' MUHAMMAD YUNU.S SURAKHVI, J.---This appeal, by way of leave of the Court, has been directed against the judgment passed by the High Court on 6-2-2001, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant herein was dismissed.
2. The necessary facts, giving rise to the present appeal, are that the appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court claiming therein that respondent No,7 is junior to him and does not possess the required qualification for the post of Joint Director. It is alleged that under the Rules governing the appointment to the post of Joint Director called as AJ&K Small Industries Corporation (Service and Recruitment) Rules, 1993, minimum qualification required for the post of Joint Director is 2nd class Master Degree in Economics/Commerce/Business Administration with 7 years experience, while the contesting respondent is M.Sc. Chemistry having no nexus with the qualification provided for the post. It is further alleged that the respondent has been appointed without considering the appellant and without A.C.Rs, being placed before the Selection Board.
3. The High Court has dismissed the writ petition mainly on the ground that the case of appellant and respondent was placed before the Selection Board. The perusal of minutes of Selection Board reveals that the case of appellant and respondent alongwith others was placed before it and it was considered by the Board. But respondent No,7 was found more eligible for the post of Joint Director on account of which he was so recommended and appointed by the Government. The grievance of appellant that A.C.Rs, were not placed before the Selection Board stands negated by the report of the Selection Board which unequivocally reveals that it has considered the A.C.Rs, put up before it.
4. The dismissal of writ petition by the High Court has been challenged by the appellant through Mr. M. Tabassum Aftab Alvi, Advocate, inter alia on the grounds that in accordance with the provisions of AJ&K Small Industries Corporation (Service and Recruitment) Rules, 1991, amended through Government notification dated 31-1-1993, the requisite qualification for the post of Joint Director in BPS-18 is Master Degree not below 2nd Class in Economics/Commerce/Business Administration with 7 years experience, however the private respondent did not possess any of the abovementioned educational qualification as incorporated in the given statutory rules while the appellant possesses the above qualification who was only officer of the "Corporation in Grade B-17 who possessed requisite qualification as incorporated in the statutory rules. The learned Judge in High Court misread the departmental statutory rules which prescribe only mode of filling the post of Joint Director BPS-18 through promotion on the basis of selection on merit. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that working paper put forward by the respondent-Director makes it clear like crystal that the post of Joint Director BPS-18 is reserved under the statutory rules 100 per cent for promotion. In the given circumstances the findings of the High Court that post of Joint Director B-18 is liable to be filled in firstly on the basis of initial recruitment for which minimum qualification is Master Degree with 7 years experience in Government/Semi-Government Organization and secondly by promotion on merit from amongst the employees of the Department with 7 years service, no such-like mode of initial recruitment is incorporated in the rules as observed by the High Court needing reversal of the impugned judgment. It was also wrongly observed by the High Court that no qualification is prescribed for promotion and the only condition for such promotion is 7 years experience in BPS-17 which is patently incorrect and against the relevant rules. The learned counsel also contended that despite the stay order issued by the High Court the official respondents with mala fide intents and only to give undue benefit to the respondent promoted him as such the order passed by official respondents was based on mala fide. The working paper submitted by the department also shows that the date of initial recruitment of private respondent was 5-6-1985, however, he was admittedly appointed in the Corporation on 25-5-1992. The respondent, Managing Director, forwarded a letter to the Secretary Services stating therein that the old rules of 1991 should be taken into consideration for the reason that the statutory rules of 1993 which stood in the field at the relevant time, provide educational qualification for promotion against the post of Joint Director. The abovementioned document was also. Not taken into consideration while deciding the writ petition. The observation made by the learned Judge that "the appellant has left the Corporation and is no more an employee of the Corporation on account of his seeking the employment in the UNDP is left open to be decided when such a question arises directly against the petitioner" is uncalled for due to the reason that the appellant was serving in UNDP on deputation and his lien was intact in his parent department.
5. Raja Muhammad Hand Khan, the learned counsel for the respondents, conceded on the point that so far as the post of Joint Director is concerned, it is to be filled in by promotion and not on the basis of initial recruitment. He also frankly admitted that the rules applicable to. The case of parties would be the Rules of 1993 and not the Rules of 1991. However, he contended that the only condition provided in the rules of 1993 for promotion on the post of Joint Director is by selection on merit fro amongst the members of service holding posts in BPS-17. The learned counsel emphasized that for promotion, the prerequisite of possessing the necessary qualifications to have Master Degree not below second class in Economics/Commerce/Business Administration with seven years experience on an executive position in Government/Semi-Government Organization or Business Organizations of repute is not necessary. The learned counsel thus submitted that the judgment passed by the High Court suffers from no illegality or infirmity. The leaned counsel also contended that the column wherein the qualifications being M.A. Second Division in Economics/Commerce or Business Administration are concerned, those will apply only when the occasion for the direct recruitment would arise. The learned counsel contended that the appellant on his own choice went on deputation in the department of UNDP and unless he comes back in his own department, he could not have been considered for promotion. The learned counsel placed reliance upon page 489 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services Code written by Mr. Amirullah Khan Mughal, which relates to deputation policy, wherein it is provided in rule IV that if an officer returns. His case will be considered for promotion in the normal course. "If he does not return in response to such intimation, his case will be deferred till he returns to Azad Kashmir on completion of 5 years and earns a confidential report on his work for one full year after resuming duty. If approved for promotion, he will regain his original seniority." The learned counsel thus submitted that the appellant's case even otherwise could not have been considered as at the time of promotion he was not in the service of the Corporation. The learned counsel contended that the respondent being senior most was rightly promoted by the Selection Board and this Court cannot substitute its own view for the view of the Selection Board, as such the writ petition against the decision of the Selection Board was not maintainable.
6. After hearing the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record, it may be stated that the High Court vide the impugned judgment has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant mainly on two-fold reasons which according to our estimation are based on misconception and misconstruction of the relevant rules. The grounds made basis for dismissal of writ petition by the High Court are as under:-
(i) under the rules two modes for appointment are provided, i,e, firstly by initial recruitment for which the minimum qualification is Master's Degree not, below second lass in Economics/Commerce/Business Administration with 7 years experience in Government/Semi- Government Organization etc. And secondly by selection on merit from amongst the employees of the department with 7 years service at their credit in BPS-17: and
(ii) the perusal of the rules reveals that the qualification provided for initial recruitment does not apply for appointment through selection. The only condition for appointment by selection is 7 years experience in BPS-17.
7. The careful perusal of relevant rules which were amended on 31-1-1993 shows that for the post of Joint Director BPS-I8 the appointing authority shall be the Board. The amended rules of 1993 are appended with the memorandum of appeal as Annexure "A", wherein 10 columns have been given.
In Column No,3 the name of post with scale is entered. In Column No,4 the appointing authority has been prescribed. In Column No,5 minimum qualification for appointment by initial recruitment or by transfer is mentioned. Column No,6 relates to promotion while Column No,7 relates to method of recruitment. In the instant case under column No,3 the post of Joint Director BPS-18 is shown whereas in Column No,4 the appointing authority is shown as Board. Under Column No,5 wherein the minimum qualification for appointment by initial recruitment or by transfer is to be shown, is left blank. Under Column No,6, which relates to promotion, the necessary qualification is shown as Master's Degree not below second class in Economics/Cornered/Bunisesss Administration with 7 years experience on an executive position in Government/Semi-Government Organization or business organization of repute. In column of method of recruitment it has been entered as by selection on merit from amongst the members of service holding post in Basic Pay Scale 17. Thus, from the plain reading it becomes abundantly clear that a person who is in possession of qualification of Master Degree not below second class in Economics/Commerce/Business Administration with 7 years experience on an executive position in Government/Semi-Government Organization or Business Organization of repute can be appointed by selection on merit from amongst the members of service holding the post in Basic Pay Scale 17. In our considered view these two provisions are to be read together because if we isolate both the provisions from each other, it would create anomalous situation which should be avoided while interpreting a statue. It is a settled principle of law that in order to interpret the provisions of a statute or rules, the Courts are not supposed to add or subtract anything in the relevant provisions. Even no word can be held to be redundant. Our aforesaid view is further strengthened by the fact that the post in dispute is basically a post for promotion and the same cannot be filled in by initial recruitment as Column No,5 of the rules is blank wherein the title of appointment by initial recruitment or by transfer is mentioned. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents, Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, is that this column has been left blank to be filled in when in future some need for the same arises. The argument, on the face of it, is not tenable as we have to interpret the law and rules as they are and not as they should be. In a case reported as Institute of Engineers. Pakistan Engineering Centre v. Pakistan Engineering Council and another (1996 CLC 129) it was observed that it is well-settled that a statute must be read as a whole and one provision contained therein cannot be interpreted in isolation of the other.
' In a case reported as Fauji Sugar Mills v. Province of Punjab (1996 CLC 592) it was observed that various provisions of section/statute must be interpreted harmoniously to each other and one provision cannot be interpreted in such a manner that the other becomes nugatory.
' In a case reported as The State v. Zahid Nadim and others (1996 M LD 506) it was observed that the Courts are duty bound to interpret different sections in a statute in order to harmonize its various sections and subsections.
' In a case reported as Rafique Akhter Chaudhry v. AJ&K Government (PLD 1982 SC (AJ&K) 124) it was observed that a statute is to be interpreted according to the intent of its maker. The intent could be gathered from looking into documents as a whole. The Court had to interpret law and not to make or correct it. No part or word of a statute could be omitted from consideration while interpreting it. It was further held that if there be conflict in provisions, attempt should be made to harmonize and reconcile every part to make them effective. Where the words used in a statute are of doubtful character, about their meaning the interpretation should be made harmoniously to the language to know the intention of lawmaker and the intention of law-maker has to be gathered from the words used.
8. Even the department was aware of the fact that the post of Joint Director was a selection post and not a post of initial recruitment. In the working paper submitted by the department before the Selection Committee, the letter of Secretary Industries and Commerce unequivocally reveals the title of meeting of Selection Committee to be held for promotion of post of Joint Director. However, it is the case of the appellant that in order to give undue benefit to the contesting respondent, the department wrote to the Selection Committee that instead of amended rules of 1993, the rules of 1991 will apply in the instant case, as in the rules of 1991 the relevant qualifications, i,e, M.A. Second division in Economics/Commerce etc. Have not been provided. This fact also makes the position abundantly clear that the post of Joint Director was to be filled in on the oasis of promotion and not on the basis of initial recruitment.
9. The last contention of Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, the learned counsel for the respondents, is that at the time of selection the appellant was on deputation in the UNDP as such unless he would have come back in his parent department, his case could not have been considered for promotion.
As stated earlier, reliance in this regard was placed at page 489 of the Civil Services Code written by Mr. Amirullah Khan Mughal. The argument, on the face of it, is not tenable for the simple reason that the relevant page, referred to by the learned counsel for the respondents, relates to policy governing civil servants on deputation abroad. It does not deal with those civil servants who are on deputation within Azad Jammu and Kashmir and their lien is intact in their parent department, whereas the learned counsel for the appellant referred to page 482 of the same book which relates to deputation policy within the State, wherein no such embargo, as claimed by the learned counsel for the respondents, has been placed. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is not tenable.
10. Mr. M. Tabassum Aftab Alvi, the learned counsel for the appellant, also submitted that in the working paper submitted before the Selection Committee by the department, the date of appointment of respondent was wrongly shown as 5-6-1985 so that he may be given undue preference in the matter of selection, whereas his date of appointment is admittedly 25-5-1992. By the aforesaid submission, the learned counsel for the appellant wants us to give observation that the contesting respondent in connivance with the department and also due to the law fide intention of the department has secured the illegal promotion. Since the aforesaid point was never argued before the High Court nor it finds mention in the impugned judgment, therefore, the same cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time before this Court. However, it is the duty of the department to incorporate the exact and full particulars of all the contesting civil servants who deserve promotion.
11. It was argued by Raja Muhammad Hand Khan, the learned counsel for the respondents, that both the appellant and contesting respondent were considered by the Selection Committee and the respondent was found more eligible and suitable to be promoted as Joint Director. Therefore, the appellant was not entitled to seek and extraordinary remedy by way of writ petition. This argument is also not tenable as the Selection Committee while selecting the respondent in patent and utter violation of relevant law and the promotion of respondent No,7. In a case titled Qurban Hussain v. Sardar Abdul Latif Khan and another (Civil Appeal No,16 of 1996 decided on 8-6-1996), it was held that the Selection Board travelled beyond its jurisdiction to hold that the respondent was not eligible to be promoted as Assistant Commissioner without having passed the higher standard examination which was not a requirement of the law or the relevant rules; so the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is hereby repelled. The reference may also be made to reported cases titled Munir Hussain Shah v. Secretary Forest Department (1993 PLC (C.S.) 1153) and Ch. Qurban v. Sardar Abdul Latif Khan Chughtai and another (1996 SCR 317).
12. In the light of what has been stated above, we set aside the impugned judgment passed by the High Court and order the acceptance of writ petition filed by the appellant and declare the promotion of respondent No,7 as null and void as a Joint Director, Azad Kashmir Small Industries Corporation Muzaffarabad. A direction is issued to the official respondents that the case of appellant and others who fulfil the requisite qualifications and merit may be sent to the Selection Committee/Board for promotion on the post of Joint Director. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.