MIAN MUHAMMAD AJMAL, J.--Through the instant petition under Article 204 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the applicant, a Senior Advocate, has sought for initiating contempt proceedings under Article 204 of the Constitution read with the Contempt of Court Act, 1976 against Mr. M. Sardar Khan, Advocate-General, N.-W.F.P. On the allegations that he (Advocate- General) while arguing Writ Petition No,968 of 1996 on behalf of the respondent, offered in the open Court and within the hearing of the Honourable Judges of the Division Bench comprising of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Tariq Parvez, J. And in presence of lawyers and general litigants, a sum of Rs,30,000 as an inducement/bribe to him (counsel for the petitioner) as quid pro quo for withdrawal of the writ petition. He as such attempted to interfere with awl obstructed the process of the Court and scandalized it, thereby committed the grossest contempt of Court.
2. We have heard the learned counsel (applicant) at quite some length.
3. It is necessary to give brief background which gave rise to the filing of the present application.
The applicant filed a Writ Petition No,968 of 1996 captioned as Meena Gabeena Baachaa v. The Principal Jinnah College for Women University of Peshawar and three others on 28-8-1996, alleging that her daughter, the writ petitioner secured 64th position in the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Peshawar's Secondary School Certificate Examination (Science Group) held in 1996. She applied for admission to F.S.C.(Pre-medical) but she was refused the same on merits; whereafter she was constrained to get admission on self-finance basis on payment of Rs,30,000 (under protest) besides payment of usual admission fee and other charges. The petitioner prayed for the issuance of writ of Mandamus commanding the respondents to refrain from violating the fundamental rights of the petitioner, to treat her equal before law and ensure equal protection of law and convert her admission from self finance basis to that of on merit basis. This writ petition came up for final hearing before the learned Bench comprising of Hon'ble the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Tariq Parvez Khan, J. On 14-1-1999 and after hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, the judgment was reserved, which was announced on 2-2-1999 dismissing the writ petition holding that it was devoid of any force.
4. It is pertinent to point out that during the pendency of the writ petition, the applicant had moved miscellaneous applications including the one (Cr.M. No,1114/97) for initiating the contempt proceedings against the Principal, Jinnah College for Women and its Head Clerk, which applications were also dismissed by the main order.
5. The learned Bench in its judgment dated 2-2-1999 has not said even a word about the offer of Rs,30,000 by the learned Advocate-General to the applicant, which was thus not deemed to be a matter of Contempt of Court by the learned Bench but treated it a matter purely between the two learned Advocates appearing against each other. The question is whether the respondent has committed any contempt of Court Article 204 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and section 3 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1976 provide the definition of the expression 'Contempt of Court' as under:-- "Article 204.. Contempt of Court.--(1) In this Article, "Court" means the Supreme Court or a High Court.
(2) A Court shall have power to punish any person who,---
(a) abuses, interferes with or obstructs the process of the Court in any way or disobey any order of the Court;
(b) scandalizes the Court or otherwise does anything which tends to bring the Court or a Judge of the Court into hatred, ridicule or contempt;
(c) Does anything which tends to prejudice the determination of a matter pending before the Court; or
(d) does any other thing which, by law, constitutes contempt of the Court.
(3) The exercise of the power conferred on a Court by this Article may be regulated by law and, subject to law, by rules made by the Court."
Section 3. Contempt of Court.--Whoever disobeys or disregards any order, direction or process of a Court, which he is legally bound to obey; or commits wilful breach of a valid undertaking given to a Court; or does anything which is intended to or tends to bring the Authority of a Court or the administration of law into disrespect or to disrepute, or to interfere with or obstruct or interrupt or prejudice the process of law or the due course of any judicial proceedings, or to lower the authority of a Court or scandalize a Judge in relation to his office, or to disturb the order of decorum of a Court, is said to commit 'Contempt of Court': ' Provided that the following shall not amount to commission of contempt of Court:-
(i) fair comments about the general working of Courts made in good faith in the public interest and in temperate language;
(ii) fair comments on the merits of a decision of a Court made, after the pendency of the proceedings in a case, in good faith and in temperate language without impugning the integrity or impartiality of the Judge;
(iii) subject to a prohibition of publication under section 9 or under any other law for the time being in force, the publication of a fair and substantially accurate report of any judicial proceedings;
(iv) the publication of any matter, amounting to a contempt of Court by reason of its being published during the pendency of some judicial proceedings, by a person who had no reasonable ground for believing that such judicial proceedings were pending at the time of the publication of the matter;
(v) the distribution of a publication, containing matter amounting to contempt of Court by a person who had no reasonable ground for believing that the publication contained, or was likely to contain, any such matter;
(vi) a true averment made in good faith and in temperate language for initiation of action nor in the course of disciplinary proceedings against a Judge, before the Chief Justice of a High Court, the Chief Justice of Pakistan, the Supreme Judicial Council, the Federal Government or a Provincial Government.
(vii) a plea of truth taken up as a defence in terms of clause (vi) in proceedings for contempt of Court arising from an earlier averment unless it is mendaciously false;
(viii) relevant observations made in a judicial capacity, such as, those by a higher Court on an appeal or revision or application for transfer of a case, or by a Court in judicial proceedings against a Judge.
(ix) remarks made in an administrative capacity by any authority in the course of official business, including those in connection with a disciplinary inquiry or in an inspection note or a character roll or confidential report; and
(x) a true statement made in good faith respecting the conduct of a Judge in a matter not connected with the performance of his judicial functions."
According to the above definition, the offence of contempt of Court may be committed in the following manner:--
(1) Disobeying or disregarding any order, direction or process of a Court which one is legally bound to obey.
(2) Committing a wilful breach of a valid undertaking given to a Court.
(3) Doing anything which is intended to or tends to, bring the authority of a Court or the administration of law into disrespect or disrepute.
(4) Interfering with or obstructing or intercepting or prejudicing the process of law or the due course of any judicial proceeding.
(5) Lowering the authority of a Court.
(6) Scandalizing a Judge in relation to his office.
(7) Disturbing the order of decorum of a Court.
' The alleged offence of contempt of Court by offering money by the respondent to the applicant in the circumstances do not fall in any of the categories mentioned above. It has been alleged that by such an act of the respondent the proceedings/administration of justice were interfered with but the record of the Writ Petition No,968 of 1996 does not support such allegations as it does not reflect anything to this effect and it appears that the learned Bench did not deem it offending for the reason that it did not tend to lower the authority of the Court or to scandalize the learned Bench with regard to its dispensation of justice. The intention of the respondent has also to be seen whether the offer was made with any mens rea or it was made in a lighter mood. Since the learned Bench before whom the incident took place has not observed anything or taken notice thereof in their judgment regarding any interference or obstruction or interruption to prejudice the process of law or judicial proceedings, therefore, the alleged offer does not seem to be designed with mala fides to constitute an offence amounting to contempt of Court. The matter of contempt is essentially between the Court and the contemner as held in case of WAPDA v. Chairman, N.I.R.C.
Reported in PLD 1979 SC 912 as follows:-- "The matter of contempt is essentially between the Court and the contemner. If the Court concerned for reasons of its own and in the exercise of its discretion does not feel inclined to take any action or for example accepts an apology in a given case, it is not for any other Court much less an appellate Court or authority to direct the said Court that it must proceed in the matter or to reject the apology."
' In another authority of Privy Council AIR 1945 Privy Council 134, it has been held as under:-- "But apart from the question of whether the motion was wise or expedient, it has to be decided whether these words could be properly regarded as a contempt of Court. The principle to be applied is clear enough. For words or action used in face of the Court, or in the course of proceedings, for they may be used outside the Court, to be a contempt, they must be such as would interfere or tend to interfere with the course of justice. No further definition can be attempted. It must be rare indeed for words used in the course of argument, however, irrelevant, to amount to a contempt when they relate to an opponent, whether counsel or litigant."
Consequently this application for initiating contempt proceedings I against the Advocate-General is dismissed.