' This appeal is directed against the order, dated 20th June, 1983 passed by the learned Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Quetta in Eviction Application No. 19/81 dismissing the appellant's application for ejectment for want of proof of relationship, which was filed on the ground of personal requirement and default. The brief facts leading to the filing of the above appeal are that the appellant filed the above application avering therein that he was landlord and that the respondent No. 1 was his tenant in respect of the shop in dispute and that he had been receiving rent from the first respondent for the last so many years. It was also averred that the above respondent failed to pay rent from September, 1979 to January, 1981. It was further averred that the appellant required the shop in good faith for his own use. The above application was resisted by the respondents. It was, inter alia, pleaded that the appellant was neither the owner of the property in dispute, nor he was landlord within the meaning of Baluchistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Ordinance'). It was further averred that after the death of deceased landlord Haji Muhammad Akbar, his heirs and legal representatives did not serve the respondent No. 1 with a notice under section 13 (A) and that the respondents Nos. 3 to 5 had no concern with the shop.
' The learned Rent Controller on the basis of the pleading of the parties framed the following two issues:-
(1) "Whether there exists any relationship of landlord and tenants between the applicant and respondents?
(2) Whether notice under section 13-A of Ordinance VI of 1959 was not given to the respondent, if so to what effect?
2. The appellant in support of the above application examined himself and his father Abdul Ghaffar, the attorney of the owners Khor Jan, Bibi Sabira, Bibi Haleema and Mumtaz Begum, whereas the respondent No. 1 examined himself and four witnesses. The learned Rent Controller after hearing the parties, by his order under the rent application on the ground that he was not the owner of the shop and that he was merely a Rent Collector. The appellant being aggrieved by the above order has filed the present appeal.
3. In support of the above appeal, Mr. Azizullah Memon, learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently urged that since the appellant was entitled to receive the rent, he was landlord within the meaning of section 2 (c) of the 'Ordinance'.
' On the other hand, Mr. Ehsanul Haq, learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 1 and 3 to 5 has contended that since admittedly the appellant is not the owner of the shop and admittedly he is not entitled to receive the rent the finding of the Rent Controller is in consonance with law.
' Mr. Azizullah Memon in furtherance of his above submission has referred to the definition of the word 'landlord' given in clause (c) of section 2 of the 'Ordinance' which reads as follows:- "(c) 'Landlord' means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf or for the benefit of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person, and includes a tenant who subjects any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised and every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord."
It may be noticed that under the above quoted definition of the term 'Landlord' any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behlaf or for the benefit of any other person or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person, is a 'landlord'. It may further be noticed that even a tenant is included within the definition of 'Landlord' who lets out with the permission of the landlord.
' Mr. Azizullah Memon, learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the following cases in furtherance of his above submission:-
(i) Muhammad Sharif v. Sh. Muhammad Amin PLD 1977 Lah. 516, in which Muhammad Afzal Zullah, J (as his Lordship then was) after quoting the above definition of the term 'Landlord' observed as follows:- "It is obvious that the expression on behalf or for the benefit of are very wide. There is no such rider in the statute that the entitlement of any person to receive rent on behalf of another person should be based on any writing. It is necessary to point out that wherever formalisation through writing was felt necessary by the law-maker, it was so provided. In section 2(i) definition of ('tenant') it is provided that a person placed in occupation of a property by its tenant unless with the consent in writing of the landlord... would not be included in the definition of 'tenant'. It is also to be observed that while the extended phrases used in the definition of 'tenant' go upto the limit of including a person by or on whose account rent is payable for a property in this category the provision in the definition of 'landlord' has gone further to include the extending provision, namely, whether on his own account or on behalf or for the benefit of any other person The case-law shows that this provision has been given wide interpretation and sometimes even servants receiving rent on behalf of landlords and owners have been treated as landlords by virtue of the definition. It is accordingly held that the respondent, by virtue of the definition, has rightly been treated as landlord and the question of relationship of landlord and tenant has correctly been determined."
' In the above case, the respondent/landlord was the husband of the owners of the property who had been realising the rent from the appellant/tenant for a number of years and used to issue rent receipts on behalf of his wife, but subsequently he started issuing receipts in his own name. It was held that 'he was a landlord within the meaning of above clause (c) of section 2 of the 'Ordinance'.
(ii) M. Yaqoob v. Ch. Barkat All 1982 CLC 500. In this case, the respondent who owned 5/12 share of the shop and in whose favour the appellant executed rent notes and paid rent from February, 1961 to April, 1966, filed the ejectment case. It was contended by the tenant that he was not the landlord.
A learned Single. Judge of the Lahore High Court held that in terms of section 2 (c) of the 'Ordinance', a landlord means any person entitled to claim rent in respect of any building whether on his own or on behalf of any other person and that the person claiming rent may not necessarily be owner of the property.
(iii) Muhammad Ali v. Haji Abdul Rehman and others 1980 SCMR 29, in which the Honourable Supreme Court while dismissing a petition for leave against the judgment of the High Court of Baluchistan observed as follows on the question of definition of the landlord given in section 2 (c) of the Ordinance:- "The first point raised by the learned counsel regarding the bona fide requirement stands concluded by the finding of fact by two learned Courts below, and no justification has been shown to disturb the same. Regarding the second point which undoubtedly is a technical one, it needs to be observed that in addition to the considerations which weighed with the learned lower appellate Courts, it cannot be ignored that the definition of landlord contained in section 2(c) of the Ordinance is very wide. An owner who is entitled to receive rent would undoubtedly be a landlord under the said Ordinance, but a person mentioned in the definition who is competent to receive rent on behalf or for the benefit of the afore mentioned landlord would also be the landlord."
4. On the other hand, Mr. Ehsanul Haq, learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 1 and 3 to 5 has referred to the following cases in furtherance of his submission:-
(i) Muhammad Israil Biswa s v. Amrita Lal Chowdhury PLD 1961 Dacca, 25 in which Hamoodur Rahman, J (as his Lordship then was) while construing section 2 (4) of the East Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1953, which defined the term 'landlord' arid which was couched in more or less in the same words, which are employed in section 2(c) of the 'Ordinance' with reference to section 17 of the said Act, held that an attorney was not entitled to file an application for ejectment on the ground of personal requirement and observed as follows:- "Again by subsection (4) of section 17 of the said Act, it is provided that, if the premises are not occupied by the landlord or such person within two months of the date of the vacating of the premises by the previous tenant, then the Rent Controller may on the application of the previous tenant, restore possession of the premises to him. This rather seems to indicate that in section 17 of the said Act, the word 'Landlord has been used in its ordinarily accepted sense as the owner of the premises or the person entitled to receive the rent from the tenant and not to include persons receiving rent on behalf of such a person. Indeed if the occupation of this wide class of persons is to be held to be a sufficiently valid and bona fide requirement for evicting a tenant, then even a Rent Collector may wellcome within this category, for, he would also be a person receiving the rent of any premises on behalf of his employer landlord and for the benefit of that landlord and would thus be a landlord within the definition clause. This would be giving an absurd interpretation to clause (c) of the proviso to section 17(1) of the Act. In the circumstances, I am of the opinion that the use or occupation of a constituted attorney is not a use or occupation which can be considered to be a sufficiently bona fide requirement for the purpose of evicting a tenant."
(ii) Mst. Razia Butt v. Ghulam Raze PLD 1979 Quetta 157. In the above case, the appellant was inducted into the disputed premises as a tenant by late Wali Muhammad in 1969. She continued to pay the rent during his life time but after his death, dispute arose as to the person entitled to receive rent. The respondent claimed that the property had devolved on him as the son of the deceased landlord and, therefore, was entitled to receive rent and factually received the rent for sometime, but the appellant stopped the payment of rent after receiving a notice from the widow.
Thereupon the respondent filed ejectment application which was allowed. Upon appeal, this Court allowed the appeal. M.A. Rashid, J. (as his Lordship then was) while commenting upon the definition of the 'landlord' given in section 2 (c) observed as follows:- "According to this definition it is not necessary that the landlord should also be the owner of the property. Persons other than owners can also become landlords in terms of Ordinance. But the criterion is that such persons should be entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land, either on his own account or in behalf or for the benefit of any other person. Mr. Munawar Ahmed Mirza, the learned counsel for the appellant, has laid great stress on the word 'entitled' used in the definition of the term 'landlord'."
(iii) Dr. Burjor N. Anklesaria v. Mrs. Zenobia and another 1982 SCM R 98. In this case, the property was owned by one Mrs. Jerbai M. Kandawala and her son Mr. Bejon M. Kandawala. The petitioner was the tenant. Mr. Bejon M. Kandawala used to receive the rent but after the death of Mrs. Jerbai M.
Kandawala, the respondents by a notice informed the petitioner that they had become the owners by virtue of inheritance from their grandmother Mrs. Jerbai M. Kandawala and by way of gift by their father Mr. Bejon M. Kandawala which position was confirmed by the latter in writing to the petitioner. The respondents filed ejectment case as rent was not paid. The petitioner denied the relationship but this question was decided by the learned Rent Controller in favour of the respondents and the ejectment order was passed. Upon appeal, learned Additional District Judge maintained the finding on the question of relationship but remanded the case to the Rent Controller for deciding the case on merits. The above judgment was maintained by the High Court, against which, a petition for leave was filed which was dismissed and while dismissing the petition for leave, it was observed by the Honourable Supreme Court that according to the above definition of the word 'landlord' even a person for the time being entitled to receive the rent in respect of any building is a landlord for the purpose of the Ordinance in question and consequently, on the basis of the notice issued by the respondents and confirmed by their father Mr. Bejon M. Kandawala, the respondents could be defined to be the landlords.
5. After having dealt with the above case law, I may advert to the evidence brought on record. It is an admitted position that after the death of Muhammad Akbar, the shop in dispute is owned by the aforesaid four ladies, namely Khor Jan, Bibi Sabira, Bibi Haleema and Mumtaz Begum. It has not come on record what is the relationship of the appellant with the above ladies. It has also come on record that Abdul Ghaffar is the Attorney of the above four ladies. He has deposed that the above four ladies had permitted the appellant to collect the rent and that the appellant had factually collected the rent for the period from August, 1978 to August, 1979. The appellant has produced the alleged counterfoils of the rent receipts for the alleged period allegedly issued by him to the respondents (Exhs. A/I to 9). Abdul Chaffer has produced the Power-of-Attorney as Exh. A/I-A dated 20th May, 1975.
On the other hand, the respondents and their witnesses have deposed that the rent used to be paid by the respondents to the women folk at the house of deceased landlord Muhammad Akbar, The rent for the period subsequent to August, 1979 has been deposited by the respondents in Court.
6. The question in issue is, as to whether the appellant has been able to establish that he is entitled to receive the rent from the respondents in terms of section 2 (c) of the 'Ordinance'. It may be pointed out that at the time when the appellant was examined by the Rent Controller on 21-10-1982, he had given his age as about 22 years. In other words, he was about 19 years of age at the time when he had allegedly collected the rent. Earring the above counterfoils which are loose and not form part of any rent receipt book and the statement of the Attorney who is father of the appellant, there is no other evidence to establish that the appellant was authorised by the landladies to collect rent or that at any point of time the respondents had paid the rent to him. In the rent application, it was not disclosed as to who was the owner of the shop. It was averred, as pointed out, that the appellant had been receiving the rent for the last so many years which averment seems to be not true as according to the above counterfoils, the appellant had allegedly received the rent only for 13 months. The rent application was filed on 2 grounds, namely personal requirement and default. A Rent Collector having no personal interest in the property i.e. the subject-matter of the tenancy, in my view is not entitled to maintain an application for ejectment on the ground of his personal requirement. Furthermore, the question, whether factually the appellant had recovered the rent for the above period of 13 months and if so, in what capacity is also not free from doubt. Since the fact that the appellant was entitled to receive rent from the respondents, has not been established, in my view, the order of the Rent Controller under appeal, does not call for any interference. It is not understandable as, to why the rent application was not filed in the names of the landladies.
' It may be pertinent to refer to the latest judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Province of Punjab through the Secretary Education and another v. Mufti Abdul Ghani PLD 1985 SC 1 (January part), in which it was held that if a landlord basis his claim on right to receive the rent on account of ownership of the property he will have to satisfy the Rent Controller on the question of title. In the present case, the appellant has not claimed the rent on the basis of his title, but what has been pleaded by him in the rent application, is that he had recovered rent from the respondent No. 1 since last so many years.
7. In my view, the ratio decidendi of the cases relied upon by Mr. Azizullah Memon, learned counsel for the appellant seems to be that if a tenant has admittedly paid rent to a person other than the owner of the property for certain period immediately preceding to the filing of ejectment application or had executed rent notice in his favour entitling him to receive rent, he may maintain an ejectment application. In all the above cited cases the applicant who had filed ejectment application was closely related to the owner of the property. In the present case, as observed hereinabove, it has not even been brought on record what was the relationship between the appellant and the above four landladies.
' For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is dismissed with no orders as to cost.