1. The respondent No,2 is the landlord of shop built on Plot No,R-155/17, Sammanabad, Karachi. The petitioner is the tenant of the said shop on a monthly rent of Rs,300 and is doing business by the name of Shakeel Studio. The premises was let out by the respondent No,2 to the petitioner in 1978.
2. The respondent has retired from employment w.e.f, 15-12-1997 and served a notice dated 30-4- 1998 under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 on the petitioner stating that the premises in occupation of the petitioner is required by the respondent No,2 for his own business purposes. The petitioner through his letter dated 20-5-1998 replied to the said notice and refused to vacate the premises. The respondent No,2 thereupon filed application under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 seeking ejectment of the petitioner from the said shop on the ground that the premises is required by him to establish his own business. The petitioner contested the Rent case and filed his written statement. Respondent No,2 filed his affidavit-in- evidence and he was cross-examined by the Advocate for the petitioner. The respondent No,2 produced one more witness Muhammad Abdul whose examination-in-chief was recorded by the Rent Controller and was cross-examined by Advocate for the petitioner. The petitioner filed three affidavits-in-evidence one of himself and other two of Maqbool Ahmed Siddiqui and Muhammad Zafar. All three were cross-examined by the Advocate for the respondent No,2. After hearing the Advocate of the parties, the learned III-Senior Civil Judge and Controller Karachi Central passed order dated 20-1-2000 by which the ejectment application was allowed and petitioner was directed to hand over possession of the premises to the respondent No,2 within 60 days. Against this older, the petitioner filed F.R.A. No,214 of 2000 in this Court. Upon amendment of the S.R.P.O., 1979 the appeal was transferred to the Court of IV-Additional District Judge, Karachi Central where it was allotted new F.R.A. No,200 of 2001. The learned Appellate Court after hearing the Advocates of the parties has passed the judgment dated 5-2-2002 by which the appeal was dismissed. The tenant has now filed this Constitution petition.
3. I have heard the arguments of Hafiz Abdul Baqi, learned counsel for the petitioner and of Mr. Shabbir Ahmed Shaikh, learned counsel for the respondent No,2 and have gone through the record.
4. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that application under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 was without jurisdiction inasmuch as the respondent No,2 has not retired from service but was relieved from the service under Golden Shake Hand Scheme which is not a retirement. He has further contended that the respondent No,2 has rented out one shop in the plot in question during the pendency of this rent case and also acquired possession of another premises being Plot No,R-748, Sector 15-A/5, Bufferzone, North Karachi, Karachi and contended that there was no bona fide requirement of the premises in question by the respondent No,2. He has relied upon the case of Ikhtiar Ahmed v. Qalandar Bux (1988 CLC 1720); Mirza Muhammad Suleman & Sons v. Muhammad Yahya (1987 MLD 2125); Shahid Nadeem v.
5. Muhammad Shafi (2000 SCMR 524); Abid Masood v. Dilshand Khan (1995 SCMR 146) and Muhammad Umar v. Muhammad Qasim (1991 SCMR 1232). Learned counsel for the respondent No,2 has argued that term "retired" in section 14 of the. Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 has not been defined and the termination of employment of respondent No,2 by way of Golden Hand Shake Scheme will come within the ambit of the term 'retired'. He further contended that the respondent No,2 has not let out any shop during the pendency of the case and the plot of Bufferzone is not a shop and was not suitable for the requirement of the respondent No,2. He has relied upon the case of Abdul Ghaffar v. Mustafa Khan (PLD 1981 Karachi 56); S. Moinul Hassan v.
6. A.H. Junaid (1985 CLC 882); Abdul Majeed v. Mst. Naimunnissa Begum (PLD 1981 SC 118); Abubakar v.
7. Abdul Haleem (PLD 1991 SC 302); Syed Mujtaba Hussain Abidi v. Ferozuddin Zakai (PLD 1985 Karachi 663); Matloob v. Mst. Saeeda Khatoon (1988 SCMR 1575); Trinity Private School v. Mumtaz H.
8. Hidayatullah (1987 SCMR 494); Arshad Ameen v. M/s. Swiss Bakery (1993 SCMR 216); Muhammad Sharif v. Muhammad Afzal Sohail (PLD 1981 SC 246) and Muhammad Yousaf v. Muhammad Sarfraz Cheema (PLD 1987 SC 20). It is an admitted position that the respondent No,2 was relieved from employment on 15-12-1987 of the State Bank of Pakistan under Golden Hand Shake Scheme. The question is whether such relieving of the respondent No,2 from the employment of State Bank of Pakistan will come within the purview of the term "retired" as contained in section 14 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. Subsection (1) of section 14 is as follows:-- "14. Delivery of vacant possession.-- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Ordinance or any other law for the time being in force, the landlord of a building who is a widow, or a minor whose both parents are dead or a salaried employee due to retire within the next six months or has retired or a person who is due to attain the age of sixty years within the next six months or has attained the age of sixty years, may, by notice in writing, inform the tenant that he or 'she needs the building for personal use and require him to deliver vacant possession of the building within such time as may be specified in the notice, not being earlier than two months from the receipt thereof." 'The term 'retired' as is used in this provision is not defined in the Ordinance itself. However, it is noted that the term 'retired' is used independent of age. The age of 60 years has been separately made a ground for seeking delivery of the possession of the premises . Therefore, the term 'retired' as is used in this provision has to be interpreted in its ordinary sense. This aspect of the matter has been considered in the previous cases and in the case of Abdul Ghaffar (supra) Division Bench of this Court has made the following observation: -- "The words 'retirement' or 'removal' are not defined and they have not been used in the Ordinance in any technical sense. They have to be understood in their ordinary meanings, for it is the first and most elementary rule on construction that is to be assumed that the words and phrases of technical legislation are based in their technical meaning if they have acquired, one, otherwise they have to be construed in their ordinary meaning, as given in the dictionaries. (See Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition, page 28).
9. We would, therefore, consider the meanings of the words "retirement", "resignation" as given in the dictionaries.
10. According to Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol.77, pages 329 and 330, the word 'retire' means to separate, or withdraw, Reliance is placed therein on State ex rel Herman v. City of Grand Island (15 NW 2d. 341), State v. Love (145 NW 1020). It also means to withdraw from office, public station, business or that like; to withdraw from active service. 'Retirement' means; the act of retiring, or state of being retired, Mass Fenny'v. Metropolitan Life Inc. Co. (159 NE, 608, 610, 262, Mass 238), voluntary withdrawal", (underlining is ours for emphasis (sic)). Mass Brown v. Little Brown & Co. Inc. (168, NE, 521, 526, 269, Mass 102). The word ' withdraw' is synonym with the word 'resign'. Reliance is placed therein on N.Y. People v. Metropolitan District Police Board (26 Barb, 487, 500, 501). According to the Words and Pharases (Permanent Edition), Vol. 37-A, page 204, the words, "quit", "resign", "separate" or "withdraw" and "retire" as synonymous with "elect to retire" as used in firemen's pension law, State ex rel. Herman v. City of Grand Island. According to the same dictionary p.473, the word "resign" means to give up, surrender by formal Act, yield, relinquish, given up one's office or position, or withdraw from (underlining" is our for emphasis (sic)). Renounce". Reliance is placed therein on Bigger v. Unemployment Compensation Commission.
11. ' According to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 3rd (1975) Edition, Vol, page 1815, the word ' retire' means "to withdraw from an office or official position, to give up one's business or occupation in order to enjoy". According to this dictionary the word 'resign' means to give up an office or position; to retire (underlining is our for emphasis (sic)), to abdicate, to submit or yield, to a person or thing.
12. It is, therefore, clear that a person could retire from service by voluntarily submitting his resignation and it is not necessary that a person could retire or be retired on superannuation only.
13. In the case of S. Moinul Hassan (supra) as learned Single Judge of this at page 891 of the reported judgment has made the following observation:-- "The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the retirement has been manipulated and obtained voluntarily. Assuming it to be so, it should not make any difference so far as his need is concerned once it is proved that the employment has ended and .the respondent is no more in service. It remains immaterial whether his service was terminated by the employer or the termination was brought about at his own request. Section 14(1) cannot be burdened with 'additional requirement that the retirement of the salaried employee should be a forced retirement and not one obtained at the request of the employee. There may be cases where an employee, on account of indifferent health or other domestic problems may choose to retire and give up the employment and thus falling in need of his own house for his personal use."
14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the case of Ikhtiar Ahmed (supra) in which the facts and circumstances were completely different inasmuch as the question involved in that case was whether a person who purchases the property after his retirement can avail of the benefit of section 14. In the above quoted portion of the Division Bench judgment of this Court, the case was of voluntary resignation and it was held that the person could retire from service by voluntary resignation and it is not necessary that a person should retire or be retired on superannuation only.
15. Thus the landlord whose employment terminated by voluntary resignation was held to have retired and his application under section 14 of the Ordinance was held to be competent. Again the case of S. Moinul Hassan (supra) also pertained to voluntary retirement and it was held that the term 'retired' as used in subsection (1) of section 14 cannot be C restricted to retirement on attaining of superannuation age only. Thus in the two reported cases of this Court it has been held that voluntary resignation and voluntary retirement comes within the purview of the term 'retired' as used in subsection (1) of section 14 of the Ordinance and its benefit has been extended to such landlords. Now we come to consider whether the benefit of subsection (1) of section 14 will be extended to persons who are relieved from employment by way of Golden Hand Shake Scheme.
16. Golden Hand Shake Scheme is a recent phenomena which is adverted to by the employers as a measure of reorganization of its establishment by which the employer seeks reduction in number of employees in its employment by voluntary means. In doing so, the employer offers to its employees special separation package containing benefits and emoluments attractive enough for an employee to avail the same and to give up remaining period of his employment with the employer. Employee who opts under the scheme voluntarily resigns from employment. On acceptance of the option and on relieving, the contract of employment between employer and employee terminates. Thus the termination of contract of employment under Golden Hand Shake Scheme is voluntary resignation from employment by the employee. Its end result is that the employee ceases to remain in employment. The provision of subsection (1) of section 14 of the Ordinance having been held to apply to the cases of voluntary resignation particularly in the case of Abdul Ghaffar (supra) a judgment of Division Bench of this Court, in my view, the same will have application to the case of the respondent No,2. I therefore, find that the application of the respondent No,2 before the Rent Controller under section 14 (1) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 was maintainable.
17. As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent No,2 was in occupation of Plot No,R-748, Sector 15-A-5, Bufferzone, North Karachi, Karachi. Learned counsel for the respondent No,2 has stated that this property comprised of an open plot of land in which there is a small room and it was being used as motor garage and is not of the same type as is in occupation of the petitioner which is a shop. He has contended that the respondent No,2 is entitled to the possession of the premises asked for by the respondent No, 2 in his application under section 14 of the Ordinance and has referred to the case of Abdul Majeed (supra) wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the reported judgment at page 119 has held as follows:-- "To our mind subsection (2) of section 14 cannot be read in isolation from subsection (1) for there has to be a nexus between the personal use for which the eviction is sought, and the premises said to be owned and possessed by the landlord in any locality referred to in subsection (2). The wide meaning sought to be put by the learned counsel to subsection (2) would negate the very intent of the Legislature which is to give the benefit to certain class. of persons to obtain summary eviction for personal use only if the other building owned by the landlord was in fact not put to such use or capable of being put to such use for which eviction is sought, the existence of such other building would be irrelevant for the purpose of subsection (1) of section 14." As regards the petitioner counsel contention that the respondent No,2 has rented out the premises of shop to Muhammad Abdul, it is found that such premises was rented out by the respondent No,2 to the tenant Muhammad Abdul vide agreement dated 1-11-1993 Exh.A/4 for the purpose of running of business of Arif Atta Chakki for a period of two years. On expiry of this agreement, another agreement dated 1-1-1997 Exh.A/5 was signed between the respondent No,2 and the said Muhammad Abdul for a period of one year and on its expiry another agreement dated 10-9-1998 Exh.A/6 was signed. Thus at the time when rent case was filed the shop was in occupation of the tenant Muhammad Abdul and it continued to remain in his occupation.
18. Extending period of tenancy by entering into fresh agreement will not amount to fresh tenancy. On examination of the definition of the term 'tenant' as given in the Ordinance it is clear that person who continues to be in possession or occupation of the premises after termination of tenancy remains a tenant. In the present case the respondent No,2 by entering into fresh agreement with Muhammad Abdul did not create fresh tenancy but merely continued already existing tenancy by altering some terms and conditions. Thus it is clear that the respondent No,2 did not get possession of the 'shop from Muhammad Abdul and let out the same to him again.
19. Accordingly, I find that both the Rent Controller as well as Appellate Court has examined the evidence and has passed a well considered order and the petitioner has not been able to point out any illegality in them, I therefore, uphold the impugned judgment and dismiss this petition.