SHAHID WAHEED, J. The bedrock of the prayer made in this appeal is the principle which contemplates that the rules embodied in the law of contempt of Court are intended to uphold and ensure the effective administration of justice and that if the orders of the Courts are disobeyed with impunity by those who owe an obligation to the society to preserve the rule of law, not only would individual litigants suffer, the whole administration of justice would be brought into disrepute. This supplication is reminiscent of Act 2, scene 1 of William Shakespeare's drama, Measure for Measure , which opens with. Angelo stating: "we must not make a scarecrow of the law, setting it up to fear birds of prey, and let it keep one shape, till custom make it their perch and not their terror".
These lines create a wonderful emblematic expression of law, its purpose, impleme ntation, and effect. This creates a profound picture of the law as a deterrence and people as birds of prey.. What is drawn out of this picture is how Angelo views the purpose of law and human nature. If the scarecrow never moves, that is, the law is never enforced, the birds of prey (humans) will convert it into a comfortable perch and the law will no longer be a viable means by which social order is maintained. Yes, this discipline of law must be followed but at the same time it must be kept in mind that the jurisdiction to punish for contempt touches upon two important fundamental rights of the citizens, namely , the right to personal liberty and the right to freedom of expression. This is the cause, for which it is' said that contempt law should be most jealously and carefully applied and the power is to be prudently exercised with the greatest reluctance and if, after taking into account all the circumstances the Court finds contempt of Court beyond condonable limits, then strong arm of the law must be used in .the name of the public interest and public justice. Now let us examine whether respondents can be held in contempt for alleged disobedience to the Court's order .
2. This Intra Court Appeal arises from a petition brought by the appellant before the learned Singe Judge under Sections 3, 4 & 5 of the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003 read with Article 204 of the Constitution, of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 i.e. Crl.Org.No.47167-W of 2017 with twofold prayer . The first prayer was that the respondents be punished for violating the order dated 31st May, 2017 passed in W.P.No.1630 of 2015. The second prayer was to the ef fect that a direction be issued to the respondents to implement and comply with the said order .
3. The facts and circumstances which led the appellant to make the above-stated prayer through a contempt petition may briefly be stated. Land measuring 2 kanals 12 marlas situated at Chak No.439/E.B., Burewala, District Vehari, belonging to the appellant and others was taken over for construction of Stadium Road by the Municipal Committee. Burewala. On 24th June, 2013 the appellant submitted an applicati on before the District Collector , Vehari for the payment of compensation of his above stated land or allotment of alternate land in lieu thereof on the ground that Stadium Road, Burewala was constructed without his consent and without payment of compensation.
The request for alternate allotment was not acceded to, however , the District Collector , Vehari determined compensation of Rs. 75,400,000/- and through Letter No. 189- 190/NT O dated 4th January , 2014 sent the matter to the Secretary , Local Government & Comm unity Development (LG&CD) Department, Government of the Punjab for his perusal and further necessary action but on the contrary it was shelved on the office racks. This indifference to the matter caused the appellant to move this Court through W.P.No.29493 of 2014, which was disposed of vide order' dated 7th November , 2014 with a direction to the Secretary , LG & CD Department to decide the matter through a speaking order within one month. Pursuant to this order , the Secretary , LG & CD Department, on consideration of the matter , came to the conclusion that the appellant and others were not lawful owners of the land at the time when the road was constructe d and thus, they were not entitled to any compensation. On the basis of this conclusion the representation/application of the appellant was rejected vide order dated 4th December , 2014.
The appellant, feeling aggrieved, again approached this Court through a constitutio nal petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 i.e. W.P.No.1630 of 2015 that was allowed vide order dated 31st May , 2017, penultimate paragraph thereof reads as under:- "12. In the circumstances, this writ petition is allowed, and order dated 04.12.2014 passed by the Secretary Local Government and Community Developmen t/respondent No.2 is declared to be of without lawful authority , and of no legal effect. In the result, the respondents are directed to forthwith pay compensation to the petitioner in lieu of the land (2 Kanal 12 Marla falling in Khasra No.32/3, situated in Chak No.439/E.D. Burewala District Vehari) illegally taken over for construction of a road."
This is the order that according to the appellant, was violated by the respondents and thus, they were liable to be prosecuted and punished under the Contempt Law .
4. Although for the disposal of instant appeal the narration of facts leading up to the order dated 31st May, 2017 is sufficient, we still consider that the events following the said order should also be mentioned so that there is no confusion. On 20th June, 2017 the appellant moved an application before the Secretary , LG & CD Department for payment of compensation of Rs. 75,400,000/-. This application was not responded and thus, on 30th June, 2017 the appellant brought a contempt petitio n, that is, Crl.Org.No.47167-W of 2017 , giving rise to present appeal, against the respondents for having violated the order dated 31st May, 2017. It appears that the Secretary , LG .& CD Department after having received notices of the contempt petition challenged the order dated 31st May, 2017 through an Intra Court Appeal bearing No. 64805 of 2017, which was dismissed in limine vide order dated 13th November , 2017. The respondents thereupon filed a petition for leave to appeal (C.P. No.67-L of 2018), which came up for hearing before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan on 27th February , 2018 and the following order was passed:- "States that he has no objection' with regard to the payment of compensation as admittedly the property in question belongs to the respondents No. 1 to 4 (respondents), which has been acquired by the petitioner or any other agency and usufruct of such property as a road without the compensation undoubtedly is against the fundamental right under Article 23 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan However , the learned Courts below have granted exorbitant compensation without enabling the petitioner to prove that the amount is unreasonably on the higher side and even without recording tentative evidence to assess the correct market value thereof The petitioner is prepared to pay the compensation provided that the same is determined fairly and according to the market value of the land acquired. Issue notice to the respondents Subject to deposit of Rs. 10,000,000/- (Rupees ten million) within one month with the Trial Court, the operation of impugned judgment is suspended. However ,if the deposit is not made, this injunctive order shall be deemed to have been withdrawn.' '
In compliance with the said order the amount of Rs. 10,000,000/-, through Pay Order No. 567977 dated 26th March, 2018 drawn at Bank of Punjab, Burewala were tendered before the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of this Court who vide Challan No. 159755 dated 27th March, 2018 deposited the same in the MCB Bank, Lahore. In the meantime the Municipal Committee, Burewala vide Jetter No. 149- 51/MCB dated 27th January , 2018 requested the District Price Assessment Committee, Vehari to determine the sale price of the land. The District Price Assessment Committee accordingly in its meeting held on 10th March, 2018 determined the rate of Rs. 4,000/- per marla as sale price of the land. It appears that the said determination of compensation was presented before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.P .No.67-L of 2018 on 4th April, 2018 when following order was passed:- "Learned counsel for the petitioner state s that the amount directed to be deposited by it vide our order dated 27.02.201P has been so deposited; however , learned counsel for that respondents has relied upon a notification issued by the Deputy Commissioner under the Stamp Act, 1899, to establish that the price of the property in question is Rs.50 lacs per marla. The learned counsel for the petitioner wants time to examine the said document and also to place on the record as to what is the true market value of the property at the time when it was taken over by the petitioner . With regard to the deposit of Rs. 1 crore by the petitioner , the respondents shall be entitled to withdraw such amount subject to furnishing a solemn surety ."
Pursuant to the said order the appellant alongwith other co-owners withdrew Rs. 10,000,000/- from the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of this Court after furnishing solemn surety . Subsequently , on consideration of the matter , the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed C.P. No. 67-L of 2018 through order dated 18th September , 2018, which reads as under:- "Admittedly the property in question belongs to the respondents, which was never acquired by the Government or the Municipal Committee Burewala. Obviously in such circumstances, whatever compensation had been determined and awarded to the respondent is appropriate and valid in law Therefore, we do not find any merit in this petition which is accordingly dismissed."
5. It is an admitted fact that as long as the proceedings in the Hon'ble Supreme Court continued, the proceedings in the contempt petition i.e. Crl.Org.No.47167-W of 2017 also continued. Consequent upon the dismissal of C.P.No.67-L of 2018 the appellant appea red before the learned Single Judge in Crl.Org.No.47167-W of 2017 and contended that as per mandate/tenor of order dated 31st May, 2017 passed in W.P.No.1630 of 2015, it was clear and unambiguous that the respondents were bound to pay due compensation to the appellant in lieu of his property . After taking into account the above-stated facts and circumstances of the case, learned Single Judge held that through order dated 31st May, 2017 passed in. W.P.No.1630 of 2015, the quantum of compensation payable to the appellant was not, determined, hence , contempt petition was not maintainable . Accordingly , contempt petition i.e. Criminal Original No.47167-W of 2017 was dismissed vide order dated 10th June, 2019. So, this appeal.
6. Impeaching the order dated 10th June, 2019 passed by the learned Single Judge in Criminal Original No.47167- W of 2017 the-appellant's counsel says that, by order dated 31st May, 2017 issued in W.P.No.1630 of 2015, order dated 4th December , 2014 of the Secretary , LG & CD Department, Government of the Punjab was set -aside and consequently , order , dated 4th February , 2014 of the District Collector , Vehari assessing compensation payable to the appellant i.e. Rs. 75,400,000/- stood revived and thus, there was no question whatsoever for re-determining the compensation by the District Price Asses sment Committee, which was illegally constituted with mala fide intent so as to frustrate the ef fect of order dated 31st May , 2017.
7. The argument canvassed at the Bar suggests that though in the order dated 31st May, 2017 passed in W.P.No.1630 of 2015 the quantum of compensation was not determined yet the implication of the said order was that the respondents were to pay that compensation which was determined by the District Collector , Vehari This brings us to the consideration of the question whether the respondents could be held in contempt for disobeying or violating the order which was inferential, deductive and implied. To see what principles we can use to find the answer to this question, it is essential that we review the case-law wherein such type of question was arisen.
8. In P.A. Thomas & Co.'s case the plaintif fs, a company specializing in the field of finance, brought an action claiming that during the course of their employment with the plaintif fs, the defendants had learnt the "know-how" of four alleged novel financial schemes which were the brain child of the plaintif fs. An interim injunction was granted in the terms asked for by the plaintif fs restraining the defendants from disclosing, divulging, or making use of any confidential information acquired by them during their employment by the plaintif fs relating to (a) schemes for the sale of income, (b) scheme providing for splitting an endowment; (c) scheme concerned with death in service. In preparing their defence to the allegation that the material which the defendants were using was confidential the defendants, after the injunction was granted, wrote to the firms competing with the plaintif fs, in an endeavour to discover whether the plaintif fs' schemes were novel and therefore confidential; these letters, so it was alleged, disclosed confidential material. On motion to commit the defendants for breach of the interim injunction the plaintif fs contended that the proper inference was that the defendants, in communicating their understanding of the plaintif fs' scheme, must have appreciated that they were at risk of disclosing confidential information in breach of the injunction. The plaintif fs lost their action on the ground that when enforcement of an injunction to protect confidential "know-how" was sought, it was essential to make clear what it was that was to be protected.
9. In Muhammad Abu Zafar's case , challenge was thrown to the order whereby services of the employee were terminated. The Court while setting aside the order terminating the services issued a direction that the employee should be treated as continuing in service and being entitled to the rights, benefits and privileges. Subsequently , this employee brought a petition for contempt proceedings with the contention that the employer did not pay arrears of his salary and deliberately flouted the order. Having regard to the order made in the writ petition, it was held that it could not be said that a mandamus of an absolute nature was issued as regards salary of the employee and thus, request to take action against the respondents for contempt of Court was refused.
10. In Qadeer Ahmad's case , the services of the employee were terminated by the Company . This order was set aside by the Court. It was, however , clarif ied that employer was not precluded from taking, fresh action against the employee in accordance with law. The employer instead of reinstating the employee issued him an inquiry notice.
The employee brought an application before the Court with the prayer that employer be directed to reinstate him with back benefits and also to initiate, proceedings against the employer under the Contempt of Court Act for deliberately avoiding compliance of the order . It was held that in order to make out a case for contempt it was necessary to establish n specific direction and its breach by the party; since no express order was passed for payment of back benefits, no breach would be said to have taken place for which the employer could be held in contempt. It was further held that proceedings for contempt could not be taken where the violation related to an order which was inferential, deductive, implied and which was open to debate and arguments.
11. In the case of R v. City of London Magistrates' Court , officers of the Serious Fraud Office (the SFO) on 6th December raided the applicant's offices to execute a search warrant in relation to an investigation, concerning another individual. Six computers were seized and subsequently , sent to a Company for the information covered by the warrant to be downloaded. While the search was still proceeding, the applicant obtained an ex-parte injunction which provided that no further downloading should take place and that any computers which had already been downloaded should be returned by 11 a.m. on 9th December . The officers conducting the search were duly notified at around 5:30 p.m. and a fax was sent to the Company instructing them to cease all work on the remaining computer equipment. However , the process of transferring information, which was completed at around midnight, was by that time taking place automatically and the fax was not seen until the morning of 9th December , when the director of the SFO also learned of the injunction for the first time. On 10th Decem ber the applicant was granted a further interim order providing for the return of the computers once the downloading was complete. The applicant applied to commit the director and other officers of the SFO to prison for contempt of court for failing to comply with the orders contending, inter alia, that the downloading process had been completed by midnight on 6th December once the information had been transferre d. The respondents contended that they were not in breach of the order because the process of downloading included not only the imaging process but also the writing of the image to disc for the purposes of securing it. It was held that the respondents were not guilty of contempt, since the orders had1 2 3 4 not been directed to them either collectively or individually , their terms were ambiguous both as to what was to be done and by whom, and they had not been served on them personally .
12. A close look at the above cited case-law is enough to deduct a principle that before a person may be held in contempt for disobeying Court's order , the order must spell out the details of compliance in clear , specific, and in an unambiguous terms so that such person will readily know exactly what duties or obligations are imposed upon him.
Indefiniteness and uncertainty in a judgment/order or where prima facie two views are possible to be drawn and unless it is specifically held that the party not only was bound by the terms issued in the judgment/order but also had defied the direction willfully and deliberately such party cannot be punished for contempt. In other words punishment for contempt can only rest on a clear , intentional violation of a specific, narrowly drawn order; specificity is essential pre-requisite of a contempt proceedings.
13. Applying the above stated principles to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen as to what kind of direction was given to the respondents for compliance in the order dated 31st May, 2017 passed in W.P.No.1630 of 2015.
According to the appellant, implication of the said order was that the respondents were bound to pay compensation to the appellant at the rate which was determined by the District Collector . Clarifyin g this plea it was submitted that the moment order dated 4th December , 2014 issued by the Secretary , LG & CD Department, Government of the Punjab was set aside by this Court, order dated 4th February , 2014 of the District Collector was automatically revived, wherein the appellant and others were held entitled to get compensation of Rs. 75,400,000/-. On the other hand, the Chief Officer, Municipal Commi ttee, Burewala in his compliance report furnished in Crl.Org.No.47167-W of 2017, stated that since the compensation determined by the District Price Assessment Committee was approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan through order dated 18th September , 2018 passed in C.P.No.67-L of 2018 the appellant was not entitled to get compensation which was fixed by the District Collector . There was yet another interpretation which was made by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order and that was that through order dated 31st May, 2017 no compensation was determined by this Court and thus, the contempt petition was not maintainable. Conjoint reading of the said three interpretations made us to conclude that there was a lurking ambiguity in the order dated 31st May, 2017 as it was open to debate and arguments. It was not specific with, regard to quantum of compensation to be payable by the respondents to the present appellant. Merely on the basis of inferences the proceedings in contempt could not be initiated and thus, the order dated 10th June, 2019 passed by the learned Single Judge in Crl.Org.No.47167-W of 2017 warrants no interference.
14. Apart from the reason stated above, there are two other grounds, which we consider sufficient to hold that there should be no contempt of court proceedings in this case. Firstly , it is now well settled that the contempt is a matter between the Court and the alleged contemnor . No one can compel or demand as of right initiation of proceedings for contempt. A jurisdiction in contempt is exercised on a clear case having been made out. It is not personal glorification of a Judge in his office but an anxiety to maintain the efficacy of administration of justice which dictates the conscience of a Judge to move or not to move in contempt jurisdiction. A litigant may invite the attention of the Court to such facts that may persuade the Court in initiating proceedings for contempt. However , such person filing an application or petition before the Court does not become a complainant or petitioner in the proceedings. He is just an informer or relator . His duty ends with the facts being brought to the notice of the Court. It is thereafter for the Court to act on such information or not to act though the litigant moving the Court may at the discretion of the Court continue to render its assistance during the course of proceedings . In the present case, incidentally the learned Single Judge who passed the order dated 31st May, 2017, in W.P.No.1630 of 2015, had the occasion to examine the said order in contempt petition (Criminal Original No. 47167-W of 2017) brought by the appellant and held that no case for contempt was made out. Taking cue from Sree Gour Nitai Saha's case and Wapda's case we are of the view that when the learned Single Judge himself found that it was not a contempt, the interference at the appellate stage is not called for. Secondly , like any other organ of the State the judiciary is also manned by human beings, but the function of the judiciary is distinctly different from other organs of the State, in the sense its function is divine. Forgiveness is one of the attributes of Almighty Allah. Thus, even if it is assumed that the Court order was disobeyed, which is not, our inclination would still be towards mercy and we would exercising divine5 6 7 attribute forgive the respondents because, in our opinion, record does not suggest that they had any intention to do so and it was an act under some misunderstanding
15. It is now fully settled that no contempt proceedings could be founded on the order dated 31st May, 2017 passed in W.P.No.1630 of 2015, so let us now see if this Court can use the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003 for the implementation or execution of said order or in other words grant the second prayer made in the contempt petition. We do not think such an order can be made in the proceedings under the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003 or Article 204 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 for that while exercising jurisdiction under contempt law the Court can either find the person proceeded against guilty or discharge him and nothing else. And the other reason for declining the second prayer is that the process of contempt cannot be invoked in aid of a remedy where some other method of achieving desired-result, is available . In other words when an order passed by this Court in the exercise of extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction is not complied with the person aggrieved may apply to this Court for further directions when there can be a bona fide dispute as to what is the effect of the order . On consideration of such application the Court may after determining the effect of its order give further directions for its enforcement; it would be like a Court executing a decree .
16. In these circumstances, we see no ground for finding any of the responden ts in contempt of Court and to interfere with the impugned order . The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. P. A. Thomas & Co. and others v . Mould, and others [1968] 1 All E.R. 963 Muhammad Abu Zafar v. Secretary to Government of West Pakistan, Agriculture-Department and others (1969 SCMR 298 ) Qadeer Ahmad v . Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and another ( PLD 1990 SC 787 ) R v City of London Magistrates' Court and another , ex parte Green Green v Staples and others [1997] 3 All E.R.
551 Shahid Orakzai v. Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Group) and 8 others 2000 SCMR 1969 , Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D. K. Mittal an4 another (AIR 2000 Supreme Court 1136), Syed Masood Alam Rizvi and others v. Dr. Muhammad Saeed (2009 SCMR 477), Khalid Rashid v. Kamran Lashari, Chairman, C.D.A., Islamabad and others (2010 SCMR 594) & Muhammad Shehzad Malik v . Muhammad Suhail and another ( 2010 SCMR 1825 ) Sree Gour Nitai Saha v . Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), Bakerganj and 5 others (1)70 SCMR 8S7) West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority through its Chairman v. Chairman, National Industrial Relations' Commission (PLD 1979 Supreme Court 912) Shah Alam Khan v. Vice-Chancellor , Agriculture University , Peshawar (PLD 1993 SC 297) & Rafique Ahmad Awan v . Additional District Judge, Sialkot and another ( PLD 2016 Lahore 282 ) Adam Phones Ltd v Goldschmidt and others [1999] 4 All ER 486 Mehdi Hassan, Additional Secretary , Food and Forests Department, Government of West Pakistan and another v. Zulfiqar Ali, Conservator of Forests, Development Circle, Lahore (PLD 1960 Lahore 751) and Dr. Nazeer Saeed v. Muhammad Javed ( PLD 2014 Lahore 660 )