KARAM ELAHPB CHAUHAN, J.-Amin-ud-Din (hereinafter called the employee) was working as an attendant in the National Gas Power Station, Piran Ghaib, Multan, under the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (commonly known as WAPDA). His services were terminated by an order dated 11-8-1977 issued under section 17(1-A) of the West Pakistan WAPDA Act XXXI of 1958, as amended by Ordinance XVI of 1975 by giving him a notice of 30 days. However, before the expiry of the aforesaid period, the employee filed an application under section 6 of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act No. LIII of 1952 before the National Industrial Relations Commission (briefly known as NIRC) which came up before its Chairman in his capacity as the "Specified Authority", as con--templated therein on 10-9-1977, who suspended operation of the aforesaid order and in the meantime also called for a report from the Chairman of the WAPDA.
2. The petitioner/employer filed a writ petition being Writ Petition No. 3719/77 taking exception to the assumption of jurisdiction by the Chair--man, NIRC, in a case of present nature and also prayed for certain conse--quential reliefs. The precise objection of the petitioner was that the WAPDA employees in the matters of disciplinary actions and appeals, etc. Were to be deemed to be Civil Servants with the result that they had the remedy of appro--aching the relevant Services Tribunals and not the NIRC under any other law.
3. Along with that writ petition the petitioner/employer filed a miscel--laneous application being C.
M. 1 of 1977 under section 161, C. P. C., praying that the operation of the impugned stay order issued by the Chairman, NIRC be suspended till the decision of the writ petition. The matter came up before a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court who granted the stay prayed for and also called for a report/comments from the Chairman, NIRC (respon--dent No. 1 herein). After the submission and perusal of the report the stay order was later confirmed by order dated 29-11-1977, relevant portion whereof read as follows :- "In view of the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the fact, as he states, that the functioning of the WAPDA is being disrupted by erosion of its statutory authority over its employees and in view of the judgment of the learned Division Bench which still holds the field, assumption of jurisdiction by the respondent No. I is stayed and further proceedings Inter panes suspended."
The judgment to which reference was made in the above passage was the General Manager, Heavy Mechanical Complex, Taxila v. Mr. Mamoon A. Kazi, Senior Member, National Industrial Relations Commission. Islamabad and another (PLD 1977 Lab. 998) where it had been held that employees of a commercial organisa--tion involved in that case, dismissed for misconduct had a remedy of approaching the Labour Court. However, in the report submitted by the Chairman NIRC to the High Court it was pointed out that the aforesaid judgment was under appeal before the Supreme Court and that the Supreme Court according to the Chairman had taken a different view in M. U. A. Khan v. Rana M. Sultan and another (PLD 1974 SC 228) and that this fact was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge when the suspension order/stay under was obtained from him by the present petitioner.
4. It appears that in the meantime certain other employees of WAPDA (other than Aminuddin respondent No. 2 herein) whose services had similarly been terminated on one month's notice also filed independent and individual applications before the Chairman, NIRC of which he took cognizance and passed certain interim orders therein. Considering that this was violative of the order of the High Court above-mentioned the writ petitioner, namely WAPDA (hereinafter called the complainant) filed an application being Criminal Original No. 176/W/78 pleading that the Chairman, NIRC had com--mitted contempt of High Court in assuming jurisdiction, in these other cases despite the fact that (according to the complainant) the stay order issued by the High Court was of a general prohibitory nature directing the respondent not to assume jurisdiction even in other cases of that nature (though of other persons) against WAPDA. A report in the case was called for after perusal whereof a Full Bench of the High Court passed a short order on 13-1-1979 which stated that "in view of the report received, no further action is called for. This is dismissed." In that report the Chairman, NIRC had also clarified that in the case in which the stay order had been granted he had stayed the proceedings but not in cases of those other employees in which the WAPDA had neither filed any writ petition nor obtained any stay order and that qua them the proceedings in his Court continued.
5. The complainant (WAPDA) has come up in appeal against the last---mentioned order to this Court under section 70 of the Contempt of Court Act XLIV of 1976.
6. We asked the learned counsel whether section 10 was applicable to such cases where a High Court does not feel inclined to proceed in contempt against a respondent. His simple reply was that the wording of section 10 was such that it did not preclude filing of an appeal even against an order refusing to proceed in contempt against an alleged contemner. This section is headed as "Appeal and limitation for appeal"-and lays down that "(1) From an original order passed by the High Court under this Act an appeal shall lie, if the order is passed by a Single Judge, to a Division Bench, and if it is passed by a Bench of two or more Judges, to the Supreme Court. (2) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from an order passed by a Division Bench of a High Court in appeal against an order passed by a Single Judge.
(3) An appeal under subsection (1) or subsection (2) shall be filed (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench of the High Court, within thirty days; and (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against." The learned counsel did not cite any case-law in support of his contention. Anyhow, we have considered the submission of the learned counsel but we must say that we do not share his view. The matter of contempt is essentially between the Court and the contemner. If the Court concerned for reasons of its own and in the exercise of its discretion does no feel inclined to take any action or for example accepts an apology in a given case, it is not for any other Court much less an appellate Court or authority to direct the said Court that it must proceed in the matter or to reject the apology. This is on the principle that the power to punish for contempt is to be exercise only by the High Court whose contempt has been committed and not by an other Court. It was on this principle that it was held in The State v. Shaukat Ali (PLD 1976 Lab, 714) to which two of us (Muhammad Akram and Karam Elahee Chauhan. JJ.) were parties that a case of contempt could not be transferred from the maligned High Court to another High Court so as to deprive the concerned High Court from exercising its jurisdiction in the matter. When therefore section 10 talks of an "order under this Act" being appealable, in its very nature confining ourselves to the facts and the circumstances of the present case, it means an order of conviction and not an order of the kind involved be herein. At this place we may mention that we are also keeping apart case of acquittal in contempt after formal charge and trial and we reserve out views qua them for the present leaving the matter to be considered in sour more appropriate case. For the present, we are concerned merely with case of a type where the High Court has not felt inclined to move further in the matter, it has neither issued any notice, nor any rule nisi, and nor framed a charge. In this context therefore when the High Court has not felt it necessary to proceed any further it is not an order of the kind contemplate v for appeal under section 10. An indirect support for this view can be had from M. H. Khondkar and another v. The State and another (1971 SCMR 743) where the High Court had just issued a show- cause notice to a contemner against which a petition for special leave to appeal was filed. The petition was dismissed with the following observations which exist at page 746 of this report and where it was held that "this notice was issued in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction as defined and limited by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, of the High Court to take cognizance of contempt of itself. We do not think we can grant leave to appeal at this stage when only a notice has been issued, as that will be tantamount to ousting this jurisdiction of the High Court and taking upon ourselves to decide in the first instance whether a contempt of the High Court has been committed. We, therefore, refrain from going into the merits of the case. The learned Advocate appearing in support of this petition has not been able to show that there is legal bar in the circumstances of the case to the issuance of the notice. We decline to grant leave to appeal against the order. C. M. P. No. P. 1 of 1969, decided on 10th November, 1960)." This shows that for the same reasons as are contained in the above passage order of the kind 'whereby a notice is issued or notice is declined is not an appealable order because, if so held then it will tantamount as not to leave the High Court tree in this particular sphere. It is common knowledge that anonymous and pseudonymous letters invariably are received by superior Courts containing irresponsible statements which are just ignored, as the superior Courts do not in their wisdom ordinarily take notice of such communication. If, therefore, mere non-issuance of notice or consigning of such communications to record is to be made appealable the results may be preposterous, and quite against the intent of the Legislature on the subject in hand.
7. Learned counsel then argued that if there was any doubt about the maintainability of an appeal against the impugned order under section 10 of the Act, then in the alternative such an order was appealable by special leave under Article 185(3) of the Constitution and therefore leave to appeal in that respect should be granted to him. In this respect we need simply refer to a decision of this Court reported in Sree Gour Nital Shah v. Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), Bakerganj and 5 others (1970 SCMR 887) where it was observed that "it appears from the order of the High Court that the learned Judges having gone through the application for contempt were satisfied that no case for contempt was made out. When the High Court itself found that it was no a contempt, the interference of this Court is not called for." We reiterate the same principle and find no ground for interference in the order of the High Court. We are further of the view that when a stay order was issued in particular case it could not be considered to extend to or cover any other case between same or different parties howsoever similar otherwise it may have been to the case in which stay order was issued because in the very nature of its jurisdiction a High Court could issue order in a case before it and not in cases of persons about whom no writ petition had specifically or indepen--dently been instituted in that Court.
8. The result is that looked at from whatever angle the petition has no merit and is dismissed.