' MUHAMMAD BASHIR JEHANgIRI, J.--This appeal by leave of this Court is directed against the order dated 6-10-1994, passed by the High Court of Balochistan dismissing a revision petition filed by the complainant-appellant against the judgment passed by an Additional Sessions Judge dated 26- 6-1994 whereby the amount of surety bonds executed by respondents 1 to 4 in the sum of Rs,200,000 each, was reduced to Rs,50,000 each.
2. Facts of the case in brief are that Malik Amir Jan, Asad Khan, Muhammad Azeem and Dost Muhammad, respondents herein, stood sureties for Mirza Khan, Essa Khan, Naseebullah and Abdul Rauf who were accused of offences under sections 302, 324, 148 read with sections 149 and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code and executed bail bonds in the sum of Rs,2,00,000 each, The said accused, however, jumped the bail and absconded after committing twin murders. Each one of the sureties informed the trial Court about the abscondence of the accused and prayed "for passing a lenient order" forfeiting their amount of bond up to 25% of the entire amount. Ultimately, the learned Additional Sessions Judge forfeited an amount of Rs,50,000 out of each bond. The learned Additional Sessions Judge while conceding to the arguments raised on behalf of the respondents observed that "the petitioners have not stood sureties for the accused persons for any monetary benefit or any other gain and that in such a case the contentions of the respondents for furnishing security on humanitarian basis could not be ruled out; that the same is to be accepted as admittedly the second occurrence has taken place outside the Court premises was the reason of disappearance of the accused persons before this Court and the production of accused seemed to be not possible for the sureties". The learned trial Judge placed reliance on the dictum of this Court in Criminal Appeal No,252 of 1992 wherein this Court had reduced the forfeited amount from Rs,2,50,000 to Rs,50,000 each.
3. The complainant-appellant feeling aggrieved filed a revision petition before the High Court for forfeiture of entire amount of bonds. This revision was, however, dismissed by the learned Judge in Chambers of the High Court holding that 'the lower Court has exercised the discretion properly under section 514, Cr.P.C., as such, no interference was called for".
4. Leave to appeal was granted to consider--
(1) whether the forfeiture of the bonds executed by the respondents to the extent of 25% was in accordance with law; and
(2) whether this Court should re-examine the question as to how the respondents, in the circumstances of the case, would have been extended leniency.
5. Mr M. Zafar, learned Advocate Supreme Court, appearing for the complainant-appellant reiterated his contentions before us which he had raised before the High Court saying that the accused who were charged with murder yet committed twin murders of two real brothers, namely, Shadi Khan and Muhammad Afzal, therefore, the sureties were not entitled to any leniency in the matter of forfeiture of the amount of bail bonds.
6. On the contrary, Mr Riaz Ahmad, Advocate-on-Record for the respondents and Ch. Ejaz Yousaf, Additional Advocate-general, besides fully supporting the impugned order, had questioned the maintainability of the petition by the complainant-appellant urging that the complainant- appellant had no locus standi to challenge the propriety of the impugned order.
7. In Criminal Appeal No,252 of 1992 (Haji Mano Jan v. The State) decided on 23-11-1993, this Court had undoubtedly reduced the forfeiture of the amount of Rs,2,50,000 to Rs,50,000. The operative part of the order, however, reads as under: "After hearing the learned counsel and taking into account all the circumstances we find that the bonds of the appellants have rightly been forfeited but at the same time we consider that the full amount of the bonds need not have been required from them and that their default will be punished adequately by requiring each of them to pay a sum of Rs,50,000 (instead of Rs,2,50,000).
The appeal is allowed to the above extent. The bonds will be forfeited to the extent of Rs,50,000 each."
8. It would be seen from the perusal of the above paragraph of the judgment that no factual background of and reasoning for the reduction in the forfeited amount is discernible. This precedent is, therefore, inapt and is not attracted to the case in hand. The reliance placed by the learned trial Court on this precedent was absolutely unwarranted.
9. The learned trial Court had conceded to the plea raised on behalf of the respondents 1 to 4 on the oft-quoted grounds, firstly, that 'Nothing has been brought on the record by prosecution that the petitioners stood sureties for accused persons for any monetary benefit or any other gain', and secondly, that 'admittedly the second occurrence (had) taken place outside the Court premises was the reason of disappearance of the accused persons before this Court and now the production of the accused persons seems to be not possible for the sureties'.
10. Now on this hypothesis reduction of the amount of bail bonds, to say the least, is entirely misconceived and not warranted by any law. The first ground that weighed with the trial Court in reducing the amount has become almost irrelevant. It was relied during the days when 'touts' used to procure sureties for the accused for monetary gain for themselves as well as for the sureties.
This trend at least in murder cases in these days is not the practice but may be an exception. In so far as second ground is concerned, it should have operated against the reduction of the amount rather than favouring the sureties. This leniency would tantamount to putting a premium on killings and murders in order to secure reduction in the amount of bail bonds.
11. The learned Single Judge while upholding the reduction in forfeited amount of surety bonds has ignored to place reliance on a reported judgment of this Court in the case of Mamroz Khan v. The State (1990 SCM R 1313). In the precedent case, the petitioner herein stood surety on behalf of the accused who disappeared after his release from custody on bail and executed a bond for Rs,50,000. The trial Court forfeited the entire amount of bail. The revision petition filed in the High Court against this order was dismissed. The petitioner-surety challenged this order before this Court but without any success. The ratio dicidendi propounded in the case of Jamroz Khan (supra) was: "We are of the opinion that Mushtaq Ahmad is admittedly charged for the offence of murder and it was the duty of the surety to have procured the attendance of Mushtaq accused and thus no ground appears for us to show any leniency in the reduction of the forfeiture of bail bond of the full amount, furnished by the petitioner. Thus, finding no force in this petition and it is accordingly dismissed."
12. Nevertheless, the operative part of the impugned order which is very short is to the following effect:-- "I have heard the learned counsel for parties and also gone through the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Coirt, as well as the impugned order.
' On careful perusal whereof, I am of the considered opinion that the lower Court has exercised the jurisdiction properly under section - 514, Cr. P.C. As such, no interference is called for, thus\ the petition is dismissed".
13. It would thus be noticed that the learned Single Judge has also been unable to furnish any justification for maintaining the reduction of forfeited amount to the extent of the 25% bail bonds.
14. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the answering respondents had invited our attention to an old authority of this Court in Dildar and another v. The State (PLD 1963 SC 47) in support of the proposition that a person who does not stand surety for monetary consideration and that if it is his sheer benevolence then he ought to be dealt with leniently.. We have already distinguished the ratio in Dildar's case in a recent authority of a Full Bench of this Court in Sher Ahmad Khan v. The State (1996 SCM R 244) authored by one of us (M. Bashir Jehangiri, J.). In this context, it would be appropriate to quote the reasoning in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the judgment in Sher Ahmad Khan's case. It reads: "4 doubt the sureties in the case of Dildar supra stood sureties out of what has been described as 'fellow-feeling' because they did not belong to the province of residence of accused Amir Jan and, therefore, they did not know his antecedents. Again Amir Jan was stated to have died in Multan and had remained untraceable. On these considerations a lenient view was taken by this Court in Dildar's case.
5. In the instant case the petitioner is the Lambardar of the village to which Suleman accused belonged. He would be presumed to have had the knowledge of the credentials of Suleman accused. He was so dare devil that soon after his release on bail, he committed the murder (perhaps of his rivals) and had become fugitive from law. The case before us is thus clearly distinguishable from that of Dildar's case."
15. In another recent judgment a Division Bench of this Court authored by one of us (Saiduzzaman Siddiqui, J.) had the occasion to examine further reduction of Rs,7,000 which had been reduced by the High Court from Rs,10,000 and after taking into consideration mere abscondence of the accused in a case under Arms Ordinance, 1965, declined to show further leniency. In the instant case, the accused have absconded after committing double murder of the two real brothers in front of the premises of the trial Court and then absconded.
16. Again, the discretion in reduction of the amount of the bail bonds to the extent of 1/4th or 1/5th is being taken in routine, although the power of determining the extent to which the penalty should be exacted should be reasonably exercised. In the context of deteriorating law and order situation prevalent in the country, the Courts should be conscious of the hazards of release of accused persons who are dare devils like those in the present case to the knowledge of the sureties and then let them off at their own behest on 'forfeiture of mere 25% of the amount of bond To our surprise, the learned Advocate-general who represented the interest of the State has also not looked into the background of the case in its proper perspective and had supported the impugned orders of the Court also in routine exhibiting dismaying in difference.
17. We have decided to refrain from addressing ourselves to the objection that the instant matter was between the State and sureties and that, therefore, the complainant-appellant was devoid of any locus standi. We have left it to another appropriate juncture to examine it in the context of dispensation of criminal justice under Islamic Jurisprudence. Suffice it to say at the moment that the powers of this Court are unfettered in correcting any legal infirmities committed by the Courts on mere technicalities.
18. In the circumstances, the impugned order of the. Learned trial Court duly affirmed by the learned Single Judge in revision suffers from serious legal infirmity and cannot be sustained. We would accordingly accept this appeal, set aside the order of the learned trial Court and that of the learned Judge in Chambers of the High Court and order the forfeiture of the entire amount of bail bonds executed by the answering respondents.
(Sd.)
' MUHAMMAD BASHIR JEHANGIRI, J.
19. SAIDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.--I have gone through the judgment proposed to be delivered in the above appeal by my learned brother Muhammad Bashir Jehangiri, J. And regret to say that I am unable to agree with the reasoning and conclusions of my learned brother.
20. I need not state here again the facts of the case which are set out in detail in the opinion of my learned brother. The principles governing the exercise of discretion by the Court while ordering forfeiture of the amount of bond under section 514, Cr.P.C. Were stated in the case of 'Dildar v. The State' (PLD 1963 SC 47) by a three-member learned Bench of this Court, in the opinion of Cornelius, C.J. (as his Lordship then was) as follows:-- "Sureties are not constituted as custodians of accused persons, and in the absence of proof to the contrary, it may generally be assumed that they do not gain by standing surety. The system of releasing accused persons on bail has several aspects of importance to the administration of justice generally. It avoids anything in the nature of punishment in advance, since restraint upon liberty even when applied for the purpose of ensuring that a case is duly enquired into and judged, necessarily involves loss of personal rights. At the same time, the release of accused persons on bail assists in the administration of justice by preventing over-crowding in the available spaces of imprisonment. Therefore, in dealing with cases of sureties who are in default, a balance has to be held between undue leniency, which might lead to abuse of the procedure and interference with the course of justice in a large number of cases, and on the other hand, undue severity, which might lead to unwillingness on the part of neighbours and friends to come forward and give bail for persons under accusation. Finally, in assessing to what extent the bond should be forfeited, the Court would have regard to such matters as whether the sureties have any direct interest through financial or blood connection with the accused, whether they have connived at or procured the absence of the accused, and whether they have done their best to secure his attendance."
21. The above-stated principles have been consistently followed by all Courts in Pakistan including this Court. In the case of Latif Hussain v. The State (NLR 1979 Criminals SC 954) Dr. Nasim Hasan Shah, J. (as his lordship then was) while sitting with Muhammad Akram, J. Observed as follows: "This is a petition for special leave from the order. In this Court also the petitioners were allowed time for one month to secure the attendance of Ashraf accused. It is now admitted before us on behalf of the State that according to the A.S.I. Of Police Station gojra, Ashraf accused had since been arrested with the help of the petitioners. In fact ever since he alongwith the other accused had been sentenced to death. In these circumstances, relying on Dildar and another v. The State (PLD 1963 SC 47) we are inclined to take a lenient view in favour of the petitioners. They have at long last been instrumental in the apprehension of Ashraf accused who had since been brought to the book. We, therefore, convert this petition into an appeal and partly accept the same reducing the amount of forfeiture of the sureties to Rs,1,000 each from the petitioners."
22. In Muhammad Sharif v. The State (1990 SCM R 1300) a learned Bench of this Court consisting of S. Usman Ali Shah and Abdul Qadeer Chaudhry, JJ. Made the following observations:-- "The accused in a co-villager of the petitioner and on account of his intimacy, the petitioner stood surety for the accused. There was no other consideration. As the accused has been arrested with the efforts of the petitioner, this petition is converted into appeal. The amount of penalty is reduced to Rs,5,000. With this modification in the judgment of the High Court, this appeal is allowed."
23. In Muhammad Rashid and 2 others v. The State (1990 SCM R 227), another learned Bench of this Court consisting of Muhammad Afzal Zullah (as his lordship then was) and Usman Ali Shah, JJ.
Made these observations:- "He, next relying on the case of Dildar and another v. The State (PLD 1963 Supreme Court 47), contended that the petitioners deserve leniency. The learned Judge in the High Court gave some benefit to the petitioners by reducing the amount from Rs,50,000 each to Rs,40,000 each. Beyond that the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners is of no help to them.
Leave to appeal, accordingly is refused."
24. In the case of Muhammad Hussain and another v. State (PLD 1995 SC 348) while sitting with Raja Afrasiab Khan, J., I had the occasion to examine the contention of petitioner in that for reduction of the forfeited amount of bond in view of the law laid down in Dildar,s case but the contention was repelled as follows:-- "The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, which is common in both the cases, is that as the petitioners had not derived any monetary benefit by standing sureties in the cases, the trial Court should have taken a lenient view and should not have forfeited the entire amount of the bonds. Reliance in this connection has been placed by the learned counsel on the case Dildar and another v. The State PLD 1963 SC 47. It is true that in the above-cited case, this Court observed that the trial Court before forfeiting the bond had not made efforts to enquire into the relevant matter and, therefore, this Court after examining the facts of the case reduced the amount of forfeiture of bond from Rs,5,000 to Rs,1,000. However, no hard and fast rule in this regard could be laid down as the forfeiture of bond in each case would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In the present case, the trial Court has ordered forfeiture of the entire amounts of surety bonds in both the cases. However, the High Court in revision substantially reduced the amounts by exercising discretion. No infirmity appears in the orders of the High Court so as to call for any further interference by this Court. There is no merit in these petitions which are, accordingly, dismissed and leave is refused."
25. There are innumerable other reported cases decided by the High Courts of Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta in which the principles laid in Dildar's case have been followed consistently without expressing any doubt. The decisions referred by my learned brother in his judgment, in my humble opinion, neither expressly nor by implication dissented from the view expressed by this Court in Dildar's case. I, therefore, find no good reason to depart from the view expressed by this Court in Dildar's case. I may however, clarify here, as was done by me in Muhammad Hussain's case (supra), that the enunciation of law in Dildar's case is binding only to the extent it stated the principles governing the forfeiture of the amount of a bond by a Court while acting under section 514, Cr.P.C. The extent of imposition of penalty by the Court while forfeiting the bond is however, within the discretion of the Court which has to be exercised keeping in view the circumstances of each case. Therefore, to the extent the amount of bond was ordered to be forfeited by this Court in Dildar's case no binding precedent was created and this part of the judgment in that case is to be read in the context of the facts and circumstances of Dildar's case.
26. In the case before us, the trial Court while ordering forfeiture of a sum of Rs,50,000 out of the bond amount of Rs,2,00,000 observed that the prosecution failed to bring on record any material to show that the respondents stood sureties of the accused in the case for monetary benefit or other gains. The trial Court, therefore, concluded that the respondents stood sureties for the accused on humanitarian grounds, With regard to the second incident which took place after the release of accused in the case, the trial Court observed that the same was committed outside the Court and this was the precise reasons for their disappearance and in these circumstances it was unlikely that their presence could be secured. It may be mentioned here that the present appellant, who is the complainant in the murder case, neither before the trial Court, nor in the memo. Of Criminal revision application filed before the High Court of Balochistan challenging the order of trial Court, nor in the memo. Of appeal before this Court alleged that the respondents had stood sureties in the case for accused person for any monetary benefit or other gains or that the escape of accused persons from the process of law was connived by them. The learned Judge in Chamber in these circumstances, refused to interfere with the discretion exercised by the trial Court in directing forfeiture of only 1/4th portion of the amount of bond executed by respondents.
27. It is a well-settled proposition of law that the discretionary orders passed by lower Courts or Tribunals cannot be interfered with by this Court ordinarily or in routine, unless it is shown that the discretion is exercised by the Courts or Tribunal below arbitrarily or perversely or against the principles laid down by the superior Courts. In the present case the exercise of discretion by the Courts below on the consideration that respondents had stood sureties of the accused only on humanitarian ground and not for any monetary or other benefits and that there was no allegation by the appellant at any stage that the respondents were instrumental or that they connived in the escape of the accused after release on bail by the Court, cannot be described as arbitrary, fanciful or perverse, so as to call for interference by this Court. My learned brother in his opinion has referred to some of the cases in which this Court declined to interfere with the orders of Court below directing forfeiture of entire amount of bond executed by surety in that case. The decisions referred by my learned brother lend support to my conclusion that orders of lower Courts passed in proper exercise of their discretion in keeping with the facts and circumstances of the ease cannot be interfered with by this Court.
28. For the above reasons, I find no merit in the appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
(Sd.)
' SAIDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.
' THIRD OPINION ' KHALIL-UR-REHMAN KHAN, J.--This appeal was referred to me by the Hon'ble Chief Justice under Order XI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 as a result of difference of opinion between the two learned Judges of this Court, Mr.Justice Muhammad Bashir Jehangiri and Mr. Justice Saiduzzaman Siddiqui, for hearing and disposal according to law.
2. The four respondents namely, Malik Amir Jan, Asad Khan, Muhammad Azeem and Dost Muhammad stood sureties for four accused namely, Mirza Khan, Essa Khan, Naseebullah and Abdul Rauf, who were being tried under sections 302, 324, 148 read with sections 149 and 109, P.P.C.
By furnishing surety/bail bonds in the sum of Rs,2,00,000 each. The accused jumped the bail and absconded committing twin murders outside the premises of the Sessions Court on a date fixed for hearing, when they had come to attend the Court in the murder case. Each one of the sureties informed the trial Court about the abscondence of the accused and prayed for passing a lenient order forfeiting the amount of bond up to 25% of the entire amount, with the assertions, inter alia, that their efforts to procure attendance of the accused did not succeed for the reason that the accused had been implicated in the alleged incident which took place outside the Court premises and due to fear of arrest they had disappeared; that the place to which the accused belong is situated in the most disturbed area of gulistan and it is not possible for the respondents herein to procure their attendance; that the respondents herein stood sureties for the accused purely on humanitarian basis and had not gained any monetary benefit by doing so. It was further asserted that the circumstances which led to abscondence of the accused were not within their prior knowledge and were created all of a sudden, and as such there was no occasion of them to withdraw their sureties before their disappearance.
3. Learned Additional Sessions Judge observing that the respondents herein had not stood sureties for the accused for any monetary benefit or any other gain and their contention for furnishing security on humanitarian basis could not be ruled out, directed the forfeiture to the extent of 25% of the total amount of surety bonds. The revision petition filed by the complainant, petitioner herein, for forfeiture of entire amount of bonds was dismissed by a learned Judge in Chambers of High Court observing that the lower Court had exercised the discretion vesting in it under section 514, Cr.P.C. Properly. Leave to appeal was granted to consider:--
(1) Whether the forfeiture of the bonds executed by the respondents to the extent of 25 % was in accordance with law? And
(2) Whether this Court should re-examine the question as to how the respondents, in the circumstances of the case, would have been extended leniency?
4. When the matter came up for hearing in appeal, my learned brother, Muhammad Bashir Jehangiri, J., after noting the relevant facts and the precedents cited before the Court, recorded the conclusion that the order of the trial Court which was affirmed by the learned Judge of the High Court in Revision suffers from serious legal infirmity and cannot be sustained. He, therefore, directed forfeiture of the entire amount of the bail bonds after setting aside the order of the learned trial Court and that of the learned Judge in Chambers of the High Court. The reason given for above conclusion is contained in paragraph 16 of the opinion recorded by him which is reproduced hereunder:-- "Again the discretion in reduction of the amount of the bail bonds to the extent of 1/4th or 1/5th is being taken in routine, although the power of determining the extent to which the penalty should be exacted should be reasonably exercised. In the context of deteriorating law and order situation prevalent in the country, the Courts should be conscious of the hazards of release of accused who are dare devils like those in the present case to the knowledge of the sureties and then let them off at their own behest on forfeiture of mere 25% of the amount of bond. To our surprise, the learned Advocate-general who represented the interest of the State has also not looked into the background of the case in its proper perspective and had supported the impugned orders of the Court also in routine exhibiting dismaying indifference."
5. My other learned brother, the second member of the Bench hearing the appeal, namely, Saiduzzaman Siddiqui J., very ably analysed the cases earlier decided by this Court, particularly Dildar v. The State (PLD 1963 SC 47) and recorded the conclusion that the enunciation of law in Dildar's case is binding only in the cases governing the forfeiture of the amount of bond while acting under section 514, Cr.P.C. The extent of imposition of penalty by the Court while forfeiting the amount of bond is, however, within the discretion of the Court which has to be exercised keeping in view the circumstances of each case and that to the extent the amount of bond is ordered to be forfeited in Didlar's case, no binding precedent was created. My learned brother, Saiduzzaman Siddiqui, J., has also examined the matter of forfeiture of surety bond when an accused jumped the bail bond, in the case Zeeshan Kazmi v. The State (PLD 1997 SC 267) which came for consideration before four learned Judges of this Court including Saiduzzaman Siddiqui, J., where following observation are found recorded in para. 7 with reference to Dildar's case, by Mr. Justice Cornelius, the then Chief Justice:-- "a balance has to be held between undue leniency, which might lead to abuse of the procedure and interference with the course of justice in a large number of cases and on the other hand, undue severity, which might lead to unwillingness on the part of neighbours and friends to come forward."
' These observations were commented upon in this very judgment (Zeeshan Kazmi's case) as under:-- "The above observations were made by Carnelius, C.J. More than three decades ago, since then there has been overall deterioration in all spheres of life. The crime rate has increased manifolds.
The criminal instinct/propensity has penetrated in all walks of life. Some of the personnel of the State functionaries/agencies which are entrusted with the duty to protect the life, property and honour of citizens, either themselves actively participate in the commission of the heinous crimes or they provide protective umbrella to the criminals. Their credibility has been denuded to the extent that the victims of the crimes do not approach them for their help or protection which they are otherwise entitled to as a matter of right under the Constitution."
6. In my view, these observations fully apply to the present case and the question whether the discretion was or was not exercised properly in the instant case may now be considered.
7. The reason given for exercising the discretion was that the respondents herein had not gained any monetary benefit; that the accused disappeared as they feared their arrest on account of the incident of murder in which they were involved; and that accused belonged to a disturbed area, therefore, the respondents herein were not able to procure the presence of the accused. No reason, whatsoever, was, however, stated by the learned counsel of the respondents herein for standing surety of the accused who admittedly belong to disturbed area. The respondents are to be posted with the knowledge that in case the accused for whom they are standing sureties jumped the bail, they will not be able to procure their attendance as they belong to disturbed area while the respondents herein belong to Quetta. Learned counsel was asked to explain the cause or the reason for the respondents standing sureties for such accused who by their conduct are dare devils and have absconded after committing twin murder in the broad day-light out sides the Court premises. No reasonable explanation could be offered. The plea that no monetary gain was involved and they offered security/surety on humanitarian grounds, cannot be accepted as Court was not taken into confidence as regards the essential factual position e.g., cause or reason for furnishing surety on account of long time acquaintance or other relationship, if any, existing between the respondents herein and the accused. The factual foundation of the plea was, thus, not established.
8. It will be noted that such an inquiry, as was made from the learned counsel during the hearing, was also made by the learned Judges in Dildar's case (supra) and on the information given, conclusions were drawn. In the instant case the conclusion that forfeiture of 25% of the amount of surety bonds will serve the ends of justice cannot, therefore, be sustained.
9. For the reasons given above, I agree that forfeiture of the entire amount of bail bonds executed by the respondents herein, as directed by my learned brother, Muhammad Bashir Jehangiri J., is justified. The appeal merits to be accepted and the order of the trial Court as well as of the learned Judge in Chambers of the High Court, are liable to be set aside.
(Sd.)
' KHALIL-UR-REHMAN KHAN, J.
' ORDER OF THE COURT ' By majority view, the appeal is accepted, the orders of the learned trial Court and that of the learned Judge in Chambers of the High Court are set aside and forfeiture of the entire amount of bail bonds executed by respondents No,1 to 4 herein, is hereby ordered.
(Sd.)
' SAIDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.
(Sd.)
' MUHAMMAD BASHIR JEHANgIRI, J.
(Sd.)
(KHALIL-UR-REHMAN KHAN, J.