'
Earlier to the above said celebrated judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan dealt with the same proposition in Lahore Development Authority v. Mst. Sharifan Bibi and another (PLD 2010 Supreme Court 705) and Sardar Anwar Ali Khan and 10 others v. Sardar Baqir Ali through Legal Heirs and 4 others (1992 SCMR 2435).
In this backdrop it is observed that the Limitation Act is a substantive law and after lapse of prescribed period provided under law valuable right accrues in favour of the opposite party in whose favour an order or judgment is passed and the party aggrieved has to explain delay of each and every day showing sufficient cause.
4. Apart from the above, when an identical matter came up before the Apex Court of country, it was observed in a judgment reported as Mian Muhammad Sabir v. Malik Muhammad Sadiq through Legal Heirs and others (PLD 2008 Supreme Court 577):- '5. -------------------Interestingly, the appellant in his application for condonation of delay even did not mention the date given by the copying agency to the appellant for obtaining, the certified copy of the judgment. This Court in a case reported as Fateh Muhammad and others v. Malik Qadir Bakhsh (1975 SCMR 157) has held that the time "requisite" for obtaining copy of order within the meaning of section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908, means only the interval between the date of application for supply of copy and the date when it is ready for delivery and that the time between the date on which the copy was ready for delivery, and the date on which the applicant choose to take delivery thereof is not a portion of time "requisite" for obtaining a copy. Even section 12(5) of the Limitation Act is of no help to the appellant as he failed to produce the chit/receipt issued by the copying agency showing the date for preparation of certified copy, inasmuch as, no such date has been indicated in the application for condonation of delay. Had the appellant produced a chit issued by the copying agency and the copy was not ready on the date indicated in the chit, then the appellant could have taken shelter under section 12(5) of the Limitation Act. This Court under the similar facts and circumstances of the case reported as Zulfiqar Ali v. Superintendent of police and others (2003 SCMR 1562) refused to condone the delay of nearly 50 days while in the present case the delay is of 249 days. The case of Zulfiqar Ali
(ibid) applied to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand on all fours.
6. There is another aspect of the case. The appellant applied for certified copy on 12-2-1998 and he waited for a period of nearly eight months to inquire about the copy, as he obtained the copy on 1-10-1998. The appellant after applying for the certified copy of the judgment went into a deep slumber and did not enquire from the copying agency about the fate of his application for the grant of certified copy for approximately eight months. Even if it be presumed that no chit/receipt was issued by the copying agency, the appellant was a prudent person should have acted with reasonable promptitude and diligent and should have approached the copying agency inquiring about certified copy within a reasonable time. The appellant was extremely negligent in securing the certified copy of the judgment and did not bother to inquire from the copying agency about the preparation of certified copy for nearly 8 months, which was ready for delivery on 21-2-1998.
Learned counsel for the respondents has rightly referred para-3 of the application for condonation of delay, in which he appellant stated that he visited the copying branch several times for collecting the certified copy but was told that the same has not yet been prepared.
Suffice it to say that the said assertion, on the face of it seems to be erroneous. Had the appellant visited the copying agency after 21-2-1998 he would have definitely got the certified copy as according to him it was prepared on the said date. It leads to the irresistible conclusion that the appellant never visited copying agency during the period from 21-2-1998 to 1.10.1998.' (Underline for emphasis)
5. Thus, from whichever angle this Court perceives, the petitioner has not been able to sufficiently explain the delay in filing his application under Order XXXVII, Rule 4, C.P.C. along with an application for leave to appear and contest the suit as well as application for suspension of operation of the ex parte decree dated 09.01.2013, because admittedly he gained knowledge about passing of the decree on 09.09.2015 but he filed the applications on 12.11.2015, which otherwise ought to have been filed soon after he purportedly gained knowledge as Article 159 of Limitation Act, 1908 provides period of 10 days for filing application for leave to appear and defend when the summons is served or defendant comes to know about the pendency of proceedings or passing of the decree as per precedents of the higher Courts. Indifferent and adamant demeanor of the petitioner is evident from the fact that he gained knowledge on 09.09.2015 but filed application for obtaining certified copies on 10.10.2015 i.e. after lapse of prescribed period for filing application for leave to appear and contest the suit after service or gaining knowledge, as stated above. In this view of the matter, the lethargic attitude adopted by the petitioner cannot be ignored because ignorance of law is no ground for condoning delay.
In addition to the above; it has emerged on record that application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was also filed on behalf of the petitioner, though he has negated the alleged filing of application by him but the said stance was not substantiated by him showing initiation of any proceedings allegedly taken by him against the counsel who filed the said application, before the proper forum; therefore, the plea taken up by the petitioner has rightly been disbelieved and discarded by the learned Court below.
6. The compendium of the discussion above is that there appears no illegality and irregularity alleged to have been committed by the learned Court below rather vested jurisdiction has aptly and judiciously been exercised while passing the impugned order. Resultantly, the revision petition in hand comes to naught and hence the same is hereby dismissed. No order as to the costs.